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ac know ledg ments
A proj ect that aims to rethink the origins of New World nations in a context 
of global transformations and that mobilizes diverse scholars over several years 
creates  great debts that can never be fully recognized and acknowledged. My 
deepest debt, as stated in the dedication, is to the participant authors. In ad-
dition, Jonathan Brown joined us in our conversations at Georgetown and 
lasa San Francisco, sharing an economic perspective and a view from Buenos 
Aires that broadened our thinking. John McNeill was a key discussant at 
Georgetown— and read so many versions of my introduction and chapter  1 
that I worry that he deserves coauthor credit. He made me become clearer— 
even when he does not share all my emphases.
Among our authors, David Sartorius began as a discussant at Georgetown 
and the strength of his understanding led the group to decide we needed him 
to write a chapter on Cuba. Jordana Dym argued that we needed to balance 
my opening emphasis on economic change with a chapter on transatlantic His-
panic politics— leading to the recruitment of Roberto Breña to join our com-
munity and write chapter 2. Adam Rothman read my contributions from a U.S. 
perspective, helping me see across borders and making me get clearer. Erick 
Langer generated the key ideas that we developed together in the epilogue— 
helping our volume look beyond 1870.
At Georgetown, the sponsorship and support of the Amer i cas Initiative has 
been crucial. It was founded and funded by Dean of College Jane McAuliffe, 
who challenged us to look at key questions across borders and across the hemi-
sphere. Dean Chet Gillis has kept us  going through sometimes trying times. 
Evan Chernack, a student of Latin Ame rica in the world, volunteered to help 
finalize the manuscript. Most essentially, Kathy Gallagher has managed the ini-
tiative from its founding in 2006. She or ga nized our gatherings and worked 
through funding challenges that made this proj ect pos si ble from first imagining 
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to final publication. It is fitting that I write this on the same day that my wife 
Jane and I take Kathy to dinner to lament and celebrate her retirement. The 
Amer i cas Initiative flourished for a de cade thanks to her effective efforts and 
constant cheer; it  will not be the same without her— though we  will find a way 
to carry on.
Once again, Bill Nelson has produced maps with skill (and his good cheer)— 
this time with the added challenge of working with multiple chapter authors. 
His work makes our books better.
And it has been a plea sure to work again with Duke University Press. My 
first inquiry about New Countries proved to be my last formal correspondence 
with Valerie Milholland, on the eve of her retirement. She wisely passed the 
proj ect on to Gisela Fosado, who saw potential in the volume, found readers 
that made us get better in many ways, and now leads us into production. I and 
many of the chapter authors previously worked with Valerie and Duke; we are 
pleased and honored to join Gisela as she keeps Duke’s innovative and critical 
vision of the Amer i cas alive.
From 1500 to 1800, the Amer i cas  were a key part of a world of empires and 
global trades.1 In the 1780s, New Spain drove silver production to new heights, 
concentrating wealth in Mexico City, by far the hemi sphere’s leading center 
of population and power. In the same de cade, French Saint Domingue led the 
Atlantic world in sugar production and the concentration of enslaved laborers. 
Meanwhile, a fledgling United States was escaping British rule, building a re-
publican polity, and searching for commercial prosperity— its  free  people 
enjoying solid well- being while a large enslaved minority saw bondage confirmed 
in a new constitution.
By 1850, the United States, having just claimed in war vast territories long 
tied to New Spain and then Mexico, was driving  toward continental hege-
mony: southern cotton growers worked slave laborers to supply British mills 
that ruled a new industrial world economy; New  Eng land mills competed to 
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profit in that economy; and  free settlers drove commercial farming across a vast 
Mississippi basin into lands taken from displaced native  peoples. At the same 
time, Mexico, its once dynamic silver economy fallen in the face of war and 
insurgency  after 1810, faced endemic po liti cal conflicts while it searched for a 
new economy in a shrunken territory. And Haiti, built by revolutionary slaves 
in once rich Saint Domingue, consolidated a society of  family cultivation and 
limited exports— excluded from the new global industrial economy. All would 
face po liti cal conflicts in the de cades to come. But in the United States, Civil 
War led to an expansive prosperity; for Mexico, Reform Wars led to growing 
dependence on U.S. capital and markets; and in Haiti, internal conflicts came 
with continuing poverty and commercial exclusion.
The dramatic changes that marked the emergence of the United States, 
Mexico, and Haiti as nations only begin to illustrate the depth and complex-
ity of the larger and more diverse transformations that created new countries 
across the Amer i cas during the de cades  after 1770.  After centuries in which Eu-
ro pean monarchs claimed sovereignty, diverse Christianities  shaped the lives 
of the power ful, the colonized, and the enslaved, and dynamic trades led by 
Spanish American silver and Atlantic sugar and slavery made the hemi sphere 
central to global trades— every thing seemed to change, creatively for some, 
destructively for  others.
During the  century  after 1750  people across the Amer i cas fought and 
negotiated, traded and labored to forge new polities and new economies— 
thus new countries. In some regions, insurrectionary movements forced new 
social relations: in Haiti, where revolutionary slaves ended slavery and took 
the land; in core regions of Mexico, where insurgent communities took new 
control of production; in diverse other places where indigenous  peoples found 
new autonomies as nations strug gled to find po liti cal stability and commercial 
prosperity. Elsewhere, old social relations endured: in expansions of slave  labor 
in Brazil, Cuba, and the U.S. South; in continuing po liti cal exclusions of many 
native  peoples across the hemi sphere. Diverse  peoples came out of old empires 
in unimagined ways. They built states with new bound aries, new citizenships, 
new social relationships, and new ways of production.
While making new countries, the  people of the Amer i cas saw their his-
tories diverge in many ways. Many founded republics, yet Brazil became an 
empire and Cuba remained a colony. Some former colonies joined together 
to become United States;  others fragmented into small nations, as in Central 
Ame rica. And while forging such diversity, the new countries of the Amer i cas 
stayed tied to a rapidly changing world economy. They emerged during the rise 
of a new industrial capitalism forged in  Eng land  after 1800 and soon replicated 
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in the northeastern United States. The rest of the Amer i cas adapted. Some 
prospered while many strug gled.
The aims and uncertainties of nation making are central concerns of  every 
national history.2 In this volume we analyze the emergence of nations (and 
Cuba’s colonial per sis tence) across the hemi sphere in the light of changing 
global relationships. Too often, the conflicts that led to the new American nations 
and the innovations that generated the British industrial revolution appear as 
simultaneous but separate— the definition of historical coincidence. We see 
them as simultaneous and inseparable. The Amer i cas played key roles in the 
Atlantic conflicts that led to new nations and in the global transformation that 
led to industrial capitalism. We explore how New World  peoples both joined 
in and adapted to key changes in the world economy  after 1780, how they 
engaged in forging liberal and republican polities, and how eight new coun-
tries navigated times of conflictive change: four coming out of Atlantic slave 
colonies— the United States, Haiti, Cuba (a new country even as it remained a 
colony), and Brazil; four built in Spanish American socie ties with indigenous 
majorities— Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia. We aim to understand how 
new countries emerged and how they diverged while industrial capitalism  rose 
to shape the nineteenth- century world.
In Search of an Integrated History
Too often, all this has been studied separately. Yet the founding dynamism of 
the early American silver and sugar economies, the late eighteenth- century 
challenges of war and po liti cal innovation, the revolutionary destruction of key 
colonies,3 and the strug gles to build nations in a changing global economy 
demand integrated analy sis if we are to understand the transformation of the 
Amer i cas  after 1750— and how conflicts  there contributed to the rise of British 
and  later U.S. industrial capitalism.4
It is a tall order, of course, to integrate the global and the local, the eco-
nomic and the po liti cal, along with social conflicts and cultural debates and 
innovations— across a diverse hemi sphere.  There have been illuminating at-
tempts: In his classic study of The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826, 
John Lynch linked hemispheric po liti cal pro cesses and local conflicts in a work 
that included most of the continent and the majority of its  peoples— those 
subject to Spanish sovereignty in 1800.5 Robin Blackburn soon followed with 
the Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848, analyzing one pervasive conflict 
central to the era of in de pen dence across the continent.6 Lester Langley took on 
the entire hemi sphere in his ambitious The Amer i cas in the Age of Revolution, 
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1750–1850.7 Recently, in Empires of the Atlantic World, J. H. Elliott compared 
key regions of Spanish and British Ame rica from their colonial origins through 
in de pen dence,8 and Jeremy Adelman offered Sovereignty and Revolution in the 
Iberian Atlantic, engaging Spanish and Portuguese South Ame rica from Carta-
gena to Buenos Aires.9 All make impor tant contributions: Lynch by emphasizing 
the local complexities of the Spanish American conflicts; Blackburn by focus-
ing us on the breadth and complexity of the prob lem of slavery; Langley by 
demonstrating the necessity of a hemispheric analy sis; Elliott by insisting on a 
comparative vision set in a long historical perspective; Adelman by emphasizing 
that within Spanish and Portuguese domains imperial breakdown preceded 
the contested emergence of national goals and states.
Still, all remain limited: Lynch brought his regionally grounded and mostly 
po liti cal vision only to Spanish Ame rica; Blackburn emphasized the demise 
of slavery, downplaying its power ful expansions in nineteenth- century Brazil, 
Cuba, and the United States; Langley understood Spanish American economic 
systems and po liti cal pro cesses but partially; Elliott compared the mainland 
colonies of Spanish and British Ame rica— the former pivotal, the latter second-
ary to the eighteenth- century world— leaving key Ca rib bean plantation regions 
aside; and Adelman remained in Atlantic South Ame rica, leaving  others 
to integrate the often- conflictive Ca rib bean, Andean, and Mexican– Central 
American sequences. The search for an integrated vision of the transformation 
the Amer i cas from 1750 to 1870 remains a challenge.
In recent years, the challenge has become more complex. Three key histori-
cal advances have illuminated and complicated analy sis of an era too long seen 
 either as an Age of Revolution or the Era of In de pen dence: First, a turn to a 
global view of history combined with a rethinking of the trajectory of the global 
economy have combined to emphasize the centrality of Asia around 1500, the 
importance of the Amer i cas in global trades from the sixteenth  century, and 
the late rise of a Eu ro pean hegemony that only consolidated  after 1800. Sec-
ond, new understandings of the Haitian Revolution and of insurgent roles in 
Mexican in de pen dence have brought popu lar demands and the changes they 
forced to the center of key conflicts in the age of revolutions. Third, a new ap-
preciation of the interplay of war, po liti cal conflict, and liberal innovation in 
the Hispanic world  after 1808 has brought Spain and its Amer i cas to the center 
of new analyses of the origins of regimes of popu lar sovereignty. Recognition 
of each innovation underscores the importance and the difficulty of the larger 
analytical challenge.
Through most of the twentieth  century, economic history offered a clear 
and too  simple vision: the industrial capitalism that  shaped the world  after 
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1800 was a natu ral, almost inevitable result of Anglo- European- Protestant cul-
ture and institutions.  Eng land, Western Eu rope, and the United States led— 
and the world followed. Then, in the context of the shift to globalization in 
the 1990s, new studies challenged the presumptive reign of Anglo- European 
primacy in global economic history. A series of studies, led by Kenneth Pomer-
anz’s The  Great Divergence: China, Eu rope, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy, have shown that China led the world eco nom ically around 1500 
and that Eu ro pean industrial eminence came  after 1770— precisely during the 
de cades of New World transformation.10 Then economists Ronald Findlay and 
Kevin O’Rourke gave us Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy 
in the Second Millennium, confirming the early dominance of China and India, 
the late rise of industrial Europe— and the importance of New World silver in 
linking and stimulating Asian and Eu ro pean economies  after 1550. They, too, 
confirm the late rise of Europe— and emphasize the importance of the Euro- 
Atlantic wars of 1750–1830 in the rise of Anglo- American industrial hegemony.11 
And now Sven Beckert’s Empire of Cotton details the rise of industrial capitalism 
during the same pivotal de cades as a transatlantic pro cess tying a long develop-
ing “war capitalism” built on empire and slavery to a rising industrial system in 
 Eng land, in the pro cess transforming the world.12
Our analyses  will suggest that to begin to grasp the radical reconstruction 
of the world from 1750 to 1850, we must see the collapse of the silver capital-
ism that was grounded in Spanish Ame rica and integrated the Amer i cas, Asia, 
and Eu rope from 1550 to 1810.13 We must also recognized the challenges to and 
per sis tence of the war capitalism of slave- based production and trades that con-
tinued to supply essential cotton and complementary sugar and coffee to in-
dustrializing Eu rope and North Ame rica past 1850. And we must see all that as 
linked to the technological innovations and capital accumulations that drove 
the industrial revolution beginning in western Britain.14
Meanwhile, scholars have also been rethinking the historical importance 
and impact of popu lar revolutionary movements in Saint Domingue (as it 
became Haiti) and New Spain (as it became Mexico). Carolyn Fick began the 
pro cess in The Making of Haiti, showing that armed ex- slaves forced not only 
the abolition of slavery, but also the collapse of the plantation economy so piv-
otal to French participation in Atlantic trade and Eu ro pean power politics.15 
In Avengers of the New World Laurent Dubois broadened and confirmed the 
emphasis that adamant and armed former slaves ended Saint Domingue’s role 
as the largest and most profitable producer of sugar and the greatest purchaser 
of slaves in the Atlantic world.16 Meanwhile, I began to understand that the 
silver economy of New Spain continued to soar at historic levels, stimulating 
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global trades (and funding wars) to 1810— when the Bajío, the leading New 
World center of silver mining, textile manufacturing, and irrigated commer-
cial cultivation, exploded in a popu lar rising that lasted a de cade. Insurgents 
undermined silver production and turned a commercial economy to  family 
production (as did the slaves in Haiti).17 Now, in En el espejo haitiano, Luis 
Fernando Granados has detailed how the popu lar power first forged in revolu-
tionary Haiti proliferated across diverse American regions to culminate in the 
insurgencies that transformed the Bajío beginning in 1810.18
It is now clear that by 1804 Haitian revolutionaries had destroyed war capi-
talism in Saint Domingue and crippled France’s chances to join in the early 
rise of industrial capitalism. The same revolution drove war cap i tal ists working 
slave laborers to expand sugar production in Cuba, sugar and coffee in Brazil, and 
cotton cultivation across the U.S. South— the latter an essential component of 
the industrial revolution. Soon  after, beginning in 1810, Bajío revolutionaries 
took down the silver capitalism that had long integrated global trades, bring-
ing China to crisis and opening the way for the rise of the industrialism so 
celebrated for its British innovations— while so many try not to see its role in 
expanding slavery. On a global scale, silver capitalism and war capitalism  rose 
together from the sixteenth  century to shape early global commercial capital-
ism. Then when silver capitalism collapsed and industrial capitalism  rose in the 
early nineteenth  century, the war capitalism grounded in slave  labor persisted 
to enable the transition. In the pro cess, the economies of Spanish Ame rica saw 
global importance give way to the marginalities  later called underdevelopment. 
Haitians grappled with new autonomies that locked them into poverty. Cuba 
and Brazil found new prosperities in expanding slave production for industrial-
izing markets. And the United States mixed the expanded war capitalism of a 
South built on slavery with the emerging industries of an industrial North and 
a westward expansion of commercial cultivation into lands taken from natives 
and Mexicans to become the New World hegemon of a new global industrial 
capitalism.
While  these fundamental socioeconomic conflicts and changes  were  under 
way, po liti cal movements, conflicts, and revolutions moved the Amer i cas and 
the Atlantic world  toward new polities. Empires of divine right faced chal-
lenges; nations proclaiming popu lar sovereignties  rose to reshape the Amer-
i cas  after 1810. A vast scholarship on Eu rope and the Amer i cas between 1765 
and 1830 has focused on  these impor tant developments.19 Yet too often, ana-
lysts imagine a derivative and imitative pro cess in which po liti cal innovations 
forged in Anglo- American domains and reenergized in French revolutionary 
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worlds imposed themselves on Iberian Americans when they came late to na-
tion making.
Since the 1990s, scholars have reanalyzed the histories of in de pen dence in 
Iberia and the Amer i cas with new studies of the Hispanic po liti cal revolution 
that led to the Cádiz Constitution of 1812. That charter aimed to hold Spain 
and its Amer i cas together in opposition to Napoleon’s 1808 invasion and 
occupation of Spain. Mostly implemented in the Amer i cas (most of Spain was 
occupied by the French), it contributed in complex and conflictive ways to the 
eventual rise of new republics. And while including some parallels with Anglo- 
American and French developments, the Cádiz pro cess had deep roots in His-
panic traditions of popu lar sovereignty as old as  those in  Eng land and France.
The new scholarship about Ibero- American in de pen dence began with 
François-Xavier Guerra’s Modernidades e independencias20 and culminated 
in Roberto Breña’s El primer liberalismo español y los procesos de emancipación 
de América, 1808–1824.21 The work came just in time to shape an explosion 
of studies focused on the cele brations of in de pen dence in the bicentennials of 
1810. A vision of Cádiz liberalism as pivotal to Spanish American in de pen dence 
marked conferences often funded by national states implementing neoliberalism. 
At times, war and trade, strongmen and insurgents faded from view. Still, the 
scholarship on the rise of a deeply Hispanic liberalism within the conflicts that 
led to Spanish American in de pen dence was mostly positive— and further fueled 
the need to rethink the transformation of the Amer i cas between 1750 and 1850.
From the sixteenth  century,  peoples across the Amer i cas lived within Eu-
ro pean empires while tied to trades that spanned the globe.  After 1760, they 
joined in unpre ce dented po liti cal conflicts  shaped by new visions of popu lar 
sovereignty and electoral participation. Many broke with empires and built 
new polities— while an unpre ce dented industrial concentration  rose in Britain 
and reshaped the world economy. Nation builders claimed diff er ent resources, 
engaged distinct indigenous and colonial traditions, and found uncertain op-
portunities in a world facing rapid economic change. Economic, po liti cal, and 
social outcomes diverged everywhere. How did broad hemispheric participa-
tion in shared economic and po liti cal challenges and opportunities lead to new 
countries with diverging trajectories in a nineteenth- century world driven by 
industrial capitalism? No one scholar is ready to take on that pivotal analytical 
challenge.
To accelerate the conversation a group of scholars who had already written 
deep studies of key regions and questions illuminating the era of in de pen dence 
across the Amer i cas met at Georgetown University  under the auspices of the 
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Amer i cas Initiative. We began with a challenge: without losing sight of the po-
liti cal, social, and cultural dynamics of the nation making we knew so well, 
how had each region experienced the changing economic dynamics of the era? 
The chapters that follow emerged from a pro cess of sharing, discussion, and 
revision. We engage common questions, but we offer no single thesis to explain 
the emergence of new countries across the Amer i cas  after 1750 and their diverse 
roles in the nineteenth- century world.
Common themes do link our studies: Imperial legacies  shaped conflicts 
and debates everywhere. In Atlantic plantation colonies, slavery was always 
a key question: would it end, persist, change, or expand? In highland Span-
ish Ame rica, the role of the indigenous republics that gave native majorities 
land and limited self- rule, and held them in subordination, focused pivotal 
debates. And of course, imperial rule itself was debated. That it ended almost 
everywhere should not mask the enduring strength of groups that preferred 
to stay in the empires: Tories in the United States fled to Canada; Mexico’s 
1821 Plan de Iguala mobilized a co ali tion that led to in de pen dence by calling 
Spanish king Fernando to Mexico; Brazil, home to Portuguese regent and then 
king João from 1808 to 1821, became in de pen dent in 1822 by proclaiming his 
heir, Prince Pedro, emperor of Brazil. And Cuba remained the “most loyal” of 
Spain’s American colonies.
Old regimes did not fall without a fight; wars  were everywhere. They 
 were inter national and internal, often at the same time. They  were po liti cal and 
social, with popu lar risings sometimes furthering po liti cal leaders’ agendas, some-
times limiting the fighters and resources available for state making. The U.S. war 
for in de pen dence was an international war; its rebels  were backed by France 
and funded by Spain (with pesos from New Spain). The Wars of 1793 to 1815 
set off by the French Revolution and Napoleonic expansion  were inseparable 
from the Haitian Revolution, the U.S. acquisition of Louisiana, the flight of 
the Portuguese court to Brazil, the opening conflicts of the Spanish American 
wars for In de pen dence, and the consolidation of U.S. in de pen dence in the War 
of 1812. Within the wars, popu lar insurgencies  were most power ful in Haiti, 
Spain, and New Spain— yet they played roles nearly everywhere.
New visions of republican government and liberal institutions  were also 
everywhere— discussed, debated, and fought about while variously defined. 
Famously, the first New World war for in de pen dence was fought to end Brit-
ish rule and forge republican governance in the United States. The Haitian 
Revolution began amid a search to bring constitutional order and universal 
rights to a French monarchy facing bankruptcy while deeply dependent on its 
hugely profitable and exploitative slave colony in Saint Domingue. And when 
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Napoleon’s 1807–1808 invasion of Iberia sent the Portuguese court to Rio de 
Janeiro and deposed the Spanish Bourbons, guerrilla conflicts across Spain and 
debates about sovereignty  there and in the Amer i cas energized a traditional 
Spanish pro cess of seeking sovereignty grounded in the pueblos (the towns). 
The resulting Cortes of Cádiz wrote the liberal charter of 1812; it was endlessly 
debated while it helped remake politics and governance in Spain, Portugal, and 
their Amer i cas.
International and po liti cal wars mixed with insurgencies, all laced with 
movements for popu lar sovereignty in government, which stimulated demands 
for popu lar rights— freedom from slavery, access to land, and more. And all 
that combined in complex ways to promote a changing world economy— 
sometimes to force, sometimes to facilitate, sometimes to limit adaptations 
to an emerging industrial capitalism. The Haitian and Bajío revolutions took 
down the two American engines of eighteenth- century global trades. Haitians 
turned to  family production and faced exclusion from the Atlantic economy; 
Mexicans tried to forge a nation while searching for a new economy— newly 
grounded in  family production. Meanwhile, Cuba and Brazil took advantage 
of the commercial withdrawal and then exclusion of Haiti to expand pro-
duction of coffee and sugar, importing more slaves to do the work. The United 
States drove the planting of slave- grown cotton across an expanding South to 
supply the rising industrial economy of  Eng land— and soon New  Eng land. 
Meanwhile, Spanish Americans from Mexico through the Andes strug gled to 
make nations and find prosperity in a new world economy.
The common theme of our studies is divergence—on three diff er ent levels. 
Most obvious is the divergence that created more than a dozen new American 
nations out of lands long integrated into four Eu ro pean empires. And we must 
not forget that while the United States claimed in de pen dence, Canada and the 
British Ca rib bean did not; while slaves forced emancipation and in de pen dence 
in Haiti, Guadalupe and Martinique remained French and returned to slavery. 
While most of Spanish Ame rica broke away to become diverse nations, Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, which had delivered New World silver to 
Asia, did not. And if all of Portuguese Ame rica became a Brazilian empire, it 
separated from Angola and other regions of Portuguese Africa that sustained 
the slave trade— while the trade carried on. National in de pen dence was nei-
ther universal nor inevitable. It led to diverse new nations while it left diverse 
other regions within old empires that had to change. Thus Cuba could both 
remain a colony and become a new country.
The second level of divergence was the rise of diversity— and sometimes of 
power ful separatist movements— within emerging American nations. Examples 
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are legion. The historic integration of the Andean highland core  under Inca 
rule and Spanish colonialism broke apart to create Peru and Bolivia. The co-
lonial Kingdom of Guatemala that ranged from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec 
to the Isthmus of Panama took in de pen dence as one— and then in de cades of 
conflict broke into five nations and the Mexican state of Chiapas. The Guate-
mala that remained strug gled to integrate three distinct social, cultural, and 
economic regions. The fragmentation of Spanish Ame rica is legendary, furthered 
by the economic challenges of the era. Brazil famously held together, but not 
without strong forces for separation in the Northeast and South— strong at-
tempts suppressed by military force backed by British naval power. And it is 
worth remembering that Texas’s secession from Mexico spurred the war that 
took the vast Mexican North and its assertive indigenous  peoples into the 
United States, in time leading the United States to split into two nations in 
1860— only re united by a devastating and deadly Civil War.
While nations strug gled to consolidate and often fragmented, many indig-
enous  peoples found new in de pen dence. The Comanche  rose to become the 
dominant power for de cades in western North Ame rica.22 Once- colonized 
communities found new autonomies across Spanish American highlands. Our 
studies of the emergence of new countries detail how local innovation and en-
during differences emerged from shared historical challenges. Against dreams 
of E Pluribus Unum, we found the opposite: from a hemi sphere of four empires 
came a proliferation of diverse countries marked by divergences— and often by 
conflicts— within.
Their creation, with all their conflicts and diversities, contributed in funda-
mental ways to the third divergence we emphasize: the “ great divergence” that 
brought the demise of China and South Asia; the collapse of the global trade in 
silver and new challenges to the sugar and slave economies that had long linked 
Eu rope, the Amer i cas, Africa, and Asia; and the rise of a new industrial capital-
ism in which production and power concentrated in northwestern Eu rope 
and the northeastern United States, while the rest of the world was pressed to 
supply staples— pivotally, cotton grown by slaves in the  U.S. South— and to 
buy manufactures— cotton cloth central among them. The creation of diverse 
new countries across the Amer i cas was a foundational part of the history of 
the rise of the North Atlantic, Anglo- American axis that  shaped the world in 
the  century  after 1800. The new countries of the Amer i cas  were born within—
as both cause and consequence of— the  great divergence that brought a new era 
of global history.23
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Shared Challenges, Diverging Outcomes
To analyze the emergence of diverging new countries across the Amer i cas, we 
pres ent ten studies. Part I offers two chapters on pro cesses that impacted histo-
ries across the Amer i cas. In “The Amer i cas in the Rise of Industrial Capitalism” 
I outline how the silver economies of Spanish Ame rica and the sugar and slave 
economies of Atlantic plantation colonies became pivotal to global commerce 
 after 1550. Silver, centered in the Andes from 1550 to 1650 and then soaring in 
New Spain from 1700 to 1810, made Spain’s Amer i cas essential to trades linking 
China, India, the Islamic world, and Eu rope. Sugar and slavery, pioneered in the 
Spanish Ca rib bean, consolidated between 1570 and 1640 in Brazil, and domi-
nating the British and French Ca rib bean  after 1680 drove trades tying Eu rope 
and Africa to the Amer i cas. Eighteenth- century competition led to wars and 
revolutions that began to destabilize the global economy around 1780. Revolu-
tions in Haiti and the Bajío saw popu lar forces destroy the leading engines of 
New World economic dynamism  after 1790. Meanwhile  Eng land, while fight-
ing long wars to claim Eu ro pean, Atlantic, and global hegemony from France 
and Spain, built mechanized industries that took off and forced  every New 
World region to adapt in the nineteenth  century. Chapter 1 offers a framework 
to understand how diverse regions of the Amer i cas lived that complex global 
economic transformation.
Amid the transformations driven by wars and revolutions, po liti cal actors 
and ideologues worked to design new polities based on rising notions of popu-
lar sovereignty and electoral participations.  These designs and debates  were 
essential to the Thirteen Colonies’ break with British rule to become United 
States; they  were central to the French Revolution, which set the stage for the 
Haitian Revolution— which focused on more fundamental liberations. Com-
ing out of Eu ro pean po liti cal debates since the seventeenth  century and recent 
de cades of enlightenment thinking, republican proj ects in Britain, the United 
States, and France are deeply studied and well recognized.24 Less recognized 
and studied only recently are the parallel seventeenth- century roots of a His-
panic popu lar sovereignty that mixed with enlightenment innovations and 
revolutionary adaptations to generate the world’s first self- defined liberalism in 
Cádiz between 1810 and 1812— and to influence the debates of nation making 
across Iberia, Latin Ame rica, and beyond.25
 Because most readers are familiar with the rise of regimes of popu lar sov-
ereignty in Anglo- Atlantic and French domains (or can easily gain access to 
key studies), yet few  will know the pivotal role of Cádiz liberalism in Spain, 
Portugal, and the Amer i cas, we pres ent Roberto Breña’s chapter 2, “The Cádiz 
Liberal Revolution and Spanish American In de pen dence.” It explores the deep 
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and complex historic roots of Hispanic liberalism, its consolidation amid the 
strug gle against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814, its limited role in Spain  under 
French occupation, its wide if uneven implementation across Spain’s Amer i-
cas, its abrogation in 1814, and its return in 1820 in both Spain and its Amer-
i cas. Designed to create a constitutional monarchy to hold Spain’s empire 
together, Cádiz liberalism fueled debates about sovereignty that generated 
movements for regional autonomy. Many evolved into conflicts that led to na-
tional in de pen dence, in the pro cess often limiting the sway of liberal ways as 
men on  horse back took power. Breña’s study of Cádiz liberalism underlines its 
transatlantic importance and contradictory reverberations to help frame our 
analyses of Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, and the Andes.
Part II pres ents four chapters analyzing the emergence of new countries in 
the slave socie ties of Atlantic Ame rica. We begin with Adam Rothman’s study 
“Union, Capitalism, and Slavery in the ‘Rising Empire’ of the United States” 
 because the mainland British colonies from New  Eng land to Georgia  were 
the first to break colonial bonds, and  because  after de cades of expansion and 
conflict culminating in the deadly war of 1860–1865, the United States held 
together to become the New World country that adapted most profitably to the 
world of industrial capitalism. Rothman brings a new hemispheric vision to 
the intensely studied and still debated pro cess that forged the United States.
The war for in de pen dence that created the United States was most innova-
tive in proclaiming popu lar sovereignty and opening electoral rights— rights 
limited by expanding slavery and enduring racist exclusions. Emerging from 
marginality in the first world economy, the United States latched onto Brit-
ish industrialization; southern states became key providers of cotton (raised 
by slaves while Britons proclaimed opposition to slavery). During Napoleonic 
wars (including the War of 1812 against Britain), northern states turned reluc-
tantly to industry. To gain land to expand cotton and slavery, from the 1820s 
southerners colonized Mexican Texas. Texans seceded from Mexico in 1836, 
helping provoke the war that took the lands from Texas to California in the 
1840s. The challenge of balancing slave states and  free states in regions taken 
from Mexico led to the Civil War that kept the  union together, ended slavery, 
and opened a diverse continent to rapid agro- industrial expansion— while 
deferring questions of justice for freed blacks, invaded Native Americans, and 
expropriated Mexicans. The making of the United States both opened and cul-
minated hemispheric pro cesses with global ramifications.
Carolyn Fick’s “From Slave Colony to Black Nation: Haiti’s Revolution-
ary Inversion” analyzes the second American society to break with imperial 
rule. Haiti did not copy the United States, but in many ways inverted its tra-
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jectory. French Saint Domingue was the driving engine of the Atlantic sugar 
and slave economy  after 1770. Its expansion led to extreme polarizations; its 
population included a huge majority of recently arrived African slaves, when in 
1790 promises of popu lar sovereignty arrived from revolutionary Paris and set 
off conflicts among the few  people of Eu ro pean, mixed, and African ancestry 
who  were  free and might claim rights proclaimed as universal and granted to 
Frenchmen. Fick details how slaves took arms to control the outcomes of years 
of debate and conflict—by 1804 ending slavery, French rule, and most planta-
tion production. She goes on to offer an essential new analy sis of how early 
national rulers committed to sustaining a state and military capable of surviv-
ing in a world of hostile powers faced a populace committed to  house hold pro-
duction and staunch in refusing plantation  labor. The result was a nation of 
military rule,  family self- sufficiency, and commercial poverty. Haitians rejected 
slavery, enabled  family autonomy, and faced deep and enduring difficulties in a 
world  shaped by rising industrial capitalism.
Cuba appears the antithesis of Haiti. David Sartorius’s “Cuban Counter-
point: Colonialism and Continuity in the Atlantic World” shows how Cuba 
became new while remaining Spanish. It did not become a nation in our era of 
transformation, yet became a new country. It turned to sugar and slavery in 
the late eigh teenth  century. The Haitian Revolution opened new markets for 
Cuban planters and new access to slaves, including some brought from Haiti by 
fleeing planters. When Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, Spanish Cubans re-
mained loyal to the Cádiz liberal regime, gaining new rights and participations 
(which Cádiz liberals carefully denied to  people of African ancestry). When 
mainland Spanish Ame rica turned to in de pen dence in the 1820s, Cuba held 
loyal to Spain— a reenergized slave country in a transatlantic Spanish nation. 
Sartorius shows that Cuban loyalty, strategic to planters’ defense of sugar and 
slavery in a world of British antislavery, also came with deep engagements in 
debates about liberal rights and monarchical legacies. Cubans, at least  free 
Cubans, joined the  free  peoples of the United States in prospering by expanding 
slavery between 1800 and 1860. The contrasts with Haiti— and the similarities 
with Brazil— are striking.
Brazil perhaps experienced the least conflict and the most seamless change 
of all the regions that broke with colonial rule before 1825. Yet it too became 
a new country, facing the conflicts and uncertainties of creating politics while 
facing changing links to the world economy. In “Atlantic Transformations and 
Brazil’s Imperial In de pen dence” Kirsten Schultz explores how Portuguese colo-
nies that had proven the global possibilities of sugar and slavery in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries became leading producers of gold and diamonds 
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 after 1700 (still relying on slave  labor). Portuguese rule rested ever more on 
Brazilian production linked to British markets— and through the eigh teenth 
 century, Lisbon aimed to prosper by both limiting and taxing  those links. 
When revolution cut Haitian exports of sugar and coffee and imports of slaves, 
sugar and slavery revived in Brazil’s Northeast, while coffee and slavery began 
to remake Rio de Janeiro’s hinterland. Rising Brazilian trades sustained Portu-
gal and Britain in times of war  after 1793. When Napoleon took Lisbon in 1807, 
the British navy helped ferry the Portuguese monarchy to Rio, tightening ties 
with  Eng land. With Napoleon gone in 1814, King João stayed in Rio— until 
Lisbon liberals turned to the Cádiz model seeking new ways to restore their 
transatlantic power. They began conflicts that drew João back to Portugal— 
and to Brazil’s separation in 1822 as an empire  under Prince Pedro, who would 
rule as Pedro  I. Regional separatist movements faced military forces funded 
by strong export earnings and backed by British navies. Vast Portuguese 
colonies— and claims to a larger Amazon— held together within a Brazilian 
empire. By 1830 Brazil was an expanding continental country sustained by cof-
fee and slavery, which  were tied to rising British industry. Like the U.S. republic 
and still- colonial Cuba, imperial Brazil expanded slavery to prosper in the new 
world of industrial capitalism.
The former colonies that expanded slave- made exports  after 1800 found 
commercial prosperity and relative po liti cal stability  until the 1860s. Then 
all faced conflicts over slavery— none more destructive than the  U.S. Civil 
War. In contrast, Haitian slaves claimed liberty and land in revolution; from 
1800 they faced continuous challenges of state making and exclusion from the 
world economy— while former slaves and their families lived better for gen-
erations. The new countries made out of Atlantic slave colonies lived enduring 
contradictions.
Part II looks at nation making in Mesoamerica and the Andes. Before Eu-
ro pe ans came,  these  were regions of strong indigenous states sustained by 
cultivating communities.  After 1500 they  were reshaped by disease and demo-
graphic collapse, Spanish rule and silver economies. The Andes led the mining 
that drove global trades from 1550 to 1650; New Spain, including Mesoamerica 
and regions north, dominated silver production  after 1700. Across mainland 
Spanish Ame rica, the era of in de pen dence brought the fall of the silver econo-
mies and difficult searches for new ways to prosper in the emerging world of 
industrial capitalism, while elites sought new po liti cal systems and many com-
munities, indigenous and mixed, pursued local autonomies. Social, po liti cal, 
and economic challenges and conflicts  shaped diverse new countries across 
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Spanish Ame rica— countries that strug gled for de cades to find stable polities 
and prosperous places in the new industrial world economy.
In “Becoming Mexico: The Conflictive Search for a North American Na-
tion” Alfredo Ávila and I explore the most radical economic transformation 
and one of the most complex and conflictive po liti cal transitions in Spain’s 
Amer i cas. New Spain remained eco nom ically dynamic and socially stable to 
1810; strong silver production stimulated global trades and funded Eu ro pean 
wars during the era of U.S. in de pen dence and the French and Haitian Revolu-
tions. Napoleon’s 1808 invasion of Spain broke sovereignty across the empire, 
setting off po liti cal conflicts in New Spain, leading to popu lar insurgency  there 
in 1810. From 1812 to 1814, authorities implemented Cádiz liberalism’s partici-
patory openings aiming to  counter insurgency; they offered local autonomy to 
regional elites and indigenous republics, aiming to hold loyalty to Spain in the 
fight against France. Scattered po liti cal insurgents refused the offer, fighting for 
greater autonomy and even in de pen dence  until 1815. Pop u lar insurgents in the 
key mining, manufacturing, and cultivating region of the Bajío remained in 
arms to 1820; pacification came with a collapse of mining and a turn to  family 
production reminiscent of Haiti.
When Spain returned to liberalism the same year, men who had fought in-
surgents and in de pen dence for a de cade led an alliance of the power ful calling 
Fernando VII to New Spain (unsuccessfully) and then proclaiming a Mexican 
monarchy in 1821. They  imagined a continental empire reaching from Costa 
Rica to Texas and California. But the collapse of the silver economy left the 
 imagined Mexico to search for both a polity (republican from 1824) and a new 
economy. The result was a mix of creative and conflictive politics (often rooted 
in Cádiz legacies), economic uncertainty, empty trea suries, po liti cal wars, and 
social instability— combining to  favor in de pen dence in the provinces, the 
autonomy indigenous villages, and the prosperity of  family cultivators. Texas 
seceded in 1836 to preserve slavery for waves of Euro- American immigrants 
growing cotton on rich coastal plains, aiming to profit by supplying British 
industry. De cades of conflict culminated in the 1840s when the United States 
invaded to take Mexico’s North, including California, where gold drew a west-
ward rush and gave new capital to a newly continental United States. Mexico 
was left to search for a polity with shrunken economic potential; the United 
States ( after the Civil War) found unpre ce dented hemispheric hegemony.
The colonial Kingdom of Guatemala extended from highland Chiapas to 
lowland Costa Rica. Far from centers of silver production, the Maya  peoples 
of Chiapas and Guatemala held onto land and local autonomies in indigenous 
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republics; more mixed  peoples to the south mostly lived by ranching. The one 
impor tant eighteenth- century export was indigo, raised in Pacific lowlands 
around San Salvador and sent to Atlantic markets by Guatemala City mer-
chants. As Jordana Dym details in “The Republic of Guatemala: Stitching To-
gether a New Country,” the kingdom enjoyed limited prosperity and general 
stability to 1808. It engaged Napoleon’s incursion and the Cádiz experiment 
with only a few conflicts, po liti cal and social. Mexico’s turn to an imperial in-
de pen dence in 1821, which aimed to include the Kingdom of Guatemala and 
sent an army to press the point, brought the break with Spain— and then from 
Mexico in 1822.
De cades of po liti cal experiment followed. A Central American federation 
was pos si ble (minus Chiapas, which stayed in Mexico) while many regional 
leaders pursued local interests. The indigo economy around San Salvador gave 
way to cochineal, a red dye raised by ladino (mixed) growers in eastern Guate-
mala. By the 1840s Guatemala began to consolidate, combining Maya western 
highlands, central valleys around the capital where merchants, landlords, and 
professionals concentrated, and the ladino eastern uplands that produced the 
nation’s only export. El Salvador separated—as did Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Costa Rica (while dreams of federation lived). Guatemala emerged from the 
kingdom of the same name, a new and smaller country with a Maya majority 
and  great internal diversity, linked to industrial Britain by one valuable dye. 
Only the late nineteenth- century rise of coffee in Pacific hills and bananas in 
Atlantic lowlands built a Guatemalan state with the power to rule assertive 
Maya communities.
The Spanish Andes led the first global silver economy, centered at Potosí 
from 1550 to 1640, by mobilizing and commercializing indigenous ways of rule, 
production, and work. Silver revived in limited ways in the eigh teenth  century, 
while the Spanish regime took growing exactions in times of war and global 
competition. Social conflict escalated from the 1740s, culminating in the  great 
risings led by Túpac Amaru and  others in the 1780s. They  were contained, yet 
left  those who ruled wary of indigenous rights and participations for de cades 
to come.
To explore in de pen dence and nation making in the Andes we offer two chap-
ters, one on po liti cal pro cesses, one on indigenous assertions. In “From One 
Patria, Two Nations in the Andean Heartland,” Sarah Chambers emphasizes 
that new countries  were neither inevitable nor always grounded in traditional 
unities. As capital of the Inca empire, Cuzco had dominated and integrated 
the highland regions that are now Peru and Bolivia. When Potosí became the 
leading center of global silver production in the sixteenth  century, Cuzco and 
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the nearby highlands became key sources of supplies and  labor. When Madrid 
reformers kept Cuzco tied to Lima while assigning Potosí to a new viceroyalty 
at Buenos Aires in 1776, the separation inhibited the response to the 1780s up-
risings that spanned the region.  After pacification, while the formal split con-
tinued, the Andean heartland remained integrated in many ways.
The Napoleonic incursion and the Cádiz experiment set off local conflicts 
in the Andes, but no adamant risings, po liti cal or social. The power ful preferred 
stability— and feared another rising of the native majority. Yet the question 
of in de pen dence could not be avoided. Amid the liberal revival in Spain, San 
Martín led armies from Buenos Aires and Chile to liberate Lima in 1821; 
Bolívar came in 1822 with forces from Caracas and Bogotá to lead  battles that 
finalized in de pen dence in Upper Peru in 1824— founding Bolivia. Chambers 
shows how during that pro cess and for de cades  after, the separation of Peru 
and Bolivia was contested. A  union of the heartland linking Cuzco and Po-
tosí held pos si ble. The ultimate division of Peru, ruled by more Spanish Lima, 
and Bolivia, with an indigenous majority in search of an economy, came out 
of uncertain conflicts. Peru eventually found po liti cal stability in an economy 
of wool and nitrate exports. Bolivia strug gled to revive mining and lost the 
chance of coastal export development in war with Chile. It remains a nation 
with an indigenous majority searching for a role in the world.
Erick Langer’s concluding chapter, “Indigenous In de pen dence in Spanish 
South Ame rica,” focuses on native  peoples in the Andes and nearby lowlands. 
It explores an outcome also noted in Ávila and Tutino’s analy sis of Mexico and 
emphasized in recent studies of Comanche power in North Ame rica: while 
empires fell and new countries strug gled, native  peoples often claimed new in-
de pen dence in local rule, production, and trade—at times finding more effec-
tive in de pen dence than young nations facing industrial powers. Langer details 
how natives across Andean highlands took new control of local production and 
trade, and how  people in eastern lowlands found a greater in de pen dence paral-
lel to the Comanche and  others in the North American West. He shows how 
they used that autonomy to their benefit for de cades,  until export economies 
tied to industrial capitalism solidified national regimes  after midcentury. Then, 
native  peoples faced rising threats to po liti cal autonomies and the lands essential 
to their economic in de pen dence. National consolidations  under export econo-
mies ended indigenous in de pen dence. Still, for generations  after 1820, native 
 peoples across the Amer i cas found relief from po liti cal powers and economic 
impositions. Deep contradictions  shaped de cades of transforming divergence.
In an epilogue, Langer and I outline how the rise of export economies  after 
1860 brought the consolidation of po liti cally oligarchic and commercially 
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liberal republics across Spanish Ame rica along with the decline of indigenous 
in de pen dence  there (and in the U.S. West)— while the longer flourishing At-
lantic export economies faced the conflicts (most intense in the United States 
and Cuba) that ended slavery. New countries built in conflicts and contradic-
tions from 1750 to 1870 fi nally consolidated— retaining polarities within, di-
vergences across the hemi sphere, and limited roles in the world of industrial 
capitalism. Only the United States claimed power in that world— and it con-
centrated in the Northeast. Many in the South, Midwest, and West saw them-
selves as struggling in export economies ruled by an industrial- financial core in 
a nation that was also a continental empire. The United States thus replicated 
within its expanding bound aries the larger relationships (including indigenous 
subordination and Spanish American dependence) that tied all of the Amer i-
cas to the North Atlantic core of industrial capitalism  after 1870.
Our histories link global pro cesses, regional challenges, and local conflicts 
to understand the hemispheric divergences that created new countries. Across 
Atlantic Ame rica, we emphasize the close link between the expansion of export 
economies grounded in slavery and early po liti cal stability— often seen as “suc-
cess” in the world of early nations. Brazil and the United States held together 
to expand as continental nations; Cuba remained in the Spanish empire. All 
expanded slavery to prosper as exporters tied to a rising industrial capitalism; 
all  later faced difficult conflicts to end slavery— and deal with racial inequities. 
The contrast with Haiti is striking:  there, armed slaves ended slavery and most 
export production; they lived better for generations while their insistence on 
farming for sustenance led to commercial “failure” and national poverty.
Across highland Spanish Ame rica, the collapse of once dynamic silver econ-
omies during the wars set off by Napoleon’s occupation of Spain and the op-
portunities of Cádiz liberalism led to republics that began in the 1820s. They 
faced openings to new polities while struggling to find new economies. Po liti-
cal conflicts persisted while the dimensions of new nations  were contested and 
native  peoples claimed new in de pen dence. Spanish Central Ame rica and the 
Andes broke into nations searching for coherence and new roles in an indus-
trializing world. They consolidated  after 1860, as they found export economies 
sending staples to  Eng land, Eu rope, and the United States.
Mexico held together ( after losing Central Ame rica), experimented with 
industry in the 1830s, and then lost its North in war to an expanding United 
States— a conflict that also sealed the fate of the Comanche empire. Both North 
American nations faced civil wars in 1860s. It was only  after Union victory held 
the nation together and ended slavery that the United States  rose to continen-
tal and  later global industrial hegemony. In Mexico, liberals triumphed in the 
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War of Reform and outlasted French occupation in the 1860s to rule a strug-
gling nation increasingly tied to U.S. expansion in a new industrial world.
The new countries of the Amer i cas faced many challenges in the internal, na-
tional, and global divergences that came with their conflictive origins. Amid the 
rise of popu lar sovereignty, po liti cally, socially, and culturally complex nations 
(and enduring colonies) became part in a new industrial world. Long marginal 
mainland colonies of British North Ame rica become a hegemonic continental 
nation. The once pivotal silver economies of Spanish Ame rica and sugar and 
slave colonies of Atlantic Ame rica became uncertain and often contested na-
tions searching for new  futures.  There are many histories in this history of new 
countries.
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In 1500, the Amer i cas  were home to power ful states concentrated in western 
highlands, cultivating communities along Atlantic coasts and in eastern wood-
lands, and diverse hunting, gathering, and farming  peoples in vast interiors. The 
 peoples of the hemi sphere faced war and trade, production and migration— yet 
lived in a world of their own. They  were only connected to Eu rope, Africa, and 
Asia  after Iberians arrived in the 1490s, an accident of Eu ro pe ans’ search for 
new routes to trade with Asia. China produced silks and porcelains, South Asia 
made printed cotton cloth, and Southeast Asia provided pepper, cinnamon, 
and other spices— all coveted by Eu ro pean consumers. Asians sought  little 
made by Eu ro pe ans; rather, they demanded payment in money, gold and silver, 
for their fine manufactures and rare commodities. China and South Asia  were 
economic powers around 1500. Eu rope could charitably be called an emerging 
region.1
1
the Ame ricas in the Rise of  
Industrial Capitalism
John Tutino
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Trade between Asia and Eu rope had a long history. Overland excursions 
departed Krakow and other towns in Eastern Eu rope with silver to swap for 
silks and other luxuries. Traders from Venice and Genoa sailed through the 
Bosporus and across the Black Sea to meet overland caravans heading east. 
 Others landed in the eastern Mediterranean to deal with Muslim merchants 
who moved money and goods across the Levant and on to South Asia and 
China. The old trades  were limited in two ways: Eu rope produced  little gold 
and limited silver, the latter mostly in Germanic lands; and land routes and sea -
lanes required traders to deal with intermediaries aiming to profit and states 
demanding revenue for protection. Still, trade flourished for centuries.
When fifteenth- century Portuguese mari ners, often funded by Genoese 
bankers, aimed to sail around Africa to trade directly with South Asia, their 
goal was to enter established trades while limiting the involvement of mer-
chants and monarchs along the way. When Columbus, a Genoese mari ner sail-
ing for Castile, headed west across the Atlantic, his goal was the same— however 
poor his global geography. For a time, the Amer i cas became an obstacle in the 
search for direct trade with Asia (while Columbus insisted he had already ar-
rived  there). Soon enough, however, the hemi sphere, long a world to itself, be-
came a key producer of commodities that accelerated trades that for the first 
time  were truly global. Spanish American gold and especially silver stimulated 
trade everywhere. Meanwhile, the Atlantic Amer i cas produced rising quantities 
of sugar, sending the sweet that was also a preservative and in time became a 
staple to Eu ro pe ans in exchange for growing numbers of enslaved Africans— 
people who  were made commodities of trade, drawing their continent ever 
deeper into global cir cuits of profit and degradation.
The incorporation of the Amer i cas into four Eu ro pean empires— first Span-
ish and Portuguese,  later British, and French— grounded the first world econ-
omy. The empires spread Eu ro pean ways of rule and promises of justice; they 
promoted Chris tian ity (with diverse emphases), and promised salvation to 
 those who embraced new truths. They also aimed to subordinate native Ameri-
can majorities— while the smallpox and other diseases that came as fellow trav-
elers from the Old World decimated indigenous numbers. Then, to replace the 
 dying and replenish laboring populations, Eu ro pe ans turned to buying young 
African men (and  women too), setting them to work in pursuit of profit— 
justifying their enslavement with racial and religious legitimations.
The taking of the Amer i cas into the Eu ro pean empires inserted the hemi-
sphere in global trades— the founding moment of the world economy. In the 
sixteenth  century and long  after, the pivotal exchange was Asian manufactures 
for bullion— drawing Asian wares to Eu rope. The gold and silver that stimu-
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lated expanded trades came primarily from Spanish Ame rica. Most went to 
Spain, passed through Western Eu rope and Mediterranean cities, often sent to 
Muslim ports, and then on to South Asia and China— drawing Asian goods 
in return flow.  After 1570, an impor tant second flow sailed from Acapulco to 
Manila, where a Chinese merchant community assembled wares from across 
Asia— Chinese silks and porcelains, Indian cottons, Island spices— for ship-
ment across the Pacific to Spain’s Ame rica, which thanks to booming silver 
economies had means to buy them.  After 1600, transpacific trade took up to a 
third of American silver for the next  century— evidence of a truly global com-
mercial economy. Meanwhile, sugar made by slaves sold out of Africa  shaped 
Brazil in the seventeenth  century, the greater Ca rib bean in the eigh teenth. Sil-
ver, sugar, and slaves made the Amer i cas pivotal to a new world economy for 
centuries— until every thing changed around 1800.2
The Amer i cas in the World Economy: The Challenge
A new and more global understanding of the economic history of the world 
has emerged in recent de cades. Through the twentieth  century, the rise of 
European—or, better, Western Eu ro pean and North American— hegemony 
was presumed, and mostly explained by cultural characteristics and innovative 
efforts within Eu ro pean domains in analyses ranging from Max Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism3 to the works of Douglass North, 
beginning with The Rise of the Western World (with Robert Paul Thomas)4 
and culminating in Understanding the Pro cess of Economic Change.5 The rise of 
China in the 1990s opened scholars to new visions. Asia was rediscovered, and 
the era of Eu ro pean hegemony was recognized as relatively brief— beginning 
about 1800 and of uncertain longevity as the twenty- first  century began. The 
new understanding began with recognition of the long historic primacy of 
Asia in Andre Gunder Frank’s ReOrient6 and Kenneth Pomeranz’s The  Great 
Divergence.7 In diff er ent ways, they emphasized the economic dominance of 
Asia in the sixteenth  century and the late rise of Eu rope as the nineteenth 
began. The new challenge focuses on explaining, not presuming, the rise of 
Europe— a task begun by Pomeranz and continued by many, including Prasan-
nan Parthasarathi in his bluntly titled Why Eu rope Grew Rich and Asia Did 
Not.8 The new vision gained power ful synthesis in Ronald Findlay and Kevin 
O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the 
Second Millennium.9
The Amer i cas are everywhere in the new vision: the stimulus of New World 
silver from the sixteenth  century; the Atlantic economy of sugar, slavery, and 
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more from the seventeenth. Pomeranz explains the rise of British hegemony 
around 1800 by two  factors: access to local coal for energy and to American 
lands for raw materials and markets. Still, the place of the Amer i cas in global 
economic history comes late in Pomeranz and remains limited in most synthe-
ses. They focus on a shifting balance between China and Western Eu rope, with 
the Islamic world and South Asia as essential participants and intermediaries. 
The Amer i cas appear often as suppliers of silver and sugar, but rarely as major 
participants in the world economy— until the rise of the United States  toward 
industrial hegemony in the late nineteenth  century.
 Here, I sketch an emerging understanding of global economic history  after 
1500— pointing to ways that the Amer i cas  were pivotal participants. I then 
turn to the two  great economies tying the Amer i cas to global production 
and trade— silver; and sugar and slavery— and to the links integrating them. 
With that foundation, I explore the ways that wars and shifting trades rooted in 
global strategic- economic changes helped set off the conflicts that led to new 
countries across the Amer i cas  after 1760 and how  those conflicts  were pivotal 
to accelerating the global turn that consolidated the British- ruled industrial 
capitalism that  shaped the nineteenth  century. I conclude by surveying the 
very diff er ent opportunities and challenges faced by the emerging countries 
of the Amer i cas in the new industrial world. Brazil, Cuba, and the United 
States prospered for de cades supplying staples raised mostly by slaves; all 
ended slavery  after 1860— but only the United States found industrial power 
in late nineteenth  century. In contrast, the silver economies of Spanish Ame-
rica collapsed as Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia became nations. They strug gled for 
de cades. So did Haiti— where slave revolution led to withdrawal and then ex-
clusion from global trades— and Guatemala, which had never lived the stimu-
lus of silver and contributed only dyestuffs to the new economy of the early 
nineteenth  century.
The transformation of the global economy and the rise of new countries 
across the Amer i cas between 1750 and  1870  were inseparable pro cesses. Yet 
their integration is  little understood, in good part  because scholars of New 
World nation- making focus insistently on internal (and sometimes transatlan-
tic) social and po liti cal developments while globally oriented analysts of eco-
nomic history attend minimally to the Amer i cas. This essay aims to deepen 
understanding of— and expand conversations about— the integration of the 
Amer i cas in the world in a key era of global change.
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The Amer i cas in the World Economy: An Emerging Vision
It is a truism that a global economy could only develop in the sixteenth  century 
when Eu ro pean empires began to incorporate the Amer i cas into trade net-
works linking Eu rope, Africa, and Asia. Still, it is impor tant to recognize the 
importance of long- distance trade before 1500. For centuries, trade linked 
Western Eu rope and East Asia, sometimes passing overland, sometimes taking 
mostly  water routes from the  Middle East via South Asia to China. Luxuries 
such as spices and silks generally traveled west, exchanged for silver or furs or 
other primary goods.  Those trades also touched Africa via the Indian Ocean 
and across the Sahara. Luxury goods of high value to low weight ruled early 
commerce, generating wealth for traders, revenue for rulers, and prestige for 
rich consumers. Diff er ent ports and centers of trade, diverse producers and con-
sumers,  were favored or prejudiced over time. Throughout, Eu rope mostly 
produced primary goods and bought luxuries; centers of innovative production 
and trade moved around the Islamic world, South Asia, and China, while trade 
linked diverse Eurasian socie ties.10
A second “world economy” integrated much of the Amer i cas before 1500. 
Dependence on archaeology has left knowledge of the hemi sphere focused on 
sites of power and symbols of rule and religion along with material products 
from crops to pottery. We lack the travel and trade narratives that tell so much 
of what we know about early Eurasian exchanges. Still, recent studies show that 
during the first millennium (ce) trade linked diverse  peoples from the high-
land basins of central Mexico ruled by the  great city of Teotihuacan, through 
Gulf lowlands where Olmecs had earlier ruled, highland Oaxaca led by Monte 
Albán, to the Maya zones of Yucatán and Guatemala. Imperial centers  rose and 
fell—as in Eurasia— but trade persisted, as did war. War and trade  shaped both 
Eurasia and Mesoamerica through the first millennium.11
Commercial integration drove north from Mesoamerica in the second mil-
lennium.  After the fall of Teotihuacan, Tula and its Toltec rulers consolidated 
power in central Mexico, keeping trade alive with Mayas far to the south-
east while pressing northward. Centers of power and enclaves of cultivation 
reached the upper Río Grande Valley (now greater New Mexico), linked by 
trade and cultural exchange to central Mexico. Waterborne trade followed the 
Gulf Coast and went up the Mississippi to bring Mesoamerican trade, goods, 
and cultural contacts to Cahokia— a state emerging near the confluence of the 
Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi Rivers. The spread of maize, Mesoamerica’s 
 great contribution to the Amer i cas and the world, across North Ame rica to 
coastal New  Eng land long before 1500 reveals very wide exchanges.12
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While trades within Mesoamerica and linking that region to North Ame-
rica are best known,  there is evidence of ties to South Ame rica as well. Maize 
became a major crop in Andean valleys in the first millennium; the Tarascan 
regime of western Mesoamerica resisted Mexica (Aztec) expansion in the fif-
teenth  century in part thanks to copper metallurgy gained from Andean con-
tacts.13 In the Andes, the Inca state remains famous for pressing power and 
exchange outward from Cuzco, integrating regions now highland and coastal 
Peru, Ec ua dor, and Bolivia and reaching southern Columbia and northern 
Chile and Argentina. Scholars insist that exchange was not trade inside the 
Inca domain and that it operated through hierarchies of reciprocity or ga nized 
by local, regional, and imperial lords. Still, exchange was everywhere, tied to 
military power and regime rule, and legitimated by claims of reciprocity (that 
masked and perhaps limited inequities). Seen in its larger function, Inca ex-
change was not radically diff er ent from Eurasian trades, where military power 
was always a  factor, state sanction essential, and claims of mutual benefit constant. 
The Inca perhaps took the fusion of regime and exchange to an extreme, but 
the integration was far from unique.14
Before 1500— and long  after— the Eurasian and American “world econo-
mies”  were what Findlay and O’Rourke call polycentric. No single city, regime, 
or region of power dominated. Places of rule might be pivots of trade; often 
they  were separate—as when inland capitals dealt with coastal ports of trade. 
Over time, po liti cal regimes  rose and fell; commercial nodes and trade routes 
shifted too. Still, trade persisted, stimulating production of luxury goods, pre-
cious metals, and more; profiting merchants and funding regimes and their 
militaries on land and sea.  Because of high transport costs, long- distance trade 
focused on goods of high value and low weight. Trade thus stimulated produc-
tion, generated wealth, and sustained power ful states; yet  every center of power 
and trade in the early world economies had to be supplied with food, cloth, 
combustibles, and building materials by local and regional producers.
While trade promoted continuing exchanges and constant wars, the local 
economies that supplied trades and sustained regimes varied widely. Produc-
tion might depend on small growers and artisans, large- scale producers, or a 
mix;  labor could be bound, drafted, or negotiated, paid well, poorly, or not at 
all. Cities and ports might draw sustenance by trade, tributes, or taxes. Local 
markets might be vibrant or limited. Concentrations of profit and power could 
be  great or limited; inequities and exploitations could be limited or deeply de-
bilitating. The key is that in polycentric commercial economies, trade linked 
centers of power and production across long distances, over time favoring some, 
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weakening  others. Commerce stimulated and sustained local and regional di-
versities of power and production— while all interacted in war and trade.
Polycentrism continued to mark the larger world economy that began when 
Eu ro pe ans linked the Amer i cas, Eurasia, and Africa  after 1500. The inclusion of 
the Amer i cas brought rising flows of silver  after 1550, of sugar  after 1600— and 
the growing trade in slaves they stimulated. American silver paid for Chinese 
silks and porcelains, Southeast Asian spices, and Indian cottons; sugar and sil-
ver stimulated the soaring demand for slaves. And in the profitable pro cess, 
Eu ro pean and Euro- American merchants found newly pivotal roles while 
demanding and funding protection by newly power ful Eu ro pean regimes 
becoming oceanic empires.
Eu ro pe ans  were not suddenly dominant, as too many histories suggest. But 
they shifted from struggling as marginal participants often subject to Islamic 
and other intermediaries to gain Asian wares, to become traders in control of 
key commodities and linking American, Asian, African, and Eu ro pean markets 
and producers. Portuguese, Dutch, and En glish traders sailed directly to South 
and East Asian ports; Spanish American merchants delivered silver to Chinese 
merchants entrenched at Manila, exchanging it for wares from China, the is-
lands, and South Asia. Into the eigh teenth  century, industrial primacy in silks 
and porcelains remained with China; South Asia made cotton goods coveted 
in Africa, Eu rope, and the Amer i cas. Eu ro pe ans became traders of rising im-
portance thanks to control of the world’s primary sources of silver, the profits 
of Atlantic sugar and slave trades, innovations in sailing technology, and rising 
naval power.
Competition among Eu ro pe ans, and between Eu ro pe ans and Asians, set off 
escalating conflicts that became a crisis in the late eigh teenth  century. From 
that time of conflict and crisis came a new British industrial, commercial, and 
imperial hegemony that ended the long era of polycentric economic interac-
tions. In what Findlay and O’Rourke call a new era of global specialization, the 
industrial capitalism that developed in  Eng land  after 1780 led to a new world 
economy: power and industrial production concentrated in one pivotal region, 
in time spreading to a very few  others; the rest of the world provided raw mate-
rials, foodstuffs, stimulants— and markets. The era of conflict and transforma-
tion from 1750 to 1870 was more than the rise of British power grounded in 
new techniques of production. It was the end of a long era of wide competition 
for power and profit in a polycentric world economy and the rise of a new 
industrial- commercial- imperial hegemony based in  Eng land, Western Eu rope, 
and the northeastern United States.
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The rest of the world was not left out; most of the Amer i cas, Africa, and 
much of Asia  were locked into roles as dependent suppliers of primary prod-
ucts, raw materials and foodstuffs that  were mostly land and  labor intensive. 
The importance of a commodity to industry, or to feeding industrial popula-
tions, the quality and extent of land or mineral deposits, the plenty and mobility 
of  labor all varied. Some regions— and many regimes and traders— prospered 
supplying industrial inputs and sustenance. Few beyond the North Atlantic 
axis of industrial concentration contended for power and primacy in the world 
of nineteenth- century industrial capitalism.
The global shift from polycentric commercial competition and integration 
to Anglo- centric industrial capitalism  shaped the possibilities and constraints 
facing new countries across Amer i cas  after 1800. Most analysts see a global 
transformation driven by events in Europe— powered by the intersection of 
war, revolution, and technological innovation  there. The conflicts that broke 
the dominance of the Eu ro pean empires in the Amer i cas and led to the birth of 
diverse new nations appear as simultaneous, yet largely separate, developments. 
As the new countries of the Amer i cas emerged in the 1820s, British dominance 
of a new industrial world seemed set.  People and nascent states across the 
Amer i cas had no choice but to respond.
Analyses that see the rise of industrial capitalism as external to the Amer i-
cas tend to exclude the Amer i cas from the analy sis of that pivotal transforma-
tion—an unfortunate deficit in the generally persuasive synthesis of Findlay 
and O’Rourke in Power and Plenty. New World silver, so pivotal in studies of 
world trade  after 1550, dis appears from their discussions of conflict and trade 
 after 1770— even as New Spain’s silver output reached historic peaks.15 The 
sugar and slave trades so central to studies of the eighteenth- century Atlantic 
too often become marginal to analyses of the years  after 1800, especially when 
the goal is to explain industrialism in Eu rope and its global impact. Yet we 
know that Atlantic sugar and slave trades  were radically disrupted by the Hai-
tian Revolution in the 1790s and that silver collapsed as a New World stimulus 
to world trade  after 1810, undermined by insurgency in the Bajío region of New 
Spain. Pop u lar risings abruptly destroyed the two leading engines of American 
participation in world trade.16
The two New World risings and their economic consequences are the most 
obvious evidence that the global economic transformation and the emergence 
of new countries across the Amer i cas  were not separate pro cesses. The rise of 
industrial capitalism usually appears a Eu ro pean triumph; the emergence of new 
American nations too often seems a tragedy— with the celebrated exception of 
Ame ricas in the Rise of Industrial Capitalism — 33
the United States. An integrated analy sis of the Amer i cas from 1750 to 1870 
 will show that triumph and tragedy  were inseparable— across the Amer i cas and 
around the world.
American Silver and the First World Economy
Two primary economies tied the Amer i cas to the world in the eigh teenth 
 century: a silver economy based in mainland Spanish Ame rica and the sugar 
and slave economy in Atlantic colonies from Brazil through the Ca rib bean. 
Regions not directly  shaped by  these core trades often supplied one, the other, 
or both.  There  were exceptions: the gold (and slave) economy of the early 
eigh teenth  century in southern Brazil and the fur trade of inland North Ame rica. 
The latter reminds us that many  peoples remained in de pen dent, uncolonized, 
in American interiors, yet they too joined rising trades. Still, the silver of Span-
ish Ame rica and the sugar and slavery of Atlantic Ame rica powerfully  shaped 
global trades and defined the hemi sphere’s place in the world in the eigh teenth 
 century.
Silver  rose first. In the wake of the early sixteenth- century incursions that 
destabilized Mesoamerican and Andean states and brought diseases that set off 
devastating depopulations, the  great mountains of silver encountered at 
 Potosí and Zacatecas in the 1540s fed China’s soaring demand for silver (de-
creed the only specie for taxation and large- scale and international trade  there 
in the 1550s). The profits of silver stimulated new ways of production and con-
solidated Eu ro pean rule across Spain’s Amer i cas. Taxco near Mexico City pio-
neered silver mining from the 1530s; Potosí and the Andes led the mining that 
fueled world trade between 1550 and 1650; Zacatecas and northern New Spain 
took off around 1600.  After a slowdown during the second half of the seven-
teenth  century, Zacatecas and Guanajuato led New Spain to global leadership 
in the eigh teenth  century, while Potosí and the Andes strug gled to regain ear-
lier dynamism.17
In the pro cess, three variants of silver socie ties developed in Spanish Ame-
rica. In the Andes, the Inca led the largest and most consolidated state in the 
Amer i cas in 1500.  After Inca rule collapsed and during the years that Old World 
diseases devastated native communities, regional native powers carried on as 
silver  rose. Perhaps  because of long wars and a slow consolidation of Spanish 
rule while native population fell by more than 80   percent, regional native 
lords (kurakas, sometimes renamed caciques) remained pivotal to colonial 
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Map 1.1. The Amer i cas, ca. 1780
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send workers to Potosí. Yet as the city of silver high in the Andes  rose to global 
eminence— its population reaching 150,000  after 1600 while the wider Andes 
fell to less than a million— Europeans seeking wealth and natives seeking 
chances together forged (unequally, of course) new commercial ways around 
mines that drove global trade.
The silver economy of Andean Potosí built on— and commercialized— 
indigenous pre ce dents more than other regions of Spanish Ame rica. Lima be-
came the Andean center of government, finance, religion, and education, while 
nearby Callao sent silver into world trade; in Ec ua dor, Guayaquil built ships 
for Pacific trade while Quito made cloth sold across the Andes; regions now in 
northwestern Argentina sent livestock to Potosí; Chile provided a Eu ro pean 
diet of wheat, wine, and olive oil to  those who ruled the Andean boom in Lima 
and Potosí. All that prospered to 1650, laden with exploitations and cultural 
conflicts, then collapsed and strug gled to revive in the eigh teenth  century. The 
limits of the revival and rising Spanish revenue demands made the Andes a 
region of escalating conflict from 1740 to the 1780s.18
New Spain developed two distinct silver socie ties before 1650. Warring Mex-
ica, Tarasco, Zapotec, Maya, and other states contested rule in Mesoamerica 
around 1500. Conquest proved more rapid  there, thanks to deep local divisions 
and the disease- driven depopulation that devastated the region from the 1520s. 
When silver mining  rose near Mexico City at Taxco in the 1530s and Pachuca 
in the 1550s, indigenous ways of rule and work faced challenges. By 1600, few 
native lords still held roles parallel to  those claimed by Andean kurakas. The 
repartimiento  labor draft, built on the Mexica’s cuatequil levy, was fragmented 
and less pivotal than the mitá, declining rapidly around Mexico City from the 
1630s. Still, the silver economy  there depended on the hundreds of native com-
munities reconsolidated  after 1550 as indigenous republics— ruled by councils 
of native notables and holding lands that sustained local governance, religion, 
and  family production.  After 1600, as population fell to 10  percent of precontact 
levels, increasingly commercial market and  labor relations linked communities, 
silver mines, and the city together— and to rising global trades.19
North of Mesoamerica, commercial dynamism  shaped every thing. Before 
1520, Mesoamerican states had faced fiercely in de pen dent hunting, gather-
ing, and sometimes cultivating Chichimecas in the region called the Bajío. 
When Eu ro pe ans arrived, the fertile basin was a conflict zone; neither states 
nor communities accustomed to sustain them ruled  there or in regions north. 
 After silver was found at Zacatecas in 1546 and Guanajuato in 1555, a flood of 
 mi grants— Europeans seeking profit, Mesoamericans looking for opportunity, 
and Africans bound to work— set off de cades of conflict with Chichimecas 
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struggling to stay in de pen dent.  After pacification in the 1590s, the Bajío and 
the North saw the construction of a thoroughly commercial social order (few 
communities gained rights as republics). With Chichimecas devastated by war 
and disease, and marginalized in missions and mountain enclaves by the 1590s, 
Spanish North Ame rica grew as a thoroughly commercial domain of mines, 
cities of trade and textiles, irrigated estates, and grazing properties.
New Spain, which integrated Spanish Mesoamerica and North Ame rica 
through its capital city of Mexico, remained second to the Andes in silver be-
fore 1650; but as production collapsed at Potosí, it revived at Parral, far north 
of Zacatecas, in the 1640s. Spanish North Ame rica ruled world silver produc-
tion during the eigh teenth  century, led again by Zacatecas and Guanajuato. 
The Bajío, mixing mining at Guanajuato, trade, textile, and tobacco production 
at Querétaro, and irrigated commercial cultivation across rich bottomlands, be-
came the most dynamic cap i tal ist region of the Amer i cas. Facing a brief decline 
of Chinese demand for silver and rising Spanish revenue demands in the 1760s, 
Guanajuato mine workers protested new taxes and militia recruitment. They 
 were crushed in 1767. Then, silver drove to new heights in the Bajío and regions 
north from 1770 to 1810. Thanks to Bourbon trade policies and rising demand, 
most of that silver went first to Eu rope, funding wars and commercial expan-
sion  there. But ultimately the production of silver that peaked in New Spain  after 
1770 responded to rec ord demand and purchases in China from 1775 to 1808.20
Mexico City replaced a shrunken Potosí as the largest New World city, pass-
ing 130,000 around 1800. (Other leading cities— New York, Guanajuato, and 
Querétaro in North Ame rica, and Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires in 
South Ame rica— hovered around 50,000–60,000.) The principal center of 
government, finance, and trade in the Amer i cas, Mexico City integrated the 
silver economies of Spanish Mesoamerica and Spanish North Ame rica, linking 
them to Spain, Eu rope, and China. The cities and the mines along New Spain’s 
silver routes— from the Gulf port of Veracruz through Puebla to Mexico City 
(with an extension to Acapulco on the Pacific), then north through Querétaro 
and Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí to regions from Texas to Cali-
fornia ( after 1770)— generated the most dynamic economy in the Amer i cas, 
sustaining with grains, sugar, cloth, tobacco, and livestock the production of 
silver that drove global trade.
In contrast, southern Mesoamerica, less tied to the stimulus of silver, re-
mained a region of small and scattered Spanish towns surrounded by indigenous 
communities that sustained themselves and sought commercial gain when they 
could. In highland Oaxaca, Mixtec villa gers made cochineal dye sent to native 
weavers, colonial cloth makers, and Eu ro pean industries. Farther south, in the 
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Kingdom of Guatemala, growers around San Salvador raised indigo, another 
dye sent to cloth  makers in worlds old and new. In warm basins and coastal 
lowlands, native growers raised cotton for artisans across New Spain. Offshore, 
Havana built ships and provided military protection against Eu ro pean inter-
lopers. The soaring revenues of New Spain’s silver economy paid for Spanish 
rule from Yucatán to California, in Manila where Chinese merchants traded 
Asian wares for American silver, and in Havana and New Orleans— with sur-
pluses sent to the always- strained trea sury in Spain.21
While the silver economy of the Andes strug gled and faced re sis tance that 
culminated in the  great rebellions of the 1780s, followed by years of repres-
sion and reconstruction, the silver economy of New Spain soared through 
the eigh teenth  century— and peaked  after 1770.22 Social pressures mounted 
 there too. But across Mesoamerica, they  were negotiated by enduring indig-
enous republics and mediated by colonial judges— keeping most conflict in the 
courts and workers in mines and fields.23 In northerly regions of Spanish North 
Ame rica, social pressures  were moderated before 1750 by per sis tent population 
figure 1.1. In the heights of silver capitalism: The Rayas Mine and  
Mellado Church, Guanajuato, Mexico. Author photo
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scarcities that favored workers and tenants, forcing mine entrepreneurs and 
estate operators to offer fair remunerations and solid securities.  After 1770, 
population pressures in the pivotal Bajío allowed entrepreneurs in mining and 
commercial cultivation to press new exploitations in a region where commu-
nity rights and lands  were scarce and judicial mediation less accessible. Social 
pressures deepened, exacerbated by cultural conflicts provoked by enlightened 
elites who increasingly maligned popu lar religious ways. Still, Chinese de-
mand drove an economic boom that sustained social peace and soaring pro-
duction in the Bajío to 1810— when every thing collapsed in a revolutionary 
conflagration.24
The Atlantic Economy: Sugar and Slavery
The Atlantic sugar and slave economy developed in parallel with the Spanish- 
global silver economy.  There  were early experiments in sugar and slavery in 
Spanish Santo Domingo, but once silver flourished, capital flowed to the main-
land. Enclaves of sugar and slavery emerged along New Spain’s Gulf Coast, in 
lowland basins south of Mexico City, and  later on the coast of Peru, but they 
 were adjuncts to silver economies.25 Sugar became the primary product, and 
enslaved Africans essential laborers, in Atlantic Ame rica. Starting in Portu-
guese Brazil, Eu ro pe ans turned to sugar to compete with the power silver gen-
erated in Spain’s Ame rica.
Sugar and slavery had a long history. The pairing began to help fund the 
Crusades in the eastern Mediterranean. Profitable, the combination migrated 
west across the inland sea and took hold on eastern Atlantic islands in the fif-
teenth  century. Africans became the primary slaves— and a growing commod-
ity in trade. Still, sugar production, the African slave trade, and the Eu ro pean 
markets and profits they stimulated remained limited. The  great expansion 
came when the complex crossed the Atlantic in the sixteenth  century.  After 
experiments in the Spanish Ca rib bean, Brazil led the rise of sugar production 
in the Amer i cas— and the shift to bound African  labor on a mass scale.26
 After 1550, the Portuguese regime’s drive for revenues, settlers’ search for 
profit, and Genoese financiers’ readiness to invest made the northeast coast of 
Brazil home to an expanding sugar industry. The climate was perfect; coastal 
lands  were ample, fertile, and well watered. The challenge was  labor. At first, 
planters used few enslaved Africans— usually skilled craftsmen purchased in 
the Atlantic islands to oversee planting and refining. Most permanent workers 
 were bound Tupí and other natives taken in raids into the interior; harvest 
 labor came from  free natives congregated in Jesuit mission villages. The com-
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bination provided flexible  labor at low cost; it built the industry and showed 
its profitability. But the early  labor system proved short- lived; natives drawn 
into regular contact with Eu ro pe ans suffered the same diseases that devastated 
 people across Spain’s Amer i cas. As the profitability of sugar was proven, the 
first  labor system that sustained it in Brazil collapsed. The Portuguese with 
Genoese financing turned to the African slave trade, escalating its numbers to 
sustain a promising second Atlantic economy.27
In the de cades  after 1600, Portuguese Brazil ( under Spanish sovereignty 
1580–1640) proved the potential of sugar and slavery. The Dutch, at war 
with Spain’s Hapsburgs, invaded to claim the rich coasts around Recife in the 
1620s. With ample capital and maritime capacity, once the Dutch mastered 
sugar production and the slave trade, they helped transfer the combination 
to the Ca rib bean, where the British and French learned quickly. Sugar (not un-
like silver) lives cycles of boom and decline; the crop exhausts the nutrients in 
once- rich soils  after eighty to one hundred years. Brazil made the industry a sta-
ple of Atlantic Ame rica from 1570 to 1650 (coinciding with the Andean silver 
cycle at Potosí). Brazil’s decline helped British Barbados rise  after 1640, soon 
followed by Jamaica. As Eu ro pean markets widened, French Saint Domingue 
expanded sugar and slavery  after 1720. When British Islands began to falter in 
the 1760s, Spanish Cuba found new openings.28 As colonies  rose and decayed, 
sugar production moved to fill demand in Europe— drawing growing numbers 
of slaves from Africa.  After 1750, Saint Domingue became the leading Atlantic 
sugar and slave economy. Production along with planter and slave trader profits 
soared; so did slave numbers as degradations deepened.29
Like silver, sugar and slavery stimulated widespread commerce. Early on, the 
Brazilian interior provided sugar plantations with staples and livestock. From 
the seventeenth  century, the farming, fishing, timbering, and shipbuilding of 
New  Eng land sustained British sugar and slave colonies.30 Before 1765, Louisi-
ana supported French Saint Domingue; then  under Spanish rule it took a simi-
lar role sustaining sugar and slavery in Cuba. Sugar islands might be small— but 
their dynamic industry stimulated the slave trade that took millions of  people 
out of Africa and promoted linked economic activities across far regions of 
Atlantic Ame rica.
Sugar— which found expanding Eu ro pean markets as a sweet, a preserva-
tive, and  later as a quick energy substitute for protein in popu lar diets— made 
the slave trade pos si ble and profitable on a large scale.31 The trade made slaves 
available to other colonial producers. Southern Brazil boomed with an econ-
omy of gold, diamonds, and slavery from 1695 to 1750, stimulating a frontier 
of settlement and staples production based in São Paulo, driving west, and also 
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grounded in slave  labor.32 In Atlantic North Ame rica, environments too cold 
for sugar saw the rise of rice, indigo, and slavery in South Carolina, and tobacco 
and slavery around the Chesapeake. Slaves labored on Hudson Valley estates 
and Long Island farms, producing staples often exported to the Ca rib bean. The 
plains around Caracas built an economy of cacao and slavery. Planters found 
profit and regimes took revenues.33 Slave  labor spread across Atlantic Ame rica 
while sugar and slavery, profit and degradation, peaked in Saint Domingue. 
When Paris revolutionaries proclaimed liberty and equality and shook colonial 
rule, slaves in Saint Domingue  rose  after 1790 and took freedom and justice as 
they saw them.
Silver and Sugar and Slavery: Global Integration
The silver economies of Spanish Ame rica and the sugar and slave economies of 
Atlantic Ame rica often appear separate. They developed in diff er ent regions 
of the Amer i cas,  under diff er ent empires, with diff er ent ways of production, 
 labor relations, and cultural conversations. Yet they developed in parallel: both 
had beginnings before 1550; both  rose to global importance between 1570 
and  1650; both faced lulls from 1650 to 1700— and both soared to unpre-
ce dented heights during the eigh teenth  century. While the leading centers 
of production shifted from the Andes and Brazil between 1550 and  1650 to 
New Spain and the Ca rib bean from 1700 to 1800, the parallel trajectories held. 
More than parallel: the two New World economies  were linked.
Most obviously, the two  great early American economies  were linked in the 
competition for geopo liti cal economic primacy among Eu ro pean powers. Early 
on, the bullion of Spanish Ame rica favored Hapsburg power. When Phillip II 
claimed the Crown of Portugal in 1580, he vastly enlarged Hapsburg domains 
and trades by adding the emerging sugar economy of Brazil and trading ports in 
Africa and Asia. The original Potosí silver and Brazilian sugar booms not only 
came si mul ta neously from 1570 to 1640— they peaked  under a common Span-
ish sovereignty that in the early 1600s ruled all of Eu rope’s Amer i cas (but for a 
few marginal British and Dutch settlements). That unpre ce dented accumula-
tion of American domains and wealth in global trades set Dutch republicans 
(who rebelled against Hapsburg rule in 1564), British and French monarchs, 
and merchants everywhere in search of parallel domains and trades. Without 
gaining revenues and riches in the new global economy they could not com-
pete in a transformed world of power.34 The Dutch became key intermediaries 
in the rise of competing British and French Atlantic empires in the seventeenth 
 century. With no access to silver, the latecomers settled on sugar and slavery.
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The larger ties linking the silver and sugar and slave economies become clear 
when we see them in global context. It has fi nally become commonplace to 
emphasize the centrality of New World silver to Eu ro pe ans’ ability to trade in 
Asia—to buy Chinese silks and porcelains, island spices, and Indian cottons.35 
Now Prasannan Parthasarathi has focused analy sis on the key link tying sugar 
and slavery to silver. Fine printed cotton cloths from India  were the leading prod-
ucts demanded in Africa as the price of slaves— and Eu ro pe ans only gained 
 those cloths with silver from Spain’s Amer i cas.36 In the era of the foundation of 
the New World economies, common sovereignty facilitated Portuguese trad-
ers’ access to Andean silver, delivered to India to purchase cloth taken to Africa 
to buy slaves shipped to Brazil and Spanish Ame rica from 1580 to 1640.  After 
1700, British merchants of the mono poly East India Com pany took growing 
quantities of Indian cotton goods, paid with rising flows of New Spain’s sil-
ver (gained through the asiento contract to supply slaves to Spain’s Amer i cas), 
to purchase  people bound as slaves to  labor in Atlantic sugar production and 
related enterprises.37 Spanish American silver also funded allied French mer-
chants’ ability to sell Africans in Saint Domingue. We now see why British 
and French merchants and regimes did all they could in war and trade, legally 
and illegally, in open and clandestine transactions, to gain New Spain’s silver. 
They worked through  factors in Seville and Cádiz; they smuggled in Ca rib-
bean ports and Buenos Aires. And we understand why Spain insisted that its 
ships and merchants must monopolize silver, ensuring that silver would profit 
Spaniards and Spanish revenues in the Amer i cas and Europe— while allowing 
loopholes large enough to enable silver to find its way to pivotal global trades.38
New Challenges, 1750–1790
Wars escalated across the Atlantic world in the eigh teenth  century. Eu ro pean 
empires fought for hegemony at home and wealth in the Amer i cas and around 
the world. Our new understanding of the linked importance of the two New 
World economies to Eu ro pean power and global trade places that time of con-
flict and its escalation  after 1750 in new light— light essential to understanding 
the role of the Amer i cas in the conflicts of 1790 to 1825 that accelerated the 
global transformation to industrial capitalism.
The War of Spanish Succession begun in 1700 set Bourbons on the Span-
ish throne, cementing a dynastic and commercial alliance between Spain and 
France and giving the latter favored access to Spain’s American trade and silver. 
The Methuen Treaty of 1703 tied Portugal to Britain, assuring the latter privi-
leged access to the gold beginning to flow from southern Brazil. Then the Treaty 
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of Utrecht that ended the war in 1713 compensated Britain with a mono poly of 
the slave trade to Spain’s Amer i cas, tightening the linkage of New Spain’s silver, 
Indian cottons, and African slaving as En glish traders supplied both British 
and Spanish Ame rica.
The first half of the eigh teenth  century proved an era of rising global trades. 
New Spain’s silver and Brazil’s gold soared si mul ta neously, the former stimulat-
ing the world and especially China, the latter notably benefiting Britain. Only 
a strong expansion of trade could sustain booms in both metals. Then around 
1750, Brazilian gold production dropped as Chinese demand for silver fell. 
Gold production declined through the rest of the  century. Silver revived in 
the 1770s, flowing more fully  toward Eu rope, then on to India to buy cottons 
to trade for African slaves, and fi nally on to China.39 With less Brazilian gold 
 after 1750, British merchants and their regime backers sought greater access to 
Spanish American silver in their drive  toward global commercial hegemony. 
Wars came quickly.
The Seven Years’ War of 1757 to 1763 is perhaps better named the First World 
War, as it was fought in Eu rope and across the Amer i cas, India, and the Philip-
pines, and the sea- lanes that linked them. Early on Britain mobilized North 
American colonials to claim Canada from France— a conquest of much cost 
and  little immediate economic value. More revealing, British forces took Ha-
vana and Manila in 1762 and  1763, demonstrating the military vulnerability 
of Spain and the strategic- commercial importance of New Spain’s silver. Sil-
ver regularly accumulated in Havana before sailing west to Eu rope; the Pacific 
flow landed in Manila to be traded with Chinese merchants for Asian wares. 
Taking the ports was pos si ble, claiming the silver a challenge— the precious 
commodity could be held in New Spain to the end of the war or diverted to 
other channels. By the Treaty of Paris, Britain kept Canada and gained Florida, 
consolidating rule in eastern North America. It returned Havana and Ma-
nila to Spain, which also gained Louisiana— reinforcing its control of the silver 
economy of New Spain and North Ame rica west of the Mississippi. From a 
war often  imagined a  great British victory Britain gained  little in the Amer i cas, 
where Spanish power was reinforced. Britain did win Eu ro pean recognition of 
its rising hegemony in India.40
In the near term, the primary result was that all the empires faced  great 
debts. Their first response was to make colonials pay. Spain’s Bourbons de-
manded new taxes, militia recruitment, and administrative controls beginning 
in 1764, provoking riotous re sis tance in and around the mines of Guanajuato 
and regions north in New Spain.  There, colonial entrepreneurs quickly backed 
the regime in a mix of repression and accommodation. Peace was reestablished 
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in 1767 and silver production  rose to hold at historic peaks from 1770 to 1810 
thanks to renewed Chinese demand. Parallel demands for revenues and power 
struck the colonies of British North Ame rica from Mas sa chu setts to  Virginia in 
the 1760s.  There, however, key colonial merchants and planters saw no reason 
to pay; they led re sis tance demanding limited taxation and self- rule that cul-
minated in U.S. in de pen dence— declared in 1776 and accomplished in 1783.41
Simply stated, the silver economy made the link between Spain and New 
Spain so valuable to Bourbon rulers and colonial entrepreneurs that they col-
luded to maintain the colonial relationship. In contrast, the mainland colonies 
of British Ame rica  were a costly burden to imperial officials while the revenue 
demands of the 1760s and 1770s made imperial rule unacceptable to many co-
lonial merchants and planters. New Spain remained Spanish  because its silver 
economy was uniquely valuable; the United States became the first New World 
nation in good part  because its economy was a peripheral adjunct to Ca rib bean 
sugar and slave economies, where planters and merchants continued to profit 
and proved slow to imagine in de pen dence.42
Still, the war that enabled U.S. in de pen dence had global ramifications. France 
sent troops and a navy, the latter pivotal to Washington’s victory at Yorktown— 
generating debts that led to calling the Estates General in 1789 and the out-
break of revolution in Paris. Spain provided British American rebels with sus-
tenance and funds— mostly silver pesos from New Spain (which became the 
basis of the U.S. dollar). Amid the conflict, with Spain distracted and backing 
Anglo- American in de pen dence, 1780 saw the outbreak of the  great risings led 
by Túpac Amaru and the Kataris in the Andean heartland (where the silver 
economy strug gled). Mass violent demands for native rights and social justice 
 were contained only when colonial elites again rallied to Spanish colonial rule 
in devastated uplands. Britain lost its mainland colonies south of Canada; 
Jamaica, its leading Ca rib bean sugar and slave colony, lost dynamism. Mean-
while, French Saint Domingue soared to new heights of sugar, coffee, indigo, 
and slavery.
The First  Great Transformation
It is often said that U.S. in de pen dence turned Britain’s imperial attention to 
India. It is now clear that Britain, in an unplanned shift in which merchants, 
manufacturers, and regime officials both competed and colluded without set 
goals, transformed cotton manufacturing, global trades, and capitalism. From 
1780 to 1820, while wars and revolutions raged across Eu rope and the Amer i cas, 
a new world economy dominated by Britain  rose.  Every region of the Amer i cas 
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and the world had to adapt— sooner in the new countries of the Amer i cas and 
old empires of Asia,  later in regions less tied to global trade around 1800.43
The rise of Britain to global industrial hegemony has been honored as a tri-
umph of British entrepreneurship and technological innovation— and it was 
both in pivotally impor tant ways.44 The development of  water- and steam- 
powered ways of spinning cotton thread during the late eigh teenth  century 
transformed production and work in ways that would go on to transform the 
world. The achievement is clear— and well emphasized. The goals at the begin-
ning are now equally clear— thanks to Parthasarathi. A group of British inven-
tors and manufacturers backed by merchants outside the East India Com pany 
aimed to displace Indian cotton goods in the world economy. Why? British- 
produced cotton cloth would not require silver. Success  after 1780 required 
technological innovation and new sources of cotton, which first came from 
Brazil and then increasingly from the newly in de pen dent United States. As 
Beckert shows in Empire of Cotton, early industrialism linked British industry 
and U.S. plantations to compete with the eoc and Indian producers in world 
cotton markets. Still, British and Indian- eoc production held strong past 1810, 
 until silver production collapsed— favoring British industries and U.S. planters 
as the Napoleonic wars ended in British triumph. In time, British power in 
India used taxes and prohibitions to inhibit South Asian cloth from compet-
ing with British manufactures.45 The rise of British industrial hegemony was 
both a technological triumph and an unplanned outcome of complex global- 
imperial wars, insurgencies, and trades. They  were simultaneous, essential, and 
inseparable.46
In the pro cess, the balance of economic power in the Amer i cas and the world 
shifted. British manufacturers and traders aimed to mechanize production of 
cotton wares in  Eng land in order to replace Indian cloths in markets in Eu-
rope, Africa, and the Amer i cas. With success thanks to mechanical innovation 
and imperial power, they reduced the need for New Spain’s silver to purchase 
the South Asian cloth much in demand in Eu ro pean and American markets, 
and essential to buying African slaves. The detailed ramifications await careful 
study, but key developments seem clear.
Chinese demand for silver had dropped briefly  after 1750, and then  rose to 
new heights in the 1770s.47 With the growth of British cotton production and 
the displacement of Indian cloth in British trade, British traders might spend 
less silver in India and send more directly to China. We know that the value in 
pesos (identical to U.S. dollars  after 1780) of silver production in New Spain 
 rose into the 1750s, fell in the 1760s, then soared to new heights from 1770 
to the mid-1780s—to dip slightly, stabilize, and fluctuate at historically high 
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levels from 1795 to 1810.48 During the era of escalating Eu ro pean warfare  after 
1793, Britain and France competed for access to New Spain’s rising flows of 
silver.49 To the extent that British merchants needed less silver to buy South 
Asian cotton goods to trade for African slaves, they could seek direct trade 
with China where demand held strong. While the French monarchy faced the 
debts created by supporting U.S. in de pen dence, French merchants still needed 
New Spain’s silver to access the cloth needed to send rising numbers of Africans 
to Saint Domingue in the 1780s. While debt crisis led to po liti cal revolution 
in Paris, the flood of recently arrived Africans, often young men enslaved  after 
fighting as soldiers, fed the extreme polarities of Saint Domingue— extreme 
even compared with other Ca rib bean slave colonies— that exploded in revolu-
tion in the 1790s.
Crucible of Conflict, 1790–1825
 There was, of course, no direct and  simple causal line from the rapid expansion 
of slavery in Saint Domingue to the Haitian Revolution, nor from deepening 
pressures on Bajío producers to insurgency in 1810. War and politics inevita-
bly intervened. Better, the de cades from 1780 to 1820 proved the inextricable 
linkages among global trades, geopo liti cal conflicts, regional economies, so-
cial relations of production, popu lar risings, Euro- American monarchies, and 
Asian regimes as old empires fragmented, new nations  rose, and popu lar com-
munities pressed gains when they could. The challenge— and necessity—is to 
seek an integrated history of the Amer i cas while the polycentric global econ-
omy of 1500 to 1800 gave way to the industrial concentration that  shaped the 
nineteenth  century. British industrial innovation, French po liti cal revolution, 
Haitian total revolution, Bajío popu lar insurgency (an apo liti cal revolution?), 
Indian economic demise and Chinese collapse— all caught up in de cades of 
geopo liti cal conflict and shifting global trades— were all essential ele ments of 
the transformation that reshaped the world as the nineteenth  century began.
The peace that ended the War of U.S. In de pen dence in 1783 proved brief. 
The French monarchy faced debts it could not pay, in large part resulting from 
its support of British American rebels. Seeing no other recourse, Louis XVI 
called long- dormant Estates General, and that assembly became the site and 
source of a French Revolution that promised new liberties and participations to 
French  people— who, now proclaimed citizens, deposed and killed the king— 
and eventually led to Napoleon’s rule, first in France, then across Eu rope. Early 
proclamations of citizenship and liberty set off debates and armed conflicts in 
Saint Domingue, leading to slave risings that ended slavery, broke with France, 
46 — John Tutino
and in 1804 founded the second nation in the Amer i cas— Haiti.50 In the pro-
cess, armed ex- slaves took the land for  family production and destroyed the 
leading sugar and slave economy of Atlantic Ame rica. By the mid-1790s, Saint 
Domingue no longer sent sugar or profits to France, nor did it buy slaves.
The collapse of Saint Domingue did not end the importance of sugar and 
slavery in the Atlantic world. Production quickly revived in Brazil, as did de-
mand for slaves in Portuguese colonies still tied to Britain. Sugar and slavery 
also  rose in Cuba, still a Spanish colony, yet in times of war dependent on Brit-
ish acquiescence and  U.S. neutral shipping to sell sugar and buy slaves. War 
and revolutions in France and Haiti shifted the focus of sugar and slavery in 
the Amer i cas, sustaining continuing conflicts over trade and revenues. Silver 
production in New Spain,  after dipping in the late 1780s,  rose to new heights 
in the early 1790s and held near  those peaks to 1810 thanks to Atlantic war and 
Chinese demand.51 Saint Domingue lost its leading role— and ended slavery. 
In the early 1800s, France lost power in the Amer i cas as it expanded in Eu rope. 
Spain strug gled in the geopolitics of Europe— but New Spain flourished; Cuba 
 rose as a sugar and slave colony; and Buenos Aires found new trade supporting 
revived Brazilian plantations.
From the 1790s, U.S. merchants had profited as the only seafaring neutrals 
in the Atlantic in times of shifting conflicts— while cotton production  rose 
across an expanding South to supply British mills. Able to increase the number 
of slaves without imports, southern planters developed a growing cotton and 
slave economy— without dependence on New Spain’s silver to obtain  labor. 
Britain, favored by industrial innovation, maritime power, and insular location 
faced constant conflicts, always away from home, that brought gains at the in-
tersection of war, trade, and industrial development. In the Amer i cas, the lead-
ing role of New Spain’s silver economy and the dynamism of sugar and slavery 
(away from Haiti) persisted to 1810. The polycentric world economy held on.
In 1793, on the pretext of defending monarchy  after the killing of the Louis 
XVI, the Eu ro pean powers led by Britain and including Spanish Bourbons and 
Austrian Hapsburgs turned to war against revolutionary France. With Paris 
in disarray and Saint Domingue in flames, it was a chance for the remaining 
old regimes to crush a struggling contender for Atlantic power. The attempt 
to restore monarchy failed ( until 1815), however, thanks to the revolutionary 
regime’s ability to mix nationalist visions, new participations, and the end of 
feudal taxes and fees and successfully call a levée en masse that mobilized vast 
armies to defend the revolution. In 1802, when the Peace of Amiens brought 
a respite from war, Britain ruled the seas and global trade, and continued to 
industrialize; France dominated its continental neighbors, having lost the trade 
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and revenues of Saint Domingue; and Spain still held New Spain, the source of 
silver that still fueled global trades and funded Eu ro pean regimes. Carlos Mar-
ichal has shown how France and Britain disputed the peak silver flows from 
1796 to 1810— a conflict as pivotal as any  battle. By deals among regimes, mer-
chants, and financiers, far from the public eye, about two- thirds of New Spain’s 
rec ord production benefited a renewed French- Spanish alliance. An impor tant 
third funded British war and trade.52 Still, nearly all eventually passed in trade to 
China— and British merchants increasingly ruled that profitable commerce. 
The world had changed enormously since the 1550s, but Spanish American silver 
remained pivotal to the global geopo liti cal economy in 1808, even as industrial 
innovation and threats to the slave trade eroded its role.
With the loss of Saint Domingue to ex- slave soldiers backed by yellow fever 
and malaria that devastated Eu ro pean troops sent to the tropics,53 Napoleon 
faced embarrassment in the world of Eu ro pean armies and a loss of trade and 
the revenues it made. That marginalization was completed in 1805 when the 
British navy destroyed the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar. 
New Spain’s silver could only reach Eu rope via deals brokered by British foes. It 
still came, as  every power needed funds in times of war— but France’s reliance 
on its primary foe for access to key specie created a debilitating dependence.
From 1805, Britain ruled Atlantic sea-lanes, thus Eu rope’s access to the 
Amer i cas, New Spain’s silver, and the profits of still flourishing China trades. 
Attempting to  counter by controlling continental Eu rope, Napoleon took the 
 gamble of invading Iberia in 1807, taking Lisbon, then turning on Madrid early 
in 1808. The Portuguese monarchy escaped to Brazil, escorted by a British 
fleet, ensuring that plantations  there (booming again  after the collapse of Saint 
Domingue) would benefit Britain’s trade and revenues.54 So Napoleon turned 
to invade his Spanish ally, provoking divisions in the monarchy— until he cap-
tured both contenders to rule and in May 1808 saw the  people of Madrid rise to 
challenge his armies, setting off wars for in de pen dence in Spain and diverging 
responses across the Amer i cas.55
In Spain, re sis tance to Napoleon concentrated in Seville and then Cádiz, 
leading to the liberal constitution of 1812 that offered new but limited rights to 
colonials, hoping they would remain in the empire.56 In New Spain, two years 
of debates focused in Mexico City from 1808 created deep rifts, dividing  those 
loyal to the regime emerging in Seville from  others who preferred to claim 
regional autonomy awaiting the resolution of the conflicts in Eu rope.57  Those 
divisions led to the revolt led by Miguel Hidalgo in the Bajío in September 
1810. The rising mobilized regional elites, Guanajuato mine laborers, and rural 
workers and tenants to take control of the Bajío in the fall of 1810. Early in 1811, 
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the po liti cal movement collapsed, Hidalgo and other leaders  were captured, 
and most mine workers returned to the mines. But the rural majority returned 
home to the Bajío to press a popu lar, redistributive insurgency from early in 
1811. In a de cade of conflict, they took the land from the commercial estates 
that had ruled their lives and sustained the silver economy for centuries, turn-
ing to  family production. The parallels with Haiti are clear.
The Bajío insurgency strangled silver mining by raising the costs of supplies 
and transport and breaking the integration of the Bajío with Mexico City and 
the larger economy of Spanish North Ame rica.58 Pop u lar insurgency, civil war, 
and economic disruption led to a de cade without investment in the mines that 
made the world’s money. Infrastructure and production both collapsed. From 
1795 to 1810, New Spain sent over 20 million pesos of silver yearly into the 
world economy. From 1811, silver production was cut in half, and with limited 
fluctuations held at 10–12 million pesos yearly to 1840. It was a devastating 
collapse for the economy of New Spain as it became Mexico in 1821. The fall of 
silver at the hands of Bajío insurgents also transformed global trades.59
Since the 1780s, the rise of British industrial textiles had begun to limit the 
need for New Spain’s silver to buy Indian cotton cloth to pay for African slaves. 
But war, rising Atlantic trade, and Chinese demand had kept demand for silver 
high. When from 1811 the silver flowing from New Spain fell by half, the global 
reverberations proved extensive and enduring.
For two and a half centuries, silver was a key commodity and money in an 
expanding polycentric world economy. Its sudden scarcity  after 1810 struck 
trades already challenged by constant war from 1750 to 1815. Fernand Braudel 
dated the end of eighteenth- century global economic growth to 1812— without 
seeing the link to the collapse of New Spain’s silver mines.60 Now, Man- Houng 
Lin has shown that the sudden fall of Chinese production and participation in 
global trade resulted directly from the dearth of silver. She sees Latin American 
in de pen dence wars as the cause; within  those wars, it was the de cade of popu lar 
insurgency in the Bajío that undermined New Spain’s silver production and the 
global trades it fueled.
The sudden scarcity of silver, amid war and commercial disruption, both 
stimulated and enabled Britain’s acceleration of textile industrialization, limit-
ing its need for silver to buy Indian cottons, replacing them in global markets 
with cloth made in British mills. In a radical re orientation of Asian trade, Brit-
ish merchants began to sell South Asian opium in China, extracting silver in 
payment. The silver that had flowed into China for centuries began to flow out, 
demonetizing the economy, inhibiting commercial life, cutting state revenues, 
stimulating po liti cal instability— and spreading all the liabilities of a proliferat-
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ing opium culture among the Chinese. China became the “silver mine” that met 
India’s demand for silver as the new Mexican nation learned its mines would 
not recover for de cades. And China lost economic dynamism as it exported 
raw silk (rather than fine silk cloth) and tea, along with its stores of silver—in 
exchange for opium. Once a dynamic engine in a polycentric world economy, 
China became a commodity exporter, a society Eu ro pe ans would  later see 
as “underdeveloped”— ignoring their own profitable role in creating that 
underdevelopment.
Meanwhile, Britain protected itself at home by shifting to gold as primary 
money. It had relied increasingly on gold since gaining favored access to Brazil 
 after 1700. Amid the wars of 1790–1815 it turned to a de facto gold standard, 
tied to developing paper monies.  After the wars it shifted explic itly to a gold 
standard in the 1820s, insulating its industrializing economy from the difficul-
ties linked to continuing scarcities of silver.61
While revolutionary slaves destroyed the plantation economy of Haiti, 
popu lar insurgents undermined the silver economy of the New Spain, and Brit-
ain  rose to industrial eminence between 1790 and 1820, other regions of the 
Amer i cas adapted as they could. The rise of sugar and slavery in Cuba, and of 
sugar and coffee and slavery in Brazil, are widely recognized. Both experienced 
relatively stable adaptations to the new world of British power  after 1820. The 
young United States lived more complex and conflictive adaptations during 
the de cades of war and global transformation.
In the 1790s, deep debates divided the new republic. One vision, promoted 
by Thomas Jefferson, saw an agrarian and export- driven  future, honoring yeo-
man farmers while presuming slave production on southern plantations (de-
spite Jefferson’s dreams of emancipation and deportation). The alternative 
pressed by Alexander Hamilton preferred commercial ways focused in north-
ern trading cities. Both  were sustained  after 1793 by northern traders’ ability 
to prosper as neutrals in Atlantic wars. They sold farmers’ grains to diverse 
Eu ro pe ans and planters’ cotton to British industries; they traded in New Spain 
to keep silver flowing into global commerce. Jefferson’s taking the presidency 
in 1800 suggested a triumph of his vision— though the election was very close 
and contested.
War soon proved decisive to the adaptive rise of the U.S. economy. With 
the end of the Peace of Amiens in 1804 and British victory at Trafalgar in 1805, 
Britain aimed to monopolize Atlantic commerce while France consolidated 
power on mainland Eu rope.  U.S. merchants saw opportunity in trading be-
tween the Amer i cas and Europe—an opportunity Britain aimed to stop with 
embargoes and naval power. Rising conflict at sea led Jefferson to impose his 
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own embargo in 1808— hoping to stop costly naval contests, and perhaps to 
consolidate a republic grounded in cultivation. Of course farmers could eas-
ily continue to feed themselves and the residents of small port towns, but 
planters committed to cotton lost outlets in Britain.
While merchants and planters protested the embargo, New En glanders 
invested in mechanized cotton mills, using the southern slave- grown staple 
earlier sold to Britain.  Under the embargo from 1808 to 1812 and war with 
 Eng land from 1812 to 1814, the Northeast became an industrial producer.  After 
the peace, new industrialists demanded tariff protection against British im-
ports. The wars of 1790 to 1825  were as pivotal to the rise of U.S. power as they 
 were to the Haitian Revolution, which destroyed France’s role in the Atlan-
tic economy, and to the Bajío insurgency, which brought down New Spain’s 
silver economy. As the 1820s began, the United States balanced southern and 
northern interests in the Missouri Compromise, enabling the expansion of a 
continental economy now grounded in northern commerce and industry and 
southern cotton and slavery; speculators and settlers pressed a westward expan-
sion that displaced native  peoples to generate staples in the Ohio basin and 
cotton (and slavery) in a new Southwest focused on Louisiana.62
Of course, the greatest economic transformation of the age was  under way 
in Britain between 1790 and 1820. The one pivotal participant in three de cades 
of war that never saw destructive conflicts at home, Britain kept trade alive 
while entrepreneurs accelerated industrial innovation. Meanwhile, wars on the 
Eu ro pean mainland inhibited industry in France while counterinsurgency in 
Spain from 1808 to 1814, fought by Spaniards backed by Britain, destroyed 
the mechanized cotton industry that had begun in Calatuña in the 1780s.63 
When the era of war closed in the 1820s, Britain was positioned to rule a world 
economy dominated by industrial textile production and supplied by slave- 
grown U.S. cotton, taking soaring profits from the trades they stimulated.
Breaking Away
In 1820 in the Amer i cas, only the United States and Haiti  were in de pen dent; 
in Spanish Ame rica, only Buenos Aires and Caracas  were committed to in-
de pen dence. The po liti cal  future of the hemi sphere was far from set. But the 
first global economy had fallen, leaving  people everywhere searching for new 
 futures. And 1820 brought new uncertainty to questions of sovereignty in the 
Spanish empire when military forces in Spain forced Fernando VII to rein-
state the liberal Constitution of 1812. As economic change accelerated, Spanish 
Americans faced new debates that led to five years of renewed conflict and the 
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emergence of new polities. By 1824 all Iberian Ame rica had claimed in de pen-
dence, except Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Ca rib bean. Brazil held together 
as a constitutional monarchy, while Spain’s domains fragmented into diverse 
republics.
Buenos Aires and Caracas consolidated in de pen dence by sending armies led 
by José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar, respectively, to break Spanish rule 
in the Andes. Bolívar finished the work by creating the republic of Bolivia, in-
cluding Potosí, long ago the heart of the global silver economy, in 1824. Loyal-
ists in New Spain  were pacifying the last popu lar insurgents in the Bajío in 1820, 
when Spain’s return to liberal rule set Agustín de Iturbide, who had fought to 
defend Spain for a de cade, to forging an alliance of the power ful that founded 
Mexico in 1821 as an empire that quickly collapsed and became a federal re-
public in 1824. Portuguese King João remained in Rio de Janeiro into 1821, 
then returned to Lisbon to deal with a Cádiz- inspired liberal movement aim-
ing to return Brazil to colonial status. His son Pedro broke with Portugal in 
1822, crowned emperor of a Brazil that remained a monarchy  until 1889.
Spanish Ame rica turned to building republican nations between 1821 
and 1824; Brazil worked to forge a constitutional monarchy. All joined the po-
liti cal pro cesses of the age, grounding new regimes in variants of popu lar sover-
eignty and offering new electoral participations. Across the Amer i cas, diverse 
new countries converged in turning to the politics of popu lar sovereignty, open-
ing pro cesses that proved long, conflictive, and repeatedly coercive— including 
in the United States, where the war of 1860–1865 proved the bloodiest con-
flict of all. Yet history repeatedly reports the United States as a most creative 
and successful republic, while seeing Latin Americans as incapable, repeatedly 
turning to military- authoritarian rule. The dichotomy was never so clear. To 
understand the diverging trajectories of the new countries that emerged across 
the Amer i cas in the first half of the nineteenth  century, we must see their dif-
fer ent possibilities and responses in new times of industrial capitalism. The new 
countries of the Amer i cas converged— and never simply copied, as Roberto 
Breña emphasizes—in pursuing politics of popu lar sovereignty. They diverged 
as regions with diverse resources and populations adapted to a rapidly and radi-
cally changing world economy. The result was mostly divergence.
Divergence in Atlantic Ame rica
Haiti diverged most. The armed slaves’ assault on sugar and slavery transformed 
its economy; withdrawal and exclusion from trade led to economic isolation. 
Haitians strug gled on, committed to personal liberty and  family production 
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while facing exclusion in the world of nations and trade. Limited coffee exports 
earned some revenues, minimally funding regimes decried as too military— 
yet that acquiesced in the turn to  family sustenance that was the first interest 
of the emancipated populace. The revolutionary fall of sugar and slavery in 
Haiti did not end that long- profitable relationship in the greater Ca rib bean. 
It expanded in Cuba, on smaller islands, and in mainland zones such as Brit-
ish Demerara, where in 1823 slaves attempted to follow Haitian’s example in 
a rising that did hasten the end of slavery in Britain’s empire.64 Older British 
and French islands saw sugar production and profits wane as soils exhausted 
and slavery ended between 1830 and 1850. They remained colonies (even if of-
ficially part of a French nation) searching for economies. Ironically,  people of 
African ancestry across the British and French Ca rib bean, long enslaved, lived 
by economies of sustenance through most of the nineteenth  century. By dif-
fer ent means, they ended where Haitians had fought to get. The parallels  were 
limited, however. Haitians often held their own land, yet faced international 
exclusions aimed to punish black revolutionaries; islanders  under British and 
French rule usually lived as tenants, while gaining some access to education and 
trade: the small rewards of not being revolutionary.65
Cuba was diff er ent, not  because it was Spanish and remained a colony, but 
 because its expansion of sugar and slavery came on fresh soils  after 1750, to ac-
celerate in the 1790s when the Haitian Revolution opened markets. Into the 
nineteenth  century Cuba was eco nom ically prosperous for local planters and 
merchants in Havana, Spain, Britain, and the United States. Many of the latter 
profited by delivering growing numbers of slaves, despite proclaimed opposi-
tion and the illegality of the trade in Britain and the United States  after 1807. 
Slaves paid for Cuba’s rise during and  after the conflicts that led to Haitian and 
Latin American in de pen dence. Masters and merchants profited while ideo-
logues worried about Haitian pre ce dents; together they aimed to keep slaves less 
than a majority. Cuba’s sugar and slave boom, the last of the cycles that  shaped 
Atlantic Ame rica, generated limited re sis tance during de cades of expansion. 
Deepening conflicts came in the 1860s, ending slavery in 1886 and Spanish rule 
in 1898.66
Brazil, where sugar and slavery first flourished in the Amer i cas, lived impor-
tant continuities as it diverged from other former slave colonies  after 1820. Its 
sugar, gold, and diamond economy had linked to Britain (via Portugal) in the 
early eigh teenth  century. Exports fell  after 1750, despite the Marquis de Pom-
bal’s enlightened policies. The economy strug gled through the 1780s,  until the 
Haitian Revolution opened markets for a revival of northeastern sugar and 
slavery and the beginning of coffee and slavery around Rio. The 1808 arrival of 
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the royal court in Rio definitively linked a revitalized slave economy to British 
merchants and markets.67
Brazil avoided a long, destructive war for in de pen dence. When the regime 
broke with Portugal in 1822, it fought regional conflicts to expel the last Portu-
guese forces, to hold northeastern and southern regions in the empire based in 
Rio, and to block limited slave re sis tance.68 Thanks to export profits and Brit-
ish naval support, Brazil held together as a monarchy (with new constitutional 
participations) committed to slavery (in this it was like Cuba, in a Spanish 
empire struggling  toward constitutional ways). Sugar declined in the face of 
Cuban expansion in the 1820s, but coffee and slavery grew to sustain a Brazil-
ian empire linked to Britain. Slave imports held strong to 1850, when British 
opposition turned from rhetorical to naval. The empire of coffee and slavery 
promised popu lar sovereignty and electoral competition in a regime  shaped 
by entrepreneurial power and patronage politics. Facing po liti cal uncertainties 
and periodic conflicts into the 1840s, Brazil proved the most stable regime in 
the Amer i cas  until slavery and empire collapsed together in 1888–1889. Through-
out, Brazil sustained British power and prosperity.69
The same can be said of the southern United States to 1860. Slavery was 
long established around the Chesapeake and near Charleston, serving tobacco, 
indigo, and rice growers. A war for in de pen dence and early national politics 
led by slaveholding planters guaranteed the endurance of slavery, facilitating 
the rise of cotton and slavery to supply British industry from the 1790s. Slav-
ery expanded numerically and geo graph i cally, making cotton to sustain British 
production. The United States proved the rare region where slave populations 
grew without imports, assuaging British opposition to the oceanic slave trade 
while its industry, power, and prosperity depended on slave- grown cotton.70
Still, the rise of the United States was more complex. As noted, trade em-
bargo and war between 1808 and 1814 brought a reluctant turn to industry in the 
North. New  Eng land became a consumer of slave- grown cotton and an emerg-
ing competitor to British manufacturers. New En glanders depended on the 
slave South while promoting wage  labor in industries at home. Contradiction 
was everywhere.  After the Missouri Compromise of 1820 an economy of con-
tinental contradictions drove west, taking land from in de pen dent natives to 
expand cotton grown by slaves and staples raised by  free farmers. In 1835 south-
erners facilitated the secession of Mexican Texas to expand cotton and slavery. 
From 1846 to 1848 they pressed a war begun to take Texas into the Union— and 
ended by taking a vast new West, including California’s gold.71
The United States claimed a continent of unparalleled resources— a repub-
lic of popu lar sovereignty, committed to slavery, slowly opening electoral rights 
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for free white men. Its expansive prosperity generated conflicts that deepened 
after war with Mexico brought vast new lands into the Union—Texas, grounded 
in cotton and slavery; California, producing vast riches in gold; and all the 
lands between. A devastating and not very civil war ended slavery in 1865, con-
firmed the triumph of northern industry, and set the re united continental na-
tion on course to become Britain’s  great competitor for global hegemony.72
Britain ruled the world of concentrated economic power that  shaped the 
nineteenth  century by building industry at home, drawing resources and sell-
ing cloth in markets across the globe, and emerging unchallenged from the wars 
of 1790–1825. The United States  later built a parallel power, concentrating 
industry in its Northeast, while drawing resources and selling in markets across 
a continent taken into a huge nation populated by  people fleeing Europe—at 
the cost of slaves, Mexicans, and native Amer i cans. Both the enormity and the 
fragility of Britain’s rise became clear as it faced the competition of a United 
States with continental foundations  after 1880.73
The Atlantic Ame rica created by sugar and slavery— Beckert would call it 
war capitalism— found diverse adaptations in the nineteenth- century world 
of concentrated industrial power. Haitians withdrew for their own very good 
reasons— and paid with poverty. Brazil deepened its ties with Britain and pros-
pered as a key commodity producer— while growing numbers labored in slav-
ery. Cuba remained a colony to become the last sugar and slave economy of the 
Amer i cas. The United States took advantage of early in de pen dence to prosper 
from trade and then industry during the wars of 1790–1820, sustaining Brit-
ish power with expanding cotton and slavery to 1865, while northeastern mills 
competed with British industry. Haitians made a revolutionary choice to end 
slavery and exports. Brazil, Cuba, and the United States, in contrast, expanded 
slavery, found commercial success, and  after 1860 faced conflicts grounded in 
the contradictions of their slave- based export successes.
Inversions in Spanish and Indigenous Ame rica
The continental regions of Spanish Ame rica broke ties with Spain  after 1820 
and quickly broke apart to create more than a dozen new countries. Following 
three centuries of pivotal global importance thanks to the silver, no region of 
Spanish Ame rica would contend for power, and few found prosperity in the era 
of North Atlantic industrial capitalism. Spanish Ame rica and China had been 
linked for centuries in silver- fueled global trades. The fall of silver left both to 
grapple with economic challenges and po liti cal conflicts—in inevitably diff er-
ent ways.
figures 1.2 and 1.3. At the base of industrial capitalism:  
Scenes on a cotton plantation
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The Andean silver economy had stimulated global trade as it commercialized 
social relations still grounded in Inca and indigenous ways from 1550 to 1650, 
also stimulating a broad commercial integration linking regions that would 
become northern Argentina, central Chile, and Ec ua dor to Lima, Potosí, and 
the Andean heartland. As New Spain became the center of silver production 
and global trades in the eigh teenth  century, Andeans strug gled as rising state 
demands provoked social conflicts that culminated in the 1780s. Madrid tried 
a cure by shifting Andean silver  toward the Atlantic via Buenos Aires in 1776, 
helping set off the risings of the 1780s and contributing to disruptions that 
continued through a repressive aftermath. Most of the power ful in the Andean 
heartland resisted in de pen dence  until the 1820s; then, caught between Spanish 
liberalism and armies from Buenos Aires and Caracas, they built fragmented 
republics— Peru and Bolivia in the heartland; Chile, Ec ua dor, Colombia, and 
Venezuela in outlying regions. All searched for new economies and polities; 
none succeeded  until they found export links to the industrial world  after 
1850: Chile stabilized first when it provided foodstuffs to gold rush California; 
coastal Peru and Chile (in regions taken by war from Bolivia) profited when 
they sent guano and nitrates to fertilize commercial fields in Cuba and else-
where; Colombia and Venezuela prospered late when they joined the stimulant 
economy of coffee exports  later in the  century.74
Buenos Aires and the Río de la Plata provide a revealing history of a region 
that was geo graph i cally Atlantic, not grounded in sugar and slavery, but instead 
long linked to the Andean silver economy in peripheral ways. The area faced 
complex changes from 1790 to 1825 and endured deep po liti cal conflicts long 
 after. Still, while struggling to become nations, the ports and  peoples of the 
Plata and the Pampas found prosperity sustaining the rising power of Britain.
Buenos Aires was founded in the late sixteenth  century to block Potosí sil-
ver from trading outside preferred imperial channels; the name of the estuary, 
the River of Silver, shows that silver found its way to the Atlantic  there. For 
two centuries, the city survived by smuggling just enough silver to profit  those 
sent to limit smuggling. The opening of the port in 1776 and the new viceroy-
alty set  there with jurisdiction over Potosí aimed to promote silver production 
and ease its arrival in Atlantic trade (as eighteenth- century flows  were drawn 
increasingly east  toward Eu rope before heading to India and China). But the 
risings that rocked the Andean heartland in the 1780s guaranteed that Buenos 
Aires would never become a  great silver exporter.
Instead, the South Atlantic port found new opportunity during Haiti’s rev-
olution and the shifting production and trade it opened. As Brazil revived sugar 
and slavery in the Northeast and began coffee and slavery in the South, the 
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Pampas became a source of salted beef and other foodstuffs to sustain growing 
numbers of slaves. Buenos Aires became a center of trade, shipping, and pro-
cessing; its population grew  toward sixty thousand around 1800— including 
large numbers of African slaves made available and affordable by the closure 
of Saint Domingue. In his transforming study Workshop of Revolution: Ple­
bian Buenos Aires and the Atlantic World, 1776–1810, Lyman Johnson details 
how the city became a center of production and social tension that fended off 
British invasion in 1806 and quickly turned to seeking in de pen dence when 
Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808. The merchants and artisans, growers and 
grazers of greater Buenos Aires sought access to the world to continue to 
prosper.75
De cades of war— first within and then against the Spanish empire,  later 
among neighbors along the Río de Plata— followed as a region facing new eco-
nomic prospects strug gled to consolidate states and po liti cal systems. Buenos 
Aires eventually became the center of an emerging Argentina that prospered 
first by sustaining slaves in Brazil and Cuba, then by sending wool, leather, 
wheat, and beef to Britain. Uruguay became a small replica of Argentina, set up 
by Britain to create a buffer with Brazil.76 Paraguay turned inward to become 
a mostly Guaraní nation, rejecting trade to preserve economic autonomy and 
indigenous ways— until a deadly war funded by Britain set an alliance of Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and Uruguay against Paraguay, forcing it open to the world in 
the 1860s, consolidating a nation of enduring Guaraní poverty.77
Paraguay’s creation as a Guaraní nation was the extreme case of a common 
outcome of the conflicts and transformations of 1790 to 1825 in South Ame-
rica. As new nations strug gled to build polities and new economies, indigenous 
 peoples often found new autonomies that endured for de cades. In regions once 
at the heart of the silver economy, indigenous republics found economic open-
ings while facing fragile and contested national po liti cal powers. Other native 
 peoples who had lived  free at the margins of empires, yet dealt with traders for 
the  horses, arms, tools, and other goods that enabled in de pen dence, found new 
ways of assertion as new states strug gled  after 1810. The spread of indigenous 
in de pen dence across the Andes and adjacent lowlands frustrated  those who 
presumed native subordination. But that in de pen dence was real—if, outside 
Paraguay, never recognized in the world of nations— long into the nineteenth 
 century.78 Only the consolidation of export economies tied to British hege-
mony and rising U.S. demand  after 1860 enabled South American states to so-
lidify and then curtail native in de pen dence— and crush Paraguay.
The transformation of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which in its largest 
sense stretched from Costa Rica to California, followed a diff er ent path. Still, 
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it too ended with disintegrations, strug gles to create new polities, searches 
for new economies, and indigenous in de pen dence— all facilitating the ris-
ing power of the United States. What made New Spain diff er ent was the 
strength of its silver economy to 1810— and the depth of the insurgent- driven 
collapse that followed. The fall of silver was clear in 1811, and entrenched by 
1820 when Spain returned to liberal rule, setting off a movement that aimed 
to draw Fernando VII to Mexico City to rule all New Spain— including the 
Kingdom of Guatemala (Central Ame rica) and Cuba in a North American 
Bourbon monarchy. Fernando refused, Cuba never joined, and Guatemala 
broke away.
Cuba remained a prosperous Atlantic colony of sugar and slavery; had it 
joined Mexico, a mostly mainland nation would have gained the profits of 
sugar, the prob lem of slavery (which it  later faced in Texas), and the merchant 
and naval power they sustained. The Kingdom of Guatemala had gained  little 
from the silver economy. It was linked to the world in the eigh teenth  century 
mostly by the indigo raised around San Salvador and sent into trade by Guate-
mala City merchants. The region had  little incentive to become subordinate to 
a regime based in Mexico City. Guatemala led the kingdom away in 1822, 
to soon face conflict and fragmentation into five Central American states. As 
cochineal from the highlands east of Guatemala City replaced indigo as the 
region’s primary trade commodity, El Salvador broke with Guatemala. Gua-
temala then reconstituted as a  union of indigenous western highlands, ladino 
(mixed/Hispanic) eastern uplands, and a capital region that concentrated 
power.79 None of the Central American nations built solid states  until they 
found commodities to sell in the new economy of the late nineteenth  century: 
coffee in Pacific hills from the 1850s; bananas in Ca rib bean lowlands from the 
1890s.
In Mexico, Agustín Iturbide, a commander noted for hard campaigns against 
po liti cal rebels and Bajío insurgents, became emperor on Fernando’s refusal to 
take a New World throne. When New Spain began to fragment as silver col-
lapsed, the empire gave way to a federal republic in 1824. Its central powers 
faced an empty trea sury as mine revenues plummeted and silver and internal 
taxes went to the states. British lenders funded the regime for a few years, 
opened Mexico to British cloth, and created debts that plagued the nation for 
de cades. To 1810 New Spain had exported revenue and capital;  after 1820, the 
Mexican state and entrepreneurs turned to British investors for capital and new 
technologies. They sustained the state and drained some mines— but generated 
few profits as silver production held low. Once the world’s source of money, 
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Mexico became an importer of capital and technology— a debtor with an un-
certain  future.
Across central and southern regions the residents of indigenous republics, 
earlier granted land and self- rule to sustain the silver economy, found new au-
tonomies as the nation and commercial ways floundered. Families that had led 
the de cade of insurgency in the Bajío, taking down the silver economy, kept 
control of often- irrigated lands, feeding themselves, supplying local markets, 
enjoying autonomies that extended to new roles for  women heads of rural 
 house holds.80 Pop u lar gains held amid national trou bles.
De cades of economic challenge and po liti cal conflict followed. Amid de-
bates over centralism and federalism, liberalism and conservatism, Zacatecas’s 
mines came back to life in the 1820s; Guanajuato revived in the 1840s— when 
silver production fi nally began to rise. British investors had left facing bank-
ruptcies; they also left steam pumps and other technologies that, adapted by 
Mexican entrepreneurs to Mexican ways of production, began to revive min-
ing. Meanwhile, in the early 1830s, a government seeking a new economy set 
tariffs on cloth imports to fund a national development bank that underwrote 
mechanized industries in the 1830s and 1840s. Could Mexico combine revived 
silver mining with mechanized industry to find new prosperity and po liti cal 
consolidation? As the 1840s began, it seemed imaginable.81
Any consolidation, however, faced two threats from the north. The Coman-
che, like many South American natives, had lived on the margins of the Spanish 
world, adopting  horses and firearms to assert in de pen dent power. With the 
fall of the silver economy and the instability of the Mexican republic, a Co-
manche empire  rose  after 1810 on the lands between New Mexico, Texas, and 
the United States. Mexican northward expansion ended as Comanche drove 
south.82 Meanwhile, mi grants from the United States expanded cotton and 
slavery in Texas. In 1836 they took Texas out of Mexico, deepening Mexican 
po liti cal conflicts.83 In 1846, expansionist U.S. southerners won incorporation 
of secessionist Texas as a slave state, knowing the act would provoke war with 
Mexico and allow the U.S to claim the land from Texas through California. The 
war also helped end Comanche in de pen dence. Defeat and the loss of northern 
territories renewed po liti cal and social conflicts in Mexico, inhibiting eco-
nomic revival for de cades.84
The collapse of New Spain’s silver economy brought a difficult birth to Mex-
ico and favored the expansive power of the United States. When gold revived 
an economy of bullion, irrigated cultivation, and commercial grazing in the 
1850s, it came in California, stimulating the economic growth and westward 
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expansion of the United States. Yet the challenge of dealing with the expansion 
of slavery into the lands claimed from Mexico led directly to the Civil War.85 
Only  after 1865 did the United States consolidate as a nation  under northern 
leadership, accelerating a westward expansion that often replicated the bullion 
economy of Spanish North Ame rica in lands recently taken  under U.S. rule and 
increasingly emptied of long- resistant native  peoples.86
Mexico did not find a po liti cal settlement or a new economy  until the 
1870s—in a liberal authoritarian regime that pressed against small producers, 
favored cap i tal ist agriculture, and welcomed U.S. capital to revive mines, build 
railroads, and energize an economy increasingly tied to U.S. markets. In a  great 
North American inversion, the regions of New Spain that had driven global 
trade via a flourishing silver economy before 1810, by 1870  were dependencies 
of a rising United States. Irony upon irony: much of the “U.S.” capital that 
came to profit in Mexico was generated in California, Colorado, and Arizona 
mining booms.  After 1848, lands once Mexican prospered by replicating the 
silver economy of Spanish North Ame rica; they benefited from the work of 
Mexicans, some long- established residents,  others mi grants newly arrived on 
well- trodden trails or newly built rails.87 The United States that challenged 
Britain for global hegemony around 1900 was favored by the collapse of New 
Spain’s silver economy; it prospered by incorporating its northern lands, its dy-
namic ways, and many of its industrious  peoples.
The world of concentrated industrial capitalism persisted into the early 
twentieth  century.  After 1870, Britain shared and disputed hegemony with in-
dustries and empires rising in the United States and Germany. Both competitors 
joined Britain on the gold standard in the 1870s, ending the long sway of that 
metal- money— and ultimately prejudicing any revival of the silver economies 
that once had made the Andes and New Spain central to global trades. A North 
Atlantic axis of geopo liti cal economic power ruled militarily and industrially, 
drawing commodities from and selling wares to an expanding and often colo-
nized “rest of the world,”  until the competitors for hegemony fell into brutal 
war from 1914 to 1918, while key outliers— Mexico, Rus sia, and China— turned 
to revolutions that became crucibles for imagining diff er ent ways of global and 
national development.
Still, the world created between 1770 and 1830 limped forward to 1930— 
when the  Great Depression completed the collapse of the first global industrial 
economy. Then, nations across the Amer i cas turned to programs promising to 
bring the benefits of industrialism home in proj ects of national development. 
The attempt proved difficult, often impossible, in a mid- twentieth- century 
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era of wars, revolutions, and technological innovation— this time bringing 
population explosion, unpre ce dented urbanization, and a new postindustrial 
globalization.88
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Preamble
The new countries that came to define the modern Amer i cas emerged within 
the “Age of Revolution,” a historical period widely recognized, yet open to 
diverse periodizations. Many focus on the half  century from 1775 to 1825, em-
phasizing the revolution of the Thirteen Colonies (1776–1783), the French 
Revolution (1789–1799), the Haitian revolt and in de pen dence (1791–1804), 
and the Spanish American in de pen dence movements (1810–1824).1 Another 
common vision sees the chronological span of the Age of Revolution as the 
 century that goes from 1750 to 1850.2 From a po liti cal perspective some his-
torians go as far back as 1688 (to include  Eng land’s “Glorious Revolution”); 
some are more “selective,” like Jacques Solé, who circumscribes this revolutionary 
era to the period from 1773 to 1804,3 some like David Armitage and San-
jay Subrahmanyam prefer a “global” Age of Revolution from 1760 to 1840,4 
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and, fi nally,  others have no prob lem extending this age to include the 1848 
revolutions.5
In this essay, I focus my analy sis on the po liti cal revolution that took place in 
the Spanish- speaking world from 1808 to 1824. My main interest is to show the 
decisive influence that the Cádiz liberal experience had on the Spanish Ameri-
can in de pen dence movements. Without understanding this experience it is al-
most impossible to grasp what went on po liti cally and intellectually in Spanish 
Ame rica during  those sixteen years (with variations, of course, depending on 
the region and the years in which we focus our attention). While the Spanish 
American in de pen dence pro cesses can be considered an integral part of the 
Atlantic revolutions, their Atlantic character stems mainly from the peninsular 
po liti cal revolution focused on Cádiz. This is not to say that the revolution in 
the mundo hispánico did not share broad po liti cal princi ples, selected ideas, 
and some debates with the other Atlantic revolutions; in this essay, however, 
I emphasize the many par tic u lar, at times unique, visions, and programs that 
defined po liti cal debates in the mundo hispánico between 1808 and 1824. They 
make it clear that no revolutionary sequence, no “revolutionary wave,” began 
in Boston, flowed to Paris, crashed in Port- au- Prince, and then flooded Mexico 
City, Caracas, and Buenos Aires.
The Spanish American in de pen dence movements are unintelligible from 
a po liti cal and intellectual perspective without understanding the events and 
innovations that began in Spain in 1808.  After de cades of wars and trade con-
flicts, with France usually as an ally and Britain normally as an  enemy, the up-
risings in several Spanish cities against Napoleon’s army in the spring of 1808 
started the po liti cal crisis that turned the mundo hispánico upside down. In 
the following years, peninsular Spaniards and Spanish Americans  shaped a new 
po liti cal vision that can be defined, albeit with varying emphases and connota-
tions, as “liberal” and that can be encapsulated, within the sociohistoric context 
of the time, in the term “liberalism.” More precisely, I define it as liberalismo 
hispánico. In the end, the crisis of 1808 led to the loss of all of Spain’s continental 
territories in the New World; a loss suffered by an empire that had faced 
 po liti cal and military decay for more than a  century (even as New Spain, Cuba, 
and the Río de la Plata lived economic revivals); that had become increasingly 
dependent on France; and that, as the  battle of Trafalgar definitively showed in 
1805, had lost the military confrontation against  Eng land that had character-
ized European- Atlantic history since at least the War of Austrian Succession 
(1740–1748). However, no conflict of the eigh teenth  century was as impor tant 
as the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) in showing the Spanish Crown the need 
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to overhaul its full military, fiscal, and administrative structure in the New 
World. The British occupation of the strategic port of La Habana in 1762 re-
vealed worrisome vulnerabilities.6 Yet Spain’s empire carried on. Its demise in 
Ame rica during the first quarter of the nineteenth  century was a protracted 
pro cess, with military and administrative weakness countered by economic re-
siliency. Social upheavals also marked the second half of the Spanish American 
eigh teenth  century, as shown by the Quito insurrection of 1765 and the Túpac 
Amaru rebellion of 1780 and related risings. Still— and despite the search by 
so many “nationalist” historians to find precursors everywhere— the conflicts 
and debates that began in Spain in 1808 and by diverse routes led to Spanish 
American nations in the 1820s surprised every body. The wars of in de pen dence 
 were completely unexpected (as many of its protagonists recognized).
The po liti cal crisis of the mundo hispánico began in 1808 with the Napo-
leonic invasion and occupation of most of Spain. Two years  later, the  futures 
of Spain and Spanish Ame rica became inextricably linked to the city of Cádiz. 
The reasons  were mostly military: its geo graph i cal location on an isolated 
peninsula with a very narrow access by land ensured that French armies could 
not capture Cádiz— while British and Spanish ships could guard and supply 
it from the sea. Safe from invading forces, Cádiz became the meeting place 
of the approximately 260 delegates from the Peninsula and overseas (all from 
Spanish Ame rica, but two from the Philippines) who gathered from Septem-
ber 1810 onward in the famous Cortes of Cádiz. From a po liti cal perspective, 
this Parliament radically transformed the Spanish monarchy; first through a 
series of decrees and then with its culminating work: the Constitution of Cádiz 
or 1812 Constitution, sanctioned in March of that year.7 In January 1814 the 
Cortes moved from Cádiz to Madrid, only to be dissolved by the recently 
restored Fernando VII in May of that same year. The dissolution of the Cortes 
ended the liberal revolution in the Peninsula and returned absolutism to Spain 
and its empire. It did not end, however, the influence of Cádiz liberalism in the 
mundo hispánico.
In the first section of this chapter I offer an overview of the Spanish lib-
eral revolution and its main intellectual sources. In the second I consider how 
the revolution affected the Spanish American emancipation processes— which 
gradually turned into “in de pen dence movements.”8 Fi nally, I explore the recent 
historiography dealing with the mundo hispánico and the Spanish American 
in de pen dence movements to emphasize that a more profound understanding 
of Cádiz liberalism and the revoluciones hispánicas should lead to a more com-
plex understanding of the “Age of Revolution.”
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The Spanish Liberal Revolution
The po liti cal and social turmoil that began in Spain in 1808 and soon spread to 
its Amer i cas began in the face of the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by Napo-
leon’s army in the fall of 1807. Officially, this was not an “invasion”  because the 
Spanish Crown had signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau in October, permitting 
French troops to enter Spanish territory on their way to invade Portugal. Soon, 
however, the supposed transit became an occupation: a tense calm lasted for 
several months,  until the  people of Madrid revolted against the French garrison 
on May 2, 1808. Three weeks  later, when the Gazeta de Madrid spread the news 
to several other Spanish cities of the so- called “abdications” of Bayonne, a gen-
eral insurrection began.9 The presence of Napoleon’s army in Spanish territory 
then became a full- fledged occupation. From that moment, the traditional alli-
ance between Spain and France that had persisted during almost all of the eigh-
teenth  century, formalized through several Bourbon pactos de familia, came to 
an end. For the next six years the Peninsula was the scene of a war so harrowing 
that Goya’s famous depiction of it (Los desastres de la guerra) became an endur-
ing symbol of the senseless and inexhaustible vio lence of all wars.
The war with France meant that the Spanish army and  people had to face 
the most power ful army of the time. Yet in an unexpected and unique way, the 
military conflict became a po liti cal revolution. During the first two years 
the revolution was led by a variety of local juntas,  later coordinated with much 
difficulty by a Junta Central that suddenly dissolved in January 1810 in the face 
of po liti cal adversities and defeats against the French army. To that point, the 
events taking place in the Peninsula did not have a po liti cal label. That changed 
during 1810 when the po liti cal group with the upper hand in the Cortes that 
gathered in Cádiz became known as liberales. The extent and depth of the 
changes that the Cortes designed for Spain and Spanish Ame rica are so vast 
that it is difficult to detail them in a few pages. I  will first outline impor tant ele-
ments of the po liti cal situation in the Peninsula between 1808 and 1814, then 
proceed to engage the main po liti cal tenets of the “first Spanish liberalism,” and 
fi nally explore key doctrinal and intellectual sources.10 Together,  these three 
ele ments should give a clear idea of the revolutionary character of first Spanish 
liberalism while revealing of some of its tensions and ambiguities.
The liberal revolution of 1808 to 1814 derived some of its main traits from 
key aspects of Spanish society at the beginning of the nineteenth  century. The 
extraordinary power wielded by the valido Manuel Godoy (Carlos IV’s first min-
ister for fifteen years) was increasingly resented; in fact, the Spanish Crown’s 
legitimacy and power declined markedly during Godoy’s tenure. Legitimacy 
plummeted for two main reasons. The first one was the Crown’s increasing 
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dependence on Napoleon. The second one was the all too public confronta-
tion between Carlos IV, king since 1789, and his eldest son, Fernando.  These 
confrontations led to the abdication by Carlos to his son  after the so- called 
motín (riot) of Aranjuez in March 1808 (a rising planned by Fernando’s sup-
porters).11 The Spanish monarchy was losing re spect and legitimacy at the very 
moment when the French army was occupying almost all of Spain’s peninsular 
territory.
This uncertain legitimacy opened the way for the dos años cruciales (two 
crucial years), as François- Xavier Guerra called 1808 and  1809. A profound 
ideological transformation affecting the  whole mundo hispánico began in the 
biennium that preceded the Cortes of Cádiz and the beginning of the Spanish 
American emancipation pro cesses.12 Militarily, the years 1808–1810 brought a 
long list of French victories on Spanish battlefields (notwithstanding the fa-
mous Spanish victory at Bailén in July 1808). In the po liti cal realm the Junta 
Central had a difficult time constituting itself as the head of the numerous local 
juntas while Fernando was a prisoner of Napoleon at Bayonne.13
For a long time, Spanish historiography presented  these local juntas, that 
or ga nized the fighting against the French, as “popu lar,” that is, formed by mem-
bers of all levels of society, including the least advantaged. It is now clear that 
the vast majority of them  were formed by the notables of each city or town. 
Still, the crisis of 1808 started as a popu lar revolt against the French and, in the 
context of the moment, most juntas could not work without popu lar support. 
At the same time, the Spanish war against French occupation made the term 
“guerrilla” synonymous with armed popu lar re sis tance.14 This pivotal period of 
Spanish history was therefore  shaped in impor tant ways by social movements 
of popu lar origin. Such foundations  were reflected, explic itly or implicitly, in 
the ideology the liberals developed from 1808 through 1814; they  were a central 
ele ment of Spanish patriotism during the war— and of an enduring Spanish 
nationalism.
In January 1810, the Junta Central, overwhelmed by military defeats, without 
economic resources, and facing a campaign of discredit by internal enemies, 
dissolved itself. In the pro cess, it first made its most impor tant decision: to 
summon the election of Cortes. The institution was no novelty: Cortes had 
existed in several Spanish kingdoms since the  Middle Ages, gathering repre-
sentatives of cities and towns to discuss, sanction, or limit royal decisions. But 
 there was novelty in the Cortes that gathered in Cádiz in 1810: the vast major-
ity of the members would be elected by much of the adult male population, 
something unpre ce dented in Spain (or in any other part of the world). No less 
impor tant, the Amer i cas  were included in the new representative body (though 
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the method of electing them was diff er ent, to ensure that deputies from the 
peninsula would hold a strong majority). As mentioned and although numbers 
vary depending on the date and the issue  under discussion, in total around 260 
deputies participated in the extraordinary Cortes that opened in Cádiz in 
September 1810. Of them, about sixty  were Spanish Americans— though Span-
ish Ame rica’s population was larger than Spain’s.15
The participation of the American representatives in the debates was very 
impor tant; several topics would not have been discussed at all or would have 
been debated very differently without the Americans’ presence. But they  were 
a minority, and they  were defeated at  every turn when votes came on the most 
impor tant economic or po liti cal issues (i.e.,  free trade or po liti cal autonomy 
for their territories). Despite their active participation in several of the most 
impor tant debates, the direct contributions of Spanish American deputies to 
the 384 articles of the final version of the Cádiz Constitution  were limited. We 
 will return to the document  later. At this point, it is impor tant to look at Cádiz, 
the city that became the head and the heart of the Spanish liberal revolution.
As mentioned, Cádiz was the seat of the Spanish government from 1810 
to 1814 for purely geo- military reasons. Still, it is impor tant to recognize the 
exceptionality of the city within Spain. It was a port and by far the most impor-
tant point of contact of the Peninsula with Spain’s Amer i cas. This brought a 
constant circulation of goods, persons, and ideas from across the world, and the 
presence of merchants, bankers, intellectuals, and politicians of diverse nation-
alities. Cádiz was a cosmopolitan city, a place used to “other” ways of thinking, 
with the vitality of any port where business is vibrant— and in the eyes of many 
visitors a very beautiful city. Lord Byron, for example, wrote in 1809: “Cadiz, 
sweet Cadiz!—it is the first spot in the Creation. The beauty of its streets and 
mansions are only excelled by the loveliness of its inhabitants.”16 Cádiz was not 
a “traditional” Spanish city. How “untraditional” it was can be inferred by the 
revolution it hosted and by the reaction of the majority of Spaniards when Fer-
nando VII returned to the Peninsula from his captivity in France and destroyed 
all that the Cortes had done. In fact, in May 1814 the king issued a decree stat-
ing that Spaniards should behave as if the Cortes had never existed.17 Most 
Spaniards, exhausted by six years of war and skeptical about the liberals’ po liti-
cal innovations, acquiesced in the fall of liberalism ( until 1820, when liberals 
returned to power and the 1812 Constitution was reinstated).
Still, what happened in Cádiz between 1810 and 1814 cannot be explained 
mainly by the characteristics of the city, unorthodox as it was within the Spain 
of 1810. What went on in the port has to be explained first by the men who 
 shaped the liberal revolution. They  were, by any standard, a small group—in 
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fact, a very small group of men. Any list can be extended to include dozens of 
names, but the main protagonists of the Spanish liberal revolution in Cádiz 
 were few: among the peninsulares, I would mention Manuel José Quintana, 
Agustín de Argüelles, José María Queipo de Llano (better known as the count 
of Toreno), Diego Muñoz Torrero, Álvaro Florez Estrada, and, with hind-
sight and from a distance (for he left Spain for  Eng land in 1810), José María 
Blanco White. Among the Spanish American representatives with unequivo-
cal liberal perspectives, I would highlight José Mejía Lequerica, José Miguel 
Ramos Arizpe, José Miguel Guridi, and Joaquín Fernández de Leiva. On this 
short list, all but Quintana, Flórez Estrada, and Blanco White  were deputies in 
the Cortes. Four  were priests (Muñoz Torrero, Blanco White, Ramos Arizpe, 
and Guridi), five had studied law (Quintana, Flórez Estrada, Argüelles, Mejía 
Lequerica, and Fernández de Leiva) and one was a noble (Toreno). Such a list, 
revealing in some re spects (for example, the weight of churchmen in the Span-
ish liberal revolution), is clearly insufficient. It ignores the hundreds of other 
men who enabled key achievements and spread impor tant ideas. Many depu-
ties contributed proposals, arguments, and votes to shape Cádiz liberalism, 
although most did so in “selective” ways, depending on the issue  under discus-
sion. On questions concerning Spanish Ame rica, Peninsulars and Americans 
 were often on diff er ent sides.
The men listed above could not have led the Cádiz liberal revolution with-
out the unpre ce dented situation created by the 1808 crisis. The absence of the 
king, the occupation of most Spanish territory by the French army, the popu-
lar turmoil provoked by the war against Napoleon, the British economic and 
military support, the de facto freedom of the press that existed in the Peninsula 
since the beginning of the crisis hispánica, and last but not least, the widespread 
discontent with Godoy and the way he handled the monarchy for years, all 
combined to create an exceptional “breeding ground.” Among  these ele ments, 
the liberty to publish po liti cal texts was paramount: from the spring of 1808 the 
Spanish press became an open and vibrant po liti cal forum.18
Liberal leaders quickly established a direct link between the war against 
Napoleon and the po liti cal revolution they  were trying to forge— nuestra revo­
lución (our revolution). A major po liti cal crisis, popu lar participation in upris-
ings all over the Peninsula, the religious character of the war against the French 
(considered atheists by many Spaniards), and freedom of the press became an 
explosive combination. If we add the unlimited devotion of the Spanish  people 
to the absent king Fernando (known as El Deseado, “the Desired One”), the con-
centration in the city of Cádiz of Spaniards looking for a po liti cal change, and 
the fact that for the first time in Spanish history elected Cortes  were in perma-
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nent session working on a new constitution, we can get an idea of life in “sweet 
Cadiz” during the liberal revolution.
In any case, while this revolution was the result of the participation of many 
 people, at its core was the small number of deputies identified as liberales. For 
the first time, the term “liberal” defined a po liti cal group. From Cádiz, the term 
extended to Spanish Ame rica, then across Eu rope and, eventually, to the rest 
of world.19
The first Spanish liberalism mixed traditional and revolutionary ele ments. 
In new historical circumstances, traditional ele ments gained strong reformist 
connotations and led to revolutionary consequences. Karl Marx saw the am-
biguous nature of the Cádiz Constitution as a combination of the old and the 
new in which the latter prevailed. For him, the document was a compromise 
between the “liberal ideas of the eigh teenth  century” and “the obscure tradi-
tions of theocracy”; the fusion made him won der how such a radical document 
came out “of the old monastic and absolutist Spain.”20
The main tenets of the first Spanish liberalism are centered in the following 
constitutional articles: national sovereignty (art. 3), protection of individual 
rights (art. 4), purpose of government (“the happiness of the Nation and the 
well- being of the individuals that compose it,” art. 13), division of powers (arts. 
15–17), national repre sen ta tion (art. 27), indirect electoral system in three levels 
(arts. 34–103), inviolability of individual liberty by the king (art. 172, section 11), 
fair administration of criminal justice (arts. 286–308), inviolability of each 
person’s home (art. 306), general taxation (art. 339), national education (arts. 
366–370), and, last but not least, freedom of the press (art. 371). Many of  these 
stipulations may not seem new, to the extent they had pre ce dents in the British 
legislation emanating mainly from the “Glorious Revolution” (1688–1689), the 
Constitution of the United States (1787), or the French constitutions that 
came out of the revolution of 1789.
Still, some provisions of the Cádiz Constitution  were revolutionary from 
any perspective: for example, the wide extension of the franchise and the inclu-
sion of the Amer i cas’ indigenous  peoples as citizens. Ultimately, the revolu-
tionary character of any constitution comes from the prevailing sociopo liti cal 
conditions in which it sees light. The Cádiz Charter came out of a global mon-
archy (including the Philippines) that had worked for time immemorial  under 
princi ples of divine right. In that context, the Constitution of 1812 brought a 
revolutionary rebalancing of the power of God, the rights of the pueblos in 
Cortes, and a  people suddenly in arms against ungodly French usurpers. The 
core po liti cal, social, and cultural values that sustained the Antiguo Régimen in 
Spain and its empire for centuries  were reworked in transforming ways.
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Marx’s perception of the radicalism of the Cádiz Constitution was right; its 
novelty built on traditional ele ments that explain the ideological ambiguity he 
read in the document. The main argument against the constitution’s revolu-
tionary character has focused on article 12, establishing Catholicism as the ex-
clusive religion and forbidding any other. Other articles in the charter point in 
the same direction: articles 35–58 on the organ ization of elections at the parish 
level (thus overseen by local priests) and article 249, maintaining the  legal priv-
ileges of the clergy. If  simple claims of divine right ended with the declaration 
of national sovereignty the Cortes made on its first day (September 24, 1810), 
the recognition of God’s ultimate power and of Catholic rights held strong.
Many historians have focused on article 12 to question the depth of the first 
Spanish liberalism. But if Spanish po liti cal traditions and new historical circum-
stances are taken into consideration, this position is untenable. It ignores Span-
ish history since at least the end of the fifteenth  century. Limiting the power of 
the monarch with a written constitution was a radical turn that did not require 
a denial of God’s rights or the Church’s roles. And the Realpolitik of re- creating 
government in the face of a foreign invasion and broad popu lar mobilization 
also inhibited any explicit turn against the Church. As leading liberals like Ar-
güelles and Toreno argued years  later to justify their less than radical position 
regarding the Church, many of the changes pressed by the constitution  were 
 going to face adversity within Spanish society (as was the case); a proclamation 
of religious tolerance would have undermined the  whole liberal proj ect.21
Still, many decrees issued by the Cortes before the constitution was sanc-
tioned in March 1812 did diminish the power of the Church, seeking to reduce 
its size and limit its power. The abolition of the Inquisition was a major liberal 
accomplishment. The six articles of title IX (arts. 366–371) are equally impor-
tant: education at all levels became the responsibility of the government and a 
“General Direction of Studies” was created to review and control public edu-
cation (art. 369). Education came  under the oversight of continuing Cortes 
that  will “legislate on every thing that has to do with [this] impor tant object” 
(art. 370). Article 371 also guaranteed freedom of the press, ending Church 
censorship. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of  these articles in pro-
moting a secularization that can be considered timid only by  those blind to the 
role the Church and the power of Catholicism in Spanish society— historically 
and still in 1810. Taking education from the Church was an indispensable step 
 toward the kind of society the liberales wanted for Spain and its overseas ter-
ritories.22 The 1812 Cádiz Constitution maintained Catholicism, but si mul ta-
neously ended the exclusive role of the Church in education, the press, and 
public discourse.
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A good way to gauge what national sovereignty, po liti cal equality, separa-
tion of powers, individual rights, elections, and a national system of education 
meant in peninsular Spain and its territories in Ame rica and Asia is the reac-
tion of the Church to the Cádiz Constitution. Clerical opposition could not 
have been more adamant or more vocal. It is impossible to explain the recep-
tion of Fernando VII on his return to Spain in 1814 and the ease with which 
he reinstalled absolutism without the total support of the clerical hierarchy. 
(The same applies to the army; in fact, in the heat of the moment its support 
was even more decisive for the return of absolutism.) It should be remembered, 
however, that several priests played central roles in the Cortes,  either designing 
many liberal mea sures or supporting them  wholeheartedly. Their participation 
contrasts with the staunch and permanent antiliberal position of the Church 
hierarchy in  every domain of po liti cal and social life (an opposition that con-
tinued throughout the nineteenth  century, and beyond).
The actions of Fernando VII when he returned and reinstated absolutism in 
1814 also give a good mea sure of the radical significance of the Cádiz Constitu-
tion. Much has been written about the alliance between “the Throne and the 
Altar” in eighteenth- century Spain. The alliance was tested by the “regalist” 
reforms of Carlos III; but  after his death in 1788 and then in reaction to the 
French Revolution, the Spanish Crown and Church grew closer  under Carlos 
IV. If we add the widespread belief among the Spanish  people that the French 
 were anti- Catholic and the profound Catholicism of Fernando VII, it is no sur-
prise that the defeat of the French in 1814 brought a renewal of an intimate 
alliance between king and Church in Spain.
This exploration of the complex relationship among Cádiz liberals, Ca-
tholicism, and the Church highlights the role of the 1812 Constitution as 
revolutionary— within Spanish history and Spanish tradition. Analysts com-
ing from other traditions cannot claim that Cádiz liberalism copied Anglo- 
American and French precedents— and malign it for not copying their 
anticlerical examples. In this and many other ways, Hispanic liberalism was 
uniquely revolutionary.
What  were the main intellectual sources of the first Spanish liberalism? The 
most impor tant are scholasticism, the modern school of Natu ral Law, Spanish 
historic nationalism (nacionalismo histórico), the Spanish Enlightenment, and 
fi nally French constitutional thought (especially the Constitution of 1791).23 
 These currents reveal the eclecticism of Spanish liberalism. Let us briefly out-
line the importance of each.
On scholasticism, during the crisis hispánica of the early nineteenth  century 
it is better to refer to “neoscholasticism.” The main neoscholastic authors “pres ent” 
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in the Cádiz Cortes  were Francisco de Vitoria (1485–1546), Juan de Mariana 
(1536–1624), and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), thinkers often identified with 
the School of Salamanca. As Quentin Skinner has shown,  these authors led a 
revival of Thomism that made very impor tant contributions to the develop-
ment of modern po liti cal thought. They laid the foundations of social contract 
theory and took the notion of consent to new levels of development.24 How-
ever, if Vitoria, Mariana, and Suárez  were pres ent in Cádiz, it was not mainly 
 because of the idea of consent, but regarding four related questions that  were 
on the Cortes’s agenda due to the French occupation: the ultimate locus of 
power, the sovereignty of the pueblos (cities, towns, and other communities), 
the subsequent limits of kingly power, and the consequent right of the pueblos 
to resist any usurpation of sovereignty. The neoscholastics gave  these topics dif-
fer ent connotations, but all insisted on the preeminence of the community as 
the foundation of po liti cal legitimacy.25 Their presence in the debates of the 
Cortes was in a certain way inevitable; Vitoria, Mariana, and Suárez  were es-
sential to the curricula of  every Spanish and Spanish American university. They 
 were, in other words, part of the “intellectual baggage” of the vast majority of 
the Cádiz deputies. The sovereignty of the pueblos, derived ultimately from 
God, was an enduring and very much debated Spanish tradition; it did not 
have to be imported or copied from anywhere.
The impor tant exponents of modern Natu ral Law  were many; the best- 
known in Spain during the second half of the eigh teenth  century  were Gro-
tius (1583–1645), Pufendorf (1632–1694), Barbeyrac (1644–1744), and Vattel 
(1714–1767). The neo- Thomists rigorously maintained the traditional scholas-
tic hierarchy of Eternal, Divine, Natu ral and  human law. For them, Natu ral 
Law was a reflection of Eternal Law—an “implant” in men to understand the 
designs of God.26 This understanding of Natu ral Law began to change when 
Grotius saw it as a dictate of reason, of the rational nature of man; for him, the 
key was not conformity with nature, but conformity with rational nature.27
Several proponents of modern Natu ral Law  were introduced into Spanish 
universities in the 1770s, shaping the visions of many po liti cal thinkers as the 
nineteenth  century began. In the Cádiz Cortes, two of the most impor tant 
 theses of what Joaquín Varela Suanzes calls iusnaturalismo racionalista came up 
in several debates, especially regarding the state of nature and the social con-
tract.28 Closely linked to rationalist Natu ral Law is another impor tant source 
of the first Spanish liberalism: the constitutional thought contained, implicitly 
or explic itly, in the works of French thinkers like Montesquieu, Rousseau, and 
Sieyès.  These authors  were also pres ent in the Cádiz debates, albeit in varied 
disguises. In the case of Rousseau, con temporary historiography is cautious 
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when calibrating his influence on Spanish liberalism. His literary and peda-
gogic ideas influenced the Spanish Enlightenment, no doubt; but his politics 
 were challenged, and become hard to discuss and assess since the French Revo-
lution and even more  after the occupation by Napoleon’s army in 1808.
In this regard, the relative openness of the Spanish Crown to the books and 
ideas coming from its Bourbon ally and neighbor came to a drastic halt in 1789. 
The count of Floridablanca, one of the most impor tant ministers of the pe-
riod, closed the border to stop revolutionary material from entering Spain. The 
closure was not fully effective, but the po liti cal reaction of the Spanish gov-
ernment and its increasingly conservative stance  toward revolutionary France 
are evident. Between 1790 and  1792 the most “progressive” members of the 
Spanish government lost their posts: Cabarrús, Jovellanos, Campomanes, and 
Aranda. The French Revolution thus fortified the ideology, the interests, and 
the po liti cal position of the Church and of the most conservative sectors of 
Spanish society.
As Emilio La Parra showed in his biography of Godoy, it is true that on 
questions of regalism and some economic goals  there was no rupture of the 
Spanish Enlightenment between Carlos III and Carlos IV. However,  there is 
no denying that in other aspects the arrival of Godoy to power in 1790 stulti-
fied winds of change that had flourished  under Carlos III.29 As Antonio de 
Maravall and Antonio Elorza showed long ago, some Spanish authors made 
enlightened and advanced po liti cal proposals in the 1780s (León del Arroyal, 
Manuel de Aguirre, and Valentín de Foronda among them). Still, the limited 
diffusion of their work and the notion, pres ent in all of them, that the king had 
to be the center and arbiter of po liti cal reforms, make it difficult to see a direct 
link between the Spanish Enlightenment and the Cádiz Cortes, that  were so 
adamant in limiting the king’s power.30 The links between the Spanish Enlight-
enment, a rationalist movement focused on socioeconomic (i.e., nonpo liti cal) 
reform, and the Cádiz po liti cal revolution are not as easy to establish as schol-
ars suggested for a long time, and some historians still do. The Enlightenment 
was primarily a protracted intellectual pro cess focused on administrative and 
economic reforms that aimed to bolster the monarchy; Cádiz was first and 
foremost a po liti cal revolution that aimed to limit the monarchy, turn it into a 
constitutional regime, expel the French, and hold the empire together.
A lot of ink has been spilled on the purported influence of the French Con-
stitution of 1791 on the Spanish Charter of 1812. Was the Cádiz text an imita-
tion of the 1791 document? The French text had clear influences on the Cádiz 
Constitution, but  there  were also blatant differences regarding certain aspects 
of government, po liti cal values, and ideological visions. Most notably, a deep 
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Spanish historical perspective— the historicismo nacionalista discussed in what 
follows— justifies the Cádiz text, while a tabula rasa mentality prevails in all 
the French constitutions drafted in the shadow of the revolution of 1789. The 
Cádiz Charter permits popu lar participation in elections and devotes a lot of 
space to electoral issues, but includes no Declaration of Rights. And as noted, 
the Cádiz document remained firmly grounded in Spanish Catholicism, much 
in contrast with the areligious character of French revolutionary texts. Influ-
ence, yes; copying, no.
We arrive at arguably the most impor tant doctrinal and ideological source 
of the first Spanish liberalism: Spanish nationalist historicism or historicismo 
nacionalista. The notion of Spain’s “historic constitution” was one of the most 
debated issues in Cádiz. The concept had been discussed in Spanish intellectual 
circles since 1780, when Jovellanos presented his discourse of admission to the 
Royal Acad emy of History titled Sobre la necesidad de unir al estudio de nuestra 
legislación el de nuestra historia (“On the need to join the study of our legislation 
to the study of our history”).31 He argued that the po liti cal liberty individuals 
enjoyed in Spanish medieval kingdoms was lost  under the Habsburg dynasty at 
the beginning of the sixteenth  century. The liberty assured  until that moment 
by Cortes that existed in several Spanish kingdoms had kept the power of kings 
within certain limits. The situation changed with the Hapsburgs— especially 
the first two, Carlos I and Felipe II. For Jovellanos civil liberty was progres-
sively lost (thus the notion of “liberty recovered,” so impor tant for first Spanish 
liberalism). Therefore, Jovellanos argued that the primary task was to end three 
hundred years of despotism; his practical recommendations, however,  were less 
critical.32 Without ignoring his historical inaccuracies regarding the real power 
of the medieval Cortes, Jovellanos’s idea of a liberty reclaimed or recovered 
became, in the hands of the liberales doceañistas, one of the most power ful ideo-
logical devices at work in Cádiz.
The same can be said of the vision of Spain’s history presented by the second 
most impor tant author of “historical nationalism”: Francisco Martínez Ma-
rina. He wrote Teoría de las Cortes, the most complete text of this current of 
thought; this book was a historical interpretation and an ideological construct 
that became a po liti cal device.33 Martínez Marina’s life and work reflected the 
ambiguities and inconsistencies of the first Spanish liberalism—to such an ex-
tent that it is difficult to locate him in the ideological spectrum of the age. He 
first collaborated with the Napoleonic government of José I, but his afrance­
sado past did not prevent his ideas from being read and discussed widely, nor 
block his election as a deputy in the revived Cortes of 1820.34 Martínez Marina 
began to develop Jovellanos’s ideas in his Ensayo histórico­ crítico sobre la legis­
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lación y principales cuerpos legales de los reinos de León y Castilla (1808), but it 
was his  later Teoría de las Cortes (1813) that gave him notoriety. He extended 
Jovellanos’s thesis insisting on the despotism of the Habsburg and Bourbon 
dynasties. In the aftermath of the 1808 crisis, Martínez Marina’s argument was 
recovered, modified, and developed by Cádiz liberals who found in it Spanish 
pre ce dents for popu lar sovereignty, the rejection of absolutism, and the recov-
ery of individual and municipal liberties.35
The third key text of Spanish historic nationalism, following Jovellanos 
and Martínez Marina, is the “Preliminary Discourse” that prefaced the Cádiz 
Constitution. Its authorship is traditionally attributed to Argüelles, the dep-
uty considered by friends and foes alike as the leader of the liberal group at 
the Cádiz Cortes. Although he was responsible for most of its content, other 
members of the constitutional commission contributed to the “Discourse.” 
This text became the most impor tant synthesis of the doctrine and program of 
early Spanish liberalism. Its opening words have been cited repeatedly. I pres-
ent them  here again  because they show the level of complexity and tension of 
the relationship that Spanish liberals established with their past:
The Commission does not propose anything that cannot be found in 
au then tic and solemn form in the vari ous legislative bodies of Spain, but 
rather the novelty lies in the way in which the duties of government have 
been distributed. Said duties have been ordered and classified such that 
they might form a system of foundational and constitutional law that 
was in accordance with the fundamental laws of Aragon, Navarre, and 
Castile with regard to national liberty and in de pen dence, to the privi-
leges and obligations of citizens, to the dignity and authority of the King 
and the judicial system, to the establishment and use of the armed forces, 
and to the economic and administrative methods to be employed in the 
provinces.36
In  these lines, the revival of Spanish monarchical traditions could not be 
stated more clearly. Yet as María Luisa Sánchez- Mejía emphasizes, the constitu-
tion also contained articles that  were pure “revolutionary liberalism”: sover-
eignty of the nation, a one chamber parliament, individual liberties, clear limits 
to the king’s power, division of powers, and the responsibility of ministers to the 
Parliament.37 The insistence of key liberals on the traditional character of their 
enterprise may thus seem odd. However, with the Spanish  people immersed in 
a brutal war against Napoleon, this insistence gains intelligibility as another 
example of their po liti cal ability. Let us read some lines from the end of the 
“Discourse”:
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The Constitution  will never be in greater danger than from the moment 
it is announced  until, following the proposal that the Constitution  will 
put into place [that it cannot be modified in eight years, article 375], the 
document begins to more firmly establish itself and thereby reduce the 
aversion and repugnance that work against it. Feelings of resentment, 
revenge, worries, diverse interests, and even habit and tradition,  will con-
spire against the Constitution.38
Regarding  those authors who still question the liberal character of the Con-
stitution and the Spanish revolution of 1808–1814, it should be mentioned 
that  there is no one model or archetype of liberalism. Instead, diverse histori-
cal liberalisms have existed in the Western world during the last two hundred 
years. It is useful to cite more of the “Discourse” to show to what extent the 
Cádiz enterprise belongs among them:
The Government must ensure that our laws are upheld. This must be its 
primary concern; but in order to preserve the peace and tranquility of the 
 people, the government does not need to determine the interests of pri-
vate citizens by means of court rulings and po liti cal decisions. The harm­
ful insistence on controlling all areas of civilian life by means of the regu­
lations and mandates of po liti cal authorities have brought about similar 
and even greater ills than  those that  were supposed to be prevented by such 
control.
A few lines ahead:
True pro gress means protecting liberty in each individual’s exercise of 
his physical and moral authority according to his needs and preferences. 
 There is nothing more appropriate for the achievement of this objective 
than the entities that established  under the proposed system. This system 
rests on two princi ples: to preserve the role of government so that it 
might be able to perform all its obligations and to grant freedom to the 
nation’s private citizens so that personal interest might be, in the case of each 
and  every individual, the agent that drives their efforts  toward well­ being 
and advancement.39
 These liberal ele ments in the “Discourse”  were partially grounded in some 
of the central tenets of historic nationalism: the adherence to the historic 
legislation of Spain, the utmost admiration for the Spanish medieval Cortes, 
the de cadence of Spain attributed to kingly despotism, and the progressive loss 
of the limiting power that the Cortes supposedly wielded. The mixture was un-
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stable, due to the prescriptive role given to history by nacionalismo histórico. 
Still, in the po liti cal situation created by the crisis of 1808, this historical, 
ideological, and po liti cal “cocktail” proved to be very effective. In the final 
analy sis, historic nationalism was the most original ele ment of the first Spanish 
liberalism— a history and a nationalism that could not be imported, yet could 
be exported and adapted to Spanish Ame rica.
Cádiz Liberalism and Spanish Ame rica
In the “Preliminary Discourse” of the Cádiz Constitution  there is only one 
mention of the wars that by March 1812, when the charter was sanctioned, had 
been  going on for more than a year and a half in several parts of Spanish Ame-
rica. The reference points to the liberal decrees that the Cortes  adopted on the 
administration of justice, which the “Discourse” stated “ will obviously begin 
to heal the wounds that the rejection of the motherland’s revolution, together 
with the disorder and arbitrariness of the previous Government, have opened 
unfortunately in some of Spain’s overseas provinces.”40  These words evince an 
idea cherished by peninsular liberals: that the text, almost by itself, would pac-
ify the American insurrections. Regarding the “disorder and arbitrariness of 
the previous Government,” the draft ers of the “Discourse” surely referred to the 
Junta Central. The reference reveals a lack of self- criticism. The Junta Central 
had dis appeared in January 1810, and the Cortes that gathered in Cádiz in Sep-
tember of that year not only failed to offer any proposal to pacify the Amer i cas; 
on the contrary, it sent more soldiers to fight American “rebels.”41
If one goal of the Cádiz proj ect was to hold Spain’s Amer i cas in the em-
pire and in the fight against Napoleon, it succeeded despite insurgencies in 
New Spain and re sis tance in Caracas and Buenos Aires during its first years of 
implementation. Yet the 1812 Constitution contributed to transatlantic po liti-
cal debates that led most of the Amer i cas to break away— during the charter’s 
second implementation (with a new anticlerical edge),  after 1820. Cádiz liber-
alism alone could not hold Spain’s domains together, nor did it alone create 
Spanish American republics. But it did create liberties that helped keep the 
empire together in the face of insurgencies to 1814— and fueled divisions that 
contributed to its fall  after 1820.
It should not be forgotten that reactions in Spanish Ame rica to Napoleon’s 
1808 invasion of the Peninsula unanimously supported the motherland (madre 
patria), and specifically Fernando VII. During 1809  there  were confrontations 
in Chuquisaca, La Paz, and Quito between Americans and the peninsular au-
thorities regarding the way the king’s sovereignty was to be kept while he was 
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a prisoner in France. Overt conflict between the metropolis and its colonies 
in Ame rica began in April 1810, when the Junta of Caracas deci ded not to rec-
ognize the legitimacy of the Regency that had succeeded the Junta Central in 
January of that year as the highest entity representing the deposed king. This 
conflict turned into an open war for separation in July 1811, when a Caracas 
junta declared Venezuela in de pen dent.42 Separation had become an option.
At Cádiz, the empire was reconceived as a constitutional monarchy that 
would guide the destiny of a transatlantic Spanish nation united  under shared 
liberal princi ples and institutions. While many in the Amer i cas saw gain, they 
also saw the limits of Cádiz when dealing with some of their most cherished 
goals: commercial freedom and local self- rule. Paradoxically, the Cádiz liberal-
ism designed to forge transatlantic unity increasingly became a language and 
a tool that fostered divisiveness between españoles peninsulares and españoles 
americanos.
Beginning in the summer of 1808 new po liti cal ideas coming from the 
Peninsula  were discussed and debated with growing intensity across Spanish 
Ame rica. Newspapers, pamphlets, and leaflets published in Madrid, Seville, 
and Cádiz arrived in the American ports and reached all the impor tant cities. 
Inevitably,  there was a lapse of months between events in the Peninsula and 
the time they  were known in Ame rica. More impor tant, the news of several 
months often arrived at once in American ports (creating uncertainty, limiting 
understanding of peninsular events, and inhibiting possibilities of reacting ef-
fectively). Fi nally, the enormous distances and the time ships took to make the 
journey (especially to distant ports in South Ame rica) often made mea sures 
taken by the Junta Central, the Regency, or the Cortes obsolete on arrival. Such 
delays can be more or less harmless in “normal” times, but more than once they 
proved to be crucial as the mundo hispánico lived critical months.
By the time the Cortes gathered on September 24, 1810, Juntas of Caracas, 
Buenos Aires, and Bogotá had deci ded not to recognize the executive power 
claimed by the Regency. And although the new Cortes could not know it, a 
few days earlier a popu lar rebellion against Spanish authorities had begun in 
New Spain, the richest and most populated territory of the Spanish Ame rica. 
The rising, headed by the priest Miguel Hidalgo, was crushed  after only four 
months; still, it shook established powers, devastated the silver economy (so 
impor tant to the fight against Napoleon), and set off continuing conflicts— 
political and popu lar— that would change the face of the viceroyalty permanently. 
Less violent movements that would nonetheless also end up in in de pen dence 
several years  after, also started in September 1810 in two South American cities, 
Santiago and Quito.
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Meanwhile, the Spanish American deputies at Cádiz faced possibilities and 
limits.43 As noted, the American minority was always defeated when their most 
impor tant po liti cal and economic demands came to a vote. This was perhaps 
inevitable: peninsular liberals never recognized the distinctive nature of the 
American territories and the diff er ent needs of its inhabitants. This “central-
izing” perspective prevailed in the Cádiz Cortes from the very beginning (the 
same can be said of the Madrid Cortes during the Trienio Liberal of 1820–1823). 
However, it is impor tant to put this issue in historical perspective. During the 
eigh teenth  century, the Spanish American territories had been treated increas-
ingly as colonies, though Spanish  legal tradition considered them kingdoms. 
Between 1810 and 1814 the American territories did obtain many  things from 
the Cortes: among them, the end of tributes paid by indigenous and mixed 
 peoples, limited representative institutions, freedom of cultivation, some com-
mercial openings, new rights to justice and education, and legislation that 
softened social hierarchies. In contrast with the numerous constitutional docu-
ments drafted in Spanish Ame rica during  these years, the goal of the Cádiz 
Constitution was to keep the transatlantic Spanish nation together. Article 18 
granted full citizenship to indigenous Americans— a radical inclusionary step 
taken by Spanish liberals, far beyond anything contemplated by the men who 
turned thirteen colonies into the United States thirty years earlier.44
The 1812 Constitution aimed to keep the transatlantic nation together 
through “unitary” rule. It centralized po liti cal power in the hands of new jefes 
políticos or jefes superiores appointed by the king in each Spanish American 
jurisdiction. The po liti cal chiefs would rule over two local entities created by 
the constitution— the diputaciones provinciales (Provincial Deputations) and 
ayuntamientos (city and town councils) that  were given only administrative 
prerogatives. However, once in place the ayuntamientos progressively acquired 
capacities that  were both administrative and po liti cal. In this, some of the most 
prescient peninsular liberals  were proven right in their fears that due to the 
enormous distance from the center of po liti cal power, any po liti cal autonomy 
allowed to Spanish Americans would lead sooner than  later to federalism and, 
in the long run, to the dissolution of the monarchy. In this and other ways, 
rights given by a charter seeking to forge unity worked to facilitate autonomy— 
and, in time, division.
The Cádiz Constitution did not operate in the  whole of Spanish Ame rica 
during its first period of application (1812 to 1814); it ruled less widely when it 
was reinstalled during the Trienio. During its first phase, it was implemented 
in the Viceroyalty of New Spain (except in the Bajío and other regions mired 
in insurgency), the Captaincy of Guatemala, the Viceroyalty of Peru, and some 
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cities in the Captaincy of Venezuela and the Viceroyalty of New Granada, as 
well as the city of Montevideo. Provincial deputations appeared in regional 
capitals, leading cities elected constitutional councils, old indigenous republics 
experimented with liberal municipalities— via parish elections that included all 
Hispanic and indigenous men, and excluded  those of African ancestry,  until se-
lections moved up to electors who ensured that only the notables gained office.
The influence of first Spanish liberalism was direct in some cases, impor tant 
in many  others, but always debated, due to the conflictive circumstances.
Liberalismo hispánico also exerted influence in discussions and debates in 
territories where the constitution was not implemented.45 Recent studies show 
that the Cádiz Constitution and the first Spanish liberalism had considerable 
influence even in the Río de la Plata region. While pursuing local autonomies, 
leaders kept informed of constitutional debates and constitutional offerings, 
responding in their own way to peninsular liberalism and at the same time 
promoting in de pen dence from the metropolis.46 A leading Argentine scholar 
of the po liti cal history of the Río de la Plata in the in de pen dence period, Mar-
cela Ternavasio, concluded that the Cádiz experience “had a strong presence in 
the rioplatense revolutionary pro cess.”47
The first Spanish liberalism came to an abrupt end in the Peninsula, and 
formally in the Amer i cas, with the return of Fernando VII in 1814. Six years 
 later liberals returned to power in Spain and forced the Cádiz Constitution on 
Fernando. In the interim, movements  toward in de pen dence had advanced in 
South Ame rica. In Peru loyalty still held, thanks to the po liti cal and military 
abilities of Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal and a creole elite who feared any 
experiment with popu lar sovereignty as the memories of the devastating risings 
of the 1780s held strong. In New Spain, po liti cal insurgency had declined since 
1815, yet was never vanquished— and the popu lar insurgency that had devas-
tated the Bajío was just ending in 1820.
Yet, while much had changed in the Amer i cas since 1814, the Trienio Liberal 
(1820–1823) did not alter the attitudes and actions of the peninsular deputies 
in dealing with Ame rica. They remained committed to the limited repre sen-
ta tion and central control that had prevailed in the Cortes of Cádiz. A new 
approach to the problema americano might have been po liti cally wise, as several 
territories, notably Buenos Aires and Caracas,  were far along the road to in de-
pen dence, and many elsewhere  were actively debating its benefits. Yet Spanish 
liberals still refused significant concessions to Americans regarding po liti cal 
autonomy and commercial openings. When peninsular deputies began to attend 
to American requests, it was too late. In September 1821 Mexico declared in-
de pen dence and New Spain’s deputies, the largest American del e ga tion at the 
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Madrid Cortes, returned to their homeland. Three years  later, in December 
1824, the  battle of Ayacucho meant that the  whole of continental Ame rica was 
irretrievably lost to Spanish rule.
The triumph of the Spanish American emancipation movements  after 1820 
should not obscure the importance of the Trienio Liberal for Spanish history 
and Spanish American in de pen dence. It was the first time that liberalism was 
implemented in all of peninsular Spain. More impor tant, this time the liberales 
came to power by themselves, not in response to invasion and occupation— but 
by a rising of military forces about to be sent to fight for the monarchy in South 
Ame rica. During the Trienio liberalism was not a cloistered anomaly in a city 
 under siege. Operating across Spain, in 1820 liberals known as exaltados began 
to press radical antiaristocratic and anticlerical mea sures. Most of the revolu-
tionaries remaining from the 1812 experience, the doceañistas, became liberales 
moderados— rivals of the exaltados. The second coming of Spanish liberalism 
was laden with contradictions; among them, military leaders forced a constitu-
tion grounded in popu lar sovereignty on a reluctant monarch in 1820 and new 
anticlerical and antiaristocratic energies turned power ful defenders of Spanish 
rule in New Spain to lead a monarchical Mexican in de pen dence in 1821. In the 
metropolis, the rise of radical anticlericalism, divisions and conflicts among lib-
erals, and the hard po liti cal and ideological turn  toward absolutism across Eu-
rope  after Napoleon’s defeat contributed to the short life of the second Spanish 
liberal experience: in 1823 an army of the Holy Alliance reinstalled Fernando 
VII as an absolutist king.
From a chronological perspective, the foundational Spanish liberalism of 
1810–1814 and 1820–1823 appears as a brief experiment that failed. However, 
its values, visions, and goals would remain part of a polarized Spanish polity 
throughout the nineteenth  century as its radicalism progressively softened.48 
The implementation of the constitution on American soil was always selective: 
elections and freedom of the press  were allowed as  those in power thought 
warranted. In New Spain, the war and insurgency of 1810 to 1815 limited its 
application. In Guatemala, tendencies to localism  were strong and economic 
conditions too adverse to enable full implementation. In Peru, Abascal modi-
fied or varied the enforcement of the constitution, yet it was applied in several 
aspects.49 Still, even with its limits and variations, the implementation of the 
Cádiz Constitution meant that for the first time millions of Americans expe-
rienced individual rights, elections, freedom of the press, and the social dyna-
mism they entailed.
The Cádiz Constitution was in force in almost all of the Spanish American 
territories considered in this book, among them the core regions of the silver 
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economies and  those with the strongest, most enduring bases in indigenous 
republics— which Cádiz would replace with constitutional municipalities. As 
Erick Langer’s chapter  will show, debates over preferences for indigenous re-
publics and liberal municipalities and the potential gains and losses for native 
 peoples would mark the nineteenth  century in Mexico and Guatemala, Peru 
and Bolivia, and to a lesser degree elsewhere.
The Viceroyalties of New Granada and Río de la Plata, as well as the Cap-
taincy General of Venezuela and the “Kingdom” of Chile, although much less pop-
ulated than the territories where the constitution was in force,  were roughly 
equivalent in size to the territories considered in this book.  Those four admin-
istrative entities  were less central to the silver economies, less grounded in indig-
enous majorities, less or ga nized in indigenous republics. But their commercial 
importance had risen in the late eigh teenth  century; they felt increasingly 
constrained by imperial trade restrictions.  These long peripheral territories also 
received, read, and discussed the hundreds of publications that arrived from 
the Peninsula from 1808 onward. While Cádiz liberals, like their monarchical 
pre de ces sors, focused on holding the rich silver economies in the empire and fa-
voring Cuban sugar growers with restrictions on Afro- Americans’ citizenship, 
they did not open trade possibilities for commodity exporters in Caracas and 
Buenos Aires.  These territories did not send delegates to Cádiz and rejected the 
constitution. They formed their own juntas and pursued autonomous routes. 
Cádiz liberalism clearly led to diverse responses: while the capitals of the Cap-
taincy General of Venezuela and the Viceroyalties of New Granada and Río 
de la Plata ignored Cádiz, some cities within  these entities stayed loyal to Fer-
nando VII and accepted the constitution.50
The intellectual, ideological, and po liti cal transformations that took place 
in the mundo hispánico between 1808 and 1824  were complex and laden with 
ambiguities and contradictions. That almost three hundred years of Spanish 
rule was often not perceived as domination by many españoles americanos help 
explain why so many years, so many qualms, so many hesitations, and so many 
 battles had to take place before several territories broke from the metropolis. In 
general, loyalty did not shift from Spain to the new patria in a direct and unequiv-
ocal manner. On the key viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, Brian Hamnett, 
a leading analyst of the period, suggests that the erosion of the “ middle posi-
tion” allowing autonomy within the monarchy was “the main characteristic of 
the period 1808–1821.”51
Amid the complex imperial and local conflicts that marked Spanish Ame-
rica  after 1808, the Cádiz revolution was never determining in a  simple way. It 
was influential in po liti cal ideas, po liti cal debates, and constitutional proposals, 
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but it was always limited by peninsular and regional economic interests, and 
by international wars, local events, internal insurgencies, and military leaders. 
While Cádiz and its constitution  shaped liberal po liti cal visions in the  whole 
mundo hispánico, power ful men on  horse back at the head of diverse armies 
 were equally impor tant— and often pivotal in determining po liti cal outcomes 
between 1810 and 1830. Bolívar, San Martín, and Iturbide may be the first to 
come to mind, but many  others played pivotal po liti cal and/or military roles 
in Spanish Ame rica at key moments during  those two de cades: among them, 
Moreno, Morelos, Rodríguez de Francia, Artigas, Santander, Sucre, Belgrano, 
O’Higgins, and Monteagudo; in Spain, Rafael del Riego forced liberalism onto 
King Fernando in 1820.
The Cádiz revolution was a hope, a promise, and a possibility for many Span-
iards and Spanish Americans. However, the vast distances and geo- economic 
differences between the madre patria and its American territories, the po liti cal 
divergences that began with the French invasion of the Peninsula, the opposi-
tion of americanos who did not want to continue  under Spanish rule, the war 
against the Spanish American territories (which the Cortes never  really dealt 
with po liti cally), and the refusal of peninsular deputies in Cádiz and Madrid 
to attend to the diverse needs of  these territories made that possibility van-
ish.52 Still, in one way or another Cádiz marked every thing in the vast Hispanic 
world for a pivotal de cade and, in certain re spects, long  after.
Liberalism and the Mundo Hispánico in the Age of Revolution
The ambitious proj ect that peninsular liberals tried to put in place between 1810 
and 1814 failed; it did not result in an enduring constitutional regime limiting 
monarchical rule; the po liti cal and social forces opposed to liberalism proved 
to be stronger. The king led the opposition, but support for the monarch in the 
top echelons of the army and the Church was decisive. Im por tant opposition 
also came from conservative deputies who showed po liti cal muscle in the elec-
tions for the ordinary Cortes that opened in October 1813. Less than a month 
before the return of the king,  these deputies drafted a document, known as 
the Manifiesto de los Persas, condemning the preceding extraordinary Cortes 
that had written the constitution. If we add a peasantry that saw  little change 
emerging from liberal proclamations (inevitable, as the constitution could not 
be implemented in most of Spain before it was abrogated in 1814) and a society 
exhausted by six years of war, the delirious welcome that Spanish towns and 
cities gave Fernando VII on his way to Madrid in the spring of 1814 come as 
no surprise.53
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In the end, a co ali tion of conservative forces and interests defeated Spain’s 
liberals. Many of them suffered the king’s repression; some died  because of it, but 
some  were able to participate in the comeback of liberalism in 1820 and, with 
it, the reinstatement of the Cádiz Constitution. This time, however, Spanish 
liberals had to share power with a “constitutional” monarch who was not cap-
tive in another country, but very much pres ent and had been working with 
international allies to bring down the liberal government and the Cádiz Con-
stitution since the beginning of its reinstallation. Thus the revival of liberalism 
in Spain was short- lived.54 Absolutism returned in 1823 without the liberals 
being able to put up a real fight. The king would stay in power another de cade, 
 until his death in 1833.
The reactions and responses to peninsular liberalism in Spanish Ame rica  were 
varied, complex, ambiguous, and thus much more difficult to follow, among 
other reasons  because  there was no “liberal” po liti cal group identified as such. 
The size and greater social diversity of Spain’s American domains also help 
to explain this complexity. In any case, the core princi ples of liberalism— 
national sovereignty, po liti cal equality, individual liberties, division of powers, 
representative government— were pursued almost everywhere. The challenge 
is to distinguish between liberal princi ples and complex and often- contested 
sociopo liti cal practices.
From 1811 onward a constitutional “explosion” took place in Spanish Ame-
rica. Between that year and 1816 more than thirty constitutional documents 
 were drafted in the region (especially in New Granada). However, given the 
state of war that prevailed in many regions, liberalism proved to have limited 
social reach during the in de pen dence period in Spanish Ame rica. Constitu-
tions and formal po liti cal structures did not lead socie ties to adopt liberal val-
ues, attitudes, and be hav iors. Very slowly and not without countermarches, this 
adoption would take place during the nineteenth  century. In that long pro cess, 
diff er ent segments of Spanish American socie ties would adapt and use liberal-
ism for differing purposes. Facing that diversity, scholars have used the term 
“popu lar liberalism” to label many of the varied instances when rural commu-
nities mobilized liberal rhe toric to demand rights from the power ful.  Whether 
 those communities had become committed to central tenets of liberalism such 
as individual rights and electoral rule, or primarily pursued local po liti cal ad-
vantage, is much debated.
The search for popu lar liberalism in large part emerged as part of the search 
for subaltern contributions, participations “from below” in the po liti cal devel-
opment of in de pen dence movements and also of republicanism in some Spanish 
American countries (during the in de pen dence period and beyond). In some 
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cases,  these contributions have opened new and more complex understandings 
of early national conflicts and po liti cal challenges.55 In  others, we remain far 
from an integrated and convincing understanding of the diverse interactions 
among liberalism, republicanism, and popu lar participation in the complex 
pro cesses of nation making in nineteenth- century Spanish Ame rica.56
The relationship between liberalism and republicanism during the era of 
Spanish American in de pen dence also remain subject to debate. The institutional 
and constitutional coincidences between the two ideologies far outweigh, in 
my view, the contrasts in the po liti cal language that some historians have privi-
leged. Some of liberalism’s deepest goals— popu lar sovereignty, electoral rule, 
freedom of the press— remained honored goals in most Spanish American re-
publics throughout the nineteenth  century. Though too often abrogated, they 
 were proclaimed constantly and practiced more often than sometimes recog-
nized. Parliamentary practice and liberal princi ples, some of them rooted in 
Cádiz, played roles that  were far more than perfunctory. Po liti cal and intel-
lectual history should recognize  these facts and pursue studies aiming to un-
derstand the enduring limits to the realization of liberal goals in the history of 
Spanish Ame rica.
 After more than 150 years of ignoring and sometimes denigrating the po liti cal 
history of the region during the first half of the nineteenth  century, Western 
historiography recently began to recuperate topics such as elections, citizenship, 
sociabilities, the press, and public opinion. The change, provoked a quarter of 
a  century ago by François- Xavier Guerra, is most welcome. Scholars began to 
see that not every thing was chaos and caudillos in the origin and formation of 
Spanish American nations. Too often, however, historiographic reactions be-
come overreactions. Studying aspects of the po liti cal and social life of the new 
nations that  were neglected or ignored is positive; suggesting that life in the 
emerging nations was infused with liberalism, republicanism, and citizenship is 
another  matter.57 One aim of the chapters that follow is to explore the interplay 
of the economic transformations analyzed by Tutino in chapter  1, with the 
po liti cal and ideological innovations engaged  here, and with the hard do-
mains where power faced participation of diff er ent kinds in diverse American 
socie ties.
In the wake of Guerra’s oeuvre, the Hispanic world of the first quarter of 
the nineteenth  century has become a vibrant field of inquiry for po liti cal and 
intellectual history.58 New circumstances and new analyses have contributed to 
a renewed interest in the “Age of Revolution.”59 I conclude by considering criti-
cally some of the ways Atlantic history has viewed the revoluciones hispánicas 
within the Age of Revolution.
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The Atlantic approach has become the dominant prism through which the 
anglophone acad emy views and studies the in de pen dence movements of Latin 
Ame rica. Too often, proponents of that approach assume that commonalities 
and sequences prevailed over the complex specifics of the several revolutionary 
pro cesses that  shaped this pivotal age.60 Lurking  behind this assumption is an-
other one: that the first Atlantic revolutions (the in de pen dence of the thir-
teen colonies and the French Revolution) became “models” followed in Spanish 
Ame rica from 1808 onward.
The Atlantic perspective on Spanish American in de pen dence is an enor-
mous step forward vis- à- vis the nationalistic approaches that prevailed for too 
long. Such approaches  were parochial and limited. Put simply: it is impossible 
to understand Spanish American in de pen dence from a po liti cal and intellec-
tual perspective by studying separate national pro cesses. The Spanish American 
nations came out of a single empire. In the last twenty- five years, nationalist 
histories of Spanish American in de pen dence have given way to broader per-
spectives. They recognize the influence of general po liti cal princi ples and con-
stitutional architectures in part originating in the North American and French 
revolutions (with impor tant British antecedents). But studies of Hispanic 
American in de pen dence have forged a new prism that is mainly Hispanic—or, 
better, Hispanic Atlantic. Rather than presume an inevitable sequence of in-
novation that began in the United States and France, the Hispanic- Atlantic 
perspective emphasizes that Spain and Spanish Ame rica began, negotiated, 
and ended their revolutionary pro cesses in deeply Hispanic ways.
Atlantic history has proven its fertility in topics like migration, commercial 
exchanges, and slavery— notably when it focuses within the British empire. Too 
often, however, the innovations of Atlantic history have not extended to ques-
tioning much older presumptions of Anglo- American primacy in the making 
of the modern world. The enduring tendency to expect that Anglo- American 
innovations, mediated by French revolutionary aspirations,  shaped in de pen-
dence movement in the mundo hispánico leads, in my view, to fundamental 
misunderstandings of the Age of Revolution.61
Global and Atlantic pro cesses, economic, po liti cal, and ideological, affected 
the in de pen dence of Spanish Ame rica, no doubt— but local historical cir-
cumstances, an ideological arsenal of  great complexity, and a series of regional 
conflicts inextricably linked to Hispanic politics led to the new countries that 
emerged in Spanish Ame rica between 1810 and  1830.  There is a clear link 
between the French Revolution and the events that shook Saint Domingue be-
tween 1791 and 1804, but it was a link of reverberations that led to oppositions, 
as Carolyn Fick shows in chapter 4.  There  were also conflictive reverberations 
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of the French Revolution, through Napoleon, on the 1808 invasion of Spain, 
on Cádiz liberalism, and on the Spanish American conflicts that led to in de pen-
dence, but none of them  were imitations.62 The presumptive assertion of imita-
tive Atlantic revolutions diminishes the complexity of the Age of Revolutions— 
and the creativity of Hispanic revolutionaries, intellectuals, and state makers.63
The causal chain often suggested by Atlantic historians mainly refers to ideas 
or constitutional princi ples (in their most general expression). Such links are 
often found by intellectual historians who exalt ideas and tend to downplay po-
liti cal and social conflicts and practices.64 The revoluciones hispánicas did not 
begin in the light of historical or po liti cal “forces” emanating from the United 
States or revolutionary France (and the Hispanic American elites who started 
 these revolutions and declared the in de pen dence of new countries saw nothing 
positive in Haiti). The revolutionary movements in Spanish Ame rica began as a 
reaction against Napoleon’s invasion and occupation of the Iberian Peninsula. 
French revolutionary ideology was rejected outright for a very  simple reason: 
the invading army came from the land of Rousseau, Marat, and Robes pierre.65
In Spanish Ame rica, at the beginning of the crisis hispánica public declara-
tions  were not against the king, but for the king— and most Spanish Americans, 
including indigenous  peoples, remained devoted to the king throughout. The 
oft- repeated claim that an accumulation of hatred among Spanish American 
criollos against peninsular Spaniards was one of the main  causes of the in de pen-
dence movements is clearly wanting as an explanation of events  after 1810. Why 
did such “disaffected” elites in New Spain and Peru remain loyal to the Spanish 
Crown for more than a de cade  after 1810?
Spanish Ame rica included a diversity of racial and social groups with no 
parallel in British North Ame rica, making the challenges of in de pen dence and 
nation making radically diff er ent. Careful analy sis of Spanish Ame rica between 
1808 and 1824 cannot suggest, much less conclude, that its in de pen dence pro-
cesses  were last “episodes” of a single Atlantic Revolution—as chapters 7 to 10 
of this volume  will show.
At the same time, however, no historical pro cess is absolutely original. The 
revoluciones hispánicas developed within the broad economic and imperial, 
po liti cal, and intellectual events that  shaped the second half of the eigh teenth 
 century.  There is no reason to deny the resonance of impor tant aspects of 
North American and French po liti cal thought and constitutional thinking. 
Still, Cádiz liberalism and the revoluciones hispánicas emerged as in de pen dent 
creations, that must be taken seriously to understand the Age of Revolution. 
Understandings emphasizing transatlantic interactions must remain; presump-
tions of Anglo- American primacy and Hispanic imitation must end.
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The Hispanic revolutions must not be presumed isolated or self- generating. 
They engaged and revised many of the broad po liti cal princi ples that played 
decisive roles in the birth of the United States and in revolutionary France. The 
chronological pre ce dence and geo graph i cal proximity of  these conflicts made 
 these influences inevitable. The general po liti cal princi ples that  were the basis 
of the Spanish American revolutions— national sovereignty, po liti cal equal-
ity, individual liberties, division of powers, representative systems— were also 
paramount in the American and French Revolutions, but with diff er ent con­
notations and emphases in each case. Since the  Middle Ages, the Spanish world 
was part of a Eu ro pean debate on monarchical power and popu lar participa-
tion. A unique Hispanic emphasis on the rights of the pueblos enabled Spanish 
monarchs to allow local republics for indigenous  peoples across its American 
domains since the sixteenth  century and helps explain why the Cádiz Consti-
tution recognized  these same  peoples as part of the citizenry.
When the mundo hispánico was turned upside down by Napoleon’s oc-
cupation of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808, Spanish and Spanish Americans 
became active and innovative participants in po liti cal, intellectual, social, and 
economic debates and conflicts. The revoluciones hispánicas inscribed them-
selves within the Age of Revolution in ways far more creative than too many 
histories allow. To fully understand Atlantic pro cesses in the formation of the 
modern world, we must recognize the creative complexity and the ambiguous 
originality of the Hispanic revolutions— the po liti cal and social movements 
that culminated the Age of Revolution.66
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Writing as Publius in October 1787, Alexander Hamilton jumped headfirst 
into New York’s raging debate over  whether to ratify the newly proposed con-
stitution for the United States. “The subject speaks its own importance,” wrote 
Hamilton at the very beginning of the very first Federalist, “comprehending in 
its consequences nothing less than the existence of the  union, the safety and 
welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many re-
spects the most in ter est ing in the world.” And just what was in ter est ing about 
this new American empire? “It has been frequently remarked,” Hamilton contin-
ued, “that it seems to have been reserved to the  people of this country, by 
their conduct and example, to decide the impor tant question,  whether socie ties 
of men are  really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection 
and choice, or  whether they are forever destined to depend for their po liti cal 
constitutions on accident and force.”1
3
 Union, Capitalism, and Slavery in the  
“Rising Empire” of the United States
Adam Rothman
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Hamilton’s “impor tant question” was  really two questions: could men  really 
choose their own form of government, and if so, would they choose wisely? In 
1787, the answer to the first question seemed to be an emphatic yes. The citizens 
of the United States believed they  were— perhaps for the first time in history— 
freely deliberating on the basic structure of their polity, rather than inheriting 
it or having it forced upon them. The motto of the new country, Novus ordo 
seclorum, indicated the collective sense of a fresh start to  human affairs, even as 
it paradoxically hearkened back to ancient lore. Despite this sense of novelty, 
the slate of society was not wiped clean by the revolution; the heritage of the 
colonial era could not be erased. Nor  were Hamilton and his countrymen de-
liberating in blissful isolation from the rest of the world. Despite a successful 
war for in de pen dence, the new United States faced a treacherous international 
landscape, and to Hamilton and other Federalists, a stronger national govern-
ment was required to meet the challenge of national survival.2
The answer to the second question remained in doubt. Hamilton was not 
at all sure that his fellow citizens would accept the proposed constitution, 
which he preferred to the existing Articles of Confederation. It “affects too 
many par tic u lar interests, innovates upon too many local institutions” not to 
arouse opposition. Reason would inevitably be clouded on all sides by “ambi-
tion, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives 
not more laudable than  these.”  Actual politics barely resembled the republican 
ideal of a rational quest for the common good. Some influential  people might 
even prefer a “subdivision of the empire,” Hamilton feared, to “ union  under 
one government.” The fear of disunion was central to the constitutional politics 
of the early United States. Supporters of both a stronger and a weaker national 
government argued that their vision would be more likely to preserve the unity 
of a large and diverse country in a dangerous world.
Hamilton erred in posing a sharp dichotomy between reflection and choice 
on one hand, and accident and force on the other.  These  were two sides of the 
same historical coin, as inseparable as heads and tails. Choice was structured 
by force, and often, force was masked as choice. This essay argues that the ori-
gins and development of the United States from the British imperial crisis of 
the 1760s to the end of the U.S. Civil War combined “reflection and choice” 
with “accident and force”— indeed, with a  great deal more “accident and force” 
than many  people in the United States care to remember  today. As Marx wrote 
about another  people, U.S. Americans made their own history, but they did not 
make it just as they pleased. How then did they make it?3
This essay focuses on three major aspects of the early history of the United 
States: the character of the polity forged out of the American Revolution; the 
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growth and expansion of the country across the continent; and the contest over 
slavery that tore it apart. Hamilton signaled the first two aspects in his uses of 
the words “ union” and “empire” in Federalist 1. By  union, he meant the complex 
po liti cal arrangement by which several disparate states (“the parts”) collected 
themselves  under one overarching government without each losing its corpo-
rate integrity; by empire, he acknowledged the vast size and big expectations of 
this new republic. He did not mention slavery in that paper, but it cropped up 
in  others and lurked perilously in the ratification debates. Although contained 
for sixty years by a long series of po liti cal compromises that  were largely con-
cessions to slave  owners, arguments over slavery rooted in real socioeconomic 
changes would emerge in time as the chief cause of the “subdivision of the em-
pire” that Hamilton and other found ers feared above all other evils.
Divergence, a keyword of this volume, offers a handy frame for conceiving the 
history of the new United States in an international context and a comparative 
way. John Tutino’s introduction suggests multiple meanings of divergence. Colo-
nists throughout the Amer i cas seceded from transatlantic empires in revolution-
ary pro cesses of national state formation, diverging from  those who remained 
within imperial polities. The new countries they founded then diverged from 
each other, taking diff er ent paths across the nineteenth  century and sometimes 
colliding into each other, as the United States and Mexico did in 1846. Many 
new countries experienced internal fissures and fragmentation as well; divergence 
between North and South nearly wrecked the United States over the question 
of slavery. That internal divergence was intricately connected to the “ great diver-
gence” described by Kenneth Pomeranz.4 The powerfully disruptive forces of the 
rise of industrial capitalism fundamentally reconfigured the Amer i cas’ economic 
prospects. Some prospered.  Others suffered. The northern United States emerged 
as Britain’s most successful imitator across the Atlantic, while the southern United 
States grew into the most formidable slave society in the world on the basis of white 
southerners’ ability to harness slave  labor to supply short- staple cotton to British 
textile manufacturers. Over time, the country became “half slave and half  free,” as 
Lincoln put it in 1858.5 Considering the United States within this set of divergences 
provides an antidote to the dogma of exceptionalism without losing sight of the 
peculiar aspects of the United States’ historical trajectory.
The Federal Union
“A more perfect Union”— that was the first aim of the constitution. But a 
 union of what or whom, and on what terms? Answering that question requires 
a pa norama of the British mainland North American colonies at the end of 
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the Seven Years’ War in 1763, and a tracing of the revolutionary dynamic from 
the origins of the imperial crisis to the ratification of the constitution and be-
yond. How thirteen diverse colonies managed to secede from the British 
empire, forge a durable framework of government, and survive the pressures of 
a war- torn Atlantic world is a story of successful divergence in the short term, 
even if Hamilton, who was killed by his po liti cal nemesis in a duel, did not live 
to taste the fruits of peace.
Relative latecomers to the early modern Atlantic world, the British main-
land North American colonies  were settler socie ties populated largely by  free 
and quasi- free  people of mostly British descent but harboring a substantial 
proportion of enslaved Africans and  people of African descent as well, particu-
larly in  Virginia and South Carolina. The late colonial population numbered 
roughly 2 million on the mainland, of whom 15  percent  were enslaved (com-
pared to roughly 400,000 in Britain’s Ca rib bean colonies, of whom 85  percent 
 were enslaved). The zone of Euro- American settlement was fairly narrow, hug-
ging the eastern seaboard and rivers that flowed into the Atlantic. Within the 
constricted zones of colonial settlement, indigenous  people had mostly been 
annihilated or driven out, but the vast continental interior west of the Appala-
chian mountains remained populated almost entirely by indigenous and métis 
 people, except for the lower Mississippi Valley, which had been penetrated by 
French settlements that from 1765 lived  under Spanish rule. Unvanquished 
indigenous power in the continental interior was confirmed by the uprising 
known as Pontiac’s War, which stretched across the southern  Great Lakes re-
gion in 1763–1766.6
The seaboard colonies  were fundamentally agricultural but eco nom ically 
diverse, ranging from the mixed farming socie ties of New  Eng land to the 
more plantation- oriented southern colonies, where slaves labored to grow to-
bacco and rice for export. Coastal towns— Boston, New York, Philadelphia, 
and Charleston— were nodes of artisanal production and Atlantic commerce, 
with ties to both Eu rope and the Ca rib bean. Hence, maritime trades  were also 
impor tant. The mainland colonies  were closely tied to the lucrative Ca rib bean 
sugar islands, which they supplied with fish, grain, lumber, and other supplies. 
The mainland fueled the islands. To put the mainland colonies in a broader 
British colonial perspective, almost three- quarters of the value of exports to 
 Great Britain from British Ame rica came from the West Indies; on the other 
hand, the value of British exports to the mainland colonies was more than dou-
ble the value of exports to the West Indies.7 The mainland American colonies 
provided ready markets for British goods and nurtured a thriving consumer 
culture, particularly in urban settings. Nothing represents the cosmopolitanism 
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of British Americans’ consumer habits as much as their taste for tea, which 
became famously politicized in the imperial crisis that led to revolution.8
The mainland colonies enjoyed considerable local po liti cal autonomy. 
Royal officials had to contend with strong colonial assemblies representing 
propertied men who insisted on their rights and privileges within the British 
empire. The colonies’ strength derived from the fact that the empowered class 
of propertied men was relatively large, literate, and prosperous, and the met-
ropolitan authorities  were basically willing to leave them alone. They lacked 
the coercive power to do other wise. Even in the commercial regulation of “ex-
ternal” trade, which had been the focus of metropolitan oversight, extensive 
smuggling made a mockery of restrictive policies.9 Despite class stratification 
and cultural markers of status, most of the mainland colonies had a popu lar 
politics that embraced a wide swath of  free men from the middling and lower 
ranks, while generally limiting  free  women to more circumscribed modes of 
participation, like petitioning, and excluding slaves from formal participation 
altogether. The presence of chattel slavery, however, made  free  people in the 
colonies hypersensitive about their own freedom, as Samuel Johnson observed 
in his famous quip “How is it we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from the 
 drivers of negroes?” When the imperial crisis came, rebellious colonists loudly 
protested that the British wanted to “enslave” them.10
The religious diversity of the British North American colonial world was 
crucial to the formation of an in de pen dent and flourishing civil society. The 
colonies  were deeply Protestant, but they also exhibited “a strange religious 
medley,” in Crevecoeur’s words. Widespread Protestant dissent challenged the 
established Anglican and Congregational churches. Non- Protestants, like Cath-
olics in Mary land and Jews in Charleston, also carved out a sacred space for 
themselves. Not coffee  houses but churches  were the most impor tant arena of 
colonial civil society, and religious associations provided the spark and the model 
for more secular voluntary organ izations. Although Protestantism had begun to 
make inroads into the increasingly creole, or native- born, slave population, most 
African and African- descended slaves  were prob ably Catholic, Muslim, or ani-
mist in their beliefs and practices.11
Historians have chipped away at the idea that a growing sense of a distinctively 
American national identity inexorably led to the revolution. Rather, colonists’ 
concept of themselves as equal British subjects was at the core of the imperial 
crisis that spiraled into a colonial revolt. To make a long story short, metropoli-
tan efforts to tighten Britain’s grip over the colonies and shift some of the fiscal 
burden for security onto them in the wake of the costly Seven Years’ War led 
many British American colonists to protest the violation of their rights, their 
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lack of repre sen ta tion in Parliament, and ultimately, the collapse of the king’s 
protection. South Carolinian Henry Laurens, who served as president of the 
Continental Congress in 1777–1778, put the case succinctly. Stung by a jibe 
from a British admiral, Laurens retorted, “I had once been a good British sub-
ject, but  after  Great Britain had refused to hear our petitions, and had thrown 
us out of her protection, I had endeavored to do my duty.”12
The revolutionary dynamic from 1763 to 1783 precipitated an American 
nationalism, and not the other way around. Pop u lar mobilization by local 
organ izations like the Sons of Liberty, intercolonial communication and co-
ordination through the Committees of Correspondence and Continental 
Congress, widely circulated propaganda like Paine’s pungent Common Sense 
(which is as much an artifact of En glish radicalism as American nationalism), 
the shared hardship and blood sacrifice of soldiers in the Continental army 
and battered communities, the remembrance of the war time strug gle in culture 
and politics— all  these created a new national or “patriot” sensibility among 
mainland British North Americans.  Whether that new national sensibility 
was actually widely shared, deeply felt, and po liti cally effective is a  matter of 
lively debate. And we might won der what would have happened to American 
nationalism if  Great Britain had successfully quashed the rebellion. The long 
shadow of Confederate nationalism over the post– Civil War South might pro-
vide some clues.13
When the Declaration of In de pen dence spoke for “one  people” in 1776, 
its authors expressed a hope more than a real ity. The colonists  were internally 
divided; significant numbers of loyalists maintained their allegiance to the 
king. The revolution was si mul ta neously a civil war, especially in the southern 
colonies, where partisan and guerrilla warfare broke out as the war dragged on. 
Loyalists  were harassed, punished, and dispossessed. Roughly sixty thousand 
loyalists fled to safer havens elsewhere in the British empire, reshaping Canada, 
Florida, and the Ca rib bean. Several hundred black loyalists founded the ex-
perimental antislavery colony of Sierra Leone, while a few  others ended up in 
Australia. Often forgotten in recent histories celebrating the prospect of free-
dom for black loyalist refugees are the roughly fifteen thousand slaves whom 
loyalist  owners carried with them into exile.14
The loyalist flight to Canada and the Ca rib bean illustrates the geographic 
limits to U.S. nationalism during the revolution. Just as not all colonists  were 
patriots, not all the British colonies joined the revolution. Why not? Demo-
graphic differences, po liti cal concessions, and a stronger British military pres-
ence  were crucial. The British won over Canada’s large French population with 
the 1774 Quebec Act (which outraged patriots in the lower colonies), while 
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British West Indian planters’ dependence on Britain and fear of slave rebel-
lion made them cling to British power. The imperial crisis and revolution di-
vided Britain’s American empire but did not destroy it, and the new United 
States had to contend with an enduring British imperial presence in its vicinity 
even as the locus of Britain’s empire shifted eastward. The British presence in 
Canada, as well as Spanish per sis tence beyond the new country’s southern and 
western borders in Florida and Louisiana, gave rise to what might be called a 
paracolonial situation. However postcolonial the United States may have been, it 
was still ringed by other powers’ colonies. Many in the new country optimistically 
expected that  these neighboring territories would eventually turn republican 
and join the United States, but nobody knew exactly how and when that would 
happen. In the meantime, the postcolonial republic coexisted with a per sis tent 
colonial order.15
The patriots did not win the Revolutionary War by themselves. Eu ro pean 
imperial competition and American environmental conditions played into 
their hands. At the conclusive  battle at Yorktown, they got timely help from the 
French navy and the malaria- bearing Anopheles quadrimaculatus mosquito. 
The French  were no less self- interested than the mosquitoes, as the colonial 
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revolt gave them a chance to exact some revenge upon the British for the Seven 
Years’ War. French and also Spanish involvement turned an intraimperial war 
into an interimperial one that rippled beyond mainland North Ame rica and 
touched  every inhabited continent. If the Minutemen at Lexington fired the 
“shot heard round the world,” then the sound reverberated through the echo 
chamber of Eu ro pean imperial power.16
In the breakaway colonies, secession inevitably led to the central questions 
of who should rule at home and how. Nearly all agreed that the states should 
be part of a single Union, and the new government should be “republican,” that 
is, ruled by the citizenry through their representatives and not by a monarch. 
In  today’s debates over the revolutionary nature of the American Revolution, 
the radical quality of the princi ple of republican self- government at the time 
should not be underestimated, despite the all- too- obvious limits on the defini-
tion of “we, the  people” in  actual practice. At the same time, consensus on the 
princi ple of republican self- government left plenty of room for diverse visions 
of who should be included and how they should govern themselves, and what 
to do about  those who  were left out.17
Much as in the newly in de pen dent countries of Latin Ame rica in the early 
nineteenth  century, a fault line  running through the postrevolutionary United 
States divided state- oriented elites who envisioned strong local autonomy within 
a loose federal system and nationally oriented elites who preferred a strong 
central government with plenary powers over the states. The former held sway 
 under the Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, which a frustrated George 
Washington lampooned a few years  later as a “half- starved, limping Govern-
ment, that appears to be always moving upon crutches, and tottering at  every 
step.” Despite some impor tant successes, including the Northwest and Land 
Ordinances that established a template for western expansion, the  union  under 
the Articles turned out to be a diplomatic and fiscal failure. It was unable to 
raise taxes, enforce treaties, maintain an army, or secure its commercial interests 
abroad. Some historians have emphasized the centralists’ anxiety over populist 
politics in the states, but an equally power ful impetus for the overthrow of the 
Articles was the intensifying sense that the federal structure was inadequate to 
deal with a hostile and meddling outside world. Notable challenges included 
Britain’s per sis tent military presence in the northwestern borderlands, and the 
failure of commercial diplomacy to crack open Ca rib bean markets to mainland 
merchants.18
Three famous sets of compromises secured the constitution. The first com-
promise balanced the interests of large and small states through the mechanism 
of a bicameral legislature. One chamber, the Senate, gave each state two rep-
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resentatives, while the other, the House, apportioned repre sen ta tion accord-
ing to population (with the slave population counted in a three- fifths ratio). 
The second involved slavery. The three- fifths clause deci ded how much added 
repre sen ta tion slaveholders would enjoy in the House by virtue of owning 
slaves; the Fugitive Slave Clause prevented slaves from gaining their freedom 
by escaping to another state; the Slave Trade Clause barred Congress from 
prohibiting slave imports before 1808, a twenty- year win dow of opportunity 
for slavers. The third compromise, completed  after ratification, led to a Bill of 
Rights, which gave suspicious anti- Federalists additional guarantees that the 
new national government would not overstep its bounds and infringe on indi-
vidual liberty or state prerogatives. One recent historian argues that the consti-
tution should be seen as a “peace pact” among the states, which kept the Union 
from fragmenting into regional confederacies or succumbing to anarchy ( until 
it failed to do so).19
One mark of the new constitution’s initial success was that the new Union 
successfully navigated the dangerous currents of international politics in the 
late eigh teenth and early nineteenth centuries. The country held together, even 
thrived, in an era of almost unremitting Eu ro pean and Ca rib bean war from 
1789 to 1815. Its population and territory doubled, and it began to pursue what 
might be called “self- strengthening” policies that placed the national state on a 
stronger footing. The first party system, a rivalry between Hamiltonian Feder-
alists and Jeffersonian Republicans, was powerfully  shaped by the French Revo-
lution and its  ripple effects. And as France warred with its enemies, the United 
States’ active neutral carry ing trade invited attacks from belligerent powers at 
sea. Although Washington’s successors heeded his advice to avoid “entangling 
alliances” with foreign powers, they could not escape the global vortex.20
Hamiltonian Federalists admired Britain and hoped to emulate it. They de-
ployed the national government to court Eu ro pean investment in domestic 
enterprise and accelerate cap i tal ist development. Particularly impor tant was 
Hamilton’s fiscal program designed to shore up public credit. By contrast, 
the Jeffersonian opposition regarded Britain as an antimodel of concentrated 
power and in equality, and they  were more sympathetic to the French Revolu-
tion  until it careened  toward terror. Most notably in the debate over the char-
tering of a national bank, Jeffersonian Republicans sought to keep the powers 
of the national government strictly limited by a narrow construction of the 
language of the constitution. During the Adams administration in the late 
1790s, the Federalists overplayed their hand, and the Jeffersonian Republicans 
swept them aside in the election of 1800, which reasserted antifederalist princi-
ples of state sovereignty within the structure of the constitution. In power, 
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Jeffersonians sought to pry open Eu ro pean markets and secure the virtuous 
commercial- agrarian republic. They deployed the young navy against the Bar-
bary pirates, and took advantage of Napoleon’s plight in the Ca rib bean and 
Eu rope to purchase Louisiana— recently regained from Spain. The Republicans’ 
trade policies of discrimination and embargo failed, but unintentionally stim-
ulated “domestic manufactures” and industrial enterprise.21
The War of 1812 showed both the strains and the strength of the republican 
nation- state. James Madison’s administration managed the war poorly. The 
United States failed to wrest Canada out of British hands, mocking Jeffer-
son’s rash prediction that the conquest of Canada would be “a mere  matter of 
marching.” The war antagonized New  Eng land’s anglophilic, arch- Federalist 
merchant elite. At the Hartford Convention in 1814, New En glanders threat-
ened to secede from the Union. Most embarrassing of all was the burning of 
public buildings in the nation’s capital. Not all was disaster for the United 
States. Tecumseh’s pan- Indian alliance collapsed in the Ohio Valley. Planter- 
general Andrew Jackson crushed the Red Stick Rebellion among the southern 
Indians and beat back a British invasion of New Orleans. The war spelled the 
doom of indigenous power east of the Mississippi River. Victories for the 
United States on the western and southern frontier stoked a heady nationalism 
and new imperial ambitions. An era of national consolidation, territorial 
expansion, and cap i tal ist development would follow the War of 1812 in republi-
can North Ame rica as much of Spanish Ame rica plunged into uncivil wars for 
in de pen dence.22
A Rising Empire
Hamilton was not alone when he referred to the United States as an “empire,” 
but what he and  others meant by that word is elusive. Its most regular usage 
simply denoted an extensive territory  under a sovereign power. A 1789 dic-
tionary published in Philadelphia defined empire as “imperial power; the re-
gion over which dominion is extended; command over anything.” It was often 
used meta phor ically, as Hamilton did in Federalist 6 to refer facetiously to the 
“happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue.” However,  there are sev-
eral references in the Early American Imprints database to the United States as 
a “rising empire,” one as early as 1776, suggesting that the concept of American 
empire was, from the very start, linked to the emergence of the United States as 
a power in the hemi sphere if not the world.23
Recent scholars have effectively historicized the found ers’ idea of a “repub-
lican empire,” their solution to the prob lem of preserving liberty and pursuing 
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expansion at the same time. The po liti cal key was the princi ple of the equal-
ity of the states composing the Union. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 en-
shrined the expectation that new territory would eventually be absorbed into 
the Union as states on an equal basis with the original states. Promising west-
erners equal po liti cal rights to local self- government was intended to prevent 
separatist and secessionist movements on the frontier, particularly  those incited 
by meddling Spanish officials in the lower Mississippi Valley. And by endowing 
westerners with substantial responsibility for their own self- government and 
defense—in a word, citizenship— republicans attempted to limit a potential 
source of the growth and concentration of power in the national government: 
colonial administrative patronage and a standing army. Federalism thus blazed 
the way for a continental, if not infinitely expansible, “empire of liberty,” to use 
Jefferson’s famous phrase.24
Turning western “wilderness” into republican “civilization” offered a social 
basis for the empire of liberty. This transformation was accomplished through 
myriad policies on the federal and state levels that promoted migration, com-
mercial development, and national integration, including the creation of a 
regulated land market, a postal network, and other infrastructural proj ects 
that eased the transportation of  people, goods, and information back and forth 
between interior communities and the Atlantic world. The infiltration of civil 
society also assisted greatly in this transformation. Religious missions and 
churches, schools, debating socie ties, newspapers, and the national po liti cal 
parties formed a diffuse and highly effective lattice of infrastructural power that 
spread the nation across an “improved” western landscape. Federalist fears of 
frontier settlers’ reversion to barbarism faded pretty quickly, or morphed into 
a new concern about the spread of slavery.25
In retrospect, the westward march of the United States across North Ame-
rica appears inexorable if not inevitable, but it was actually a sporadic pro cess 
that depended heavi ly on “accident and force” and sparked enormous inter-
national and domestic conflict. Consider the windfall known as the Louisiana 
Purchase. Jefferson’s main goal was to protect western farmers’ access to foreign 
markets by keeping New Orleans out of the hands of the French  after the secret 
Treaty of San Ildefonso, but St. Domingue’s rebels and mosquitoes defeated 
Napoleon’s ambitions to revive French empire in North Ame rica and the Ca-
rib bean, so Napoleon threw in the  whole vast Louisiana territory as lagniappe. 
(That’s what they call it in New Orleans.) In acquiring Louisiana, the United 
States not only played the Old World’s game of imperial diplomacy but also 
benefited from the explosion of the ultimate contradiction between metropol-
itan liberty and colonial slavery in transatlantic imperialism. The shocks from 
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that explosion would continue to reverberate in Louisiana and elsewhere for 
sixty years. The New Orleans Daily Picayune was still reeling in May 1861, when 
it charged that the “abolition party” in the North “would gloat to see the South 
made the scene of another massacre like that of St. Domingo.” The fates of the 
United States and Haiti diverged in innumerable ways across the nineteenth 
 century, but they  were also deeply entwined.26
In acquiring Louisiana’s roughly eight hundred thousand square miles, the 
United States gained more than enough land to perpetuate the agrarian repub-
lic for generations. It also acquired nominal dominion over at least fifty thou-
sand  people of Eu ro pean and African descent living in colonial settlements 
mostly on the lower Mississippi, and at least another hundred thousand Indi-
ans spread across the vast territory. Nobody knew exactly how many  there  were 
at the time,  because of the autonomy of indigenous communities from impe-
rial control— and census- takers—in the late eigh teenth  century. One hundred 
years  later, the U.S. government officially counted 144,000 Indians living in 
the region of the Louisiana Purchase;  whether relocation and reproduction 
made up for displacement and death is difficult to say.27  Whether and how to 
integrate all  these  people into the United States posed a considerable array of 
challenges for the proponents of republican empire. It also posed a consider-
able array of challenges for  those American Jonahs swallowed by the  U.S. 
 whale. Perhaps the most innovative new scholarship on Ame rica’s continental 
empire focuses on the view from inside the belly of the beast.
Louisiana’s white, largely francophone population descended from early 
French settlers in the Mississippi Valley, as well as  later mi grants such as the 
Acadian and Ca rib bean refugees. Many eastern Federalists expressed suspicion 
of their republican credentials and would have liked to place them  under an 
indefinite po liti cal apprenticeship  until they could learn the proper habits of 
citizenship, but  after some debate and negotiation, they  were admitted to the 
United States  under similar rules as governed the Northwest and Southwest 
Territories. So their po liti cal equality with the rest of the country was ensured—
at least in time. Thirteen states  were eventually carved out of the Louisiana 
Purchase, ending with Oklahoma in 1907, which means that the pro cess of 
folding Louisiana into the republican empire took more than a  century. The 
po liti cal status of citizens living in so- called unor ga nized areas of the Purchase, 
or areas stuck in the territorial stage of government, was a subordinate one, 
reminiscent of  those of us who live in Washington, D.C.,  today, who lack voting 
repre sen ta tion in Congress.28
Up and down the Mississippi Valley, Greater Louisiana’s “creole” population 
soon found itself outnumbered by newcomers from the eastern United States 
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and foreigners from abroad. According to the 1850 census, only 40  percent of 
the 1.2 million white  people living in the four states then formed out of the 
Louisiana Purchase (Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, and Iowa)  were native to 
the state they lived in, and 10  percent of the  whole population of  these states 
had been born abroad. New Orleans was second only to New York as a port of 
disembarkation for immigrants before the Civil War, most of whom headed up 
the Mississippi River into the continental heartland, where the U.S. government 
was selling federal lands for a minimum of $1.25 an acre. Immigrants populated 
the towns and cities of the Upper Mississippi to a remarkable extent; more than 
half the residents of St. Louis in 1860, for instance,  were foreign- born.29
While the creoles  were overrun, the Indians  were pushed aside. Not only 
did the Louisiana Purchase bring many new Indian  peoples  under nominal U.S. 
sovereignty, but it occurred to a few U.S. policy makers (included Jefferson) 
that “uninhabited” Louisiana could serve as a potential receptacle for displaced 
eastern Indians. Mounting demographic and po liti cal pressure against the east-
ern Indians reached a critical juncture in the late 1820s with the election of 
Andrew Jackson as president. Jackson and his followers regarded the enduring 
Indian presence as an obstacle to demo cratic republicanism. They saw asser-
tions of Indian sovereignty, most notably the Cherokee Constitution of 1827, 
as illegitimate assaults on the constitutional prerogatives of the states and unjust 
monopolies on valuable land. Indian removal truncated federal and evangelical 
efforts to “civilize” the eastern Indians through the provision of farm imple-
ments and the establishment of Christian schools and missions. Consequently, 
removal met with strong but ultimately unsuccessful opposition from the 
Indians’ largely northeastern evangelical and anti- Jackson allies inside the 
United States, as well as fierce opposition from the Indians themselves.30
Jackson defended Indian removal as a benevolent alternative to physical an-
nihilation or unwanted cultural and po liti cal assimilation, but it was in fact a 
vicious, deadly sham conducted with fealty to the outward forms of diplomacy 
and justice— force dressed up as choice. “To destroy  human beings with greater 
re spect for the laws of humanity would be impossible,” observed Alexis de Toc-
queville, who witnessed a miserable group of emigrant Choctaws crossing the 
Mississippi at Memphis. By 1845, roughly seventy- five thousand Sac, Fox, Kicka-
poo, Shawnee, Potawatomi, Miami, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, Choctaw, 
and Seminole Indians had been compelled by fraud and vio lence to migrate 
to the so- called Indian Country, a reserve carved out of the Louisiana cession 
west of Missouri and Arkansas in what  today is Oklahoma. Several thousand 
died along the way from starvation and disease (including newly arrived chol-
era); hundreds of  others  were killed in the wars of removal, including the Black 
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Hawk War in Illinois and Wisconsin and the protracted Seminole War (1835–
1842) in Florida.31
Emigrant and relocated Indians tried to compose themselves in the Indian 
Country west of the Mississippi River, but their displacement created a  whole 
new set of challenges. The new Indian settlements butted against the power ful 
Osage, Sioux, and Comanche Indian nations of the Plains, who  were often hos-
tile to them. Feckless U.S. Indian agents and army garrisons did not help. In the 
1850s, another wave of Euro- Americans broke over them as the bloody saga of 
Indian annihilation, displacement, and confinement repeated itself on diff er-
ent terrain and with more lethal technology. “Bleeding Kansas,” the infamous 
battleground between proslavery and antislavery settlers in the 1850s, was also 
the first theater of the thirty- year war between the Lakota Sioux and the U.S. 
Army. The heart of North Ame rica became a crossroads of conflict.32
A long chain of causation led from the Louisiana Purchase to war between 
the United States and Mexico, which resulted in the United States’ next  great 
territorial extension. As Ávila and Tutino’s essay on Mexico in this volume 
makes clear, the origins of that pivotal war (perhaps it should be called “The 
War of Northern Aggression”) must be viewed as much in the context of 
contests over state  formation and market development on Mexico’s northern 
margin as in the context of U.S. western expansion and rhe toric of Manifest 
Destiny. Texan secession and in de pen dence from Mexico was not only fueled 
by Anglo mi grants from the United States, but also had deep roots in the clash 
between Mexican centralists and localists (into which Anglo mi grants inserted 
themselves on the localist side), the expansion of plantation slavery and trade 
with New Orleans and St. Louis, Mexican abolition of slavery in 1829, and the 
failure of the Mexican government to protect northern Mexican communities 
against Indian raids.33
By itself, the rhe toric of Manifest Destiny explains  little about the internal 
pressures  behind U.S. expansion, which  were  shaped in crucial ways by partisan 
po liti cal competition between Demo crats and Whigs, who had contrasting 
cross- sectional co ali tions that led to diff er ent outlooks on war and territorial 
expansion. Polk and the southern- dominated Demo crats coveted not just 
slave- based Texas, but also control of West Coast harbors that would fulfill a long- 
standing desire to push into Pacific and Asian markets. The more northern- 
dominated Whig Party had greater fears about the divisive sectional effects of 
expansion. That conflict over slavery  shaped  these divisions became apparent 
when South Carolina’s John Calhoun, in his capacity as secretary of state, ar-
gued for the annexation of Texas as a bulwark against British abolitionism in 
North Ame rica, clinching northern antislavery opinion that Texas annexation, 
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and the war that followed, was a proslavery plot. Whig and abolitionist oppo-
nents registered anguished objections to the war.34
The U.S. victory was not the cakewalk it has often seemed to be in the 
historiography. While its battlefield victories  were often overwhelming and 
decisive— due in  great mea sure to the professionalism of the United States’ 
West Point– trained officer corps— occupying extensive Mexican terri-
tory proved far more challenging. (Sound familiar?) Local uprisings against 
the  U.S. presence made Mexican territory hot to the touch. In the end, the 
United States grabbed as much Mexican territory with as few inhabitants as 
pos si ble via the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Even so, the acquisition of ter-
ritory posed similar prob lems for the republican empire as had the Louisiana 
Purchase: how to incorporate Mexicans; what to do about Indians;  whether 
the territory should be slave or  free. But too much had changed for  these prob-
lems to be solved in the same way as before.35
The discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in 1848 put the  U.S.- Mexican War 
in a  whole new light. A massive influx of mi grants from around the world 
quickened California, as well as the ports and passageways leading to it. Al-
most 40  percent of California’s population in 1860 was foreign- born, includ-
ing 35,000 Chinese, 33,000 Irish, and  22,000 Germans, as well as argonauts 
from Sonora, Peru, and Chile. The California gold rush inspired the equally 
 great discovery of gold in Australia, and the infusion of massive quantities of 
gold from the Pacific World powerfully stimulated the American and global 
economies. Friedrich Engels ruefully admitted that the Communist Manifesto 
had not foreseen the “creation of large new markets out of nothing.” The rapid 
development of California stirred schemes to tie the West Coast closer to the 
eastern United States through a transcontinental railroad, which in turn ig-
nited the  bitter sectional strife over slavery that led to the Civil War. But that 
next war remained hidden beyond the horizon when the nineteenth  century 
reached its midpoint, and few  people in the United States would have pre-
dicted it, despite their divisions. In the wake of the so- called Compromise of 
1850, which appeared to soothe the tensions over slavery’s expansion resulting 
from the war with Mexico, more would have been more apt to celebrate a new 
era of peace, prosperity, and power than to fear an impending crisis.36
An Irrepressible Conflict
All changed quickly. Just a de cade  after the conclusion of the Mexican- American 
War, William Seward— a leader of the new Republican Party that caught fire in 
the North— proclaimed the existence of an “irrepressible conflict” between two 
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po liti cal systems in the United States, one based on “servile, or slave  labor” and 
the other on “voluntary  labor of freemen.”37 Seward’s irrepressible conflict soon 
became a vicious civil war that revolutionized the foundations of the Union by 
breaking up the “slave power.” Why did the United States split apart? How 
was it remade? Answering  these questions remains a challenge for historians, 
but the global turn in U.S. history has infused the study of the Civil War era 
with a new dimension. The nation’s history must now be embedded in more 
global dynamics of capitalism, national state  formation, imperial expansion, 
international diplomacy, and the clash of ideas about slavery and freedom.38
The North American slave regime changed in impor tant ways between 
in de pen dence and Civil War. It became more sectional, more completely 
domesticated, and enmeshed in the transatlantic cotton economy. First more 
sectional: slavery dis appeared from the northeastern states through a state- 
by- state pro cess of gradual emancipation, and it was barred from the “old 
Northwest” by  legal enactments (the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri 
Compromise). A mix of revolutionary antislavery ideals, evangelical perfec-
tionism, and emerging bourgeois norms of freedom motivated northern aboli-
tion, which was made feasible by the relative insignificance of slave  labor in 
the northern economy.  Free  people of color in the North generally occupied 
the lowest rungs on the economic ladder, and they faced newly institutional-
ized forms of racism, but they also or ga nized vigilance committees, mutual aid 
socie ties, schools, and (most importantly) churches that provided the bedrock 
of an African American civil society.39
As slavery dis appeared in the northern states, the northern economy expe-
rienced a transformation that some historians have called a “transition to 
capitalism” and  others a “market revolution.” In crude summary, demographic 
growth and improvements in transportation led to an intensifying social divi-
sion of  labor and economic specialization, the commercialization of agriculture, 
the emergence of proto- industrial production, and the proliferation of towns 
and cities. Placing the so- called market revolution in a transatlantic context, it’s 
clear that  these developments mirrored similar developments in Britain and 
borrowed liberally from the British model. New  Eng land entrepreneurs smug-
gled industrial knowledge out of Britain, while skilled and semiskilled immi-
grants added their own technical know- how and ingenuity. A common lan-
guage facilitated this transfer of  human capital. British lenders helped to finance 
state- sponsored internal improvement proj ects in the 1830s and private railroad 
construction in the 1840s and 1850s. Throughout the era, British goods flooded 
American markets, providing standards of industry and fashion that domestic 
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manufacturers strug gled to imitate and improve upon  behind a protective wall 
of tariffs.40
By midcentury, a broad array of northerners celebrated “ free  labor” as the 
just, progressive basis of their social order, while regarding southern slavery as 
cruel and backward.  Free  labor ideology did not necessarily lead to abolition-
ism, however, since distance, racism, property rights, and federalism all stood 
in the way. It took something more for the transformation of northern society 
to precipitate into a po liti cally effective antislavery movement. Yet  free  labor 
ideology harbored a crucial tension. The concept encompassed both the in de-
pen dent farmer and artisan who worked for himself and commanded his own 
 house hold, and the wage laborer, increasingly common in the North, who “vol-
untarily” worked for someone  else  under the compulsion of the  labor market 
rather than the lash. Spokesmen for the northern white working class invoked 
the slogan of “wage slavery” to indict the swindle of  free  labor, and at times, 
they transmuted “wage slavery” into its doppleganger, “white slavery.”41
In the southern states, by contrast, the “market revolution” traced a diff er-
ent, slavery- based path  toward modernity. The well- known rise of the short- 
staple cotton production invigorated and extended North American slavery 
from the Carolina upcountry to Texas. A local crop used for home textile pro-
duction in the eigh teenth  century, short- staple cotton became the favorite fiber 
of cotton textile manufacturers, the vanguard of the industrial revolution in 
the nineteenth  century. Annual North American short- staple cotton exports 
increased from almost none in 1790 to 4 million bales by 1860. The United 
States produced two- thirds of the world’s short- staple cotton on the eve of the 
Civil War, and three- quarters of the U.S. crop was exported, mostly to  Great 
Britain. Cotton alone accounted for more than half the value of all U.S. exports 
throughout the pre– Civil War era. All this did not magically occur  because of 
the cotton gin. That  simple invention was less a cause than an effect of the new 
structure of opportunity in the transatlantic economy.42
Neither capitalism nor the market revolution (whichever one wants to call 
it) bypassed the southern states. Rather, the cotton plantation system at the 
core of the nineteenth- century South latched onto transatlantic industrial 
revolution and went along for the ride—an unnatural symbiosis in which the 
parasite feeds its host. Outside the cotton core  were other slave- grown crops 
(tobacco and hemp in the Upper South, rice in the Carolina- Georgia low 
country, and sugar in lower Louisiana), upcountry enclaves where non– slave 
 owners predominated, and an outer ring of towns and smaller cities from Bal-
timore to New Orleans where slavery took on a distinctive urban form. North 
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American masters weathered the revolutionary challenge and adapted slave 
 labor to a wide range of environments and economies, much like their counter-
parts in Cuba and Brazil.43
Unlike Cuba and Brazil, the United States “domesticated” its slave population 
by (mostly) withdrawing from the Atlantic slave trade before 1820. Instead of 
imported Africans, biological reproduction and a massive internal slave trade 
sustained the expansion of cotton and sugar production in the Deep South 
in the de cades before the Civil War. The routine buying and selling of  people 
gave the nineteenth- century South its most brutally commercial aspect, not-
withstanding slave  owners’ many strategies of denial and concealment.  Those 
strategies  were in fact crucial ele ments of proslavery ideology— a conceptual 
domestication. Proslavery was the antithesis of northern  free  labor ideology. 
Southern slave  owners came to insist that slavery was natu ral, just, and even 
progressive in the classic sense. Most of all, they endorsed it as a sacred Christian 
arrangement and a bulwark against the dangerous isms of the modern world.44
The clash between northern antislavery and southern proslavery viewpoints 
crystallized within broader transatlantic debates over slavery and freedom, and 
it was paracolonial in that both sides drew lessons from the models of eman-
cipation pioneered elsewhere in the Atlantic world. Both sides reacted to the 
British campaign against the slave trade, the Haitian Revolution and other foreign 
slave revolts, the vari ous West Indian emancipations, and antislavery coloniza-
tion proj ects in West Africa. Intellectuals on both sides of the slavery debate 
drew from Eu ro pean po liti cal economy, anthropology, and sociology to bol-
ster their positions. U.S. abolitionists beginning in the 1830s allied with their 
British counter parts through personal correspondence, the travel and lecture 
cir cuit, and antislavery publishing and marketing. The transatlantic icon of 
abolitionism, a kneeling slave emblazoned with the slogan “Am I not a man 
and a  brother?,” illustrates this collaboration. The abolitionists’ foreign con-
nections could backfire, however, since it opened them to the potent charge of 
anglophilia.45
Southern slave  owners looked on with increasing alarm at a spreading anti-
slavery epidemic in the North. From the 1820s to the 1840s, they more or less suc-
cessfully quarantined the national state from infection through their influence 
in the po liti cal parties, the suppression of debate via the “gag rule” in Congress, 
and an insistence on a narrow reading of the national government’s constitu-
tional powers with re spect to slavery. But they had no such power over northern 
civil society, where antislavery flourished in churches and  middle- class parlors. 
While the immediatist, antiracist stance of William Lloyd Garrison attracted 
many black northerners, his brand of radical abolitionism remained marginal 
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among white northerners. A more diffuse and sentimental antislavery atti-
tude made greater headway. Many subscribed to African colonization in the 
delusional hope that removing black  people would pave the way for a gradual 
emancipation. That many white Americans thought an overseas colony could 
solve the prob lem of domestic slavery is, among other  things, a good indication 
of just how much slavery— and the racism it spawned— unhinged republican 
princi ples.46
What translated northern antislavery opinion into an antislavery politics 
beginning in the 1840s? The trigger was the Mexican war and the emergence of 
 free- soilism.  Free soil fused an indictment of slavery with a defense of the rights 
of white northerners against infringement by the “slave power.” Although the 
question of the status of slavery in the Mexican cession was resolved by the 
so- called Compromise of 1850 (which admitted California as a  free state and 
shifted the burden of decision onto local communities in the rest of the ces-
sion through the mechanism of “popu lar sovereignty”), the debates over once-
Mexican lands Mexico let the slavery genie out of its  bottle. When Stephen 
Douglas’s Kansas- Nebraska bill applied the princi ple of popu lar sovereignty 
to the newly or ga nized Louisiana Purchase territories of Kansas and Nebraska 
in 1854, the  bottle shattered. The operation of the new Fugitive Slave Law, fili-
busterism in Cuba and Nicaragua, and loud southern agitation to resume Af-
rican slave importation all strengthened northern fears that southern slavery 
had aggressive national, and even international, ambitions— what Abraham Lin-
coln called “the high- road to a slave empire.” By 1860, Whigs had virtually dis-
appeared, Demo crats had divided along sectional lines, and a new antislavery 
party calling itself Republican had reassembled the shards of northern politics 
into a winning electoral co ali tion.47
Lincoln, a western railroad  lawyer mythologized as a rail splitter, won the 
presidency in 1860 without a single southern electoral vote. Even though Lin-
coln and the Republican platform disavowed abolitionism and pledged not 
to touch slavery in the states where it already existed, southern secessionists 
viewed the outcome as im mensely dangerous to slavery. It placed the national 
government in the hands of a northern antislavery party. Once in control of 
the legislative and executive branches of the national government, they foresaw, 
Republicans would do more than simply contain slavery. They could legislate 
slavery out of existence by degrees. They could use patronage to build up a south-
ern antislavery party starting in the northern tier of slave states and working 
its way down. Or worst of all, the Republican victory could breed more John 
Browns, the militant abolitionist who tried to spark a slave revolt at Harpers 
Ferry,  Virginia, in 1859.48
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Map 3.2. The United States in North Ame rica, ca. 1860
At the same time, secessionists did more than react defensively against an 
existential antislavery threat. They also attempted to forge a popu lar national-
ism based materially and ideologically on slavery. The secessionist campaign 
following Lincoln’s election, the establishment of a new Confederate govern-
ment, and the initial mobilization for war  were po liti cally effective, though not 
uncontested, articulations of proslavery nationalism in the South. (Four border 
slave states remained in the Union, and opposition to secession was quite strong 
in non- slave- owning pockets of the South.) Over time, however, the long slog 
of war exposed Confederate weaknesses relative to the Union: a smaller citizenry, 
an inferior industrial base, difficulties of communication and coordination, a 
deep- seated localism, and, as it turned out, slavery itself. Confederate national-
ist hopes that dependence on southern cotton would compel Eu ro pean diplo-
matic recognition and support went unfulfilled. Unlike the breakaway colonies 
during the American Revolution, the Confederacy had to fend for itself in a 
new era of industrial warfare.49
By contrast, only a few northern voices defended the right of secession. Lin-
coln could neither concede to slave  owners’ demands for constitutional pro-
tections for slavery nor let the South go. Most northerners regarded secession 
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as “the essence of anarchy,” as Lincoln put it in his first inaugural address. It 
flaunted basic demo cratic princi ple. Time and again, Lincoln emphasized the 
world- historical significance of American democracy. In 1862 he called it “the 
last best hope of Earth.” In the Gettysburg Address he implored his country-
men to resolve that “government of the  people, by the  people, for the  people 
 shall not perish from the earth.” Union soldiers agreed. They fought for the 
Union and the abstract princi ple of demo cratic self- government that it sym-
bolized. Over time, however, northern war aims shifted away from merely 
preserving the Union to overthrowing slavery. This momentous shift resulted 
from the tenacity of Confederate re sis tance. If they had given up sooner, they 
might have held on to slavery longer.50
From southern slave  owners’ perspective, the Civil War turned into the very 
catastrophe they had hoped to prevent through secession. It was Haiti all over 
again, the military road to emancipation. Masters’ authority eroded. Thou-
sands of slaves fled to the Union lines. Almost two hundred thousand black 
men joined the Union army and navy in the last two years of the war once 
Lincoln authorized black enlistment. But the military road to emancipation 
was not straight and narrow. Diff er ent rules applied in diff er ent places and to 
diff er ent  people; freedom came sooner to some than  others. Among the last 
to be freed  were slaves in the Union slave states of Kentucky and Delaware, 
where emancipation did not generally apply  until ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in December 1865. The physical and en-
vironmental devastation of the war made life difficult for freed  people strug-
gling to eke out a living from a ruined landscape. The trauma of war scarred 
southern society. Many former Confederates refused to accept the legitimacy 
of emancipation, and their rage at defeat took the ritual form of lynching and 
murdering freedpeople. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in the 
United States but did not define what freedom meant for newly emancipated 
 people. As in other postemancipation socie ties in the Amer i cas, the meaning of 
their freedom was hammered out over subsequent de cades of intense and often 
violent strug gle, and fell so far short of full citizenship and economic in de pen-
dence that “freedom” is a misnomer.51
The United States came through its “fiery trial” at a steep price in blood 
and trea sure. At least 750,000  people died, and the war cost an estimated 
$10 billion (approximately $32 trillion  today). The protagonists strug gled to 
make sense of the death and carnage. Some found meaning in emancipation, 
 others in martial virtues like courage. Most ultimately attributed the war to 
God’s inscrutable  will. In hindsight, historians have endowed the Civil War 
with more secular significance, such as “the last cap i tal ist revolution” or “the 
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first modern war.” Less reductively, this essay has argued that the Civil War 
and emancipation resulted from the intricate dynamics of republican state- 
formation, transatlantic cap i tal ist development, and imperial expansion across 
North Ame rica. Ultimately, the crisis of the 1860s answered Hamilton’s impor-
tant question— choice or force?—in terms revealed by a photo graph taken in 
City Point,  Virginia, in 1865, showing a black soldier guarding a line of cannon. 
As Lincoln had reminded the  U.S. Congress earlier in the war, “We cannot 
escape history.”52
The Civil War ended one era of  U.S. history and launched another, yet 
 there is never a clean break with the past. The war did more than restore the 
Union; it strengthened the hand of the national government in its unending 
figure 3.1. Defending the Union and freedom: A soldier  
guards cannon in  Virginia, 1865
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contest with the states. Still,  there  were significant reassertions of state- level 
power through the late nineteenth  century, including the return to home rule 
in the South and the formation of new states in the West. Industrial cap i tal ist 
development was spurred by the war and accelerated afterward. With railroads 
as a leading sector, the U.S. economy steamed  toward new accumulations and 
concentrations of wealth, sharper in equality, and fierce class conflict often ar-
ticulated in the seemingly outdated language of Jeffersonian republicanism. 
Unpre ce dented numbers of immigrants flooded into the country, diversifying 
and populating swelling cities and manning its workshops, slaughter houses, 
and factories. The United States overtook  Great Britain as the world’s largest 
manufacturer by the 1890s.
Untangled from slavery and infused with industrial might, the American 
empire grew into a more global force. Seasoned Union veterans of the Civil 
War, armed with power ful weaponry, stampeded the Plains Indians into mea-
ger reservations and intensified the crusade of civilization against them. It did 
not take long for the United States to flex its muscle abroad. In 1867, the United 
States annexed tiny Middlebrooks (Midway) atoll in the Pacific, and just over 
three de cades  later, it would claim far bigger prizes from Spain— Cuba and the 
Philippines. By the dawn of the twentieth  century, the rising empire of Hamil-
ton’s ambitious generation had transformed into a  great power and a linchpin 
of the modern world.53
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By the late eigh teenth  century, the French slave colony of Saint Domingue was 
by far the most lucrative colony of the French empire and the entire Atlantic 
seaboard. Its trajectory from a slave colony to an in de pen dent nation led by 
former slaves and their descendants in the early nineteenth- century Atlantic 
defies idealization. Yet its existence as an in de pen dent black state, the challenges 
it posed to Eurocentric notions of liberty, and the fact that the emancipatory 
revolution was launched and sustained by the slaves themselves  were extraordi-
nary and unpre ce dented accomplishments. To most contemporaries (and  until 
the last few de cades for most historians), the capacity of enslaved Africans to 
envision freedom, develop strategies to achieve it, and establish an in de pen-
dent nation- state to defend it, was inconceivable. Simply put, a slave revolution, 
understood on its own terms, lay outside the conceptual framework of Western 
thought.1
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Yet Haiti did exist in 1804— and has endured despite a history of difficulties 
and denigrations. Its existence as an in de pen dent country, founded on anti-
slavery, anticolonialism, and racial equality, rather than conventional forms of 
po liti cal philosophy and constitutional theory, came riddled with complexi-
ties and posed almost insurmountable barriers to leaders committed to state 
formation— and to Haitian masses seeking a nation grounded in peasant land-
holding,  house hold production, and local markets.
Saint Domingue: The Quin tes sen tial Slave Colony
On the eve of France’s 1789 revolution, Saint Domingue was at its peak. It 
had 7,000 plantations: nearly 800 in sugar, more than 3,000 in indigo, some 
2,500 in coffee, another 800 in cotton, and some 50 cocoa growers— worked 
by over half a million slaves, two- thirds of them born in Africa.2 Yet  there was 
very  little in its early stages of settlement in the late seventeenth  century, with 
the spurious activities of freebooters, buccaneers, and pirates, and only a small 
number of tobacco and cotton farms, to indicate that a  century  later the colony 
would become the jewel of the French colonial empire and the engine that fu-
eled her international commerce, supplied her domestic industries, employed 
millions of French workers, and guaranteed enviable trade surpluses through 
reexportation of finished colonial imports to Eu ro pean markets.
Only at the turn of the seventeenth  century,  after France acquired the west-
ern portion of Hispaniola from Spain in the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), did 
Saint Domingue enter its sugar boom, with 120 sugar plantations by 1704, 100 
built from 1700 to 1704.3 Over the next eighty years Saint Domingue’s econ-
omy soared to new heights not only in sugar, but, during the de cades following 
the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, in an emerging coffee sector as well. 
By 1789, the total property values in the colony  were estimated to be over 1.6 
billion livres.4
Such prosperity was not pos si ble without slavery and the slave trade. The 
slave trade was a key component of economic expansion in both the metro-
politan and the colonial economies, with over a million slaves imported into 
the French West Indies during the eigh teenth  century, approximately 800,000 
 going directly to Saint Domingue. By the eve of the revolution, the colony was 
importing between 37,000 and 40,000 slaves annually.5
Part of the reason for the insatiable demand for slaves lay in the  labor- intensive 
nature of sugar production and the profit- driven motives of Saint Domingue’s 
planters. Sugar, unlike most other colonial exports, required extensive cultiva-
tion and semi- industrial manufacturing. The planting and harvesting of cane; 
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the twenty- four- hour multistage pro cess of hauling, milling, boiling the cane 
juice, crystallization, purging, and fi nally drying and packing the sugar, all re-
quired an inexhaustible, highly diversified, enslaved  labor force. With mortality 
rates on the sugar plantations among newly arrived Africans reaching upward 
of 50  percent in their first five to eight years in the colony, planters continually 
purchased more slaves, not just to replenish their diminished stock of  human 
 labor, but to expand operations, increase profits, offset debts, and build personal 
wealth. The slave population never reproduced, and by 1789 well over two- thirds 
of Saint Domingue’s slaves had been born in Africa.
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Map 4.1. Saint Domingue, ca. 1790
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As slave imports to Saint Domingue reached nearly forty thousand per year 
by 1791, most of the African- born, predominantly from the lower West African 
coast of Angola and the kingdom of Kongo, had arrived in the colony in the 
de cade or two before the outbreak of the revolution.6 On average, they  were 
between the ages of fifteen and thirty- five on arrival. They had spent their for-
mative youth and early adulthood acquiring knowledge and a worldview that 
embraced the politics, the languages, religious practices and cultural forms, 
kinship ties and obligations, as well as the landholding and agricultural prac-
tices of the African socie ties from which they came. Most had acquired a long 
figure 4.1. Slaves milling cane in eighteenth- century Saint Domingue
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experience in  house hold production of food crops and local marketing, prac-
tices fundamentally at odds with the system of large- scale plantation produc-
tion and commodity exports they  were now forced to endure and sustain.
Slaves born in Saint Domingue, plus a few of the African- born who became 
acclimated to colonial slave society, generally occupied elite or supervisory 
positions in the slave hierarchy as domestics, coachmen, valets, skilled labor-
ers, and artisans practicing trades in the towns or on plantations.  Others held 
impor tant roles as slave  drivers, or commandeurs. Holding positions of respon-
sibility and, as commandeurs, authority over other slaves, and with access to the 
outside world, some gained a knowledge of French and became aware of po liti-
cal and other events in the colony, as well as of the politics  behind the events— 
which often originated in France. The core of the slave leadership that or ga-
nized the massive slave insurrection of August 22, 1791, came from the ranks 
of the commandeurs, along with coachmen, domestics, and other elite slaves, 
who played key roles in its inception.7 Toussaint Louverture, who would rise to 
the summit of power as a revolutionary black leader and statesman, had been 
born a slave, but was already  free at the time of the revolution. The revolution, 
however, did not begin with slave revolt.
The Background to Slave Emancipation
To understand events in Saint Domingue, we must look to France on the eve of 
its revolution. An unpre ce dented financial crisis faced the Bourbon regime due 
in large part to debts incurred to fund the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) and 
military support of the British American war of in de pen dence. The re sis tance 
of the nobility and upper clergy to government tax reforms compounded the 
crisis— leaving the monarchy no alternative but to convoke the Estates General. In 
 doing so, however, Louis XVI opened the floodgates to a revolutionary pro cess 
beyond his capacity to control. In addition to dealing with taxation, represen-
tatives from each of France’s three estates— clergy, nobles, and commoners— 
were to submit lists of grievances, or cahiers de doléances, to be considered by a 
deliberative assembly that had not met since 1614, yet with each estate meeting 
and voting separately. Finding themselves at a permanent two- to- one disadvan-
tage with re spect to the two privileged estates, the delegates of the Third Estate, 
which comprised close to 98  percent of the French population and included all 
classes of  people— wealthy port merchants, slave traders, commercial agents, 
provincial  lawyers, notaries, urban and rural artisans, and shop keep ers, as well 
as the peasantry—on June 17, 1789, boldly declared themselves a National As-
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sembly, deliberating and speaking for the nation as a  whole. Three days  later, 
they swore not to adjourn  until a written constitution was  adopted for France. 
On August 26, they laid out foundational princi ples in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen: universal equality and the preservation of the natu-
ral rights to liberty, property, security, and re sis tance to oppression.
In the context of unfolding revolutionary events in France, sparked by the 
opening of the Estates General in 1789 and the egalitarian ideology put for-
ward by the Third Estate, the colony’s white planters and  free coloreds (affranchis) 
mobilized— and fought against each other—to press their own grievances and 
obtain rights they believed to be theirs. The white planters wanted freedom 
from restrictive mercantilist policies, po liti cal autonomy within the colonial 
administration, and the maintenance of racial supremacy.
For the island’s  free coloreds, whose elite members  were planters, and slave 
 owners, coffee merchants, and militia officers, many educated in France, some 
having fought for British North American in de pen dence as volunteers in 
the French army, the goal was to gain access to the unfolding po liti cal pro cess 
in France. They hoped to claim the rights of universal citizenship proclaimed 
in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in France and thereby re-
gain  legal equality with their white counter parts, denied them  because of their 
African heritage.8
They aimed to “regain  legal equality”  because initially, by Louis XIV’s Code 
Noir of 1685, the affranchis  were to enjoy “the same rights, privileges and liber-
ties enjoyed by persons born  free,” which is to say, by all French subjects. This 
remained more or less the case  until the Seven Years’ War,  after which Saint 
Domingue witnessed an influx of new French immigrants seeking fortune in 
the colony’s expanding plantation economy. Facing competition from a rising 
class of  free colored property  owners for land, slaves, and employment, racial 
tensions became increasingly acute. From the late 1760s  until the eve of the 
revolution, planters pressed racial exclusions. Colonial authorities passed leg-
islation imposing racial segregation in public places, barring  free coloreds from 
most “white” professions, restricting their ability to travel to France, and, to 
suppress feelings of social equality, imposed sumptuary regulations in the pub-
lic sphere. By the early 1770s,  free coloreds  were required to renounce French 
surnames and adopt  others suggesting African origins.9 And they  were prohib-
ited from holding po liti cal office.
The revolutionary context of 1788–1791 suddenly opened the questions of 
po liti cal equality for  free coloreds—of access to office and to the legislative 
and judicial pro cesses of making, changing, and interpreting laws. The right to 
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participate in the public domain took on special urgency. It became the battle-
field on which not only the  future of  free coloreds, but the  future of slavery 
itself would be fought and determined.
 Free colored leaders like Vincent Ogé, a rich coffee merchant from the col-
ony’s North province, who was in Paris at the outset of the French Revolution, 
argued that only if they gained po liti cal equality by peaceful and constitutional 
means could a generalized slave revolt be averted. If  free coloreds had to take 
to arms in defense of their rights, they could not be responsible for any actions 
the slaves might take. The white planters, for their part, argued that extend-
ing po liti cal rights to even one  free colored in Saint Domingue would open 
the floodgate to demands for universal equality, including the colony’s  free 
blacks and ultimately their kin still in slavery. For the power ful white colo-
nists, po liti cal and civil equality for  free coloreds would inevitably lead to the 
end of slavery— and of their personal fortunes. In the end, both parties  were 
proven right— for opposite reasons. A massive slave insurrection did break out 
in the colony’s North province on August 22, 1791, a day  after  free coloreds in 
the West province announced taking recourse to arms to defend their cause 
and their lives from violent aggressions aimed against them across the colony, 
mostly by property- less “small white” and other déclassé ele ments. It would take 
another eight months of violent conflict among factions of white colonists— 
some wanting to secede from revolutionary France to defend racial supremacy; 
 others embracing a counterrevolutionary royalist position; and still  others who 
supported French revolutionary officials— and between  these factions and the 
 free coloreds, before the latter  were granted universal rights of French citizen-
ship by the Legislative Assembly in France on April 4, 1792.
With the new law,  free coloreds  were expected to aid French authorities in 
putting down the slave insurrections that had erupted throughout the colony, 
and in returning rebel slaves to their plantations. The task proved impossible. 
 Those in the North,  under the command of Jean- François and Biassou (with a 
small contingent of several hundred well- trained and hardened rebel slaves led 
by Toussaint Louverture),  were fighting  under the banner of Spain, defending 
monarchy, and occupying numerous parishes in the eastern part of the prov-
ince. Slave insurgents in the West  were close to forming alliances with the Brit-
ish, whose agents had begun to negotiate with secessionist planters to bring 
the colony  under British domain. In the South, a massive slave rebellion was 
unfolding by the end of summer 1792 in the mountainous region around the 
capital of les Cayes; rebels formed a massive maroon community of ten to twelve 
thousand men,  women, and  children, with armed contingents and military 
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outposts. By March 1793, France was at war with both  Great Britain and Spain, 
and the threat of British invasion loomed.10
By late spring 1793, the two French civil commissioners, Léger Félicité Son-
thonax and Étienne Polverel, having arrived in the colony in September 1792 
with a mandate from the revolutionary government to restore order, enforce 
the April 4 decree, and suppress the slave insurrections, faced a near- hopeless 
situation. Amid threats of foreign occupation and agitations by secessionist and 
royalist factions, new conflicts broke out on June 22–23 in the northern capi-
tal of le Cap. The newly arrived governor- general, Thomas Galbaud, refused 
to recognize the superior authority of the civil commissioners, who dismissed 
him and issued deportation  orders. Events escalated to rioting in the streets 
and the emptying of the prisons. Hundreds of disgruntled sailors aboard the 
governor’s fleet in the harbor joined the fray, as did some ten thousand of 
the city’s black slaves. By June 23, fires destroyed over two- thirds of the city. In 
the face of  these events, and no longer able to rely upon the full support of  free 
coloreds to save the colony from the revolution’s domestic and foreign enemies, 
the commissioners turned to the rebel slave insurgents and their leaders, who 
had taken arms, torched plantations, and for two years maintained or ga nized 
armies to defend their freedom: “It is with the natives of the country, that is, 
the Africans,” the commissioners wrote to the French National Convention, 
“that we  will save Saint- Domingue for France.”11 In desperation, and in the 
name of the French Republic, they offered  legal manumission to any rebel slave 
who enrolled in the French army, with liberty soon extended to their wives 
and  children. Yet not one of the major slave leaders, Toussaint included, rallied 
to the call, maintaining their professed allegiance to Spain in the strug gle for 
freedom.
Nearly half of the slaves in the North province had deserted the planta-
tions to join the rebel movements;  those who remained, along with le Cap’s 
white and  free colored citizens fearing the power of slave insurgency, pressured 
Sonthonax to proclaim general emancipation. On August 29, 1793, the com-
missioner decreed slavery abolished in the North province, an act that was 
followed by Polverel in September and October for the West and South prov-
inces, respectively. On February 4, 1794, the French National Convention rati-
fied the abolition of slavery in all French territory and ostensibly extended the 
Rights of Man and Citizen to all colonial inhabitants, without regard to color 
or previous status. Unpre ce dented as this was in the history of slavery, the de-
cree did not end colonial rule or the plantation regime of enforced  labor and 
export commodity production.
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From Slavery to Freedom— and Plantation  Labor
From the moment the revolutionary commissioners abolished slavery, the 
prob lem of reconciling freedom, universal citizenship, and individual rights 
with coerced plantation  labor and the large- scale production of exports that 
alone could generate commercial prosperity and strong government revenues, 
 shaped defining debates and conflicts— and ultimately proved impossible to 
resolve. In the end, Haiti became a nation of peasant producers, as did the Bajío 
in Mexico  after the popu lar insurgencies launched in 1810 brought the collapse 
of the silver economy  there. For Haiti, the outcome appears inevitable, given 
the permanent rejection of plantation  labor by the overwhelming majority of 
former slaves.
It was not the chosen path of  those in power. In the transition from slavery to 
a postemancipation, and then to a postcolonial state and society based on uni-
versal freedom and  legal equality, colonial administrators and in de pen dence 
rulers alike tried to maintain large- scale plantation production and commodity 
exports— and repeatedly faced the prob lem of replacing the social relations of 
slavery with the  labor of  free individuals.  Every attempt failed. Barring coer-
cion, military supervision or, at the very least, the suppression of individual 
rights, freed slaves refused to reconcile themselves to the plantation regime.
The  labor regime first put in place in 1793–1794 by the civil commissioners 
 after general emancipation served as a prototype for each successive regime of 
the revolutionary period and  after, from Toussaint Louverture to Dessalines 
and Christophe long into the national period. The emancipation proclama-
tions of Sonthonax and Polverel acknowledged that the plantation workers 
 were  free and that the rights of French citizenship extended to them. Freedom 
from chattel slavery, of course, was one  thing; personal liberty and the right to 
land, quite another.  Under the first emancipation regime, plantations would 
remain intact as productive units, as would the collective  labor force. To assure 
a stable transition from slavery to “ free  labor,” workers  were ordered to remain 
on the plantations of their former  owners, where they would  labor at the same 
tasks as  under slavery.12 They would, however, gain a small wage for their  labor, 
but only on fulfilling a six- day work week, as  under slavery.  Under this arrange-
ment (le système portionnaire) one- third of the plantation revenues (or one- quarter 
 after deduction of government taxes)  were reserved for workers, to be divided 
among them in unequal portions according to rank, occupation, sex, and age; 
the other two- thirds belonged to the owner as profit and investment capital. 
Theoretically, the more the ex- slaves worked and the greater the output, the 
greater their collective portion of the crop revenues. Their only rights  were  those 
derived from their  labor and confined to the plantation regimen. The August 29 
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emancipation proclamation issued by Sonthonax in the North province, fol-
lowed by more a detailed document promulgated by Polverel in February 1794 
for the West and South provinces,  were the first of their kind in the history of 
slavery and abolition. While proclaiming universal emancipation, the decrees 
 were regimented work codes that set norms for plantation  labor. In essence, 
they granted a “plantation citizenship.”13
The reason to maintain plantation agriculture was clear: France was at war 
in Eu rope and facing Spanish and British occupation forces in the colony. 
Without the  labor of plantation workers to produce revenue- generating ex-
ports, France could not sustain the war effort in Eu rope or in the colony, let 
alone pay the salaries of their black compatriots who, as  free French citizens, 
had joined the ranks of the French army to defend the Republic and general 
emancipation. Plantation workers  were to consider themselves “soldiers- in- the- 
field”; their efforts, like  those of their counter parts in the army,  were necessary 
to the defense of revolutionary France who had sanctioned their freedom. The 
exigencies of the war economy dictated the social relations of production, land, 
and  labor. Ironically, the war economy set the terms and conditions of freedom.
At this point, Toussaint Louverture was still allied with Spain and rebel 
leaders Jean- François and Biassou, while fighting for general emancipation in 
his own name. He remained cautious about Sonthonax’s emancipation proc-
lamation; normally only kings or other sovereigns had the power to abolish 
slavery. Decreed by a commissioner, emancipation might be revoked in the 
ever- changing course of events in France. Only  after news arrived in early May 
1794 of the National Convention’s law of February 4 abolishing slavery did 
Toussaint break with his Spanish allies and join the French republican army. 
From then  until the final evacuation of the British troops in 1798, on terms 
he personally negotiated as commander- in- chief of the French army in Saint- 
Domingue and lieutenant- governor of the colony, Toussaint  rose to become 
the foremost figure— militarily and politically—in determining the direction 
and destiny of the colony. He worked to create a prosperous, self- governing ter-
ritory of France,  under sovereign black rule.
Over time, he lost confidence in the conservative post- Jacobin government 
of the French Directory, responsible for reorganizing the colonies into over-
seas departments of the Republic, “one and indivisible,” and for implementing 
universal citizenship and equality among former slaves. The year 1797 brought 
a resurgence of royalist and other proslavery factions, inside and outside the 
government; they took control of the legislature in spring elections and  were 
pushing  toward a restoration of the slave trade and the pre-1789 colonial regime.14 
Although  these ele ments  were purged in the republican coup d’état  later that 
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year, the Directory came close to suspending application of the French con-
stitution of 1795, which guaranteed the abolition of slavery. Fi nally, in early 
1798, the Directory sent a military, rather than a civil agent, General Marie- 
Théodore- Joseph Hédouville, to represent French republican authority in 
Saint Domingue. For his part, Toussaint began to build the foundations for 
Saint- Domingue’s po liti cal autonomy and, ideally, economic conditions to take 
an emancipated black state into the Atlantic world of the still- slaveholding 
 great powers. But how? With what powers and with what consequences? What 
kind of a society would it be? In the absence of metropolitan guarantees, how 
could such an entity—on its own amid revolution and international warfare— 
defend emancipation? Fundamental contradictions underlay any exercise of 
colonial sovereignty in a plantation society without slavery.
The Road to In de pen dence
Toussaint’s state- in- the- making revolved around a number of overriding and 
interlocking objectives.15 The first and most crucial was to defend general eman-
cipation, and to do so  under black rule. In the uncertain world of colonial slav-
ery and Atlantic imperialism— not to mention the uncertainties of the French 
Revolution— Toussaint needed a strong army; and for this he needed the re-
vival of exports and accumulation of foreign reserves to sustain his emerging 
state and the military. The path he chose  toward economic recovery was built 
on the ruins of the pre-1789 plantation export regime, and on the post-1793 
emancipationist  labor regimes founded by the French civil commissioners.
To restore the colony’s war- torn economy, which by 1795 left Saint Domingue’s 
exports virtually non ex is tent,16 Toussaint reinforced, rather than reformed, 
the existing agrarian structure. To deter individual initiatives  toward a model 
of production based on in de pen dent smallholding and local markets, which 
might undermine his regime, he placed plantation laborers  under military 
rather than civil administration. Commercial prosperity,  under slavery or free-
dom, came only from agricultural exports. Large- scale agriculture and plantation 
 labor  were tied to international commerce, and without commerce Toussaint 
could never hope to achieve his ultimate objective— a solid and sovereign black 
state. For Saint Domingue to reenter the commercial Atlantic as an interna-
tional player, Toussaint needed  free markets and open trade relations, notably 
with neutral countries like the United States. Inevitably this would bring him 
into the tangled world of international diplomacy and the vortex of Atlantic 
colonialism. To consolidate his own government and preserve the freedom of 
his  people, he would need to deal directly with two major powers,  Great Britain 
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and France, and an emerging nation, the United States— each motivated by 
self- interest.
At the time of the British evacuation in August 1798, Toussaint sought to 
maximize his options and turn to advantage the terms of Britain’s military 
troop withdrawal. He entered direct negotiations with General Maitland and, 
overriding France’s legally constituted agent, General Hédouville, signed a mu-
tually expedient convention by which  Great Britain was guaranteed protected 
and exclusive trading relations with Saint Domingue.17 In exchange,  Great 
Britain would guarantee the colony’s security by promising not to attack Saint 
Domingue for the remainder of the war with France in Eu rope, or to intervene 
in its internal affairs. For his part, Toussaint promised the same with regard to 
Jamaica, which meant that he would not try to export emancipation beyond 
Saint Domingue. The convention was a hermetic trade agreement with an  enemy 
of France. By acting in his own name, without consulting— and without the 
consent of— any higher French authority, Toussaint assumed powers of head of 
state. He exercised a function normally reserved to sovereign states, negotiating 
international treaties.
 Later that year, Toussaint took another step to expand Saint Domingue’s 
commerce, this time with the United States. On November 6, 1798, he dis-
patched a letter to President John Adams proposing to reopen trade between 
the two states. Toussaint aimed to circumvent the interruption of commerce 
with U.S. merchants that had resulted from the diplomatic hostilities between 
the United States and France in their Quasi- War against each other’s shipping.18 
He would legalize and expand trade that, at the time, was conducted clandes-
tinely. For the young North American nation, the West Indies trade was crucial 
to commercial development; by now U.S. trade with Saint Domingue ranked 
second in importance only to that with  Great Britain.19 The foreign policy of 
the Adams administration reflected  these commercial goals, even as the cau-
tious opening to diplomatic relations with a nominally sovereign black state 
exposed the contradictions embedded in early  U.S. attitudes  toward slavery, 
emancipation, and race.
Renewed commerce, of course, depended on Saint Domingue’s capacity 
to produce and export plantation crops to pay for foodstuffs, arms, and other 
basic goods with which to equip the army. In the first of a series of proclama-
tions relating to land and  labor resources, issued on November 15, 1798, Tous-
saint began to reor ga nize and reinforce the plantation structure by placing it 
 under the supervision of the military. In the pro cess, he began transforming the 
civil basis of the society into a military one. Toussaint specifically charged his 
lieutenants, the military police, and local army commanders with enforcing 
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work discipline and the overall submission of the plantation laborers, and with 
forcing  those who had abandoned their estates for opportunities on other plan-
tations or in the towns, to return to  those to which they belonged.20 He also 
began leasing out plantations that had been sequestered by the state to leading 
generals and other high officers of his army. As leaseholders, they became new 
proprietors; for plantation laborers, they became new masters.21
On November 17, 1798, Toussaint issued another ordinance seeking to re-
dress the colony’s balance of trade, offset the drainage of colonial currency, and 
increase government revenues. He lamented: “The small volume of trade [at 
pres ent] with the Americans and the Danish tends only to drain the colony of 
its specie.  These foreign traders bring mostly luxury goods and very few staples, 
of which the colony is constantly deprived to meet its basic needs.”22
The “mercantilist maneuver,” as Toussaint called it, had three detrimental 
effects: maintaining the high cost of basic staples by reducing supplies, creating 
scarcity and increasing unmet demand; draining the colony of specie to pay for 
costly luxury goods; and, in prevailing war time conditions, driving down prices 
of exports by limiting outlets for plantation production. In response, Toussaint 
restricted the landing of luxury goods to one- third of a ship’s cargo, prohibited 
the export of colonial specie in any form and, to  counter fraud and corrup-
tion, tightened administrative controls over customs and trea sury officials.23 
As impor tant as  these mea sures  were to improving government finances, and 
strengthening his government and army, without a normalization and expan-
sion of trade with neutral powers like the United States, the reforms remained 
insufficient.
On February 9, 1799, Congress passed and President Adams signed into 
law “Toussaint’s Clause,” exempting Saint Domingue from the U.S. embargo 
on trade with France in the Quasi- War between the two countries, reopening 
trade with the colony. Adams appointed Edward Stevens as consul- general to 
Saint Domingue, a title implying official recognition of an in de pen dent Saint 
Domingue. For Stevens, the reopening of trade with Toussaint was good policy 
and an absolute necessity for the U.S. merchant  houses  doing business clandes-
tinely since the initial American embargo on French ports. He urged a parallel 
agreement with  Great Britain “in the interests of Ame rica.” For Maitland on 
the British side, trade with Saint Domingue, if well- regulated and kept within 
a  U.S.– Great Britain– Saint Domingue triangle, would eco nom ically benefit 
Britain, strike a blow at French commerce, and also isolate Saint Domingue, 
preventing the spread of emancipation in the Ca rib bean or the southern United 
States. A three- way alliance, known as “Heads of Regulation,” was signed on 
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June 13, 1799. It expanded the earlier Louverture- Maitland agreement to open 
direct trade in Saint Domingue to both British and American shipping.24
Yet the arrangement had significant drawbacks for Toussaint. It prohib-
ited Saint Domingue from building a merchant marine or navy by restricting 
the size of her ships to fifty tons and their navigation to five leagues from the 
northern coastline. While Toussaint had broadened his trading partners and 
widened his markets, Anglo- American commerce with Saint Domingue, in-
cluding the carry ing of the plantation exports Toussaint promoted, would be-
long exclusively to British and U.S. ships. However, the agreement did permit 
Toussaint to pursue another objective: eliminating his po liti cal rival, André 
Rigaud, military commander of the South and leader of the colony’s former 
 free- colored elite. Anticipating the impending civil war between them, Tous-
saint insisted that the ports of the South be excluded from the new trade agree-
ment to prevent Rigaud from supplying his army and ensure his defeat.
The United States wanted to ensure Toussaint’s victory over his rival; they 
saw him as the stronger of the two protagonists and one who, “ were his power 
uncontrolled, would exercise it in protecting commerce, encouraging agricul-
ture and establishing useful regulations for the internal government of the col-
ony.” Should he be unsuccessful, Stevens wrote, “all the arrangements we have 
made respecting commerce must fall to the ground. The most solemn treaty 
would have  little weight with a man of Rigaud’s capricious and tyrannical tem-
perament.”25 Furthermore, in the view of the United States and the British, 
Toussaint was seeking to separate himself from French authority. As soon as 
Rigaud was defeated and the last French civil commissioner sent off, Stevens 
anticipated that Toussaint would declare the colony in de pen dent.26 From 
the U.S. point of view, if Toussaint declared in de pen dence, the United States 
would bear no responsibility and could carry on trade with Saint Domingue 
without having to extend official diplomatic recognition, and thus contravene 
French sovereignty.  Free trade with Toussaint was commercially beneficial, 
having Toussaint declare in de pen dence would be diplomatically pragmatic, 
and, so far as any potential threat to slavery, a safe bet. Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering added that, for the time being, “and perhaps for a much 
longer period,” Saint Domingue’s foremost needs  were military.27 The popula-
tion of Saint Domingue would be tied to agriculture; the Heads of Regulation 
ensured that Saint Domingue would never have a navy or merchant marine 
posing a threat to U.S. commerce.
With his final victory over Rigaud in August 1800, Toussaint could have 
declared in de pen dence. We may never know  whether he was on the verge of 
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 doing so, but Toussaint knew he was dealing with France’s enemies. He had 
defied French authority in the colony, while maintaining deferential relations 
with the metropolis; he kept British and U.S diplomats guessing about the con-
sequences and ramifications of Saint Domingue in de pen dence. Toussaint had 
entered the world of nation- states and plunged into the vortex of imperialist 
politics; he was no dupe to the ultimate aims of British American commercial 
interests, and less so to  those of British imperialism. Had he broken ties de-
finitively with France in 1799 or 1800, Saint Domingue would have been  little 
more than a protectorate of the United States and  Great Britain, a pawn serv-
ing Anglo- American commerce and British imperialism. Neither the United 
States nor Britain encouraged Saint Domingue in de pen dence on abolitionist 
princi ples or to further black self- determination. Their only goal was to take 
the colony from France and further their own commerce. They accepted slave 
emancipation on the island of Saint Domingue alone,  because  there was noth-
ing they could do about it. They hoped to contain in Saint Domingue the 
dangers of a black state born of slave revolt. To preserve his own and Saint 
Domingue’s de facto in de pen dence, Toussaint remained deferential to France. 
As long as it maintained the abolition of slavery, he stopped just short of break-
ing formal ties with the metropolis.
Within the colony he reigned supreme.  After defeating Rigaud in the civil 
war, Toussaint had arranged for his exile to France, eliminating any further 
challenge to his authority in Saint Domingue. To consolidate  these gains, he 
turned to incorporating the adjacent Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (ceded 
to France in 1795 by the Treaty of Basel, but never formally occupied). In early 
January 1801, defying metropolitan prohibitions, he sent an expedition to place 
the Spanish territory  under military occupation in the name of France. He thus 
extended his military and po liti cal authority over the entire island. At the same 
time, he placed the remaining French commissioner, Philippe Roume,  under 
 house arrest for refusing to authorize the expedition. Fi nally, Toussaint created 
a commission to draft a constitution, promulgated on July 8, 1801, conferring 
po liti cal sovereignty (although not formal in de pen dence) over all of Hispan-
iola and absolute power on himself as governor- for- life.
The constitution was not a declaration of in de pen dence. Toussaint was 
careful to recognize that Saint Domingue was still French and to reiterate the 
permanent abolition of slavery: “ There cannot be any slaves on this territory; 
servitude  here is forever abolished. All men are born, live and die  here,  free and 
French.” Hence all individuals  were equal before the law, which would be ap-
plied without distinction of color. Toussaint’s constitution established the  legal 
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foundations for a multiracial egalitarian society. He, not France, set the terms 
by which Saint Domingue would be governed.
Napoleon Bonaparte had already ended the status of the colonies as over-
seas departments of France, previously conferred  under the Directory’s Con-
stitution of 1795. Now, according to Article 91 of his new constitution of 1799, 
the colonies would be subject to “special laws” that addressed the specific needs 
of each colony. In his proclamation of December 25, 1799, to the “citizens of 
Saint Domingue,” but directed primarily at Toussaint Louverture, at the time 
still engaged in the civil war against Rigaud, Bonaparte announced that the Di-
rectory’s Constitution of 1795 had been replaced by a new constitutional pact 
“aimed at strengthening liberty,” Article 91 of which concerned the colonies. 
Given differences in climate, customs, soil, agriculture, and types of production 
from  those in France, the inhabitants of the colonies could not be governed 
by the same laws as  those in the metropole. Still, it proclaimed the princi ples 
of liberty and equality for blacks to be inviolable: “Remember, brave Negroes, 
that only the French  people recognize your freedom and the equality of your 
rights.”28
Lurking in all the deflecting rhe toric, the law of February 4, 1794, which 
abolished slavery and extended universal citizenship to all inhabitants of the 
French Republic, no longer had constitutional validity. For Toussaint, the po-
tential for a restoration of slavery became manifest.  There was  little doubt in 
his mind that Bonaparte’s “special laws” would strike a terrible blow to the  legal 
foundation of freedom and lead to a very uncertain  future.
In the absence of French constitutional law, Toussaint aimed to provide 
clear, decisive, and sovereign black leadership for Saint Domingue, on his own 
terms and with his own constitution. Yet beyond the constitutional guarantees 
of personal security, the inviolability of domicile, the sanctity of private prop-
erty, the right to be lawfully charged with an offense before arrest, the right 
to a trial in court, and the right of petition— “especially to the governor”— 
the structures Toussaint set to govern the colony and direct the economy  were 
military.29
All previous laws and ordinances on agriculture and the policing of the 
plantation workforces  were constitutionalized, as was the leasing of sequestered 
or abandoned estates to army generals and other high- ranking officers. Former 
white colonists wishing to return and take possession of their properties  were 
encouraged. To reinforce the plantation complex and preclude the rise of a class 
of smallholding peasants, Toussaint passed legislation prohibiting the purchase 
of land  under 50 carreaux (approximately 165 acres). Any worker or association 
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of workers hoping to buy a few carreaux  were barred. To ensure the growth of 
the plantation workforce and the increase of agricultural output, Toussaint’s 
constitution gave him power to import additional laborers (presumably by 
purchasing them through the slave trade and then freeing them), a mea sure 
that, ironically, gave rise to rumors in the North that Toussaint intended to 
restore slavery. Such rumors, along with the harsh restrictions and ubiquitous 
presence of the military, prompted widespread popu lar revolt against his re-
gime in October, only three months  after the promulgation of his constitution. 
It was inspired by Toussaint’s nephew, General Moïse; as agricultural inspector 
for the North he opposed the repressive mea sures that deprived workers of per-
sonal freedom. Following the revolt, which cost the lives of hundreds of white 
colonists, Toussaint ordered Moïse arrested and quickly had him tried and ex-
ecuted. He then enacted new mea sures of control requiring district military 
commanders to submit censuses of all farmworkers on the plantations  under 
their jurisdiction. Anyone not a farmworker had to carry a passport proving his 
vocation or trade, or be arrested and sent to the fields. Any residential, occupa-
tional, or social mobility to which a farmworker might aspire was precluded; 
they  were tied to the plantations.
Toussaint made a clear distinction between freedom as the abolition of 
chattel slavery (insisting that no person could be property of another), and 
freedom as the right of former slaves to exercise individual liberties. The latter, 
if allowed to plantation laborers, would, he believed, inevitably lead to wide-
spread vagrancy and idleness, a lack of moral and civic virtues, and of parental 
responsibility in educating youth. Above all, it would result in the refusal to 
work on plantations for the profit of  others, undermining the island’s economic 
prosperity. He formalized the distinction in his constitution:  there could be no 
slaves in Saint Domingue— all men are born, live and die  free and French; but, 
“the colony being essentially agricultural, [it] can suffer no loss or interruption 
of production,”30 lest it lead to economic ruin and leave the colony prey to 
slaveholding colonialist powers. Each plantation should therefore be run as a 
factory, with a permanent concentration of workers assembled as one  family 
 under the paternalistic authority of an owner or man ag er, and the absolute 
authority of the military. To defend slave emancipation, Toussaint effectively 
replaced civil society with a militarized state, making any distinction between 
state and society, or “the state and the nation,” all but invisible, leaving the mass 
of the agrarian citizenry constitutionally and po liti cally alienated.
Toussaint did achieve a limited economic recovery. Export figures for 1801–
1802, at the height of his governance, are revealing. Compared with figures for 
1795, when the colony exported almost nothing,  those for 1801–1802 show a 
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significant increase in coffee and cotton exports, and a lesser rise in sugar. In 
1795, sugar exports, the economic lifeblood of the plantation system,  were but 
1.2  percent of the levels of 1789; by 1801 they had risen to 13  percent of the earlier 
peak, a limited growth that documented encouraging results from the opening 
of Anglo- American trade and the efficacy of Toussaint’s  labor regime, despite 
freed slaves re sis tance to the most difficult of  labors. In 1795, coffee, a crop re-
quiring far less capital investment than sugar, had dropped to 2.8  percent of the 
prerevolutionary peak— then  rose to 57  percent by 1801. Evidently, freed slaves 
profited from coffee, but only when they received their entitled wages from 
coffee sales and only through coerced  labor conditions. Cotton exports experi-
enced a fall to only 0.7  percent of preconflict levels in 1795—by 1801 they  rose 
to 35  percent of their 1789 levels. Certainly this was a crop the British would 
buy if production could increase. Only indigo, concentrated in the South, ex-
perienced a slight decline between 1795 and 1801, when British occupation and 
civil war disrupted production. In 1802, Saint Domingue’s exports  were even 
more favorable, with sugar reaching 38  percent, cotton 58  percent, coffee hold-
ing near 45  percent, and indigo up to 4  percent of 1789 levels.31 The recovery 
enabled Toussaint to build reserve funds to strengthen the army that accounted 
for 60  percent of government expenditures in 1801.32
Toussaint had achieved a tenuous sovereignty in a world of imperial ri-
valry and wars, and in which  there was no guarantee that slave emancipation 
would survive. Many events threatened to undermine the proj ect of black 
self- determination. On September 30, 1800, barely two months  after his vic-
tory over Rigaud, the Treaty of Mortefontaine was signed in Paris ending the 
Quasi- War between the United States and France, and terminating Toussaint’s 
trade alliance with the United States. The next day, on October 1, the Treaty 
of San Ildelfonso confirmed the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France; 
then the presidential victory of Thomas Jefferson over John Adams in early 
1801 again brought into question the island’s favored trade relations with the 
United States. The final thunderbolt came with the signing of the Amiens 
peace preliminaries between France and  Great Britain in October 1801, allowing 
Bonaparte to reor ga nize and redeploy French troops for a military expedition to 
Saint Domingue, led by his  brother- in- law, General Charles Victor- Emmanuel 
Leclerc.
With Napoleon in power and Louisiana in French hands, Saint Domingue 
was destined to become the cornerstone of a revived French empire extend-
ing up the Mississippi Valley. The plan, however, required a French victory 
over the emancipated blacks of Saint Domingue and a restoration of slavery 
 there. For this, Bonaparte needed the support of the United States, now  under 
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Thomas Jefferson, who had let it be known to Bonaparte that he would support 
a French expedition against Saint Domingue to remove Toussaint and restore 
the colonial regime.
However, when he realized that a French victory in Saint Domingue would 
lead to an expedition to occupy Louisiana, threatening the security and poten-
tial of the young republic, he withdrew support. Jefferson needed a victory by 
emancipated Haitians over Bonaparte’s army to render Louisiana worthless to 
France and valuable to the United States. In a perverse irony, the Haitian vic-
tory over Bonaparte contributed to the maintenance and expansion of slavery 
in the United States, its total embargo of Haiti in 1806, and nonrecognition of 
Haiti’s in de pen dence by the United States for another fifty- six years.
When Bonaparte’s army landed on February 2, 1802, Toussaint’s constitu-
tion became irrelevant. The terms of Haitian in de pen dence  were set not by 
Toussaint Louverture, but by Napoleon’s attempt to restore slavery.  After three 
months of sustained re sis tance to Leclerc’s army  under the command of Tous-
saint’s closest and most loyal generals, notably Christophe and Maurepas 
in the North and Dessalines in the West, and with heavy losses on both sides, 
Leclerc offered Toussaint a deal in early May— amnesty for the emancipator 
and his generals, personal asylum at a place of his choosing within the colony, 
and the maintenance of general emancipation.33 At the same time, Christophe 
asked permission from Toussaint for a conference with Leclerc,  after which he 
defected with over fifteen hundred colonial troops and nearly five thousand 
armed workers. Two days  later, Toussaint accepted Leclerc’s offer of asylum, 
leaving Dessalines militarily isolated and with  little recourse but to submit in 
turn. In June, Leclerc summoned Toussaint to a meeting. Having laid a trap, he 
had him arrested, bound as a criminal, and deported to France, where he died in 
isolation on April 7, 1803, at Fort de Joux prison.
When news arrived that summer that slavery had been restored in Guade-
loupe, the Haitian masses understood that their fate and their freedom no 
longer lay in the hands of the leaders now fighting in Leclerc’s army. Only their 
own capacity to mobilize in mass insurgency, maintain individual and collec-
tive networks of re sis tance, to fight to the end—in short, to live  free or die— 
could keep them  free. By October, the forces of popu lar insurgency had reached 
a peak throughout the colony in a total war against slavery— despite the brutal 
campaigns by Dessalines and the other generals  under Leclerc’s  orders to harass 
and suppress them and their chosen leaders, now mostly of African origin.
Facing an unsustainable impasse and with the mass of the population in 
rebellion, Dessalines and the southern mulatto general, Alexandre Pétion, de-
serted Leclerc to join forces and take over the direction of the in de pen dence 
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strug gle, in the pro cess liquidating the popu lar revolutionary leaders who re-
fused to submit to their authority— once again pitting the military (and ulti-
mately the national) leadership against the masses. Yet it was the instinctive 
self- mobilization of the masses that rendered the defection of the generals 
militarily and po liti cally feasible. As Toussaint’s intrepid second in command, 
it was Jean- Jacques Dessalines, now commander- in- chief, who would lead the 
indigenous army to in de pen dence.34
With in de pen dence, slavery was forever abolished. The plantation economy 
that had made Saint Domingue the most valuable colony on the Atlantic— that 
drove the slave trade to new heights and flooded Eu ro pean markets with slave- 
made sugar and coffee, guaranteeing French domination of both markets— 
also collapsed. In less than a de cade, the parallel but interlinked Spanish North 
American silver economy of Bajío would also collapse  under pressures of popu-
lar insurgency in parallel movement  toward peasant holdings and  house hold 
crop production. For Haitians, however, individual acquisition of land was not 
the immediate outcome of in de pen dence; it took over two de cades before the 
transition to an economy of  house hold production, local markets, and, at best, 
of coffee cultivation for limited exports, was completed.
What Haiti’s in de pen dence in 1804 did provide was the opening for other 
slaveholding regions, notably Cuba and Brazil, to take her place sending slave- 
made sugar and coffee into changing world of early nineteenth- century in-
dustrial capitalism. Confronting that world, Haiti needed to constitute and 
defend itself as a state, creating the institutions, revenues, and military power 
to sustain itself in a hostile world that would not acknowledge its legitimacy.
A Nation Divided
On January 1, 1804, Haiti defiantly proclaimed its existence to the world as a 
nation whose  people, in conquering their liberty, had avenged the oppressed 
of the New World. In a more than symbolic gesture, Hayti, the original Taino 
name for the island, replaced the French colonial name, Saint Domingue.
Haiti’s strug gle to justify, define, and defend its existence, and to create a 
unique national identity, can be understood by examining key princi ples of its 
foundational national constitution, written and promulgated in 1805  under the 
regime of Dessalines. In its preamble, as Sybille Fischer demonstrates, the uni-
versalism of Haiti’s existence as a  free black nation is established by appealing 
to the Supreme Being, “before whom all mortals are equal” but whose power is 
revealed only through  human diversity and difference among the  peoples of the 
earth;35 and to nature—in a disavowal of the centuries- long exclusion of Africans 
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and  those of African descent as “unworthy  children.” Equality, to be universal, 
would have to encompass racial equality, something Haiti could only achieve 
through the violent negation of slavery and of its perpetrators, and through a 
war for in de pen dence that conferred upon the new nation a historically self- 
determined existence. Haiti might stand as a pariah in “Western history,” but it 
also broke the Enlightenment out of its racist Eurocentric constraints.
A close examination of some of the seminal articles of Haiti’s first constitu-
tion reveals far more than lofty statements of intent. As Fischer suggests, they 
constitutionally historicize Haiti’s identity as a black nation— the first of its 
kind— having overthrown a colonial past grounded in racial slavery. This ex-
plains why the 1805 Constitution stipulates that “no white man, regardless of his 
nationality, may set foot in this territory as a master or a landowner, nor  will he 
ever be able to acquire any property”;36 but that white  women and their  children 
who are “naturalized as Haitian citizens,” as well as the Germans and Poles (who 
had deserted Napoleon’s army to fight alongside the blacks for Haiti’s in de pen-
dence), would be exempt; and that “ because all distinctions of color among 
 children of the same  family must necessarily cease, all Haitians  will henceforth 
be known generically as black [noir].”37 Although this stipulation may at first 
glance appear to be racial, it must be understood in light of Haiti’s rejection 
of the colonial taxonomies that created artificial categories of color and corre-
sponding categories of  legal and social status. “Black” in the new context of 
Haitian in de pen dence became a po liti cal category of citizenship and national 
identity.38
Given the socioeconomic and ethnic diversity of Haiti’s population, and 
the po liti cal, social, and cultural aspirations of each group, one may question 
the extent that such princi ples  were put into practice. As with the 1812 (lib-
eral) Constitution in Spain and in the Spanish American in de pen dence move-
ments, as Roberto Breña points out in his essay, it is impor tant to distinguish 
between lofty constitutional princi ples and sociopo liti cal practice. Contingen-
cies of revolution and insurgency, the lack of experience of early in de pen dence 
leaders, the militarization of politics and selective or manipulative application 
of citizenship rights by  those in power, or, as Jordana Dym demonstrates in 
her essay on Guatemala, cultural forces of regional identity that compete with 
national identity, all tended to short- cir cuit the universal application of consti-
tutional aspirations. And Spanish liberalism had centuries of intellectual and 
institutional tradition to draw on in elaborating the 1812 Constitution. For 
Haiti, the realities of citizenship  were defined on the ground by the legacies 
of its colonial past, particularly with re spect to the peasantry. Constitutional 
aspirations  matter; in young nations, power strug gles may  matter more.
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In defining and defending the nation  under Haiti’s first postin de pen dence 
regimes of Jean- Jacques Dessalines (1804–1806) and Henri Christophe 
(1807–1820) in the North, the universalism of the revolution’s liberating aspi-
rations and the popu lar nationalism of the war of in de pen dence gave way to 
the militarism and social inequalities that characterized the last colonial re-
gime  under Toussaint, and to power strug gles among and between the new 
country’s elites. What emerged from in de pen dence was a military state that 
dominated rather than governed its citizenry, the vast majority of whom  were 
permanently excluded from participation in nation building. With in de pen-
dence, all lands of the former French colonists  were taken into the national do-
main (as biens nationaux), making the state— a military state— the primary 
property owner in the country (and the biggest landowner of the entire Ca rib-
bean). The new militarized state effectively replaced the colonial master class to 
rule the agrarian masses and “recolonized” the  labor force.39 To restore exports 
and reinforce military capacities in the fledgling nation, both Dessalines and 
Christophe, who themselves had leased numerous plantations  under Tous-
saint’s regime, unquestioningly maintained the plantation system of land and 
 labor. The agrarian structure of their regimes was, in many ways, a reinforced 
extension of that codified and constitutionalized by Toussaint, relying on the 
suppression of popu lar sovereignty, the denial of individual liberties, and the 
prohibition of in de pen dent peasant smallholding— the only way Haiti’s agrar-
ian laborers could or ga nize their lives freely. In constructing an indigenous 
black state to defend antislavery, civil society was truncated. What emerged was 
not a coherent nation, but a state with a po liti cal and military elite that domi-
nated society.
Plantation workers  were not the only alienated ele ment of the new Haitian 
state  under Dessalines, who exacerbated the recurrent “color question” that 
had so often plagued Haiti’s colonial past and led to civil war between Tous-
saint Louverture and André Rigaud in the revolutionary period. Since all prop-
erties formerly belonging to the French had been confiscated  either during the 
revolution, by decree  after 1803, or by the 1805 constitutional prohibition of 
white property owner ship, the only potential private landowners  were the for-
mer  free coloreds, living primarily in the South and West. Fearing that white 
planters might try to entrust properties to their mulatto offspring as they fled 
the colony in 1803–1804, hoping to reclaim them  later, Dessalines demanded 
verification of all transfers of land title  after 1803; any land claimed by mulat-
toes but previously held by whites was confiscated by the state and their claims 
rendered null and void. Only mulattoes who could prove owner ship in their 
own name and prior to 1803  were allowed to retain their holdings.40
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Dessalines’s land policy, as much antimulatto as antiwhite or anti- French, 
combined with his autocratic rule and imperial pretensions (crowning himself 
emperor in 1805), led to his assassination on October 17, 1806. His short- lived 
regime, however, was symptomatic of a deeper crisis that would exacerbate ten-
sions and open power strug gles between the country’s two emergent elites over 
control of constitutional pro cesses and the po liti cal and economic direction 
of the country. The constitutional crisis that followed the death of Dessalines 
led the new nation into a second civil war and a split into two po liti cal entities, 
the Kingdom of Haiti  under Henri Christophe in the North (1807–1820) and 
the Republic of Haiti  under Alexandre Pétion (1807–1818) in the South. As 
in  every new American country that faced economic collapse, each Haitian 
leader had to confront fundamental questions of state formation: what kind of 
government, what kind of economy— and in the case of Haiti, what kind of so-
cial and  labor relations should replace  those that prevailed  under slavery, while 
maintaining plantation production and commodity exports. Military defense, 
international relations, as well as the role of the state vis- à- vis the citizenry  were all 
ridden with new and irreconcilable contradictions.
For the former slave majority living on the land  under Christophe,  there 
 were no  free choices. The land was property of the state; plantations  were given 
in five- year leases to high- ranking army officers or members of a new “nobil-
ity”; they  were worked by former slaves who preferred to be in de pen dent peas-
ant farmers. Workers  were thus tied to estates in a condition of regimented 
plantation  labor, in perpetuity, even though they received a quarter of the prof-
its, exempt from taxes paid by the estate holder on the crops produced. Other 
rights and obligations of farmworkers and estate holders  were codified in 
Christophe’s Code Henry, issued in 1811.41 Christophe tried to convince work-
ers cultivating cash crops for export that the harder they worked and more they 
produced, the greater the value of their share of the profits, and thus the 
greater their own well- being. Such incentives proved of  little avail, as workers 
increasingly left plantations,  either taking to the hills as “maroon” peasants or 
squatters, or, in the final years of his regime, migrating to live  under the more 
tolerant regime of Pétion in the South, where government policies eventually 
placed land within reach of even the poorest. In the northwestern parishes of 
Gros Morne and Port- de- Paix, disaffected farmworkers turned to armed upris-
ings against Christophe’s coercive plantation regime.42
Beside their entrenched opposition to plantation  labor— painfully remi-
niscent of slavery— other  factors also contributed to workers’ rejection of the 
plantation model. Sugar never regained its place in Haiti’s export economy, and 
what  little sugar was produced for export could not compete with the exports 
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of Cuba, well on its way to dominating Atlantic sugar markets by opening new 
lands worked by newly imported slaves. For Haiti, only coffee held its own as a 
major export, and it was vulnerable to price fluctuations and stiff competition 
from Brazil, also opening new lands with new slaves. For the Haitian workers 
 under Christophe’s regime, vulnerability to unpredictable market conditions 
left their quarter shares uncertain and subject to sudden decline. Such hardship 
reinforced the desire for a piece of land to cultivate food crops for their families 
and to fashion their own lives. It was a situation Christophe only addressed 
belatedly, in 1819, the final year of his reign; and even then his decision to par-
cel out portions of government estates served only the military, with soldiers 
and officers receiving grants according to rank: 20 carreaux (approximately 66 
acres) for a col o nel and 1 carreau (or 3.3 acres) for a soldier.43
Yet Christophe found fair success in organ izing his kingdom and creating a 
functioning state. The economy performed fairly well despite the adverse cir-
cumstances  under which he tried to reintegrate the country into Atlantic com-
merce. By placing the country on the gold and silver standard for trade with 
foreign merchants, notably  those of  Great Britain and neutral countries such as 
the United States, he ensured that exports held at sustainable levels. He raised 
annual averages of $3 to $3.5 million in government revenue, and on his death 
in 1820 left a surplus of $6 million.44 Overall, the trea sury was fiscally sound, al-
lowing Christophe to begin financing a national education proj ect. Most con-
temporary observers of Haiti confirmed the importance Christophe placed on 
education; as head of state (and illiterate) he understood its importance to any 
emerging nation. Although the primary beneficiaries  were  children and young 
adults of the upper classes and the military, Christophe’s efforts remain note-
worthy in a country then (and still) overwhelmingly illiterate. He understood 
the need for educated individuals to run the public administration and state 
bureaucracy, especially for the northern kingdom of Haiti with a population 
composed almost exclusively of ex- slaves and former  free blacks, and where 
educated mulattoes  were few. His antipathy  toward the latter was notorious. 
Instead, he looked to  Great Britain, where abolitionists supported his educa-
tional proj ects, and to Prus sia, whose educational system was among the most 
progressive in Western Eu rope at the time.45
Christophe’s kingdom was, to borrow an apt expression, “oddly modern”46— a 
self- proclaimed monarchy with an in ven ted nobility. That Christophe opted to 
rule as a king, rather than a republican president, is understandable. In 1811, 
when he proclaimed his regime a monarchy, nearly all of the Eu ro pean powers 
 were monarchical; as no country had recognized Haiti’s in de pen dence, a monar-
chy might provide Christophe’s government with some legitimacy and a regal 
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aura for himself as head of state. Royal absolutism and a hereditary monarchy, 
as opposed to constitutional republicanism, where rights and invested powers 
could be contested, also short- circuited po liti cal opposition,  whether from the 
masses below or the ranks of educated elite. It is also pos si ble that Christophe 
presumed an affinity among his African- born subjects for kingship.47 Chris-
tophe’s monarchy was by no means anachronistic for the time; at least two 
other new Latin American countries, Mexico briefly in 1821–1822, and Brazil 
from 1822 to 1889, began as monarchies. For Brazil, monarchy provided con-
ditions for long- term po liti cal consolidation and the maintenance of slavery 
to 1888. In Haiti, the death of Christophe in 1820 brought an end to the mo-
narchical regime in which the state dominated the lives of plantation laborers 
struggling to acquire land of their own, hoping to reshape them and forge their 
own identity. Its end did not resolve the fundamental prob lems of citizenship 
and nationhood— which would plague so much of the Amer i cas long into the 
nineteenth  century.
Alternative Landholding Policies and the Peasant Economy
While Christophe’s monarchy strug gled to rule and maintain the plantation 
system in the North, in the South, the republican regime of mulatto president, 
Alexandre Pétion, opened the way for alternatives to large- scale plantations 
and coerced  labor.  After early and largely futile attempts to restore the planta-
tions by adjusting tariff and tax policies on sugar and coffee, and by subsidizing 
them in times of declining market prices during his first two years in power, 
Pétion began a policy of land distribution that, by 1817, had led to the breakup 
and transfer of some four hundred thousand acres of land from the national 
domain to roughly ten thousand peasant recipients.48 His turn to distribution 
reflected both an understanding of the need to address the goals of the majority 
and the needs of the state. First, Pétion recognized that  those who had fought 
in the war of in de pen dence deserved to be rewarded with land in recognition of 
their military ser vice to the nation (and in lieu of back wages): noncommissioned 
soldiers and officers received 5 carreaux (16.5 acres) each; former commissioned 
officers received larger grants according to rank. By 1814 he was distributing 
land taken from large coffee estates to active members of the military, to civil 
servants, hospital employees, petty administrative officials, and influential politi-
cians.49 By 1817 properties from the national domain  were for sale at affordable 
prices, enabling thousands of  others to become property  owners.50 Pétion 
believed that if peasant families owned their land they would be motivated to 
cultivate it and produce crops not only for their families and local markets, but 
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also for export. That was pos si ble in the South, where coffee easily meshed with 
subsistence production, facilitating a  family- based mix of production for con-
sumption and trade. And with a stake in landholding, Pétion believed that 
ex- slaves become peasants would gain a stake in society: civic virtue,  family values, 
and personal and civic responsibility would all be promoted— while govern-
ment would be left to predominantly light- skinned, educated elites.
Pétion’s recognition of the needs and potential of his citizens merged with 
other, often more pressing concerns. His government faced a serious fiscal cri-
sis when he took office in 1807 and his early attempts at restoring the planta-
tion economy during his first two years  were dismal failures. By parceling out 
portions of the national domain beginning in 1810, Pétion aimed to create a 
mixed economy in which state revenues derived from taxes on the production 
of a wider and more numerous base of in de pen dent peasant landowners culti-
vating coffee for exports, in addition to food crops for domestic or  family 
consumption— while remaining large estates might continue to produce for 
export, yet with diminishing returns.
At the southwestern extremity of the island in the region of  Grand Anse, 
a large in de pen dent maroon community of armed peasants lived on the pe-
riphery of Pétion’s emerging republic. Their leader, Jean- Baptiste Goman, had 
been a popu lar insurrectionary slave leader from the early days of the revolu-
tion and an impor tant figure in sustaining the popu lar re sis tance forces against 
the French army during the war of in de pen dence. Refusing to submit to Des-
salines when the indigenous army entered the South, Goman retreated into 
the mountains of  Grand Anse, where by 1807 he led an armed peasant state 
numbering close to three thousand men,  women, and  children. Their fierce re-
sis tance to Pétion’s government and crushing defeat of his troops in 1813 likely 
influenced the latter’s agrarian policies. To undermine the attraction that the 
existence of Goman’s armed landed community provided, and to consolidate 
national unity, in 1814–1815 Pétion began to implement mea sures to ameliorate 
the socioeconomic conditions of workers and accelerate the pace of land dis-
tribution.51 Over time, Pétion’s land distribution policies created a diversified 
peasantry, with a few rich large holders,  others  middle- sized, and many very 
small landowning peasants producing alongside tenants and sharecroppers (de 
moitié workers) on the larger estates.  There remained countless landless peas-
ants, many squatting in outlying regions, occupying land in their  family name 
and cultivating it illegally,  others working for wages as day laborers.52
 Under Pétion and his successor Jean- Pierre Boyer (1818–1843) popu lar peas-
ant demands for land  were ultimately satisfied.  Were the same peasants si mul-
ta neously disempowered po liti cally at the hands of a ruling mulatto oligarchy 
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that progressively abandoned landholding to take control of the more lucrative 
sectors of politics, commerce, and the state? Did they ensure that the peasants, 
in the majority black, African- born and illiterate, would become po liti cally ap-
athetic, inactive, and self- isolated? Scholars long maintained that the parceling 
of land resulted in an “egalitarian poverty”— the root cause of Haiti’s economic 
stagnation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.53
Recent studies of the early nineteenth- century Haitian peasant economy 
and society now challenge the prevalence of peasant apathy and po liti cal with-
drawal.54 Postin de pen dence peasant strug gles for democ ratization (essentially 
po liti cal in nature) did exist; universal citizenship and universal male suffrage, 
effective at local levels, persisted  under Pétion. Peasant proprietorship and 
demands for po liti cal citizenship merged; landholding peasants and citizens 
pressed to negotiate individual citizenship rights, including  those of education, 
in the spaces open to them. Most politics  were local, sometimes pressing de-
figure 4.2. Market  women in nineteenth- century Haiti.  
Courtesy Archives  cidihca (Centre International de Documentation et 
d’Information Hatienne,  Caraibeenne, y Afro— Canadienne)
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mands in armed rebellions. As citizens of the republic they exercised the right 
to petition for, and receive, land grants  under the reform program instituted 
by Pétion. They  were left to their own initiatives to make the land productive, 
improve their lives, and seek inclusion as citizens of the nation.
Boyer made a final attempt to restore plantation production and exports in 
the Rural Code of 1826— adopted in an attempt to raise revenue to pay the in-
demnity debt promised to France in 1825 in exchange for recognition for Hai-
tian in de pen dence. Pop u lar pressure demanding land and resisting plantation 
 labor proved too strong, and by midcentury the landholding structure had been 
permanently transformed. The plantation system was gone and a diversified 
landholding peasantry dominated production. Coffee— easily grown on peas-
ant holding of diverse size— irreversibly replaced sugar— which demanded large 
plantations and forced  labor—as Haiti’s primary export. At the same time, the 
state and the military institutions that sustained it operated in an enclave, disen-
gaged from Haiti’s agrarian citizenry. Left to produce and pay taxes, the landed 
majority was left without channels of effective po liti cal participation or protest. 
The structural ties between the state and civil society that might have permitted 
ordinary individuals to make their voices heard in meaningful ways at the state or 
national level did not exist. And the role of the military in the day- to- day lives 
of the peasantry and in relations between the peasantry and the state reinforced 
the cleavage between the two. Haitian peasants  were neither “traditionally con-
servative” nor “self- isolated” po liti cally. They  were blocked by the powers con-
centrated in the state from exercising greater agency and active po liti cal roles.55
Peasant empowerment was also constrained by the rise of merchants, often 
former planters who had turned from landholding to seek new wealth by ruling the 
links between peasant producers, international markets, and a state in search 
of revenues. They gained virtual monopolies over peasant marketing, setting 
prices for  house hold surpluses. Property holding peasants found themselves 
vulnerable to the price- fixing practices of speculators and merchants (them-
selves indebted to foreign capital) and to direct and indirect taxation by the 
government, whose sole source of revenue came from taxation of peasant pro-
duction, especially coffee.56 The only other source of state revenue came from 
customs duties and export taxes, normally paid by  wholesale merchants and 
middlemen, but inevitably passed on to coffee peasants by uniformly lowering 
the price paid them for their coffee.57 Increasingly, the in de pen dent peasantry 
saw small gain in producing for export markets. They carried on out of dire 
needs to supplement their meager incomes from  house hold crop cultivation 
while they bore the burden of state financing. The same state deprived peasants 
of any direct means to negotiate or ameliorate the terms of their inclusion in 
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a market economy. Their inclusion in civil society was similarly constrained. 
Meanwhile, former plantation  owners shifted their pursuit of wealth from 
landholding (irrevocably in decline) to commerce, forging a working alliance 
for profit and power with the state.58
The one opportunity for a rapprochement of “state” and “nation” came in 
the context of the Liberal revolt of 1843 to overthrow the aging Boyer. A new 
generation of young Haitian elites, educated in France and  eager to break the 
control of politics and the state held by Boyer in his twenty- five- year autocratic 
regime, aimed to implement basic princi ples of nineteenth- century liberal de-
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mocracy, enabling them to play a defining role in the politics of the nation. In 
the face of Boyer’s intransigence, the movement became a revolt that violently 
toppled Boyer’s government. But in the elections held  after they took power, 
and in implementing their constitutional reforms, the young liberals’ professed 
princi ples of racial equality broke down. Insurrectionary peasants saw an open-
ing to demand citizenship that would give tangible social, cultural, and eco-
nomic, as well as po liti cal meaning to the rights of citizenship. They pressed 
a counterdiscourse of popu lar sovereignty and peasant democracy as experi-
enced in their communities and peasant organ izations, and practiced in daily 
lives. Their deception with the politics of the liberal elite was well founded; the 
traditional wisdom of the Kreyòl proverb “Constitusyon sé papié, bayonet sé 
fer” (constitutions are paper; bayonets are iron), well  placed.
Jean- Jacques Accau, a former member of the rural police, led the “Army of 
Sufferers” in the Piquet peasant rebellion of 1844–1847. The focus was not the 
pursuit of individual peasant property, by then widely dispersed, but to claim 
the constitutional rights of social democracy. As primary spokesman, Accau ar-
gued for  these with less emphasis on the distinctions of color that separated the 
educated light- skinned elites from the po liti cally disempowered black peasantry 
and more along lines of class—of rich versus the poor. The Piquet insurrections 
forced open new public spaces in which rights  were forcefully contested, in 
which po liti cal citizenship, the state, and the nation could have been redefined, 
and from which a new social contract might have emerged to encompass the le-
gitimate claims of the peuple souffrant to integrated rights of citizenship including 
education, po liti cal empowerment, and social and economic justice.
By 1847, the insurrections  were suppressed. An opportunity for fundamental 
change and national consolidation was lost as the liberal mulatto elites turned 
to a politique de doublure; a succession of black “front” presidents would be ma-
nipulated to serve the financial and commercial interests of the power ful few, 
maintaining the latter’s indirect domination of the state. Haiti’s peasantry, as 
Mimi Sheller plainly put it, was “ready for democracy from before the first day 
of emancipation, but democracy was not ready for them.”59 National consoli-
dation never occurred as the state continued to function, when it functioned 
at all, as a self- contained entity which parasitically exploited the peasantry to 
sustain itself.
paradoxically, haiti’s first regimes (except Dessalines’s) proved 
relatively durable, perhaps  because the Haitian majority of ex- slaves did gain 
two key goals of their revolution: first and most immediately emancipation, 
more slowly but in time solidly access to land to consolidate lives focused 
168 — Carolyn Fick
on  family sustenance. Si mul ta neously, the nation was po liti cally isolated, and 
while gaining some trade and revenues from coffee, never joined the Latin 
American countries that in the  later nineteenth  century stabilized by produc-
ing commodities to sustain the industrializing countries of Eu rope.
Throughout, Haiti stood as a beacon of freedom to the oppressed, offering 
asylum and,  after one year of residence, naturalization as a Haitian citizen to 
any person of African or Indian descent who entered Haiti, regardless of their 
place of birth.60 In 1815, at a critical moment in the Spanish American wars 
of in de pen dence, Haitian president Alexandre Pétion provided asylum, mon-
etary and military aid, and Haitian troops to a defeated Simón Bolívar, allow-
ing him to continue to fight and eventually succeed in his strug gle for South 
American liberation. He asked only that Bolívar pledge to abolish slavery in 
the territories he liberated.61 A de cade  later, in preparatory talks for the hemi-
spheric Panama Congress, to be held in 1826, the Federation of Gran Colombia 
raised the issue of Haitian in de pen dence and argued for Haiti’s participation 
in the conference. U.S. delegates refused to recognize Haitian in de pen dence on 
blatantly racist grounds, guaranteeing that Haiti was excluded from the Con-
gress and would remain on the periphery of inter- American relations long  after 
the United States, in Civil War over slavery, recognized Haiti in 1862.
Only France recognized Haiti’s full in de pen dence in 1825—at a catastrophic 
price.  After seven years of fruitless talks with Haitian leaders, including Chris-
tophe and Pétion, about restoring French rule over the country and its  people, 
and  under the threat of French gunboats stationed on Haiti’s shores, President 
Boyer agreed in 1825 to France’s demand for an indemnity of 150 million francs 
(equivalent to anywhere from $12 billion to $21 billion U.S. in  today’s value), 
plus a 50   percent reduction in customs duties on all French imports. Such 
recognition left the Haitian government fiscally bankrupt, crippling Haiti’s lim-
ited commercial economy and prejudicing po liti cal consolidation for de cades 
to come.62 An in de pen dence that consolidated the end of slavery and enabled 
the rise of a landed peasantry gained recognition from its former “ mother 
country” only  under pressure and by a deal that left the new country permeable 
to the power of international finance capital and economic imperialism of 
the  great powers. In the  later de cades of the nineteenth  century Haiti would 
face the economic uncertainty and po liti cal instability that earlier characterized 
many new Latin American republics.
the haitian revolution permanently destroyed the plantation econ-
omy of the world’s foremost sugar colony, a French de pen dency that had fueled 
the international slave trade, profited home industries large and small, employ-
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ing uncounted workers in a “ free” France, and sending produce across Eu rope. 
The revolution was  shaped by contradictions embedded in the country’s colonial 
origins: the vast majority of the African- born had to strug gle perennially to forge 
spaces of freedom based on in de pen dent peasant holdings— their definition of 
in de pen dence and the means by which to defend their freedom against slavery 
(and the coercions that followed), plantation production, and the state.
The leaders who  rose during and  after the revolution  were, by the nature of the 
war against slavery, military men who took control of government,  shaped the 
state in their own interests, and tried to maintain exports and revenues by per-
petuating the plantation economy— which they knew required coerced  labor, 
as former slaves who fought for in de pen dence would never willingly return to 
cane fields. That contradiction set off a long strug gle— until by the late 1820s 
peasant proprietorship and  house hold production prevailed. Former slaves liv-
ing as peasants  were by then better off than before— certainly more autono-
mous and likely better fed.
The gains— and they  were real— did not bring an end to exploitation. In 
consolidating freedom and gaining the land, Haitian peasants faced the rise 
and per sis tence of a predatory state backed by a class of merchants traffick-
ing the country’s only  viable export, coffee, in the emerging world of indus-
trial capitalism, and sustaining themselves— state politicians and merchant 
predators— through a perfidious system of peasant taxation. The state became 
si mul ta neously authoritarian and weak and fractured within. Through the 
nineteenth  century nationhood remained, as it remains  today, a dream deferred 
in a new country— arguably the newest in the Amer i cas based on its revolution-
ary transformation— shaped by the unresolved contradictions of revolutionary 
emancipation, a population adamantly grounded in autonomies on the land, 
and the challenges of making and sustaining a sovereign state.
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No mention was made of the Spanish part of Hispaniola that was originally 
ceded to France in 1795 and then incorporated into the colonial state  under Tous-
saint Louverture’s 1801 constitution. With total disregard for Haiti’s sovereignty as 
of 1804, France agreed to return the territory to Spain during the post- Napoleonic 
negotiations at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In 1822, President Boyer led an ex-
pedition into Santo Domingo to bring it back  under Haitian sovereignty. In 1844, 
following the liberal revolt to overthrow Boyer, the  people of Santo Domingo 
claimed in de pen dence from Haiti and became the Dominican Republic.
On September 19, 1825, a bold call for Cuban in de pen dence cited “the instinct 
that all men have to search for their freedom” as the impetus to end Spanish 
rule on the island. For the authors of the manifesto, the  tables had turned in 
the epic contest between civilization and barbarism:  after more than a de cade 
of war, the Amer i cas  were now the home of pro gress, justice, and liberty, and 
Spain embodied the decay and backwardness of an outdated po liti cal and 
economic order. According to the declaration, Cuba remained “ under the do-
minion of a race of men who, to humanity’s disgrace, cannot enter into social 
relations with civilized  peoples”; with plenty of recent examples of the heroism 
of mainland patriots throughout Spanish Ame rica, Cubans could act on the 
“sanctity of their rights” with the full support of the new republics. In turn, 
Cuba’s strategic location at the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico—it had long been 
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known as the Key to the Indies— meant that its in de pen dence would guarantee 
the “peace, abundance, and prosperity” of all new nations in the Amer i cas.
This appeal to  free Cuba did not hail from Havana or Santiago de Cuba, or 
any other locale on the island. It originated in Mexico City, where conveners 
of a “patriotic meeting” promoting Cuban in de pen dence had directed a state-
ment to the nascent Mexican Congress.1 The group boasted the inclusion of 
some resident Cubans as well as Mexican citizens, but of the sixty men who 
signed the document, most  were Mexican in de pen dence leaders and politicians. 
While Cuban luminaries José María Heredia and  Father Felix Varela appear 
on the list, even their famous names get lost among a Who’s Who of Mexican 
in de pen dence and statehood: Vicente Guerrero, Antonio López de Santa Ana, 
Nicolás Bravo, Anastasio Bustamante, Vicente Filosola, Manuel Gómez Pe-
draza, and many more. They all claimed to speak for the “effervescence that has 
produced the desire for freedom in the public spirit” of Cuba.
On the island itself, evidence of this effervescence is spotty. Ventriloquizing 
a desire for Cuban in de pen dence became a common gesture among leaders 
and citizens of newly in de pen dent republics in Spanish Ame rica. Their opti-
mism and certainty often masked their own bumpy, uncertain transitions from 
colonies to nations in the Amer i cas. Cuba’s continued status as a colony  until 
1898 frustrated assumptions from abroad that an unstoppable desire for in-
de pen dence existed on the island that would inevitably topple Spanish rule. 
That an armed strug gle against Spain did not occur  until the second half of the 
nineteenth  century disrupts a narrative that sees events in the Atlantic world 
between 1750 and 1850 coalescing to make the national in de pen dence of Ameri-
can colonies a foregone conclusion.2 Nevertheless, highlighting Cuba’s divergence 
from common American patterns may obscure as much as it reveals. First, even 
 those onlookers who yearned for Cuba’s liberation  were themselves unclear 
about what po liti cal and economic practices constituted a new regional norm, 
especially in light of fragile postcolonial predicaments.3 And second, to empha-
size continuity in Cuba and change everywhere  else is to miss new dynamics of 
colonial rule, exaggerate the newness of mainland Spanish American republican 
and liberal experiments, and prioritize the po liti cal such that the sweeping social 
and economic transformations that occurred on the island fade from view.
 Those changes, coincidentally, have figured as the most common expla-
nations for continuity. Explaining the per sis tence of colonial rule in Cuba led 
nineteenth- century observers, and more recent scholars too, to zero in on two 
 factors: sugar and slavery. In the wake of the Haitian Revolution, the argument 
goes, the Cuban elite recognized the potential to pick up sugar production where 
St. Domingue left off before the Haitian Revolution, and it realized the necessity 
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of a steady supply of African slave  labor in order to do so. Rather than risk the so-
cial instability that accompanied po liti cal transitions to nationhood elsewhere, 
wealthy Cubans—of Spanish descent in the vast majority— opted for the mili-
tary safeguards, po liti cal control, and relaxed trade regulations offered by Spain.4 
To the extent that talk of freedom held appeal, concerns about its contagion 
among a growing slave population left white Cubans vigilant about the prospect 
of “another Haiti.”5 The 1825 statement to the Mexican Congress tried to assuage 
concerns that Cuban in de pen dence would incite revolutionary slave re sis tance by 
noting that Spanish rule in Cuba looked nothing like the weak French state 
and disor ga nized planters in late eighteenth- century St. Domingue. Few Cubans 
appear to have been persuaded, and the extraordinary wealth generated by sugar 
production throughout the nineteenth  century left the Cuban creole elite, unlike 
their counter parts on the mainland, to accept the continuity of Spanish rule. Seen 
in this light, Cuba justifiably stands out as an exception to the period variously 
termed the Age of Revolutions, the in de pen dence period, and the beginning of 
the “modern period” in Latin American history.
As historians have sought to understand the period of in de pen dence as a 
complicated balance of continuity and change, it is useful to revisit the assump-
tion of Cuban exceptionalism and opposition to the trends of the period.6 Such 
polarity, with its deep roots, can prove difficult to unsettle. In 1940, Cuban 
anthropologist,  lawyer, and activist Fernando Ortiz published Cuban Counter­
point: Tobacco and Sugar, in which he identified the dynamic of a “multiform 
and per sis tent contrast” between modes of tobacco and sugar production and 
the cultures that they  shaped.7 This essay enlists that dynamic for a diff er ent pur-
pose as it considers the extent to which Cuba can be contrasted to the nations 
in the Amer i cas that emerged between 1750 and 1850. Did colonial rule exclude 
Cuba from the experiments with liberalism, representative government, and 
po liti cal participation that occurred elsewhere? Did the explosive economic 
growth of the sugar economy continue older patterns of Atlantic commerce, 
or did the abrupt changes on the island prevent the kind of economic stagna-
tion experienced in the rest of Spanish Ame rica? Answering  these questions 
requires critical distance from some basic assumptions about the politics and 
economics of the “ever- faithful isle.”
Bread and Sugar: Continuity and Change in the Cuban Economy
Antonio López de Santa Anna, the Mexican general,  future president, and 
signer of the 1825 call for Cuban in de pen dence, saw no compatibility between 
the island’s prosperity and the continuation of Spanish rule. In 1824, only 
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months into his tenure as governor of Yucatán province, Santa Anna submit-
ted a proposal to the central government to lead an invasion of Cuba. Spain’s 
presence in the region, and especially around Veracruz, he argued, jeopardized 
Mexico’s in de pen dence and made its mining economy vulnerable. But other 
enticing economic opportunities  were at stake: a dozen Cuban exiles in Yuca-
tán had also persuaded him of the profits to be reaped by liberating Cuba, since 
Mexico “would have to be compensated by a country of inexhaustible resources, 
given its locale, ports, fecundity, and output.” And then  there  were Mexican 
exports, which could buoy the fledgling national government in Mexico City 
provided that they enjoyed unfettered access to Cuban markets. Santa Anna 
realized that the regional economy was in transition and that its spoils  were up 
for grabs: Colombian ships  were already dotting the Cuban coastline and Co-
lombian agents had hatched the failed Soles y Rayos de Bolívar in de pen dence 
plot in 1823. “I repeat that this task belongs to the Mexican Nation and its 
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Map 5.1. Cuba, ca. 1790–1860
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In its final de cades as a colony, New Spain had done its share to facilitate 
Cuba’s economic rise: annual situados, or royal subventions, transferred reve-
nues from Mexico to Cuba in an attempt to invigorate new areas of the colonial 
economy.9 Whereas Santa Anna in 1825 recognized Cuba’s (and perhaps Mex-
ico’s) potential to profit from Atlantic economic realignments, other observ-
ers a half  century earlier  were less optimistic about the region’s fortunes— and 
about Spain’s ability to stimulate them. In de pen dence- minded creole elites in 
the American colonies  were not unique in viewing imperial economic systems 
as irretrievably outmoded. In the eigh teenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
debates gained momentum in Western Eu rope about the merits and viability 
of maintaining colonies. From Adam Smith to Montesquieu, economic and 
po liti cal critiques of empire accumulated, and within the Iberian world, figures 
such as Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes called for reforms based on a brutal 
assessment of Spain’s policies in its colonies.10 When Jeremy Bentham exhorted 
Spaniards in 1821 to “rid yourselves of the Ultramarine colonies,” he was mo-
tivated less by moral injustices of colonialism than his belief that their Ameri-
can colonies no longer generated profits.11 Critics of Spain’s excessive focus on 
mainland silver mining cited the missed opportunities for sugar production in 
the Spanish Ca rib bean. As Franklin Knight proposed, “Had Cuba not been a part 
of the Spanish empire, it would undoubtedly have followed the earlier path 
of St. Domingue, Barbados, or Jamaica.”12 This economic counterfactual had oc-
curred to many of  those in Spanish Ame rica who felt the pinch of Bourbon 
economic policies and began to won der  whether colonialism and long- 
term profitability had ever been compatible and what the  future might bring. 
Among the vari ous charges that Denis Diderot leveled against Spain, its rigid 
economic policies illustrated the brutality characteristic of the Black Legend: 
an inability to colonize according to the “true princi ples of commerce” (namely 
mutual trade with in de pen dent countries) and greed that made “a wilderness of 
her own country and a grave of Ame rica.”13
While the onset of in de pen dence movements in mainland Spanish Ame rica 
might only have added to doubts about Cuba’s colonial status, the island’s eco-
nomic elite saw nothing but long overdue opportunity  under Spanish rule, a 
new and leading role in a changing Atlantic world. One year  after a massive slave 
rebellion began in St. Domingue,  those Cubans with the means and clout to 
direct the island’s economy formed in 1792 what became known as the Socie-
dad Económica de Amigos del País. The Havana group advocated for overhaul-
ing Cuba’s environment, society, and infrastructure in order to accelerate the 
expansion of sugar, coffee, and tobacco production. Enlightenment ideas  were 
key to this endeavor, but the writings of Smith, Montesquieu, and Bentham 
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(often hard to acquire thanks to government censors) mattered less to most 
members than scientific treatises of the period, especially  those that provided 
the botanical, chemical, and technological knowledge to improve the refine-
ment of sugarcane. It translated studies of sugar used by French planters and 
technicians on St. Domingue, and for de cades published its Guía de foraste­
ros, an almanac for foreigners who might bring capital and commerce to the 
island.14 Always on the lookout for new sources of revenue, Spanish officials 
listened carefully to the appeals of the society. Beginning in 1789, when Spain 
allowed the  free trade of slaves in Cuban ports, Cubans won a number of con-
cessions over the course of three de cades that allowed them to reshape the west-
ern and central parts of the island. The structure of land owner ship and land 
use changed drastically to clear land for sugar cultivation, and as Cuba became 
the world’s top sugar producer, it did so in a period of an astounding increase in 
sugar consumption: between 1800 and 1880 the amount of sucrose production 
that reached the world market increased fifteenfold.15  Little surprise, then, that 
planters and investors looked to agricultural expansion with wide- eyed confi-
dence and to a po liti cal system that frequently supported them.
The engineers of this transition often thought comparatively, depicting Cuba 
as having mastered economic lessons that other regions had learned the hard 
way. Arguments for the strict surveillance and harsh control of slave workforces 
rested on the desire to avoid “another Haiti”— a fear of slave rebellion often 
willfully disconnected from aspirations to match or exceed St.  Domingue’s 
successes in sugar. By the 1810s and 1820s reformers could also warn that Spain 
should seek to avoid another Mexico, the loss of a prized colony due to mis-
management. One Santiago resident seeking to boost agriculture in the eastern 
part of the island wrote to the king in 1811 that mono poly and trade restrictions 
had wrecked New Spain’s tobacco economy and led to an época fatal that Spain 
could forestall in Cuba.16 But  these attempts to make Cuba a counterpoint 
to its regional neighbors overlooked the deep connections between them that 
blur the borders of nominally discrete case studies. Po liti cally and eco nom ically 
they often experienced linked fates both real and  imagined, from the situa-
dos that Cuba enjoyed from New Spain to  later Mexican designs for Cuban 
in de pen dence.17 Beyond what Saint Domingue and the Haitian Revolution 
represented in the abstract, arrivals to Cuba of  people from Saint Domingue 
during the height of the conflict had immediate and vis i ble effects. In eastern 
Cuba, French planters established coffee farms that used slave  labor, marking 
a change for the region but continuity for the planters and slaves themselves. 
As Ada Ferrer points out, the revolutionary pro cess in Haiti briefly relocated 
a reactionary order to Cuba rather than destroying it outright: “ People who 
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would have remained  free in Saint- Domingue/Haiti became slaves once more 
in Cuba. . . .  And planters who had shipped coffee to the United States from 
southern Saint- Domingue now grew it and shipped it from eastern Cuba.”18 
Interconnected trajectories like  these complicate assessments of Cuba’s excep-
tional status, a style of comparative thinking aided by the formation of national 
units that rely on assertions of distinctiveness. Explaining or justifying why 
Cuba took a diff er ent path than other countries can neglect the occasions on 
which their paths crossed, merged, and ran parallel.
A further hindrance to understanding Cuba’s economic trajectory comes 
in considering it within the context of the Atlantic world, a frame of reference 
as much about time as it is about space. Given that other Ca rib bean slave socie-
ties that produced sugar prospered (often briefly) much earlier through Atlantic 
Ocean exchanges of capital, goods, and  people, it is tempting to see Cuba as a 
latecomer to the system, an island out of step with the rest of the region.19 Cer-
tainly, the waning of the transatlantic slave trade in the early nineteenth  century 
complicated the expansion of slavery that accompanied the sugar revolution. 
When Spain loosened restrictions on the trade in 1789, the slave population 
more than doubled between 1792 and 1817. Yet Spain then signed a treaty with 
 Great Britain (and received a £400,000 incentive from Britain) to end the slave 
trade to Cuba by 1820, and a clandestine slave trade flourished  until the 1860s 
despite British cruisers surveilling the Cuban and African coasts and mixed 
Anglo- Spanish commissions attempting to enforce the ban on the island. In 
other words, Cuba remained an active participant in an Atlantic commercial 
system in decline.
But other Atlantic worlds  were pos si ble. One difficulty of the Atlantic 
framework for understanding nineteenth- century Cuba is that scholars have 
often bracketed its period of relevance between 1500 and 1800, at which point 
the end of certain Eu ro pean colonial proj ects in the Amer i cas ruptured the 
economic and po liti cal structures that constituted the Atlantic system. Never 
mind that the majority of Ca rib bean islands remained  under Eu ro pean rule 
well into the twentieth  century and most of the Eu ro pean powers in the At-
lantic continued to maintain colonies. Historians have recently attempted 
to extend the periodization of the Atlantic world: Emma Rothschild, for ex-
ample, articulates a vision of “late Atlantic history,” and José Moya defines an 
Atlantic world in the nineteenth  century not by “early modern” standards but 
by the markers of what tends to count for “modernity.” Suggesting an analyti-
cal path forward, they have identified new commodities, new ideas, and new 
migrations and connections that do not correspond neatly to the patterns char-
acteristic of the earlier period.20
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Seen in this light, Cuba appears not as an anachronism from a bygone era 
of slavery and colonialism, but as an engine of a renovated Atlantic economy. 
Technological advancements such as steam- driven sugar mills and rail trans-
port between plantation regions and ports plotted Cuban sugar production 
squarely within the nexus of industrial capitalism. Dale Tomich has referred 
to a nineteenth- century “second slavery” that infused new life into the econo-
mies of Cuba, Brazil, and the United States, and complicated swift or easy plans 
for abolition.21 If we shift perspective to consider questions of consumption 
and imports in  these second slave socie ties, more new Atlantic connections 
come into view. Slavery was vital to the development of profitable export pro-
visioning economies that used new technologies of mass production to pro-
vide sustenance for other slave socie ties. Brazilian coffee, for example, provided 
the profits that allowed Brazilian planters to buy wheat flour from places like 
 Virginia, where slaves  were active in wheat farming. Cuban demand for North 
American wheat spiked in the late eigh teenth  century, to the benefit of the 
fledgling economy of the United States. In fact, the Upper South’s targeting of 
the Cuban market worried many Spanish officials, merchants, and wheat farm-
ers. Cheap U.S. flour disadvantaged Cuba’s own wheat farmers, located mainly 
in the central and eastern parts of the island—to the contentment of many 
planters and policy makers who argued that Cuba should devote itself to sugar 
alone.22 Demand for subsistence goods in export- intensive agricultural areas 
and port cities in Cuba, Brazil, and the United States re oriented the Atlantic 
economy  toward new regions on new terms.23 Moreover, imports of foodstuffs 
in lieu of domestic production placed less pressure on planters to allow their 
slaves to cultivate conucos, or provision grounds, and at least in some regions of 
Cuba the rare instances when slaves could profit from their garden plots was 
precisely during war time disruptions of the Atlantic food import economy.24 
Cuba remained, as Alejandro de la Fuente noted of sixteenth- century Havana, 
“not just a place in the Atlantic but an Atlantic place,” although the Atlantic 
looked quite diff er ent than it had in previous centuries.25
That Cuba, Brazil, and the United States anchored a distinctive nineteenth- 
century Atlantic economy, both fueled by and fueling slavery, is a useful re-
minder that the per sis tence of slavery in the Amer i cas and overseas commerce 
did not depend on a single po liti cal form such as colonial rule, national in de-
pen dence, or empire. Indeed, all three systems  were in play, and making Cuba an 
exception to the transformations in the Atlantic world between 1750 and 1850 
privileges one (national in de pen dence) over the  others.26 Economic historians 
have continued to explore the par tic u lar impact of colonialism and foreign 
trade in the Amer i cas, even  after the pull of de pen dency theory weakened in 
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the 1980s and 1990s. Research in this vein has generally demonstrated Cuba’s 
similarity, more than disparity, with the emerging national economies of main-
land Spanish Ame rica, up to a point. Contrary to the assumption that foreign 
trade uniformly disadvantaged the Latin American economies, other  factors 
now better explain “how Latin Ame rica fell  behind.”27 The calculations of Linda 
and Richard Salvucci of Cuba’s terms of trade in the nineteenth  century il-
lustrate a surprising pattern. Although the end of colonial rule had severely 
disrupted their export economies, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and many 
other Latin American nations generally experienced a rise in their terms of 
trade throughout the nineteenth  century. Some of their export sectors  were 
too small to yield significant benefits, and many gains derived from commod-
ity booms that exacted heavy economic tolls, but the fact of foreign trade itself 
did not necessarily produce impoverishment. One might expect Cuba, with its 
gargantuan export economy contributing to a decline in world sugar prices, to 
figure 5.1. Slaves making sugar in nineteenth- century Cuba:  
The boiling  house of the Asunción estate
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have suffered in contrast. Instead, improvements in productivity (likely from 
steam- powered mills and being one of the first countries in the world to use rail 
transport) prevented declining terms of trade  until 1847, and they began to rise 
again in 1862.28 In other words, despite presumed differences between the  free 
trade that Spain allowed for Cuba and the  free trade policies of new nations 
(which often included fierce protectionism), both Cuba and the nations of 
Latin Ame rica benefited, however indirectly and unevenly, from foreign trade. 
Spain eventually closed the Cuban trade system for one con spic u ous commod-
ity. Spanish officials fretted about the increasing volume of trade between 
Cuba and the United States, and beginning in the 1830s, Spain imposed heavy 
duties on wheat flour from the United States.29 The intended beneficiaries of 
this protectionism  were Spanish wheat farmers, not Cubans, and once the du-
ties took effect in the 1840s and 1850s, Spanish wheat imports to Cuba nearly 
qua dru pled.30
Together with the developments already mentioned, this aggressive policy 
suggests several conclusions about Cuba’s “contrapuntal” economy in relation 
to  those of the mainland republics. First, Spanish strategies in Cuba  were 
neither afterthoughts nor sufficiently weak to indicate a “natu ral” decline in 
imperial might and an opening for in de pen dence. In combination with the ac-
tive interventions of the Cuban elite, policy makers effected a transformation 
that consolidated Spanish po liti cal control. This challenges commonplace 
assumptions that in de pen dence and nationhood offered better alternatives 
to presumably restrictive colonial relationships. Second, the significance of 
new Atlantic realignments in the nineteenth  century was not lost on Span-
iards or Cubans; the island was not artificially exempt from economic rela-
tionships developing among in de pen dent states  because it remained  under 
imperial rule.  Those realignments also adhere to a longer timeline that suggests 
similarities and connections, not simply contrasts, with other Spanish colo-
nies and new nations. Fi nally, colonial officials worried not simply about the 
possibility of Cuban in de pen dence but about the possibility of a new power, 
namely the United States, acquiring commercial, if not po liti cal, control of the 
island.  Those fears  were not unfounded. By the 1830s, Cuban exports to the 
United States had already exceeded  those to Spain, and by the 1850s almost 
half of Cuban exports went north.31 Instead of viewing that influence as a late 
nineteenth- century development that fused U.S. po liti cal interests in Cuba to 
increasing  U.S. investments in Cuban sugar  after the Ten Years’ War (1868–
1878), we might see concerns about competition with new foreign rivals as a 
facet of the early nineteenth  century that occasioned a power ful response from 
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Spain that resembles attempts in Mexico, Brazil, and other countries to shape 
the contours of British and U.S. economic interventions.
Nevertheless, the impulse to single out Cuba, and the Spanish Ca rib bean 
more broadly, as an outlier and exception has enjoyed a long history and no-
table adherents, including British scholar and colonial bureaucrat Herman 
Merivale. In 1841 he romanticized the supposedly harmonious nature of the 
Spanish Ca rib bean colonies before their economic takeoff and observed how 
times had changed. He wrote that “the tropical colonies of Spain  were com-
monwealths in an epoch when  those of most other nations  were mere factories; 
they are now rapidly acquiring the degrading characteristics of factories, while 
ours, we may hope, are advancing  toward the dignity of commonwealths.”32 
Overlooking a key connective story— how Britain’s sugar “factories” suffered 
in part from direct competition with Cuba’s successful enterprise— Merivale, 
like  others, took a dim view of Cuba’s po liti cal fortunes relative to its economic 
prosperity while still affirming the princi ple that colonies could achieve from 
po liti cal communities for the common good.
¡Viva España! The Politics of Spanish Rule
 Whether commonwealth or factory, Cuba was subject to laws and policies that 
 were never wholly determined by economic ambitions. The idealized memory 
of a Spanish commonwealth based on noble, benevolent princi ples experienced 
a lengthy afterlife on the island. Shortly  after Cubans drafted a progressive con-
stitution in 1940, the historian and  legal scholar Ramón Infiesta published 
a monumental history of constitutionalism in Cuba. He traced the origins of 
the island’s demo cratic traditions not to recent efforts to challenge Gerardo 
Machado’s dictatorship and the po liti cal influence of the United States, nor to 
the in de pen dence movement against Spain, but to Spanish colonialism. The 
1812 Constitution, he argued, was situated at “the nexus between past Castil-
ian freedoms and a new demo cratic spirit.” While Infiesta admitted that the 
membership of the Cortes of Cádiz betrayed the inclusive ideology expressed 
in the constitution, he celebrated its advocacy of elections “that excluded any 
regard for casta or of privilege” and that located politics “outside the radius” 
of class influence.33  These  were certainly generous interpretations of “Castilian 
freedoms,” and especially of the Cádiz Constitution; far from being race blind, 
it offered only a narrow win dow of citizenship for  free men of African descent 
who proved their “virtue and merit.” For Infiesta, any flaws in Spanish consti-
tutional rule derived from constraints on civic life: obsessed with public order 
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and hunting down runaway slaves and bandits, local governments did  little to 
foster a demo cratic spirit beyond the realm of institutional politics inhabited 
only by the privileged. Nevertheless, this early period of constitutional rule 
 under colonialism laid the groundwork, according to Infiesta, for the demo-
cratic po liti cal culture that had culminated in a twentieth- century constitution 
that has long set a po liti cal standard for many Cubans.34
The idea that Spanish rule had championed any freedoms, or that colo-
nial notions of sovereignty and po liti cal legitimacy might serve as models for 
postin de pen dence politics, was uncommon among Spanish American elites, 
and has only recently has attracted the attention of historians in the case of the 
Cádiz Constitution.35 More commonly, new nation- states defined themselves 
against the old colonial regime and professed a commitment to representative 
government and constitutionalism, in Jeremy Adelman’s words, “building on 
the po liti cal achievements of defeating metropolitan monarchies.”36 In another 
interpretation, however, “schizophrenic” in de pen dent states strug gled to rec-
oncile republicanism with the “organicist and corporatist” ideologies left over 
from colonial rule.37 To acknowledge the fuzziness of the transitions from col-
ony to nation in mainland Spanish Ame rica, especially in the realm of po liti cal 
practices, is to invite curiosity about the explicit per sis tence of colonial politics 
in Cuba, albeit in the context of new visions of the Spanish nation.
Despite widespread inequalities during the colonial period along the lines 
of gender, race, and class, Cubans like Infiesta could look to the late nineteenth 
 century and cite some evidence of inclusive po liti cal practices. By 1898, Cubans 
had come to enjoy freedoms of press and association, po liti cal parties modeled 
on  those in Spain, and, at the end of the in de pen dence war, even a last- minute 
offer of full po liti cal autonomy within the Spanish empire. Aside from sepa-
ratist sentiment, the presumed unimportance of popu lar politics in Spanish 
Cuba is often understood as the logical casualty of the simultaneous growth 
of African slavery— and, for many scholars, a reason to exclude the island from 
comparative considerations of nineteenth- century Spanish American po liti-
cal history. But innovations in Spain’s nineteenth- century empire raise simi-
lar questions to  those relevant to the new republics about liberalism, popu lar 
politics, civil society, and about imperial and national imaginaries not easily 
contained within neat periodizations that end “the colonial period” with main-
land in de pen dence.38 In this light, the relationship between institutional and 
popu lar politics in colonial Cuba becomes as ripe for analy sis as it has been for 
the rest of Spanish Ame rica during its “modern period.”39
One of the most apparent features of po liti cal life during Cuba’s contin-
ued colonial status was the surprising degree of popu lar support for Spain, in-
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cluding that of  free and enslaved  people of African descent. In contrast to the 
stable category of royalists who emerged out of the mainland in de pen dence 
conflicts with patriots, loyalty to Spanish rule in Cuba was rarely a fixed or 
permanent po liti cal identity; allegiance to Spain was contingent and flexible. 
Given that all Cubans occupied some subordinate social or po liti cal position 
 under Spanish rule, the colonial state often recognized claims to privileges from 
self- proclaimed loyal subjects more readily than demands for rights based on 
elusive national citizenship. Racial in equality, just like other built-in colonial 
hierarchies, contained within it the possibility of inclusion. And ultimately, 
symbolic acts of loyalty to the imperial proj ect, not the promise of citizenship 
embodied in the 1812 Spanish Constitution, may have been what offered more 
secure footing to some  free men of color— not despite the widespread unrest 
and in the Amer i cas but precisely  because of it. What many Cubans came to 
realize in the years of imperial crisis, as they watched other regions of Spanish 
Ame rica dissolve into violent conflict, was that loyalty, as opposed to exit, of-
fered a relatively stable position from which to argue for economic reforms, 
improved social standing, or po liti cal recognition.40 As for much of the colo-
nial period, subordinate status, not equality among citizens, grounded po liti cal 
subjectivities, so that even humbler colonials could speak to power in the lan-
guage of loyalty, so long as some means of expression was available. Just before 
the constitution was promulgated, for example, Pedro Galdíz, a lower officer 
of the pardo battalion in Havana, successfully lobbied the captain general for 
a portion of normal monthly pay during months of rest. In 1811, he appealed 
“with no pretension but obedience and hope for the return of our legitimate 
sovereign to his throne” for a type of recognition that could not yet have been 
granted by invoking the constitution. For many African- descended Cubans, 
the constitution seems to have stood as one, but not the primary, front on 
which they advanced strug gles for survival, success, and mobility.41 On most 
fronts, the language of loyalty figured prominently.
As in the new mainland republics, the constitution enjoyed a long afterlife 
in Cuba, but on the island its limitations and possibilities became especially 
manifest  under the continuation of Spanish rule. Ferdinand VII abrogated it 
in 1814, it was restored in 1820–1823 following a military coup in Spain, was 
wrongfully reinstituted by Santiago’s governor in 1836, and its protections  were 
definitively placed out of reach from Cubans in 1837 with Spain’s decision to 
govern the colonies by “special laws.”42 Cubans frequently looked favorably on 
its guarantees of  free press and association, particularly during its restoration in 
1820. In an initial test of  those freedoms, the restoration provoked lively public 
commemorations that stretched the limits of what kind of public fraternizing 
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would be tolerated. Alejandro Ramírez, and army intendant, reported on five 
straight days of cele bration in Havana to celebrate the physical arrival of the 
constitution. On April 15, a Spanish ship carry ing the proclamation completed 
its month- long voyage from La Coruña and was met by three Spanish regiments, 
one of them proudly headed by a col o nel who had guarded Cádiz in 1812 when 
news of the constitution was initially proclaimed. Soldiers led  music and me-
andering parades through the streets, and they eventually mixed with “paysa-
nos de toda ropa,” followed by “masses of blacks and mulattoes, all of them 
with bouquets and  little paper lanterns placed on long sticks, singing, drum-
ming, and shouting at whomever they encountered.” Amid the “infernal noise,” 
Ramírez identified groups of negros “who shouted ‘Viva el Rey’ from a distance 
when they heard of the Constitution’s victory.”43 This, for Ramírez, was the 
desired outcome of loosening restrictions on public gatherings: however bois-
terous the Cubans of color might have been, they used public space to show 
support for Spanish rule— a far preferable alternative to uniting in rebellion.
As his description continued, however, the intendant snuck in some suspi-
cion amid the praise. On the final night of the festivities, crowds proceeded 
down Calle Muralla— renamed Calle de la Constitución—to a plaza featuring 
the Arca de la Ley, a stone memorial to the constitution.  There they sang patri-
otic hymns, toasted the new po liti cal order, and wore hats that bore the message 
“Viva la Constitución.” Once again, soldiers mixed with civilians, “masses of 
 people of all classes, sexes, and colors,” but now many of the images and deco-
rations that he witnessed bore “triangles, squares, and other tools of masonry, 
and a combination of three colors. . . .  Blue- striped ribbons worn on their black 
coats; such dress, according to some intellectuals of the Egyptian mysteries, was 
analogous to the Triangular emblem.” The role of Masonic lodges in many Span-
ish American in de pen dence movements was a fresh memory to officials like 
Ramírez, although Cuban lodges generally traced origins and ongoing relation-
ships to counter parts in Spain and generally survived intense government scru-
tiny.44 The concern at the end of the restoration cele brations seemed to locate 
the potential for subversion in Masonic iconography—an anxiety undoubtedly 
linked to understandings of the influences on mainland in de pen dence— much 
more than assumptions about the rebellious nature of Cubans of color.
Throughout the week, Ramírez expressed ambivalence that characterized 
the uneven development of public life in early nineteenth- century Cuba. He 
could not help but observe that the events “gathered all of the ele ments capable 
of generating disorder,” and that the loyal sentiments of the African- descended 
participants  were insufficient to overcome the subversive potential of general 
revelry. He concluded that “although the desires and intentions of the pueblo 
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 were Spanish and Patriotic, the princi ple that set the machine in motion was 
neither Patriotic nor Spanish, at the opposite extreme.”45 Could the medium 
have been the message? Ramírez certainly thought so, and opportunities to 
express support for colonial rule waxed and waned as authorities worked with 
qualified success to limit the forms of popu lar public expression that voiced 
po liti cal opinions, pro- Spanish or other wise.
The second constitutional period ostensibly broadened opportunities for 
more Cubans, citizens or not, to engage in po liti cal discussion, but even  those 
liberties had their limits: government censors issued 147 denunciations to vari-
ous licensed newspapers in the course of the Trienio.46  After major turning 
points away from expanded rights—in 1823, in 1837, with the announcement 
of “special laws,” and  after the slave revolts and La Escalera conspiracy in the 
1840s— moderate reforms coming from Madrid often faced skepticism from 
officials on the island, such as Captain General Luis Dionisio Vives’s refusal in 
1823 of Spain’s continuation of associational freedoms  after the constitution’s 
nullification. Such austerity left figures like  Father Félix Varela, once a Cuban 
delegate to the Cortes, to relocate po liti cal discussion off of the island—in Va-
rela’s case to the United States, where he published El Habanero in Philadel-
phia and advocated Cuban in de pen dence. The restrictions placed on public 
space and association, po liti cal discussion, and publications may have intended 
to squelch seditious and revolutionary activities, but they also limited even ex-
pressions of support for Spanish rule.
Before 1837, the creole elite had won economic concessions in the absence of 
po liti cal repre sen ta tion, but the announcement of “special laws” for the island 
rightly struck them as explic itly silencing. Drawing on the ill- fitting rhe toric 
of  human bondage, a furious José Antonio Saco, now stripped of his position 
in the Cortes, accused Spain of “reducing  free citizens to po liti cal slavery” and 
wondered how it could cite fears of slave rebellion to justify its decision, given 
that Spain had created the system itself: Cubans owned “slaves that the Govern-
ment itself brought us and forced us to buy.”47 Ramón de la Sagra, the Spanish 
agriculturalist who studied and taught in Cuba and often sparred with Saco, 
tried to give the decision a positive spin. From Paris he published an analy sis of 
the constitution’s suspension in Cuba that saw special laws as a privilege, not 
an insult, bestowed on white Cubans. They had the resources they needed to 
prosper, and lost repre sen ta tion in the Cortes was a small price to pay to pre-
vent po liti cal freedoms from becoming “a seductive spectacle for an unhappy 
race that can neither understand nor enjoy them.”48  Things could still improve 
for the white population, but more importantly they  were now less likely to be 
destroyed altogether.
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All the while, talk of in de pen dence remained relatively muted. Annexation 
to the United States increasingly piqued the curiosity of slave- owning Cubans, 
reformers seeking autonomy  under colonial rule floated vari ous designs for 
“Spanish Cuba,” and a handful of planters found a modest platform to make 
their interests heard in Madrid. In the 1840s and 1850s, Saco was a frequent 
spokesmen for Cuban planters and slave  owners who met with limited success 
when they argued that white immigration and an end to the slave trade might 
create a Cuba worthy of constitutional protections. Although Cubans  didn’t 
dis appear entirely from the Spanish po liti cal scene, they had to adapt their 
rhe toric to fit their exceptional and subordinate status. Francisco Muñoz del 
Monte, a wealthy Santiago liberal who became a regular presence in the court 
of Isabel II during the 1850s, wrote frequently for a Spanish periodical called 
La América. He still celebrated the merits of freedom, but he now paired it 
with order as a necessary preventive balance for unchecked liberties. He tried 
to fuse the interests of the Spanish and Cuban bourgeoisie with appeals to the 
“Iberian race” and fraternal harmony. And he watched with some exasperation 
 after 1854 as po liti cal parties proliferated in Spain, mindful that Cubans  were 
left out of such debates. In an article about the many “liberal parties” in Spain, 
he reminded readers that Spanish liberals and conservatives alike could trace 
their origins to the liberal ideals of the 1812 Constitution.49
As long as slavery and racial differences existed on the island, the Spanish 
government seemed disinclined to encourage hopes for the extension of con-
stitutional rights. We should not see in this an absence of politics altogether— 
either as two- dimensional conjecture about Iberian absolutism or as a contrast 
to demo cratic American republics, themselves reckoning racial divisions with 
rights talk. Again, the promise of constitutional rights and liberal government 
was only one mechanism by which Cubans could achieve inclusion and justice. 
And as the 1812 Constitution made no attempt to curb slavery and excluded 
slaves from any claims to citizenship, many slaves themselves pursued po liti cal 
paths with older origins. Alejandro de la Fuente has discussed how the per sis-
tence of slaves in Cuban courts helped transform the centuries- old  legal cus-
tom of coartación, or slaves’ self purchase, into an institution understood as a 
right— though not without disagreements by planters and the colonial govern-
ment.50 One syndic in 1852 affirmed the freedom claim of a slave  woman named 
Catalina  because she had traveled with a former owner to Spain, where slavery 
did not exist. He reasoned that “the right of post- liminy was established to 
promote freedom . . .  according to the wise and enduring  legal code formulated 
by Alfonso X, ‘All worldly rights always advance the interests of freedom.’ ”51 
 Here was an invocation of freedom that did not depend on constitutional guar-
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antees or the threat of anticolonial revolt. The fact that this anecdotal evidence 
does not necessarily congeal into a well-defined pattern is precisely the point: 
this was a system of exceptions and special cases. With the rules themselves 
frequently in transition, aspiring to citizenship  under the Spanish constitution 
was rarely a stable po liti cal stance that would be uniformly recognized as al-
legiance to Spain.
Nevertheless, on the eve of Cuba’s first war for in de pen dence,  there began 
to appear a slight softening of the parallel rigidity among Cuban leaders to the 
enslaved and  free descendants of Africans. Certainly, the U.S. Civil War and 
slave emancipation had dampened enthusiasm for annexation, and former 
adherents rerouted their discontent in the direction of colonial reform. Over 
two de cades  after the alleged conspiracy of La Escalera, which led to a brutal 
crackdown on slaves and  free  people of color alike, the  free- colored militias 
had been reinstated, whitening the population became a more common goal 
of elites, and deceptive discussions about “ free” African mi grant  labor at least 
acknowledged that slavery would not last forever. Each of  these developments 
pointed to a need or desire for better social integration despite a wide gap 
between its princi ples and practice. Together, they ostensibly placed Cuban 
creoles in a stronger position to critique the po liti cal fractures and exclusions 
they had long suffered. Even though the Junta de Reformas de Ultramar that 
convened in 1865 could not align the interests of its Puerto Rican, Cuban, and 
metropolitan constituencies, it nevertheless offered a limited space for po liti cal 
deliberation. Ironically, 1865 was also the year of the founding of the Sociedad 
Abolicionista Española, an organ ization that would debate the role of former 
slaves and Cuba’s sizable  free population in preserving support for Spanish rule.
To what extent might this openness in the 1860s have been extended to the 
exclusions and exceptions made for Cubans of African descent? The captain 
general himself seemed optimistic. Domingo Dulce acknowledged the “civiliz-
ing aptitude” of the  free population of color and urged the Ministerio de Ultra-
mar to loosen up. Since he had arrived in Cuba in 1862,  free  people had achieved 
success in many professions, “even  music and poetry,” and Dulce recommended 
removing  legal obstacles to their contribution to the “expansive and fusionary 
Spanish race.” He warned that the ministry should not “draw up special laws for 
the libres de color, nor deprive them de facto and de jure of the equality before 
the law that they have possessed and still possess, although  there are only few 
slight differences to repeal.” The work of dismantling  legal inequalities within 
the island might have been the necessary condition for holding at bay special 
laws in general, as, Dulce predicted, the “divergence of aspirations between 
the majority of the inhabitants and a minority of peninsulares  will dis appear.” 
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Ultimately, though, he admitted that the “progressive amalgamation of race 
 will be the work of time and not of legislation,” and by 1868, time for musing 
about a racially amalgamated empire or po liti cal equality was interrupted by 
the outbreak of Cuba’s first war for in de pen dence.52
While the treaty that ended that war effected an unpre ce dented expansion 
of the public sphere— far more opportunities for po liti cal deliberation, includ-
ing the founding of conservative and liberal po liti cal parties—1868 begins a 
narrative of in de pen dence that differs from that of the other Spanish American 
colonies in that a national vision preceded po liti cal in de pen dence. That vision, 
as Ada Ferrer so persuasively articulates, was built less on the ideas of biological 
and cultural mixing, which fueled calls for national unity in the nineteenth- 
century republics, but “as the product of a revolutionary cross- racial alliance— a 
formulation that ostensibly acknowledged the po liti cal actions of nonwhite 
men and therefore carried with it power ful implications for racial and national 
politics in the peace and republic to follow anticolonial insurgency.”53 What 
happens, asks Jeremy Adelman of approaches to Spanish American in de pen-
dence, if we “do not suppose the existence of the nation,  either as social forma-
tion or as idyll, before empires crumbled and the fires of revolution began to 
spread across colonial hinterlands?”54 What happens if we examine Cuba’s his-
tory as counterpoint and harmony alike: questions of po liti cal inclusion that 
 shaped the trajectories of all American nations, but with Cuba’s strug gle for 
in de pen dence and race- transcendent nationalism a marked distinction from 
the creole- led movements of the early nineteenth  century.
Conclusion
Another appeal for Cuban in de pen dence, made almost thirty years  after the 
statement to the Mexican Congress, characterized anticolonial rebellion as 
an inevitable and foreseeable event by midcentury, prophesying that “down- 
trodden  peoples, brutalized by ages of oppression,  will rise in the rude maj-
esty of their ungovernable might.” Indeed, by now Cuban desires for po liti cal 
emancipation could be historically documented: the author cited an 1823 plea 
to Simón Bolívar for help, an 1826 plea at the Congress of American States in 
Panama, the 1828 conspiracy of the Aguila Negra, and the Santiago governor’s 
1836 attempt to reinstate the Cádiz Constitution. This time, the call came from 
neither a Cuban nor Mexican but a U.S. southerner. Samuel R. Walker was a 
New Orleans filibuster who made the case for in de pen dence in 1854 to John 
Perkins, a Demo cratic Louisiana congressman; he had in mind more than a 
moral crusade against “the divine right sacrilegiously claimed by imbecile king-
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craft.” A  free Cuba, for Walker, was a vital issue for the southern economy. 
“The articles we produce are  those they most need,” he insisted, and  Eng land 
or France would never “have suffered such an incubus to have existed at the 
outlet of even their petty rivers, weighing down their commercial advance-
ment.” Po liti cal solidarity did not lie far from his economic ambitions, and 
although a full- scale invasion of Cuba might upset the delicate racial balance, 
Walker still asked what “the United States, the center from which  these rays di-
verge, [would] be willing to contribute to the cause of freedom and humanity.”55 
His assessment echoed the sentiments of the Mexican supporters of Cuban 
in de pen dence in 1825, who claimed that Cuba needed the strong “protection 
of a friendly nation” in order to secure its liberty.56 As in much of the American 
hemi sphere’s history, economic and po liti cal motivations rarely separated neatly 
as  factors in expansionary proj ects.
If that rhe toric portends  later justifications for the 1898 U.S. intervention 
in Cuba’s final war for in de pen dence, it should also alert us to a per sis tent 
counterpoint between the harmonious “ family of nations” in the nineteenth- 
century Amer i cas and the expansionary and paternalistic ambitions of some 
of its members, including, but not limited to, the United States. Even as Eu ro-
pean empires expanded throughout the  century, and still controlled much of 
the Ca rib bean, observers from new American nations commonly proclaimed 
the incompatibility between colonial rule in Cuba and regional cap i tal ist de-
velopment. But the experiments with inclusionary politics and economic inno-
vation in the last de cades of Spain’s presence in the Amer i cas allow us to unfix 
liberalism and capitalism from their association with the nation- state. Not that 
Cuba alone diverged from this presumed norm. While colonialism on the is-
land rarely approximated the liberal imperialism claimed and theorized by the 
British and French in their nineteenth- and twentieth- century global exploits, 
it was never the sole site of imperial allegiances, enduring racial hierarchies, 
and coerced  labor in the Amer i cas.57  Those phenomena remained  viable and 
prominent even in the new nations that  were gradually and unevenly  shaped 
in opposition to them. Counterpoint— between colony and nation, equality 
and subordination, rights and privileges— might involve diff er ent contours and 
rhythms, but the melodies are intrinsically interdependent.
This point was not lost on Fernando Ortiz. The oppositions that he delin-
eated in Cuban Counterpoint never remained distinct; rather, the historical 
pro cesses by which they informed and transformed each other laid the foun-
dation of Ortiz’s wide- ranging concept of transculturation. And this insight 
offers a way to understand Cuba as an integral part of the Age of Revolutions 
rather than a curious exception to it. Perhaps the loudest counterpoints are 
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to be found not between individual cases but within them. Cuba, for all of 
its continuity, became a laboratory for experiments in economic and po liti cal 
reform throughout the nineteenth  century. If preserving slavery was the criti-
cal explanation for maintaining colonial rule, the hierarchies that bolstered it 
could be mobilized not simply for economic exploitation but for membership 
in a public or po liti cal community that was unequal by design. The privileges 
and paternalism characteristic of Spanish colonial rule held the attention of 
many Cubans at the same time that the rights and freedoms attributed to in-
de pen dent nation- states  were being hammered out elsewhere. Situating Cuba 
alongside the new nations in the Amer i cas brings into sharper view the colo-
nial foundations of the vari ous “national” po liti cal cultures that emerged and 
the “modern” features of Eu ro pean empires.
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In impor tant ways Brazil became a new country in the early nineteenth 
 century. Following its exit from the Portuguese empire in 1822, it faced strug-
gles over national authority and regional autonomy, including quests for 
provincial secession. The formation of a Brazilian nation- state— the most en-
during nineteenth- century American monarchy— also entailed reckoning with 
transatlantic and national debates about slavery and reconsolidating an export 
economy in the midst of Britain’s rise to industrial eminence. In all of  these 
challenges Brazil shared conflicts and debates that  shaped other new countries 
of the Amer i cas. Yet, as has been noted often, Brazil faced the least conflictive 
path to in de pen dence. Brazilians recognized the heir to the Portuguese throne 
as a leader of in de pen dence; the new monarchy successfully defended its sover-
eignty over most of the territory of the former Portuguese colony; and in the new 
commercial regime of open ports and direct trade with Britain, landowners and 
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merchants invested in the rapidly growing coffee export economy and agreed 
that preserving the slavery that sustained this economy was paramount.
Was Brazil, then, the least new of the new countries? Understanding how 
Brazilians consolidated a monarchical national state, fostered a new coffee 
economy, and defended slavery to hold together as the largest, most pros-
perous, and most po liti cally stable South American country in the nineteenth 
 century requires a long historical vision. The transformations that made Brazil 
both new and more eco nom ically prosperous and po liti cally stable than many 
of its American neighbors should be traced through the  whole eigh teenth 
 century and into the early de cades of the nineteenth. This is not to suggest that 
the roots of Brazilian nationhood, or of a Brazilian nation- state, arose early 
in Brasil- Colônia, or that ideas and institutions of nationhood and statehood 
 were uncontested  after the 1830s. Rather, examining Brazil’s transformations 
within the Portuguese empire’s long eigh teenth  century illuminates the ways 
in which it became part of a dynamic Atlantic world in the context of a global 
empire— and how Brazil’s place within that empire  shaped how  people on 
both sides of the Atlantic experienced the crises that ultimately led to Brazilian 
in de pen dence and adapted to a world increasingly defined by British industrial 
and military power.1
The eigh teenth  century and the first de cades of the nineteenth encom-
passed interrelated economic, po liti cal, and administrative transformations, 
interpreted and addressed in vari ous ways within the Portuguese royal court 
and at the local level in Brazil. They redefined the Portuguese empire, while 
 people in both Portugal and Brazil forged a transatlantic po liti cal culture that 
mixed allegiance to, and critique of, monarchy and royal administration. At 
the start of the eigh teenth  century Brazil was part of an empire in transforma-
tion and a dynamic Atlantic world, linked to global markets through exports 
of agricultural commodities and gold, and imports of  human chattel. By the 
 middle of the  century, the Crown had recognized Brazil’s primacy among its 
territories by investing in diplomatic, administrative, and commercial policies 
that sought to leverage the “continental” potential of the American ultramar 
as a guarantee of the monarchy’s in de pen dence within Eu rope. In the wake of 
the Napoleonic crisis and the Portuguese royal court’s move to Rio de Janeiro 
in 1808, the legacies of  these policies  were manifest yet divergent. Rio- centered 
po liti cal elites worked to preserve the American and imperial  future envisioned 
by eighteenth- century royal officials by liberating Brazil from colonial status 
within Portuguese politics and imperial commercial policy. By the 1830s  these 
elites had forged a new in de pen dent state— a constitutional monarchy called 
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the Empire of Brazil— and defended it against challenges from Portugal and 
within Brazil.
Although one royal  family holding the thrones in Portugal and Brazil 
brought entanglements and uncertainties, Pedro I’s abdication to his young 
Brazilian- born son, Pedro II, in 1831 affirmed the separation between Eu rope 
and Ame rica. British abolitionism notwithstanding, leaders of the new Brazil-
ian empire also negotiated international recognition of in de pen dence and a 
diplomatic framework for gradual abolition that allowed for an expansion of 
slavery in the short term, enabling—as slave traders and slave  owners insisted 
it would— the expanding production of wealth within a global economy that 
had long linked Brazil and  Great Britain via Portugal. The elimination of Por-
tugal from this network served the “interests of commerce” and opened the 
economic and po liti cal potential of Brazil, promoted by eighteenth- century 
royal officials and secured  under a nineteenth- century empire linked directly if 
informally to industrializing Britain.
At the same time, the defense of American empire and its economic poten-
tial was inextricably linked to quests to po liti cally transform the former colony 
from within. As recent historical scholarship has shown, a plurality of po liti cal 
proj ects, both old and new,  shaped a complex articulation of state and nation-
hood in the first half of the nineteenth  century. Institutional and economic 
continuities (slavery, monarchy, export production, British markets and mer-
chants) provided frameworks within which  people in Brazil sought to define a 
new nationhood in law, in po liti cal and economic practice, and in culture. In 
the pro cess, visions of vassalage, monarchical authority, nationhood, and the 
state’s sovereignty over the territory of Brazil, including its vast hinterland and 
disputed border zones, effaced local authorities and autonomies. As vassalage 
was transformed into citizenship, the ideals and practices of cultivating alle-
giance to the state and thereby forging a unified social and po liti cal order in 
the name of nationhood underwrote an entrenchment of old hierarchies and 
exclusions, as well as new understandings of the imperatives of territorial unity 
and po liti cal authority. Thus, notwithstanding the dynastic, geographic, and 
socioeconomic continuities so often cited as having set Brazil apart from its 
Spanish American neighbors, throughout the nineteenth  century  people living 
in the vast territory claimed by the new Empire of Brazil, like their counter-
parts across the hemi sphere, contended with the contingencies and contradic-
tions of a new sovereignty, even as the  free reaped the rewards and slaves bore 
the burdens of Brazil’s export prosperity linked to an expanding, industrial 
capitalism.
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Global Empire and Portuguese Ame rica in the Eigh teenth  Century
From the fifteenth  century, the Portuguese empire was a leading participant 
in the creation of a complex global economy that by the late sixteenth  century 
linked the flow of American silver  toward China and the Atlantic trades in 
sugar and slaves. It was a growing economy  shaped, and reshaped, by rivalry. 
What Charles Boxer called “the global strug gle with the Dutch,” began during 
the Union of the Iberian Crowns (1580–1640) and ended  after the restoration 
of Portuguese sovereignty  under the leadership of the House of Braganza. It 
led to the loss of the Moluccas (1605) and fortresses in Ceylon (1638–1658) as 
well as lengthy efforts to fend off the Dutch in Africa (El Mina in 1638 and Lu-
anda from 1641 to 1648).  These wars  were costly and disastrous for Portuguese 
Asian trade; in the 1630s, in contrast to the 1580s and 1590s when the carreira 
da India comprised as many as fifty- nine ships, fewer than two ships arrived 
at Lisbon per year with no significant increase in the following two de cades.2
In the second half of the seventeenth  century the attention of royal offi-
cials in Lisbon shifted from the Estado da Índia, the Indian Ocean network 
of fortresses, merchant communities, and administrative cities,  toward the At-
lantic, following the generation of revenue. Yet the shift from east to west was 
complex. The Dutch had set their sights on the Amer i cas as well. In the 1620s 
they attacked Salvador da Bahia and the following de cade occupied the neigh-
boring capitancy of Pernambuco— where the Portuguese  under Spanish Haps-
burg sovereignty had consolidated the first large- scale sugar and slave society in 
the Amer i cas. To revitalize the Brazilian enterprise, the newly restored Portu-
guese Crown founded the Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil in 1649, 
providing a new venue for investment (in many cases from New Christians) 
with rights to import cod, oil, and wine into Brazil, and the duty to or ga nize 
and share in the revenue from transatlantic fleets laden with slaves and sugar; 
one of  these fleets was instrumental in expelling the Dutch from the Brazil 
in 1654. The renewed growth of Brazil’s sugar economy was limited, however, 
by concurrent transformations in transatlantic commerce. As the En glish, the 
French, and the Dutch established plantations in the Ca rib bean, the price of 
sugar declined; Portugal’s revenues reached a low in the 1680s. And when Bra-
zilian trade revived, its revenues could not compensate for what had been lost 
in Asia. Nor could new links between Brazil and the Estado da Índia via the 
Cape route— especially the trade in Brazilian tobacco— reverse the trend of 
declining imperial revenue.3
A dramatic transformation and the preeminence of what some have called 
an “Atlantic system”— based on the intricately linked export economies of 
Brazil and Africa— took shape only at the end of the seventeenth  century, 
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fueled initially, yet not entirely, by the discovery of gold in Portuguese Ame-
rica’s hinterland. The adaptation of slavery to the production of gold across 
the uplands beyond Rio and São Paulo ensured that bound Africans would 
remain the base of Brazil’s production. Despite the challenges of administering 
new settlements and extracting new resources, by the turn of the eigh teenth 
 century the empire was once again providing substantial financial resources 
to the Crown. Gold from Brazil had become part of a complex international 
political- economic conjuncture. Even as wars in Eu rope at the beginning of 
the  century disrupted existing trade and commerce, they created new oppor-
tunities for Brazilian exports. In a context of war and commercial potential, 
the Crown of Portugal committed to a new alliance with  Eng land, signing the 
Methuen Treaty in 1703; it provided for low tariffs on Portuguese wines sent 
to  Eng land and ensured open markets in Portugal for En glish woolens. For 
Portugal, the result was a trade deficit with  Eng land, paid for with Brazilian 
gold. As royal officials at the time observed, it was the price of alliance with a 
formidable Eu ro pean power that would protect Portuguese territories from 
Franco- Spanish aggression.4 For  Eng land, Brazilian gold sustained the mo-
mentum of its own eighteenth- century commercial enterprise. Brazil found a 
new place linked to Britain in a global economy that was, as Tutino explains, 
dynamic and polycentric.5
With the new Brazilian mining economy playing such a vital role in the 
Atlantic economy and imperial policy, the Crown remained committed to estab-
lishing control over new areas of settlement in Brazil. As thousands of settlers 
from Bahia, Pernambuco, São Paulo, and Portugal traveled both the official 
caminhos and newly forged and often clandestine paths to as Minas, the Crown 
first aimed to defend its sovereignty in Ame rica by limiting access to the min-
ing region, and then turned to administrative and fiscal reforms that officials 
hoped would forge effective governance.6 As officials on both sides of the At-
lantic noted, governing and ensuring a steady stream of revenue from Brazilian 
mines carried high costs. Along with officials’ salaries and the cost of freight 
and of building and staffing foundries, the Crown had to invest in forces of 
order: by the 1720s a troop of professionally trained dragoons was stationed 
in Minas to assist locally recruited militias in escorting gold shipments and, at 
times, to suppress revolts. Over time the Crown began to assume the costs of 
defending the Brazilian coast, once a burden borne by the residents of coastal 
cities. Yet if the costs of governing Minas Gerais grew, the economy that took 
shape around mining in the hinterland also afforded the Crown sources of rev-
enue beyond the quinto (royal tax), including tolls on roads that  were used to 
export gold and transport needed supplies to and within the region. Much of 
206 — Kirsten Schultz
this revenue was spent locally to sustain fiscal administration and infrastruc-
ture. Such investment “helped to reinforce government control and ultimately 
rendered pos si ble the very construction of Brazil.”7
In the second half of the eigh teenth  century, even as gold exports entered a 
period of decline, the Portuguese imperial shift from east to west endured. On 
the one hand, gold exports  were but one source of revenue from a larger and 
more diverse export economy that generated revenue through customs tariffs. 
Indeed, as Stuart Schwartz observed, as “the gold cycle” lost dynamism around 
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midcentury, agricultural production, including a revived sugar economy, out-
paced mining. In 1760, he explains, “when Brazilian exports  were valued at 
4,800,000 milréis, sugar accounted for half of that figure and gold for 46%.”8 
While the mix of gold and agricultural exports ensured that Brazil remained a 
very lucrative enterprise for the Crown, in the Estado da Índia revenues stag-
nated and the Portuguese faced not only Eu ro pean rivals but also the ambi-
tions of local rulers who sought to increase the territories  under their control 
at the expense of the Portuguese.9
Facing what appeared an irreversible decline of the Asian empire and the 
growth of Brazil, royal officials began to articulate a new vision of an Atlantic 
American empire. Led by Brazilian- born Alexandre de Gusmão (1695–1753) and 
bolstered by increasing geographic and cartographic knowledge of the Ameri-
can hinterlands, the Portuguese Crown renegotiated the borders between 
Spanish and Portuguese Ame rica; the new Treaty of Madrid (1750) displaced 
the Treaty of Tordesillas by upholding the princi ple of uti possidetis (occupa-
tion) in Africa and Asia as well as the New World. The size of Portuguese claims 
doubled to include the vast basin of the Amazon River, while an exception was 
applied in Río de la Plata where the Portuguese relinquished claims to the Co-
lonia do Sacramento. Although the southern borders of Portuguese Ame rica 
continued to generate disputes and the Treaty of Madrid was revised by the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777, the new western borders would endure.10
João V’s successor, José I (r. 1750–1777), and his power ful prime minister, 
the  future Marquês de Pombal, took up the challenge of crafting administrative 
and economic policy for the Amazon region and of ensuring that the  whole 
empire remained prosperous. Pombal pursued reforms, often compared to 
 those of the Bourbons in neighboring Spain and Spanish Ame rica, intending 
to strengthen Portugal’s position in Eu rope. Without abandoning the Luso- 
British alliance, he sought to diminish Portugal’s trade deficits with  Eng land by 
promoting manufacturing to reduce imports and establishing the Alto Douro 
Com pany in Portugal to curtail En glish control of the wine industry. Beyond 
what Kenneth Maxwell described as a “nationalization” of Portugal’s economy 
through import- substitution, Pombal sought to develop colonial economies in 
the interest of both security and imperial trade. To exploit the Amazon basin, 
Pombal created the Companhia Geral do comércio do Grão Pará e Maranhão 
(1755), promoting the expanded use of African slave  labor, the settlement of 
Azorean immigrants, and the diversification of the northern economy, espe-
cially the cultivation of cotton and rice. To consolidate de facto royal control 
over the Amazon, he entrusted his  brother, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça 
Furtado, with the task of devising a policy for the region’s indigenous population; 
208 — Kirsten Schultz
the Directorio que se deve observar nas Povoações dos Indios do Pará, e Maran­
haõ was published in Lisbon 1757.11 A centerpiece in the Pombaline effort to 
achieve what Ângela Domingues has called the “occidentalization of Amazo-
nian space” through greater settlement, in the wake of the expulsion of the 
Jesuits from the Portuguese empire in 1759 the Diretório provided the frame-
work for governing and appropriating the  labor of the indigenous populations 
formerly supervised by that order.12
As Pombal began to implement his reforms, in recognition of the growing 
economic and strategic importance of the Brazilian South and to further shore 
up Portuguese control of frontier territories  there, in 1763 the Crown moved 
the capital of Brazil from Salvador, Bahia, to Rio de Janeiro. The Crown sent 
out cartographers, engineers, and natu ral scientists in expeditions intended to 
increase knowledge of the potential of its territories. To enhance its defensive 
and administrative capacities, the Crown raised auxiliary cavalry and infantry 
regiments throughout Brazil and established juntas da fazenda (exchequer 
boards) in each captaincy. The end of the requirement that ships sail within the 
fleet system, in turn, gave a select group of merchants more flexibility in adapting 
to supply and demand. In response to the British seizure of Havana in 1762, 
officials on both sides of the Atlantic began a series of proj ects aimed at fortify-
ing the Brazilian coast. To further security and, above all, to keep commerce 
Portuguese and Brazilian, the Crown barred foreigners from Brazil’s ports.13
Although Pombal fell from power following the death of Dom José in 1777, 
much of his reform vision weathered the criticism that found voice in the new 
royal court of Maria I (1777–1816). Brazilian planters and merchants, Portu-
guese royal officials, and what Maxwell calls “the merchant- industrial oligar-
chy” enriched by Pombaline protectionism continued to recognize both the 
overwhelming importance of Brazil within the imperial economy and that the 
new controls on commerce within the empire had diminished trade deficits 
with Britain and dismantled “the commanding role” earlier played by the Brit-
ish merchants in Portuguese ports. Led by Pombaline protégé Rodrigo de 
Sousa Coutinho, in the last de cade of the eigh teenth  century Portuguese royal 
officials continued to foster the diversification of Brazil’s export agriculture as 
well as the revival of mining. Thus, as Maxwell observes, “the South Atlantic 
dimension of the long Portuguese eigh teenth  century . . .  set the chronological 
framework for the  whole epoch.”14
While the Portuguese defended mercantilist policies throughout the  century, 
what contemporaries called the antigo sistema colonial proved “pervious.” Por-
tuguese imperial commerce linked to northern, central, and southern Eu ro pean 
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shipping and finance; it included direct trade in certain commodities (i.e., 
cod) between northern Eu rope and Brazil; it extended to “intercolonial ex-
change” between Africa and the Indian Ocean network and, above all, to the 
transatlantic slave trade, much of which was controlled by Portuguese African 
and Brazilian traders. In Brazil, both trade with Portugal and the slave trade 
between Brazil and Africa fueled the development of local and regional econo-
mies, expanding commodity production, and a wealthy landed and mercantile 
elite.15 Thus, in Brazil, as Tutino has noted of other American contexts, the ter-
rain of the eighteenth- century commercial economy was not only defined by 
exchanges between metropoles and colonies, but also encompassed regional and 
subregional economic centers and ports linked in complex ways to each other 
and to global trade networks.16
The porosity of a global empire defined by what one royal official called the 
“interests of commerce” also  shaped the ways in which royal officials perceived 
political- cultural challenges to Portuguese authority. If investment in the de-
fense of the Brazilian coastline reduced the potential of foreign aggression, the 
prob lem of cultivating po liti cal allegiance and gaining administrative and fiscal 
control over the extraction of wealth proved to be more challenging and en-
during. In the newly settled mining region, in the first three de cades of the eigh-
teenth  century the Crown faced both violent challenges to po liti cal order and a 
general disregard for royal authority. The Crown also faced revolts against taxes 
in the 1710s in Salvador and São Paulo, as well as armed conflict between plant-
ers of Olinda and wealthy merchants in Recife. The Crown responded with 
force, as it had in Minas, to restore order and maintain control. In the first half 
of the eigh teenth  century, as officials negotiated the implementation of taxes 
and the recognition of local institutions, they also promoted public and collec-
tive displays of allegiance and afforded urban life and urban planning greater 
space in royal policy.17 It would be in urban centers where, in the last de cades of 
the eigh teenth  century, residents would receive and share news of challenges to 
monarchy and empire taking shape in North Ame rica, France, and Haiti, and 
where residents would mount their own conspiracies against royal government 
and rebellions against the social order that royal authority upheld. The Crown 
successfully confronted  these challenges too— most famously the Tiradentes 
conspiracy of 1789 in Minas Gerais— with force and exemplary punishment.18
Throughout the eigh teenth  century the Crown also contended with an ef-
fective absence of its authority in the vast hinterlands of Portuguese Ame rica. 
The Pombaline Directory envisioned assimilating Indians into colonial society 
as laborers. In practice, the lack of resources for interior administration, local 
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initiatives that contradicted royal policy, the corruption of directors, the en-
croachment on indigenous villages and lands as settlers pushed into territo-
ries  under Indian control, the Indians’ re sis tance to such settlement, and Por-
tuguese perceptions of indigenous savagery, all mixed to stimulate local and 
royal efforts to militarize the hinterland and enslave, remove, and in some cases 
exterminate indigenous populations without effectively enhancing the gover-
nance of territories far from the historic, mostly coastal, centers of settlement. 
Indeed, as Hal Langfur explains, while in the hinterland of Minas the Crown 
sought to create a “forested no- man’s land, peopled by native antagonists 
whose enmity . . .  would prevent unauthorized access to and smuggling from 
the mines to the coast,” even this “enforced absence” proved difficult to sustain 
in practice. African slavery too presented challenges to sovereignty; through-
out Brazil slaves who escaped from plantations formed communities, called 
mocambos or by the eighteenth- century quilombos, which  were eco nom ically 
 viable and po liti cally autonomous. In the late seventeenth  century royal au-
thorities had turned to military force to dismantle the large, populous, and 
long- established República dos Palmares in northeastern Brazil. Yet the use 
of force on the margins of Portuguese settlement, often at odds with the local 
imperatives of negotiation, did not mean that the sovereignty proclaimed by 
treaties became real ity on the ground. Indeed, at the turn of the nineteenth 
 century much of the territory claimed by the Portuguese Crown encompassed 
an “archipelago” of autonomous indigenous communities and quilombos. 
They sustained “territorialized re sis tance,” as one historian describes it, to set-
tlement and enslavement in places both remote from and adjacent to centers of 
economic and po liti cal power.19
Still, the fractured geography of governance and sovereignty notwithstand-
ing, as royal officials in Portugal assessed Napoleon’s undeniable ambition and 
the prospects of another Eu ro pean war, Brazil’s potential loomed large. Rec-
ognized throughout the eigh teenth  century in diplomatic, commercial, and 
administrative policies that promoted settlement of American hinterland, 
urbanization, investment in administrative and judicial institutions, and the 
cultivation of po liti cal allegiance, Brazil had become the foundation of Por-
tuguese wealth and power. Its potential grew as revolutionary ex- slaves took 
down the export production of sugar and coffee in Haiti, the Atlantic leader in 
both before 1790, opening new markets for Brazilian growers. As chief of the 
royal trea sury Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho surmised in 1803, “Portugal by itself 
is not the best and most essential part of the monarchy.” If a war  were to leave 
Portugal devastated, he concluded, “it was incumbent upon its Sovereign and 
its  Peoples to go and create a power ful Empire in Brazil.”20
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Crisis, In de pen dence, and Sovereignty
When in 1807 Napoleon ordered an army to march across Spain and occupy 
Lisbon, he brought to an end the neutrality that sustained the Portuguese com-
mercial empire in the last quarter of the eigh teenth  century as well as recent 
debates within the Portuguese royal court about capitulation to the French or 
alliance with the British. In response, Prince Regent Dom João, ruling in place 
of his incapacitated  mother Maria I, established a regency, counseled his vas-
sals against armed re sis tance, assured them they would endure his absence only 
“ until the General Peace” was attained, and, with thousands of courtiers and 
a British naval escort, crossed the Atlantic.21 While Brazil officially became a 
short- term haven from war and occupation, key royal counselors saw the move 
to Brazil as a continuation of eighteenth- century visions of Western ascendance 
and recent conjecture about American potential. Sousa Coutinho, now min-
ister of foreign affairs and war, dramatically restated his optimistic appraisal of 
the reorganization of imperial space. Rather than embarking on an exile, the 
prince regent, he posited in the “Declaration of War against the French,” was 
headed for “a new empire, which he  will create.”22
In the years that followed, royal officials insisted that the “new empire” stood 
against revolution and in defense of po liti cal tradition and hierarchy, while rec-
ognizing that it would also bring significant change. In Bahia in 1808, before 
arriving at Rio, the prince regent issued a charter that opened Brazil’s ports 
to allow commerce and the collection of revenue to continue during the war 
and the occupation of Portugal. Officially defined as “interim and provisional,” 
merchants and officials across the empire recognized that the mea sure marked 
the end of the “old colonial system” of mercantilist mono poly and the begin-
ning of “ free trade” for Brazil. In a time of war and British naval and com-
mercial dominance in the Atlantic, trade links to Britain became direct, while 
markets for Brazilian export commodities grew steadily in the 1810s.23
As the Peninsular War ended in 1814, demonstrations of po liti cal alle-
giance and transatlantic solidarity began to fracture. Vassals of the Portuguese 
monarchy questioned the empire’s new configuration, with its capital in Rio. 
In 1817  in Pernambuco, as sugar prices fluctuated and the fiscal demands of 
the Rio government appeared to jeopardize prosperity, provincial elites staged 
an insurrection demanding more autonomy. The same year, discontent in Por-
tugal with postwar conditions led a group of officers to plot against the in-
terim government of British marshal Beresford in  favor of “in de pen dence” and 
a constitutional monarchy. Although the Crown moved swiftly and success-
fully to repress both movements, it faced growing criticism of the po liti cal 
and economic ramifications of the alliance with  Great Britain, expressed in an 
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ex- patriot press in London, in public squares in Portugal and Brazil, and at the 
royal court itself.
The key concern among Portuguese merchants was a new commercial re-
gime, created by the Treaties of Commerce and Navigation of 1810, upheld in 
subsequent agreements, and characterized by Alan Manchester as “British pre-
eminence” in Brazil. Desired by imperial and commercial interests in London 
before the transfer of the court, temporarily undercut by the 1808 charter that 
opened Brazil’s ports to all nations, the 1810 treaties gave British traders and 
goods a preferential status in Brazilian ports: import duties of 15   percent on 
British goods  were lower than  those applied to Portuguese merchandise and 
other international goods. And while Portugal gained “most favored nation” 
status within the British empire, Brazilian sugar and coffee, “articles similar 
to the products of the British colonies,”  were denied direct entrance to Brit-
ish markets. Within Brazil the British also gained the unreciprocated privilege 
of selling retail. Although the 1810 treaties  were at first accepted in Portugal 
as essential in war time, when it became clear that the postwar regime would 
not bring changes that favored merchants in Portugal, ac cep tance gave way to 
disenchantment.24
In Brazil, if merchants and local economies did not suffer as dramatically 
from the opening of Brazil’s ports, many residents viewed the British as hav-
ing gained the upper hand in trade and, as some protested, in local economies 
as well. Complaints about the British presence in local markets and frictions 
generated by growing British communities in Brazilian port cities resonated 
with perceptions of the larger threat of  Great Britain’s imperial ambition in 
South Ame rica. Brazilian elites especially opposed British demands that the 
Portuguese Crown curtail the slave trade. While the presence of royalty in Rio 
de Janeiro had raised questions about both the moral and cultural effects of 
slavery, and the Haitian Revolution had raised doubts about security, the ma-
jority of Luso- Brazilian elites saw slavery as integral to imperial prosperity.25
At the end of the de cade the perception of besieged economic and po liti cal 
sovereignties and a more general dissatisfaction with the local politics of the 
new po liti cal economy of empire, the “internal conflicts” of the Luso- Brazilian 
empire came to a head and laid bare the po liti cal limits of the war time impe-
rial reconfiguration. The center of the crisis formed not in the royal court of 
Rio de Janeiro, but in Portugal where the Crown failed to convince its vas-
sals of the promise of a new American  future. Instead both the British postwar 
occupation and the opening of Brazil’s ports  were read as signs of the former 
metropolis’s new “colonial” status. In Portugal growing criticism of the trend 
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 toward “national de cadence” focused on the nature of sovereignty itself. In Au-
gust 1820 a group of property  owners, merchants, low- ranking military officers, 
magistrates and clergy, and some members of the nobility in Porto, called on 
Dom João to return to Portugal.  There the monarch could usher in a “regenera-
tion” of the Portuguese nation by convoking the Cortes, a formerly consultative 
institution that represented the kingdom in the reunion of three estates. In-
spired by the experience of Cádiz in 1812, they called on representatives to write 
a constitution for Portugal and its empire.
While the movement professed loyal to the monarchy, its loyalty was based 
on Dom Joã o’s allegiance to the Cortes and a new constitution that would 
circumscribe royal power and restrict it to the role of executive. The nation, 
not the Crown, would be sovereign. The news of the rebellion reached Rio in 
October 1820. A steady stream of rumor and reports followed, including news 
that confirmed the spread of the rebellion to Lisbon where the Cortes Gerais, 
Extraordinárias e Constituintes da Nação Portuguesa, would convene. As royal 
counselors debated how to respond, po liti cal actions in Brazil redefined emerg-
ing challenges. Beginning in January 1821 local expressions of support for the 
Cortes from officials and Portuguese troops in the Northeast and in Rio began 
to include demands that the Spanish Constitution of Cádiz, drafted in 1812 
during the French occupation of Spain and recently reimplemented at the in-
sistence of Spanish military men, serve as a provisional charter of the global 
Portuguese nation. In response, Dom João pledged support for the delibera-
tions of the Lisbon Cortes.26
When, in recognition of the Cortes’s demands, Dom João set sail for 
Portugal in 1821, he left  behind his son Dom Pedro as regent of Brazil and 
uncertainty about  whether the new constitutional order would endure and, 
if it did, what it would mean for the empire. One draft of a new Portuguese 
constitution defined the Portuguese nation as the “ union of all Portuguese of 
both hemi spheres,” including “ free men born and living in Portuguese terri-
tory” and “the slaves born in the ultramarine possessions that obtain manu-
mission.”27 Thus, the ideal of national repre sen ta tion would itself serve as the 
basis for  future imperial integrity and prosperity. In practice, imperial integrity 
would be guaranteed by the presence in the Lisbon Cortes of deputies from 
Brazil, elected to provide repre sen ta tion for each province and, with other 
representatives of the Portuguese “nation,” to deliberate on the “new order of 
 things.” Yet constitutionalist politics and po liti cal culture produced manifold 
visions and debates. Within the now uncensored press, pamphleteers raised 
the question of  whether the nation, monarchy, and empire  were coterminous. 
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 Were they products of history and tradition, language and law, and a  will to live 
together in a po liti cal community, or illusions that would succumb to percep-
tions of cultural, geographic, and racial differences?28
Indeed, although Dom Pedro accepted his  father’s pledge to defend the 
 future constitution and re spect the authority of the Lisbon Cortes, by the  middle 
of 1822, the ideal of a constitutionally sanctioned repre sen ta tion that promised 
to preserve the unity of the empire became the basis of rupture. As “citizens” on 
both sides of the Atlantic debated the empire’s  future, many in Brazil began to 
claim publicly that the promised repre sen ta tion and “equality of rights” would 
not necessarily serve what they defined as Brazilian “interests” and “ causes.” 
At the same time, by August 1821, with Brazilian delegates a minority, and be-
fore many of them had arrived in Lisbon, the Cortes began to pass mea sures 
interpreted in Brazil as efforts to “reduce Brazil to the old status of colony”: 
commercial regulations that had inhibited the interests of peninsular mer-
chants  were repealed; Rio was stripped of its status as a po liti cal capital with 
the creation of provincial governments directly subordinate to Lisbon; addi-
tional troops  were sent to Brazil; the high courts established in Rio following 
the transfer of the court  were abolished; and, perhaps most threatening, Prince 
Regent Dom Pedro, heir to the throne, was ordered, as his  father João VI had 
been in 1821, to return to Portugal.29 Thus, as was the case in the Cádiz delib-
erations, as the promoters of the Lisbon Cortes offered constitutionalism as a 
way to integrate the empire through repre sen ta tion, Portuguese representatives 
worked to affirm Lisbon’s rule within the empire. As in Spain’s domains, first 
in Cádiz and then with the 1820 reinstitution of the constitution, the attempt 
to use constitutional liberalism to integrate an empire came with limits and 
impositions that led American representatives and  those they represented to 
consider separation.
Local and provincial governments in the Brazilian Northeast, with strong 
commercial ties to Portugal and the first to embrace constitutionalism, re-
mained loyal to the Cortes that, in turn, acknowledged their authority, seek-
ing to drive a wedge between them and Dom Pedro’s regency. In Bahia, armed 
conflict between Portuguese expeditionary forces and local Brazilian regi-
ments left Portuguese merchants and the military governor in Salvador to face 
mounting opposition to the Cortes in nearby towns and the countryside. Some 
refugees from the city, including militiamen of color, together with slaves and 
other laborers, saw an end to Portuguese sovereignty as an opportunity for so-
cial change; at the same time plantation and sugar mill  owners surmised that 
a government led by Dom Pedro would preserve slavery and the social hierar-
chies that underwrote their wealth.30
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Contrasting visions of uncertain changes could lead to a common pursuit of 
separation. In Rio and surrounding provinces the Cortes’s decrees also inspired 
 people with diverse po liti cal and social aspirations to mobilize in support 
of the prince regent’s remaining in Brazil. Dom Pedro responded favorably, 
pledging in January 1822 to defy the Cortes and stay.31 The following May, with 
increasing or ga nized support for his leadership, Dom Pedro complied with a 
request from Rio’s city council to call a representative body that would evaluate 
the conditions for  union between Portugal and Brazil, and  whether and how 
the constitution drafted by the Lisbon Cortes would apply to Brazil.32
Dom Pedro hoped that the new assembly in Rio and the Cortes in Lisbon 
would work together to maintain the integrity of the Portuguese monarchy and 
empire, a vision similar to the 1821 Plan de Iguala that aimed to hold Mexico 
and Spain together  under Bourbon sovereignty. But in Rio in 1822 public sup-
port for “in de pen dence” as a guarantee of Brazil’s post-1808 status began to take 
shape.33 Meanwhile, in the Lisbon Cortes, as representatives from Brazil defended 
autonomy, the majority of delegates expressed skepticism about the maintenance 
of a government in Brazil led by the prince regent. On September 7, informed of 
figure 6.1. An emperor for a New World empire: Acclaiming Dom Pedro, 1822
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the Cortes’s decision to defend its undivided sovereignty over American ter-
ritory with force, Dom Pedro pledged to secure Brazil’s complete separation 
from his native Portugal. In October, Dom Pedro was acclaimed emperor of 
the new Empire of Brazil. Originally called as a “Luso- Brazilian Assembly,” the 
representatives gathered in Rio de Janeiro  were charged to write the new em-
pire’s constitution.34
To consolidate the Empire of Brazil, Dom Pedro and his allies faced the chal-
lenges of establishing the empire’s sovereignty in all the territory of the for-
mer colony and of defining po liti cal practice. While Brazil’s in de pen dence is 
often seen as a relatively peaceful counterpoint to the violent strug gles that 
unfolded across Spanish Ame rica, Dom Pedro’s rupture with the Cortes was 
challenged. The confrontations between  those defending the new empire and 
 those defending Portuguese sovereignty, provincial autonomy, or both,  were 
often bloody. To gain control over the North and the South Dom Pedro and 
his allies purchased arms and recruited foreign military officers; naval forces 
led by Thomas Cochrane aided local insurgents’ ultimately successful blockade 
of Salvador, together forcing the departure of Portuguese forces in July 1823. 
Following two years of fighting that included the use of brutal and at times 
indiscriminate force the empire’s armies prevailed.
The effort to define constitutional practice in Brazil, if less bloody, was no less 
contested. As the new Constituent Assembly debated the scope of the emperor’s 
and its own authority, a nativist press inflamed tensions between Brazilian- and 
Portuguese- born residents of Rio de Janeiro, leading Dom Pedro to denounce 
the assembly as a source of disorder. He sent troops to disband it. The Con-
stitution of 1824, written by a council of men subsequently appointed by Dom 
Pedro and promulgated by him in March of that year, recognized both a gen-
eral assembly and the emperor as representatives of the “Brazilian Nation.” It 
also established central administrative authority over local sovereignties and 
provincial autonomies.35
Although Brazil’s fight for in de pen dence stood in contrast to that of Spanish 
Ame rica, where a once vast empire fragmented into ten diff er ent and debated 
nations, the new empire continued to face local and regional challenges. In-
deed, beyond Rio de Janeiro the new constitutional order was rejected. As was 
the case in 1817 and 1822, the northeastern provinces rebelled against monarchi-
cal authority and proclaimed their own understandings of liberal governance. 
Allegiance to a new “Confederation of Ec ua dor” took shape in Pernambuco 
and in the northern provinces of Alagoas, Paraíba, Río Grande do Norte, and 
Ceará. In response, lacking Portuguese recognition of Brazil’s in de pen dence 
and anticipating the arrival of Portuguese forces, Dom Pedro’s government had 
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to calculate  whether a deployment of forces to assert authority in the North 
would jeopardize the defense of Rio de Janeiro. Mobilizing British mercenaries 
and local allies, imperial forces defeated the Confederation; its leaders  were 
arrested and incarcerated or executed.36 In the South, the empire had less suc-
cess. In the mid-1820s rebels in the Banda Oriental challenged Dom Pedro’s 
authority and Brazilian sovereignty and aligned themselves with the United 
Provinces of Río de la Plata. By 1827,  after decisive defeat on the battlefield and 
with  Great Britain mediating the dispute, Brazil had to recognize the loss of 
the territory that three years  later became Uruguay.
Brazil in the early 1850’s
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Map 6.2. Brazil in the nineteenth  century
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Following  these initial de cades of conflict, the empire went on to preside 
over a po liti cal stability and prosperity that stood in sharp contrast to much of 
the Amer i cas for de cades. The question of why has elicited numerous debates. 
Historians have examined the complex social and po liti cal arrangements of the 
early nineteenth  century in which Brazilians negotiated transformations and 
continuities. The development of an economy of export diversity during the 
long eigh teenth  century, promoted by Portugal while always linked to Brit-
ain, also underwrote early national stability. During the wars that shook the 
Atlantic world from 1790, Brazil gained new export opportunities opened by 
the slave revolution in Haiti, became the center of a global empire in 1808, and 
found prosperity in expanding export growth increasingly linked directly to 
Britain during the years  after 1810. When the conflicts that led to the experi-
ment in liberalism and then Brazilian imperial separation came to a head in the 
early 1820s, Brazilian export prosperity linked to British commercial ascen-
dancy held strong. As it  rose to global industrial and military hegemony,  Great 
Britain facilitated the in de pen dence and unity of Brazil. Britain mediated border 
disputes, negotiated international recognition of the empire’s in de pen dence, 
and financed the 2 million pounds sterling the empire agreed to pay Portu-
gal as an indemnity. All that opened the way for formal guarantees of British 
traders’ rights to operate in Brazilian ports, facilitating their dominant place 
in Brazil’s commercial and export economy during a period of  great growth 
as the cultivation and export of coffee expanded in the region around Rio de 
Janeiro.37 The Empire of Brazil, in this sense, inherited Portugal’s historic com-
mercial and po liti cal alliance with  Great Britain, as the latter soared to new 
power and prosperity.
The new Brazilian empire also inherited ongoing negotiations over the 
 future of the slave trade as British foreign policy embraced the use of po liti-
cal and economic power and recognition of South American in de pen dence as 
leverage for demanding the immediate end of the trade between Africa and the 
new states. In Brazil, some power ful po liti cal elites, including José Bonifácio 
de Andrada e Silva, expressed support for the end of the slave trade and of the 
institution of slavery in the  future. They also insisted, pointing to recent events 
in Haiti, that only a very gradual and nonviolent abolition would avert disas-
ter for Brazil’s export economy.  After two centuries of plantation production 
grounded in slavery and a second  century in which the bondage of Africans 
became the base of gold mining, slavery was deeply entrenched in Brazilian so-
ciety; slaves supplied the  labor on both plantations and more modest holdings, 
in mines and cities. As the Brazilian po liti cal elite staunchly upheld both the 
trade and slavery itself, even as most new Spanish American republics agreed to 
Atlantic Transformations and Brazil’s In de pen dence — 219
abolish the trade in the 1820s, within British official circles Brazil became “the 
slave trade personified.”38
Between 1821 and  1826  in both London and Rio de Janeiro, in negotia-
tions over recognition of in de pen dence and commercial arrangements between 
 Great Britain and Brazil, British and Brazilian representatives took up the ques-
tion of a time frame for ending the slave trade as well as of how to characterize 
the Empire of Brazil’s commitment to earlier conventions between Portugal 
and  Great Britain, which limited the trade to below the equator. Some in the 
British cabinet expected an agreement that would make the end of the slave 
trade a condition for recognition of in de pen dence. British officials, however, 
also saw a need to balance the moral proj ect of abolition with the commercial 
interests of their own empire. Accepting Brazil’s refusal of immediate abolition, 
the British government recognized Brazilian in de pen dence in 1825 prior to a 
settlement over the question of the trade. The British maintained their com-
mitment to abolition by stipulating that the Empire of Brazil could not unite 
with former Portuguese colonies in Africa, a  union that would have created a 
national, rather than international, transatlantic slave trade.  After a new round 
of negotiations the following year, the governments of  Great Britain and Brazil 
ratified an antitrade treaty in 1827. Brazil agreed to observe the obligations of 
earlier treaties that limited the trade to south of the equator; beyond the line, it 
had three years to continue the trade before the British would begin to regard 
it as piracy.39
Although the treaty found support among Dom Pedro’s closest allies, many 
among the po liti cal elite regarded the outcome as the unfortunate result of the 
emperor’s excessive power and British imperial ambitions.40 As the negotia-
tions over the treaty had unfolded, another po liti cal crisis contributed to an 
erosion of both elite and popu lar confidence in the emperor. Following Dom 
Joã o’s death in Portugal in 1826, Dom Pedro’s interest in Portuguese politics, 
specifically his  daughter’s claims to the throne, called into question his po liti cal 
allegiances and priorities, especially among Brazilian- born elites who feared a 
reunion with Portugal. Feelings of uncertainty over the po liti cal  future of Bra-
zil mounted in the context of fiscal crisis (the Bank of Brazil, founded on the 
arrival of the royal court to Rio, closed in 1829), while the loss of territory that 
became Uruguay on the Río de la Plata left military commanders disenchanted 
with the imperial government. In 1831, as demonstrations both for and against 
his authority engulfed the city of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Pedro abdicated to his 
five- year- old son and namesake.41
The end of Pedro I’s reign marked the end of the de cades of conflicts and 
transition that made Brazil a new country— a constitutional monarchy of vast 
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territorial claims that found a rising prosperity for a power ful few by sustain-
ing export production grounded on growing numbers of enslaved laborers. In 
Portugal’s American empire responses to the crises  shaped by the Haitian Revo-
lution, the fall of the Eu ro pean empires, and the rise of British industrial hege-
mony  were conditioned by the ways eighteenth- century Brazil had become a 
dominant export economy, first within the Portuguese empire and then linked 
to Britain during the key de cade of conflict and transition  after 1810. Initially, 
revolution in the United States, France, and Saint Domingue provided oppor-
tunity, as Brazilian exports took the place of Ca rib bean competition undermined 
by local vio lence. With the arrival of the Portuguese court in Rio, the colony 
continued to prosper while guaranteeing the survival of the monarchy. The cri-
sis of authority in Brazil and Portugal that followed the Napoleonic wars led to 
an embrace of a monarchy “emancipated” from absolutism by “national sover-
eignty.” In the 1820s in po liti cal discourse and practice, the residents of Brazil’s 
historic urban centers, together with statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic, 
came to recognize Brazil as an “autonomous po liti cal body.”42
The economic basis for the empire’s prosperity— export commodities made 
by slave  labor— was ensured in a constitution that both recognized the legacies 
of slavery for citizenship (freed slaves born in Brazil  were citizens) and allowed 
slavery to expand.43 Notwithstanding British abolitionism and its appeal 
among members of the British government, the Empire of Brazil secured rec-
ognition of its in de pen dence from Portugal only three years  after Dom Pedro 
had pledged to defend it with his life. Brazilian diplomacy— and the promise 
of profitable export trades— produced a framework for ending the transatlan-
tic trade that was sufficiently porous to allow rising imports of enslaved Af-
ricans. As slaveholders and po liti cal elites responded to slave rebellions with 
repression, policing, and efforts to effectively “administer” slaves as laborers, 
the fear generated among slave  owners by news from Haiti and by local rebel-
lions in Brazil did not displace vio lence or greed. Although the legislature  later 
strengthened the  legal framework for the abolition of the trade, the Brazilian 
government for de cades showed neither the interest nor a capacity to enforce 
the ban. No surprise to a British government which sought to protect its own 
interests in the Brazilian export economy, neither the slave trade treaty’s rati-
fication nor the end of the years of “tolerance” led to a decline in the number 
of Africans brought to Brazil. Indeed, some Brazilian elites began to forge a 
proslavery discourse in the legislative assembly and in the press, countering ar-
guments in  favor of even a gradual abolition in a distant  future. It is difficult to 
exaggerate the tragic dimensions of the consequences: between 1831 and 1850, 
Brazil, together with the Spanish colony of Cuba, received 10  percent of the 
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total number of Africans brought to the New World in the entire 350  years 
of the transatlantic trade. In the expanding coffee regions around São Paulo, 
Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro planters imported three times the number 
of slaves in 1836–1840 as their pre de ces sors had in the centuries before 1835. 
Meanwhile, in sugar- producing Pernambuco the annual number of imported 
slaves tripled between 1837 and 1840.44 The export economy grew, serving Brit-
ish and North Atlantic markets, financed by British banks. British merchants 
and Brazilian planters reaped the rewards.45 The Brazilian expansion of slavery 
figure 6.2. Slaves carry ing coffee in nineteenth- century Brazil
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thus converged with other American experiences examined in this volume; 
with Cuba, where slave imports increased, and with the United States, where 
southern planters drew a growing local population of slaves westward  toward 
Louisiana and Texas. Across the hemi sphere, links to British industry yielded 
American prosperity, profits, and enduring  human costs.
Territory and the Predicaments of Sovereignty in the New State
Viewed from the capital in Rio, provincial port cities, and the coffee and 
sugar plantations that sustained their wealth by sending slave- made exports to 
Britain as it forged a new industrial world, mid- nineteenth- century Brazil ap-
peared a consolidated new country. The economic dynamism and diplomatic 
negotiations that enabled the po liti cal elite’s commitments to both constitu-
tional monarchy and slavery did not, however, end the fractured nature of de 
facto sovereignty in Brazil. Although the continuities that marked in de pen-
dence grounded elite prosperity in key coastal zones and nearby interior en-
claves of the vast territory claimed by the new empire, the continuities included 
per sis tent historic tensions as well. As noted above, imperial authority (now 
based in Rio) was often at odds with provincial elite and popu lar demands for 
autonomy. The empire also encompassed conflicts between elites and a range 
of  peoples and communities seeking to escape slavery or preserve indigenous 
in de pen dence. Thus, even as slave- based export prosperity stood in sharp con-
trast to Spanish South Ame rica, the challenges of internal integration and local 
sovereignty  were shared across the continent. Indeed, in Brazil the po liti cally 
turbulent de cade of the Regency that followed Pedro I’s abdication laid bare 
the weak consensus among elites and the popu lar classes about the institutional 
frameworks for governance at the national and regional level, and about the 
scope of imperial authority and provincial autonomy. Only in the  middle of 
the nineteenth  century,  after two de cades of provincial rebellion, a decentral-
ization and then recentralization of power in the executive branch, reform of 
the judiciary, reforms of the military and the creation of a National Guard, and 
the end of the Regency and Dom Pedro II’s assumption of the throne in 1840 
did the imperial state consolidate its authority in provincial urban centers and 
their hinterlands.
The forging of ideas and practices of nationhood and administrative sover-
eignty across the empire’s larger territory was an even more protracted pro cess.46 
The re sis tance and per sis tence of quilombos on the outskirts of coastal cities 
and plantation zones forced po liti cal leaders and planters to recognize their 
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incapacity to eradicate communities of freedom whose residents often worked 
nearby on plantations and in cities for wages. As Yuko Miki has explained, liv-
ing as  free  people within socie ties and spaces in which the law defined them as 
slaves, quilombolas (maroons) forged an “insurgent geography” of citizenship 
that allowed them to control their own  labor and maintain  family ties.47
For the indigenous, in turn, even as nineteenth- century novelists  imagined 
their  unions with settlers leading to the birth of an amalgamating nation, in de-
pen dence from Portugal did not bring significant shifts in their relations with 
frontier settlers and po liti cal elites. Legislators recognized Indians and their 
capacity for “civilization” in debates in the constituent assembly of 1823, as had 
eighteenth- century royal legislation, but the status of the indigenous was not 
addressed in the Constitution of 1824. As before in de pen dence, nineteenth- 
century policies privileged assimilation and acculturation while marginalizing 
Indians from social and po liti cal agency as  legal dependents. The Pombaline 
Directory, dismantled at the end of the eigh teenth  century, was not replaced 
with a new administrative structure for indigenous communities (the mid- 
nineteenth- century office of Director- General of Indians was not put into 
practice). As Hal Langfur explains, although the declaration of war against 
“savages” and cannibals in 1808 centralized the vio lence that was already a fea-
ture of Indian- Portuguese relations at the local level, by the 1830s the Crown 
had given up on the Botocudo war as a means to force territorial incorporation 
in the vast hinterland beyond Rio and São Paulo; it did not have the resources 
necessary to sustain it. This suggests the emergence of spaces for indigenous in-
de pen dence in the Brazilian backlands parallel to  those Erick Langer details 
for the frontiers of Spanish South Ame rica. Yet in many parts of Brazil, indig-
enous prosperity and autonomy  were challenged by elite efforts to gain control 
over the hinterland. Land legislation abetted the shift, already  under way in the 
eigh teenth  century, away from efforts to appropriate Indians’  labor to dispos-
sessing them of their land. Indeed, in the “just war” against the Botocudo, the 
Crown, while insisting it intended to “civilize” Indians, took the opportunity 
to redefine and reinforce its control over frontier lands by taking them as ter­
renos devolutos to be demarcated, settled, and despoiled.48 As in the United 
States east of the Mississippi, a flourishing slave- based export economy drove 
the search for lands westward in Brazil, limiting the chances for indigenous 
in de pen dence that proved better on the margins of nations with economies 
in crisis.
Thus, the new Empire of Brazil inherited from the Portuguese Crown a “con-
tinental” geography defended in the Treaty of Madrid, a fractured sovereignty 
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over that huge territory, as well as economic, cultural, po liti cal, and  legal 
frameworks for conquest and settlement that would, over the course of the 
nineteenth  century, diminish but not entirely eradicate indigenous autonomy. 
The gap between ideal and real sovereignty sustained the new state’s relation-
ship to what James Holston describes as the “distinctly porous enclosure” of an 
“inclusively inegalitarian” national society that  shaped the empire and endured 
long  after its fall.49 Amid  these contradictions, the in de pen dent empire sus-
tained slave- based export economies— the older sugar plantations and mills in 
the Northeast and the new and expanding coffee cultivation in the South—as 
British capital and commerce (British abolitionism notwithstanding) facili-
tated profitable ties to the Atlantic economy. If the empire presided over the end 
of slavery in 1888, it bequeathed the export economy and its own less decisive 
presence in an interior, where diverse  peoples continued to negotiate the possibil-
ities and uncertainties of their relative autonomy, to its successor, the “Republic 
of the United States of Brazil,” a year  later.
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During the eigh teenth  century, New Spain was the most eco nom ically dynamic 
region of the Amer i cas. Its silver drove global commerce. The Spanish mon-
archy, however uncertain at home, ruled New Spain with skill— promoting 
silver production and expanding trades, keeping the peace through limited 
participations and judicial mediations, negotiating to contain the few po liti cal 
and popu lar challenges that came before 1800. Then, beginning in 1808, the 
breakdown of sovereignty in the Spanish empire led to constitutional debates, 
po liti cal wars, and popu lar insurgencies that culminated in Mexican in de pen-
dence in 1821. A vibrant po liti cal culture  shaped contested national and provin-
cial politics; a brief flirtation with monarchy in 1821 gave way to a decentralizing 
federal republic by the Constitution of 1824, followed by a turn to greater cen-
tral power in 1835— a trajectory not unlike that of the United States, which 
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began in confederation and then turned to stronger central powers in the Con-
stitution of 1787.
Yet just as the nation began, it faced the fall of silver and a rapidly changing 
world economy. Constitutional creativity could not generate profit or state rev-
enues or calm po liti cal conflict. The search for a new economy proved slow and 
uncertain. Instability continued into the 1840s, when the United States turned 
to war to take the northern half of Mexico’s territory. Both North American 
nations faced deep po liti cal and social conflicts into the 1860s. When they 
ended, the United States emerged a continental power set to compete for global 
hegemony; Mexico still searched for po liti cal stability, economic possibili-
ties, shared prosperity— and a national culture that might integrate historic 
diversities.1
New Spain: Silver Economies and Social Stability to 1810
Visiting New Spain as the nineteenth  century began, Alexander von Humboldt 
wrote his four- volume Po liti cal Essay, detailing economic dynamism and the im-
portance of silver to global and Atlantic trades— and lamenting the deep inequi-
ties that sustained them.2 By the time the work became widely available, Mexico 
was becoming a nation.  Later analysts have suspected that Humboldt was wrong 
about “Mexico’s legendary wealth.” He was not. New Spain was as rich and as 
impor tant to the world as he portrayed it— when he visited, before 1810.
New Spain began in the early sixteenth  century with the conquest of the 
Mexica (Aztecs) and the rapid subordination of the other states of Mesoamer-
ica. A devastating depopulation driven by smallpox and other Old World dis-
eases enabled the conquest and continued long  after, reaching 90  percent by the 
1620s. In the  middle of the sixteenth  century, however, destructions began to 
mix with opportunities— mostly for Euro- Americans— stimulated by a newly 
integrating world economy. Silver production had begun at Taxco in the 1530s 
and at Pachuca in the 1550s, both near Mexico City in the heart of Mesoamerica. 
Zacatecas and Guanajuato  rose as mining centers to the north, in the lands of 
the mobile and warring Chichimecas. Their re sis tance delayed development. 
 Later their defeat in the 1590s opened the way for the deeply commercial society 
of Spanish North Ame rica.
Responding to Chinese demand, New Spain developed two silver socie ties— 
one grounded in landed indigenous republics in Spanish Mesoamerica, the 
other founded in the Bajío and driving north with commercial dynamism to 
create Spanish North Ame rica. Together, the silver economies of New Spain 
stimulated global trades for centuries.3
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 There  were coercions and exploitations in the reconstruction of Mesoamer-
ica, but the opportunity of silver, the scarcity of the native population, and the 
rights to land and self- rule granted to new native republics led to negotiations 
of inequities that kept the silver economy strong and indigenous communities 
essential. The republics sustained local families and markets and became sites of 
vibrant indigenous adaptations of Catholicism focused on Christ, the Virgin, 
and diverse saints.4 By the early 1600s, silver boomed, the native population hit 
bottom, republics consolidated, and colonial courts mediated conflicts, stabi-
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Oaxaca, Yucatán, and Chiapas, and into Guatemala, few mines developed and 
the stimulus of silver was weak.  There, the consolidation of indigenous repub-
lics kept communities strong and limited Spanish exploitations.6 The defining 
characteristic of Spanish Mesoamerica was the grafting of a commercial econ-
omy on a foundation of landed communities reconstituted as native republics.
The richest silver mines and most dynamic commercial economy in New 
Spain developed north of the states and cultivating communities of Mesoamer-
ica. About two hundred kilo meters northwest of Mexico City, the fertile Bajío 
basin was a frontier contested by Mesoamerican states and mobile Chichime-
cas around 1500. Soon  after the conquest, Otomí communities drove north from 
Mesoamerica to  settle Querétaro. But the  great push came  after the discovery 
of silver at Zacatecas in the 1540s and Guanajuato in the 1550s. Eu ro pe ans, Af-
rican slaves, and diverse Mesoamericans flooded north. Spaniards and Meso-
americans fought as allies against state- free Chichimecas— who also faced the 
destructions of Old World plagues. The opening of the north to silver mining, 
stock grazing, and irrigated cultivation in vast regions with few landed repub-
lics forged a distinctly commercial colonial society around 1600.7
In many ways, the eigh teenth  century was the  century of New Spain. Popula-
tion tripled, silver production qua dru pled, trade with Eu rope and Asia soared, 
and settlement drove north into California. New Spain’s trea sury funded Spain’s 
regime across the northern Amer i cas— including Cuba and Louisiana. From 
1700 to the 1750s, strong demand and high prices in China stimulated silver in 
New Spain; the Bourbon regime solidified in Spain and pressed  little reform in 
the Amer i cas. Silver production in New Spain  rose from 4 million pesos yearly 
around 1700 to nearly 13 million pesos in the 1750s.8 A drop below 12 million 
pesos annually from 1760 to 1765, linked to falling Chinese demand, coincided 
with Spain’s role in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). The peace brought demand 
for new revenues and military recruitment— assertions similar to the demands 
for revenues and new powers that set off the conflicts that led to the U.S. in-
de pen dence a de cade  later. In New Spain, tax hikes and recruitment provoked 
risings by irate mine workers and  others in and near silver centers at Guanajuato, 
Real del Monte, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí in 1766 and 1767. Yet an al-
liance of officials and local entrepreneurs mobilized to end re sis tance, resume 
mining, and turn the regime to promoting silver production.
 After 1770, Spain’s rulers stimulated silver with tax breaks and cheap mer-
cury. All of Eu rope’s Atlantic powers aimed to gain as much silver as they 
could—in trade if pos si ble, by war if necessary. New Spain’s production  rose 
from about 12 million pesos yearly in the late 1760s to hold near 23 million pesos 
from 1791 to 1810. Production held strong amid wars, trade disruptions, and 
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revolutions. A key to that strength was a regime that stimulated production 
while keeping social order—at  little cost relative to the revenues it gained in 
New Spain. Indigenous republics funded local rule and religious life with com-
munity lands; Spanish city councilmen purchased seats and gained  little pay; 
local landlord- commanders funded militias; new city patrols  were small and 
paid  little.  There  were almost no professional military forces in the colony 
before the 1750s; when armed forces expanded  later, militias funded by local 
elites still prevailed.9
Generating soaring silver for trade and state coffers, Bourbon New Spain 
maintained an inexpensive regime, weak in coercive force, dependent on judi-
cial mediations. The dearth of coercive power left officials to negotiate rule and 
legitimacy with their subjects, usually in court. The revenues of silver, alcabalas 
on trade, the tribute paid by natives and mulattos, and the Tobacco Mono poly 
built in the 1760s, funded administration in New Spain, missions and presidios 
on the frontier, and subsidies for Cuba and Louisiana— with ample surpluses 
for Madrid.10
Mexico City, the largest city in the Amer i cas around 1800, grew to over 
130,000  people as the center of government and trade, religion and education 
for both Spanish Mesoamerica and Spanish North Ame rica. Near the capi-
tal, the mines at Taxco flourished into the 1750s; Real de Monte boomed in 
the 1760s and 1770s— all surrounded and sustained by landed republics and 
commercial estates. As population grew, the  people of the republics faced land 
shortages; to compensate they sent expanding gangs of men and boys to gain 
wages at nearby estates— which supplied mines and city markets. Estate opera-
tors profited; villa gers survived— and the courts continued to mediate.11 During 
the crisis of the 1760s,  there was  little violent conflict in the central highlands. 
Only at Real del Monte, where mine workers faced wage cuts, did they rise in 
a revolt that was quickly suppressed— and mediated to resume silver flows.12 
Local disputes and riots proliferated during the de cades  after 1770— but most 
 were still resolved in the courts. The economy grew and social stability held 
around Mexico City to 1810.
In southern Mesoamerica, the stimulus of silver remained weak in the eigh-
teenth  century. Growing populations created limited pressures on still ample 
community lands; small cities and limited demand kept estates small. Conflict 
rose— perhaps heightened by the lack of commercial opportunity, leaving frus-
trated entrepreneurs to press on entrenched communities. Again, the courts 
mediated. In Oaxaca’s mountains, Mixtec villa gers raised cochineal— a bril-
liant red dye made by drying and crushing insects that grew on local cactus— 
for international markets. As Eu rope increased cloth production, demand for 
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cochineal  rose. Made by  women in Mixtec  house holds, it was marketed by 
district magistrates who doubled as merchants. Tensions between growers and 
traders  rose as profits favored magistrate- merchants. Conflicts increased but 
 were still resolved in the courts. Social stability held through the eigh teenth 
 century.13
Spanish North Ame rica was diff er ent.14 Silver production soared at Zacatecas 
and in far northern Chihuahua before 1750, at Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, 
and Catorce  after 1770. As population and production grew, commercial culti-
vation expanded across the Bajío. Cloth production boomed at Querétaro and 
San Miguel el Grande. Grazing shifted northward, as did the search for new 
mines. Conflict and trade with in de pen dent natives, now often Apaches, drove 
northward, too, along with missions to draw them to lives of laboring Chris-
tian dependence. Population, commercial ways, and trade  rose everywhere. 
North of the Bajío, that combination brought opportunity for entrepreneurs 
and chances for diverse settlers— who held together in the face of conflicts 
with in de pen dent natives.
In contrast, in the Bajío the mix of demographic and economic growth be-
came socially polarizing  after 1770. Mining soared to new heights at Guana-
juato, the leading producer of silver in New Spain and the world from 1770 
to 1810.15  After containing the risings of 1767, mine  owners continued to press 
down on workers’ earnings, aiming to end the ore shares that had made them 
partners in production and profit. The regime offered tax breaks and subsi-
dized mercury to mine operators and expanded city patrols and militias to 
solidify social controls. State power backed by coercion was a new focus— a 
turn away from judicial mediation. Meanwhile, reformers in Madrid favored 
Spanish cloth exports, aiming to draw silver to Eu rope, threatening Bajío tex-
tile shops. The result was not decline in the Bajío, but a shift from large shops 
to  family weaving ruled by merchant financiers who pressed falling earnings on 
struggling  house holds.
Across the rural Bajío, estates continued to expand irrigation and commer-
cial cropping. When a mix of early frost and severe drought brought unpre ce-
dented dearth, famine, and death in 1785 and 1786, estates profited from fam-
ine prices, took fields back from tenants, and forced worker salaries down. The 
years from 1790 to 1810 brought deepening pressures on the lives of Bajío mine 
workers, cloth makers, and rural producers.16 Social exploitation was com-
pounded by escalating cultural conflicts as promoters of a new “enlightened” 
religion maligned popu lar practices as superstitions. Still, production boomed 
and stability held— until Napoleon broke the Spanish empire in 1808, followed 
by two years of po liti cal debates as drought again ravaged the Bajío.
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Politics in New Spain
The history of New Spain often appears without politics, which seems to be a 
creation of in de pen dence in Mexico. If politics requires competitions to select 
leaders for large jurisdictions,  there was no politics in New Spain before 1808. 
But if politics involves participation in shaping and influencing the institutions 
of governance and justice that orient everyday life, then politics flourished 
throughout New Spain. Across Spanish Mesoamerica, politics was pivotal to 
the power ful in key cities and towns— and to the native majority in thousands 
of indigenous republics. In Spanish North Ame rica, city and town politics 
was a regular concern of the power ful— but with few indigenous republics, the 
majority found few ave nues of participation before 1810.
 There  were three overlapping levels of politics in New Spain: the politics of 
indigenous republics; the politics of Spanish city councils; and the politics of 
imperial administration. They  were integrated by a judicial structure that fo-
cused on the mediation of disputes at  every level. A mix of segmented politics 
and judicial mediation was pivotal to the stabilization of New Spain during 
the de cades of economic dynamism and social polarization that peaked around 
1800. They must be understood to analyze the diverse regional and social par-
ticipations in the po liti cal conflicts and popu lar risings that led to in de pen-
dence. And they must be understood to analyze the po liti cal conflicts and social 
instabilities that persisted long  after 1821— when national and regional politics 
flourished, while judicial mediations waned.17
The politics of the indigenous republics of New Spain are often studied, 
but rarely as politics. Established in the second half of the sixteenth  century, 
they integrated head towns and outlying villages, all ruled by governors and 
councilmen elected annually by (and among) minorities of notables designated 
principales. The republics held land to fund local government and religious fes-
tivals, to provide modest commercial holdings to notables, and give subsistence 
plots to the majority. Republics oversaw local religious life and local justice— 
and regularly petitioned the General Indigenous Court in Mexico City when 
prob lems within or between republics, or with Spanish officials, merchants, or 
estates, could not be resolved locally.18
With such impor tant roles,  there was a lively and often contested po liti-
cal life in the native republics. Factions contested power, building co ali tions 
within the republics and allies without; one group might court the local priest, 
another turn to a trader or the man ag er of a nearby estate. The indigenous re-
publics of Spanish Mesoamerica— county- sized jurisdictions— lived active 
po liti cal lives in the eigh teenth  century. Officeholding favored leading fami-
lies; participation in elections included only principales. Still, contested politics 
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often led to co ali tions that mobilized much of the local populace around key 
local questions. Such local po liti cal actions, by contrast,  were scarce in Spanish 
North Ame rica, where  there  were few republics. The rural majority lived as 
commercial dependents of landed estates and faced rising pressures in the eigh-
teenth  century— without republican politics and with limited access to the 
judicial mediations  those politics facilitated.19
A less participatory politics focused on the Spanish councils that ruled the 
cities that centered the commercial economies of New Spain. Men of old 
wealth held most seats permanently; from the 1770s many included rotating 
“honorary” councilmen elected by established members— bringing in men 
of new wealth often claimed in mining and trade and invested in commercial 
estates. Councilmen also elected annually the local magistrates who oversaw 
urban justice. Such councils oversaw public affairs in Mexico City; at Queré-
taro, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and other centers in the North; in Puebla, Oaxaca, 
Mérida, and other towns in Mesoamerican regions stretching east and south. 
They or ga nized city markets and public works; they oversaw education and 
religious cele brations; they mobilized relief in times of dearth and disease; they 
orchestrated the militias and urban patrols that expanded  after 1765. Spanish 
city councils sent agents to represent them before officials in Mexico City, Se-
ville, and Madrid, petitioning in judicial pro cesses to negotiate local needs. 
Formal council politics  were internal, limiting po liti cal participations. Still, 
councils had to maintain po liti cal bases; they could be challenged in court 
by disgruntled citizens— and by republics that or ga nized native populations 
in Mexico City and Querétaro. Across New Spain, Spanish cities and towns 
lived vibrant politics that  were less participatory that  those of the indigenous 
republics.20
The highest level of politics in New Spain focused on imperial power and 
the silver economy— the viceroy, the High Court, trea sury officials, intendants, 
and  others. While formal power concentrated in Madrid, imperial prosperity 
depended on the Amer i cas— especially New Spain’s silver. The regime under-
stood that balance of power. It recognized merchant chambers and mining 
boards that provided a voice and a mea sure of self- governance to the entrepre-
neurs who kept the silver flowing. Recent analysts call it a stakeholder regime, in 
which key entrepreneurs played sanctioned roles in planning and governance—
to the mutual benefit of entrepreneurs and the regime.21 New studies also show 
vibrant conflicts and emerging po liti cal networks in the late eigh teenth  century, 
forming a new public opinion in New Spain.22
The politics of imperial power in New Spain extended beyond sanctioned 
institutions and stakeholder participation. Leading financiers and mining mag-
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nates, merchants and landlords forged ties with key regime leaders. In some 
cases, they  were linked by business affairs. In addition, top colonial officials, in-
cluding many sent by the Bourbons to assert Spanish power over colonial sub-
jects, found marriage ties and rich inheritances in the families of New Spain’s 
leading entrepreneurs. Trea sury officials, High Court judges, and viceroys built 
such links. In New Spain and in Spain they became advocates for the power ful 
few who ruled the silver economy of New Spain.23
From 1790 to 1808, while the silver economy boomed and war brought 
rising demands for regime revenues, mining soared, the regime claimed rising 
revenues, and entrepreneurs in mining and global trades profited. Middling 
entrepreneurs and the Church lenders that funded them faced financial stress. 
Textile producers lived hard times when imports flowed freely, then boom 
times when war blocked trade and local production soared. Indigenous re-
publics in Mesoamerica used established rights and access to courts to blunt 
impositions and retain autonomies. In the far north, the same years brought 
uncertain opportunities to  those ready to risk trade and war with in de pen-
dent natives.
The Bajío, pivotal to economic growth  after 1770, mixed mining boom, 
textile uncertainties, tobacco growth, and expanding cultivation in times of po-
larization. While entrepreneurs negotiated policies that promoted commercial 
profits and regime revenues, the  people lacked institutions of po liti cal partici-
pation and social negotiation. The rich profited, or at least adapted, in times 
of opportunity and challenge; the populace faced deepening difficulties. Mine 
workers saw ore shares cut while wages fell— driven down in part by the refin-
eries’ recruitment of  women to sort ores for low pay. Large textile workshops 
closed and  family producers faced falling earnings between 1770 and  1793; 
then war time blockades mixed with respites of peace to bring alternating years 
of boom and bust. The rural majority faced rising rents, evictions, and falling 
wages.24
The producing majority in the Bajío lacked the po liti cal rights and judicial 
access to negotiate rising impositions and deteriorating lives. A few tried,  going 
to court to claim lands, councils, and religious rights as indigenous republics. 
They understood the value of such rights in fending off entrepreneurial demands 
and regime claims. Most failed. When the Bourbon regime fell to Napoleon in 
1808, setting off a war for in de pen dence in Spain and debates about sovereignty 
across the Amer i cas, in New Spain nearly  every group— Spanish city councils 
and indigenous republics, merchant chambers, royal officials, and High Court 
judges— negotiated unimagined challenges through established po liti cal chan-
nels. The populace of the Bajío faced deepening difficulties without indigenous 
242 — Alfredo Ávila and John Tutino
republics and with limited access to the courts. When a provincial priest backed 
by a few militia officers called them to arms in 1810, they  rose in the tens of 
thousands to challenge a regime and economy that had prejudiced their lives 
for de cades.
From Imperial Crisis to Provincial Insurgency, 1808–1811
The conflicts that led to Mexican in de pen dence in 1821 did not begin in New 
Spain. During the eigh teenth  century,  Great Britain and France, Spain and 
Portugal engaged in wars that aimed to increase trade and revenues in American 
possessions.  After the global war of 1757 to 1763, all expected colonial subjects 
to pay the costs of imperial contests. All enacted reforms to increase revenues 
and make collection more efficient. In the face of urban re sis tance among mine 
workers and  others in Guanajuato and nearby, New Spain’s entrepreneurs and 
Bourbon rulers came together to crush the re sis tance and reenergize the silver 
economy— leading to the boom of 1770–1810.
New Spain sustained soaring silver production, booming trade, rising agri-
cultural production, and growing regime revenues past 1800. But drawn into 
escalating wars in the 1790s, Spain saw its naval power collapse  after 1800. 
Spanish traders strug gled to maintain commercial ties with American domains 
while war between Britain and Napoleonic France pressed the Spanish monar-
chy, which faced military and financial exhaustion even as New Spain’s econ-
omy carried on despite fiscal demands.
Carlos IV, through his “favorite” minister, Manuel Godoy, entered a difficult 
alliance with Napoleon. Dependent on French military power, the Spanish 
Crown submitted to  every demand. In 1803, Madrid signed a Treaty of Sub-
sidy with France, agreeing to pay 6 million livres (or about 1.5 million pesos) 
monthly; the  imagined total of 18 million pesos yearly would deliver to Napo-
leon the equivalent of 75  percent of all New Spain’s silver. Godoy committed 
American revenues directly to foreign creditors. Rising demands led to discon-
tent in Spain and New Spain, resentments heightened by knowledge that the 
revenues  were flowing to bankers sustaining imperial rivals. Leading aristocrats 
and politicians began to see in Fernando, prince of Asturias, an alternative to 
the dangerous dependence on Napoleon built by Carlos and Godoy. The idea 
that Godoy aimed to sell the kingdom to France found widening ac cep tance.25
In 1804, the king decreed the Consolidation of Royal Bonds, demanding 
that pious foundations across Spain’s Amer i cas sell income properties, call in 
loans, and deliver the proceeds in royal coffers. Many feared that the program 
would damage colonial production. Convents, cathedral chapters, and other 
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Church institutions had long served as sources of credit. They had to call in 
loans and, if the creditor could not pay, auction property.  Those who chal-
lenged the decree— Querétaro corregidor Miguel Domínguez, Michoacán 
canon Manuel Abad y Queipo, and Mexico City councilman Francisco Primo 
de Verdad— faced the ire of Viceroy José de Iturrigaray. In a negotiated imple-
mentation, rich entrepreneurs paid  little, convent- banks in Mexico City and 
elsewhere lost most, and capital became scarce for middling landowners who 
depended on ecclesiastical mortgages to develop estates.26 The greatest impact 
of the Consolidation was the discontent it provoked. Collectors, including Vice-
roy Iturrigaray, gained fees and  were easily seen as profiteering from war and 
the Consolidation.27
In 1807, Spain signed a treaty allowing French armies to cross Spanish terri-
tory to occupy Portugal. France took Lisbon, but the monarchy escaped with 
British help to Brazil, making Rio de Janeiro the capital of the Portuguese 
empire and a British de pen dency. Napoleon turned his armies on Spain in 
the spring of 1808. Having lost the wealth of Saint Domingue to the Haitian 
Revolution, Napoleon aimed to take Portugal and Brazil; when that failed, he 
turned on his Spanish ally in pursuit of American silver.
As French armies entered Spain, the discovery of a plot against Godoy link-
ing power ful aristocrats and Fernando offered clear evidence of Napoleon’s 
involvement in Spain’s affairs. When Godoy tried to follow the Portuguese ex-
ample and take Carlos and the monarchy to Ame rica, riots at Aranjuez blocked 
the plan. Carlos IV was forced to abdicate, his son proclaimed king as Fernando 
VII. Soon, however, Napoleon drew both Carlos and Fernando to Bayonne; 
 father and son abdicated to their “beloved friend and ally” Napoleon, who de-
livered the Spanish throne to his  brother, José Bonaparte.
The Napoleonic intervention— armed and dynastic— set off an unpre ce-
dented crisis. The collaboration of high authorities with the French led  others 
across Spain to form juntas to or ga nize re sis tance and preserve Bourbon rights. 
The Bayonne renunciations created a constitutional crisis. Many rejected the 
abdication, presuming that Carlos IV was forced— and that he had no  legal 
right to abdicate. Many more recognized Fernando, whose name— even in 
captivity— symbolized opposition to Napoleon. In Spain and the Amer i cas, 
many refused to recognize  either Carlos IV or José I.
Across a suddenly beheaded empire, juntas claimed control of the monar-
chy’s powers, arguing that they  were conserving Fernando’s domains  until he 
reclaimed the throne. As the Mexico City Council stated, the monarchy held 
the kingdom in trust; no king could legally alienate his domains. Nor could the 
kingdom ever be without a king;  there was always a successor, based on the laws 
figure 7.1. Vicente Guerrero
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of succession. As a result, as Francisco Primo de Verdad insisted, the viceroy 
could obey neither José Bonaparte nor any junta claiming to govern in Spain. 
The latter could rule only their home territories. Across New Spain city coun-
cils and indigenous republics promised to fight any delivery of the kingdom to 
the French.28
The absence of a legitimate king in Spain left enormous potential power 
in the hands of the viceroy in Mexico City. To ensure that Iturrigaray did not 
rule arbitrarily, key leaders— including High Court Judge Jacobo de Villaur-
rutia and most Mexico City councilmen— proposed a junta parallel to  those in 
Spain. It would represent the interests of New Spain in times of crisis. Nearly 
all other High Court judges, Church leaders, and top regime officials argued 
other wise: the viceroy should rule only in concert with the established High 
Court, ensuring the power of Spain in New Spain. The two factions faced off 
in meetings in Mexico City in August and September 1808.  After they failed to 
reach a resolution, a group of merchants, high officials, and military mobilized 
the merchants’ militia to arrest the promoters of a junta and the viceroy. In the 
wake of the first coup in Mexican history, the conspirators named a weak vice-
roy; recognized the Seville Junta, which claimed to rule in Spain; and promised 
support for the war against Napoleon.
In Spain, as Roberto Breña shows in chapter 2, the crisis of 1808 triggered 
a po liti cal revolution that led to the proclamation of a liberal constitution in 
1812. The Cortes de Cádiz declared the sovereignty of a nation that included 
all imperial dominions. In New Spain, elections came in the summer of 1810. 
Deputies from New Spain took impor tant roles in the Cortes’ debates. Miguel 
Ramos Arizpe, from Coahuila, led the Cortes to establish Provincial Depu-
tations, regional boards charged with promoting the common welfare. José 
Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, born in Tlaxcala, argued that Spanish Ame rica 
should have repre sen ta tion equal to Spain. But Spain’s deputies held a strong 
majority and blocked that key American demand. A leading Spanish liberal, 
Agustín Arguelles, stated directly that  because Americans outnumbered Iberi-
ans, they could not have proportional repre sen ta tion.
 After two years of unpre ce dented po liti cal uncertainties and debates, in 
September 1810 Francisco Xavier Venegas arrived in New Spain as viceroy, sent 
by the Regency that called the Cortes to write a constitution for a transatlantic 
Spanish nation. Si mul ta neously, militia officers Ignacio Allende and Mariano 
Abasolo, the priest Miguel Hidalgo, and Josefa Ortiz, wife of Querétaro’s Corregi-
dor Domínguez,  were denounced for joining other Bajío notables in meetings 
to promote provincial rights and limit subordination to France or Spain. Learn-
ing of the denunciations, Hidalgo called to his parishioners on the morning of 
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September 16, in an event tradition re- created as “El Grito de Dolores.” Hi-
dalgo’s call to defend the kingdom from French imposition and “be done with 
oppression” raised thousands of men. In weeks, the Bajío, the pivot of the silver 
economy, was in flames— literally and po liti cally. Wherever the few troops and 
vast populace following Hidalgo and Allende marched, Eu ro pean Spaniards, 
reviled as gachupines, lost power and faced imprisonment and sometimes death. 
American Spaniards took over. In a few months, rebel governments ruled Gua-
najuato, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Guadalajara, and Valladolid (now Morelia) 
and other key towns. The rising found its strength in the Bajío. From San Luis 
Potosí, Félix Calleja— soon to lead the counterinsurgency— reported that the 
offer of self- government attracted many American Spaniards, and some from 
Spain too.29
In Valladolid, Hidalgo set up a government of American Spaniards, order-
ing reforms including the end of tributes to improve the lives of indigenous 
communities,  people of African descent, and other subject groups.  Later in 
Guadalajara, Hidalgo reaffirmed and extended his reforms. He sought sup-
port among the populace and found backing among elites whose enlightened 
views recognized the need for reform. But po liti cal vio lence against immigrant 
Spaniards (mostly officials and merchants) and mass assaults on urban stores 
and estate granaries, created apprehension. The occupation and the sacking of 
the mining city of Guanajuato provoked fear. Manuel Abad y Queipo, once 
Hidalgo’s close friend, condemned and excommunicated the insurgent priest. 
Many city dwellers welcomed the strong mea sures taken by Viceroy Venegas 
against rebels— who found most support among rural  people who had lived 
de cades of declining earnings, evictions, deepening insecurities, and two years 
of drought and famine just ending.
In January 1811 outside Guadalajara, Hidalgo, Allende, and insurgent forces 
faced defeat by provincial militias, mostly Americans. Insurgent leaders fled 
north, where most  were soon arrested. Hidalgo, Allende, and  others  were ex-
ecuted. Calleja began a campaign of repression. In Aguascalientes, he called 
for locally recruited and financed defense forces in  every town and city. He 
limited the viceregal army to defending the mining center of Guanajuato and 
pursuing leading po liti cal rebels. In the long run, local forces helped cities and 
towns defend their own interests— which might change over time. Outside 
the Bajío, where the rising began and many rebels returned home to carry on 
guerrilla re sis tance, 1811 saw quick pacification even as Ignacio Rayón formed a 
Junta Americana in isolated uplands around Zitácuaro and José María Morelos 
turned to armed po liti cal re sis tance in Pacific coastal lowlands.30
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Transatlantic Liberalism, Monarchical Restoration, Enduring 
Insurgencies, and the Fall of Silver, 1812–1820
The Cortes carried on in Cádiz, aiming to hold Spain and its Amer i cas to-
gether and to give communities new opportunities to promote and defend 
their interests— within  legal institutions. In 1812 it promulgated a constitution 
promising liberal rights.31 Its first articles stated that sovereignty belonged to 
the Spanish nation, including all inhabitants of Spain, Spanish Ame rica, the 
Philippines in Asia, and a few possessions in North Africa. The nation was defined 
as a totality of  people subject to the same laws and with the same rights. Gov-
ernment included three branches: the Cortes, the king, and a Supreme Judicial 
Tribunal. All descendants of Spaniards and indigenous Americans  were citi-
zens;  people of African descent  were excluded— and discounted in determin-
ing repre sen ta tion (a concession to Spanish Cubans committed to slavery). The 
constitution called for one deputy for  every seventy thousand  people (excluding 
castas of African origin).
The creation of Provincial Deputations and Constitutional City Councils 
elected by citizens satisfied demands for self- rule in many cities and towns. 
Freedom of the press allowed the emergence of a new journalism in New 
Spain, notably El pensador mexicano (The Mexican Thinker), published by José 
Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, and El Juguetillo (The  Little Jester), published 
by Carlos María de Bustamente. They and  others promoted participation and 
the exercise of rights, especially voting. Late 1812 and early 1813 brought the 
first popu lar elections in New Spain. All adult men, excluding castas of African 
origins and a few  others (criminals, friars,  etc.),  were called to elect councilmen. 
Voting was in levels, first in parishes, which sent electors to join city or town 
elections. It is impossible to know how many voted, yet the turnout surprised 
the authorities. Many of African ancestry voted;  after centuries of mixing, lines 
 were hard to see. In Mexico City, the results worried authorities. The major-
ity of men elected  were Americans favoring self- rule. Some sympathized with, 
even assisted, insurgents in the provinces. Viceregal officials suspended the 
elections and freedom of the press.32
A focus on counterinsurgency conditioned the implementation of the con-
stitution. The liberal insistence that all citizens contribute to the trea sury, thus 
to the costs of counterinsurgency, pleased the viceroy and his commanders. The 
High Court, pivotal to maintaining the link between Spain and New Spain in 
the coup of 1808, continued as a council of government— despite its prohibi-
tion in the constitution. The founding of a Provincial Deputation in Mexico 
City was delayed to avoid limiting the viceroy’s po liti cal and military powers.
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While the Cádiz Constitution was written in Spain and implemented in 
New Spain, insurgencies, po liti cal and popu lar, proliferated across New Spain. 
During 1811, the pacification led by Calleja claimed major victories. Loyal au-
thorities reclaimed most mining centers, cities, and towns. But the popu lar 
re sis tance that had fueled the first mass insurgency carried on to threaten power 
and production. It persisted south of Guadalajara, where Hidalgo had made his 
last po liti cal stand. It continued north of Mexico City in the Mezquital, a dry 
basin where Otomí villa gers threatened commercial estates and the mines at 
Real de Monte. And most damaging to the silver economy, the original rebels 
from the Bajío, tens of thousands strong, returned home in January 1811 to take 
control of the fertile basin that sustained Guanajuato and its mines.
Calleja took his troops to occupy Guanajuato— knowing the importance of 
reviving mining  there. For a year, he tried to coordinate a campaign to pacify 
the Bajío— and failed. Insurgent families ruled the countryside, claiming estate 
lands and livestock, producing for sustenance, and supplying local markets 
as they found useful. Most Bajío towns  were islands of loyalists surrounded by 
an insurgent countryside. Mining held below 50  percent of the level of 1810. 
While popu lar insurgents ruled the Bajío countryside and Calleja remained 
surrounded in Guanajuato, po liti cal rebels or ga nized the Junta Nacional 
Americana at Zitácuaro—in rugged uplands between Mexico City and the 
Bajío, protected by the insurgency  there. When Calleja realized at the end of 
1811 that he could not alter the stalemate in the Bajío, he moved to dislodge the 
junta. It was too late: popu lar insurgents ruled the Bajío, and the silver econ-
omy remained besieged.33 From 1812 on, most Bajío cities held in loyalist con-
trol; Guanajuato strug gled to resume silver production. But cities surrounded 
by rebel communities faced unpre ce dented threats and costs: sustenance 
came from insurgent cultivators; shipping silver to Mexico City required costly 
convoys— and payment to insurgent patrols. A limited resumption of mining 
paid for both insurgency and counterinsurgency, yet neither mining nor the 
commercial economy approached their previous dynamism in the Bajío  after 
1810.
The regime had to implement constitutional innovations that aimed to 
strengthen loyalty to Spain by granting new participations in New Spain— 
while fighting popu lar insurgencies that undermined the commercial economy 
in the Bajío and elsewhere, and while resisting po liti cal rebels who found new 
strength. The well- known po liti cal insurgents such as José María Morelos nei-
ther mobilized nor led the popu lar movements. They developed in distinct re-
gions, Morelos based in the Pacific lowlands, popu lar insurgency grounded in 
the Bajío. Still, they  were mutually reinforcing, making the regime fight two 
Becoming Mexico — 249
very diff er ent foes si mul ta neously. Po liti cal insurgents like Morelos fought for 
po liti cal autonomies that led  toward national in de pen dence; popu lar insur-
gents in the Bajío, the Mezquital, and elsewhere sought autonomies of produc-
tion and culture that would limit the power of any state.34
Some po liti cal rebels like Francisco Osorno, who ruled the Apan plains 
and the Puebla sierra into 1816, built alliances with insurgent communities. 
He imposed taxes on local merchants and estates, creating authorities that op-
erated as insurgent states.35 More typical, the Villagrán  family led po liti cal 
insurgency in the uplands of Huichapan, dealing irregularly with the Otomí 
communities that persisted in insurgency across the Mezquital from 1811 to 
1815— threatening the mines at Real del Monte. They might ally briefly in skir-
mishes with common foes; most of the time they took mutual advantage of 
loyalist forces’ difficulties facing both si mul ta neously.36 Meanwhile, Guadalupe 
Victoria built power in the highlands of Veracruz, near the Gulf Coast, sur-
rounded by resistant Totonac villages in the northern Huasteca and rebellious 
Africans and mulattos, slave and  free, to the south.37 Victoria, too, depended 
on popu lar insurgents more than he led them.
In Pacific lowlands from southern Michoacán, past Acapulco, and into 
Oaxaca José María Morelos coordinated re sis tance that recruited key landlords 
seeking local rule, indigenous communities seeking greater autonomy, and di-
verse mulattos (including muleteer Vicente Guerrero, Mexico’s second presi-
dent, in 1828). Morelos led a mobile guerrilla army that at times held the mines 
at Taxco, the sugar basin around Cuernavaca south of Mexico City, and the city 
of Oaxaca— but never threatened Mexico City.38
Through 1812 and into 1813, diverse and disconnected insurgent groups, po-
liti cal and popu lar, held a line that began in the mountains of Veracruz and 
passed through the Puebla sierra, across the Apan plains and the Mexquital 
into the Huichapan uplands. The line of re sis tance broke at Querétaro— a key 
to regime survival— but held the core of the Bajío and the nearby uplands, 
surrounding the Guanajuato mines and extending  toward Guadalajara. Mean-
while, Morelos and his allies held strong in Pacific hills and lowlands. Officials 
and loyalists ruled Mexico City and most cities, working to implement the 
Cádiz Constitution  there and in indigenous republics across Mesoamerica. In-
surgent power in the Bajío and other zones cut transports links with the North 
and threatened routes to Atlantic and Pacific ports. The  future of New Spain 
was uncertain at best.
Loyalism and liberalism engaged each other and po liti cal and popu lar in-
surgents in complex conflicts and negotiations. Early in 1812, Calleja besieged 
Morelos and his army at Cuautla, southeast of Mexico City. Calleja’s victory 
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ensured that no insurgency would again approach Mexico City; Morelos’s es-
cape with most of his forces south to Oaxaca guaranteed that insurgency would 
survive to challenge regional rulers and economic integration.39 In Oaxaca, 
Morelos began the insurgents’ most ambitious po liti cal proj ect. Carlos María 
de Bustamente, a  lawyer and journalist who had or ga nized elections in Mexico 
City in November 1812, only to see victories overturned and face persecution 
by loyalist officials, energized the work. He concluded that monarchical rule 
was by nature authoritarian and would never re spect liberal laws. His leader-
ship gave Morelos’s po liti cal proj ect its salient characteristic: it would be con-
stitutional but, unlike Cádiz, would reject the monarchy.
During 1813, while Morelos besieged Acapulco (cutting trade ties with Asia), 
his movement held elections where it could. Amid war, only Oaxaca and Tec-
pan (southern zones of the Intendancy of Mexico) elected deputies. Other 
delegates  were substitutes serving regions  under loyalist rule. On September 13 
a Congress opened in Chilpancingo. Morelos offered key princi ples in his cel-
ebrated Sentimientos de la nación: American in de pen dence; the abolition of 
slavery and racial distinctions; self- government; and protection of Catholic 
religion. The Congress published a Declaration of In de pen dence.40
Morelos’s po liti cal advance, however, came with military collapse. Troops 
arriving from Spain reinforced viceregal armies. Calleja was named viceroy 
and began new campaigns against the rebels. In 1814 the Treaty of Valençay re-
turned the Spanish throne to Fernando VII, who abolished of the Cádiz Con-
stitution and dissolved the Cortes— turning against  those who fought hardest 
for his return. In New Spain, Calleja dissolved liberal institutions. Provincial 
Deputations and constitutional city and town councils dis appeared, yet pre-
vious ways did not fully return. War brought profound changes— not easily 
reversed. Calleja kept some Cádiz innovations— notably the constitution’s tax 
provisions. Absolutism returned to focus the fight against insurgency.
The po liti cal insurgents around Morelos offered an alternative to absolutism. 
At Apatzingán in October 1814, a Congress promulgated a Constitutional De-
cree for the Liberation of Mexican Ame rica (América mexicana). It prescribed 
a separation of powers in three branches, recognized the rights of citizens, and 
protected Catholic worship. The decree offered the  people of New Spain a con-
stitutional alternative to the return of Fernando and the abolition of the Cádiz 
Constitution—in part the inspiration of the new Mexican charter. But mount-
ing defeats left the Apatzingán Constitution to have force but briefly in towns 
of the tierra caliente— the south of the Intendancies of Michoacán and Mexico. 
The capture and execution of Morelos late in 1815 all but ended insurgent con-
stitutional government.
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Pop u lar insurgencies persisted, notably in the Bajío. This was a common 
sequence: the Villagrans faced defeat in the summer of 1813; Otomí insurgents 
held the Mezquital into 1815. With the defeat of Morelos in 1815, po liti cal in-
surgency survived only in isolated retreats, notably with Vicente Guerrero in 
the south and Guadalupe Victoria in Gulf uplands. Yet loyalists only pacified 
popu lar insurgents in the Bajío between 1818 and 1820. From 1811 to 1815, the 
dilemma of loyalist forces, first liberal and then absolutist, was how to contain 
the popu lar insurgencies in the Bajío and elsewhere that prejudiced produc-
tion and regime revenues while also fighting the po liti cal threat of Morelos and 
his allies in southern strongholds. Both insurgencies, po liti cal and popu lar, en-
dured longer thanks to the presence of the other. Almost everywhere, popu lar 
insurgencies proved stronger—or at least lasted longer.41
The per sis tence of popu lar insurgency across the Bajío for five years  after the 
defeat of po liti cal insurgency meant that while authorities might try to restore 
pre-1808 ways, they could not return the silver economy to pre-1810 dynamism. 
Mining carried on at Guanajuato, but capital proved scarce and supplies expen-
sive. Operators dug ore without investing in infrastructure and drainage. They 
took limited silver and lesser profits, paying taxes that funded counterinsur-
gency and exactions that sustained insurgents. Disaster came in 1820, just as the 
surrounding countryside seemed pacified: the Valenciana mines flooded. The 
Guanajuato council reported that the city, New Spain, and the world would 
be forever changed.42
With the collapse of mining, rural pacification could not return the Bajío 
to its long- profitable ways. Peace came between 1818 and 1820, as commanders 
saw that the only way to reestablish property rights was to allow families that 
had taken lands as insurgents to retain their ranchos, enabling them to con-
tinue  family production on the promise of small rents (paid irregularly). The 
summer of 1820 brought the end of popu lar insurgency, the collapse of silver 
mining, and a turn to  family production across the Bajío. The regime’s triumph 
was also a victory for popu lar communities. Ten years of popu lar insurgency 
made revival of the Bajío silver economy impossible.
Six years’ experience with the debates and experiments of Cádiz liberalism 
made the return of Bourbon absolutism problematic. Ten years of war brought 
other irreversible changes. The number of men at arms increased radically; com-
pared to late colonial times  there was a sudden militarization of society. Even 
with Bourbon efforts to build military power, standing troops  were few in 1810. 
Most forces remained militias, funded and led by provincial elites. Some had 
joined in insurgency, led by Allende in 1810; many more mobilized in counter-
insurgency, called out by Calleja to defend the regime. Ten years of war created 
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armed forces everywhere. Troops began to arrive from Spain in 1812. Militias 
 were at arms so long they became standing forces. Estates fearing popu lar 
insurgents paid local defense troops. Native republics, on losing municipal 
rights in the return of absolutism in 1814, kept local militias for “patriotic 
defense.”43
From 1815 to 1820, as pacification progressed slowly, New Spain did not 
become less military. Troops pressed remaining insurgents to take amnesties, 
which often included the right to keep arms as patriotic militias. Militias and 
amnestied insurgents often linked—to rebel again, then claim another am-
nesty. Guerrillas, insurgents, and bandits mixed to keep New Spain a violent 
place. When Viceroy Juan de Apodaca reported to the authorities in Spain 
that peace reigned in 1820, he was lying. Conflicts continued and regional 
commanders took advantage to amass more troops and more power. José de la 
Cruz, captain general at Guadalajara, led forces that challenged the viceroy. 
Joaquín Arredondo ruled the Northeast with autonomy, like many com-
manders in the North, where years of conflict in the Bajío had cut ties with 
Mexico City.
Revived Spanish Liberalism and the Experiment  
in Mexican Monarchy, 1820–1823
Most insurgency, po liti cal and popu lar, ended by 1820; deep economic, so-
cial, and po liti cal challenges remained when news arrived from Spain of a re-
turn to liberal rule. Spanish military forces refused to sail to face Bolívar in the 
Andes  unless Fernando reinstated the Cádiz Charter. Fernando, knowing his 
rule rested on military power, acquiesced and called a new Cortes. Reactions 
differed in New Spain. Many military leaders feared that new constitutional 
authorities would prosecute excesses committed during the wars. Meanwhile, 
constitutional councils revived in many cities and towns; Puebla and Valladolid 
demanded Provincial Deputations. Renewed press freedom allowed expressions 
of support for the constitution— while  others argued that true rights required 
a break with Spain.
In 1821, a group of American deputies presented the Cortes a proposal to 
create three kingdoms in Ame rica, all recognizing Fernando, each with its own 
Cortes— thus its own laws. Inevitably, the Iberian majority rejected the plan. 
Before leaving for Spain, many of New Spain’s representatives knew that po-
liti cal and military leaders  were planning to call the king or a member of his 
 family to become emperor of Mexico. Agustín de Iturbide, a former loyalist 
commander in the Bajío, led the effort; he recruited high churchmen and lead-
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ing entrepreneurs in the capital and gained adherence by Vicente Guerrero, 
still in the field and committed to in de pen dence in his southern stronghold.
In February 1821, the Plan of Iguala declared Mexico in de pen dent, offering 
the throne to Fernando VII, promising a constitution appropriate to Mexico, and 
offering citizenship to all men, including  those of African origin— addressing a 
key demand pressed by Guerrero, whose African roots left him no rights  under 
the 1812 charter. Iturbide’s Plan also defended Catholic institutions and religion. 
The anticlerical turn of Spanish liberalism in 1820, absent in 1812, drew many in 
New Spain to in de pen dence.
Through spring and into the summer of 1821, Iturbide and Guerrero led 
an alliance of former loyalists and insurgents seeking support for a reformed 
monarchical- constitutional Mexico. Victory came with the adherence of key 
commanders and city councils in the Bajío and nearby: Guanajuato, Guadala-
jara, San Luis Potosí— and, pivotally, Querétaro in early July. The city that had 
anchored counterinsurgency for a de cade joined the Iguala movement, unit-
ing the entire Bajío—or at least its urban elites—in support of in de pen dence 
for the first time.44 The rural majority, entrenched on  family ranchos and ex-
hausted by a de cade of conflict, stood aside. Iturbide and the Iguala movement 
took power by linking military commanders and urban councils.  There  were 
few real  battles; cities and armies joined in a new route to power.45
Facing rising opposition, Viceroy Apodaca ended freedom of the press in 
Mexico City. On July 5, as Querétaro joined the opposition, the Mexico City 
garrison deposed the viceroy. Spanish commanders found his defense of the 
regime timid. They offered a replacement, but neither the Mexico City council 
nor the Provincial Deputation recognized him. As in 1808, leaders of fragile 
legality fell, replaced by  others without legitimacy. Juan O’Donoju, sent from 
Spain to pacify New Spain, chose to deal with Iturbide. In August, O’Donoju 
accepted the Plan de Iguala and Mexican in de pen dence.46
Soon  after, the Army of the Three Guarantees— religion, in de pen dence, 
and union— entered Mexico City. Iturbide named a provisional junta, which 
named a Regency and Iturbide its president. On September 28, 1821, the junta 
proclaimed an Act of In de pen dence of the Mexican empire. It would rule from 
Panama to California. Soon news arrived that Fernando has refused the Mexican 
throne and the Spanish Cortes did not recognize Mexican in de pen dence, de-
claring it a rebellious province. Iturbide took power, a less than fully legitimate 
emperor.
Thirteen years of unpre ce dented conflict— political, military, ideological, 
social, and cultural— made the kingdom of New Spain in de pen dent. Noth-
ing  else was resolved in 1821. The economy faced collapse. Iturbide proposed 
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a constitutional monarchy, and for a time ruled as emperor.  Others sought a 
republic— and still  others pursued provincial autonomies. Spain resisted the 
loss of the kingdom that had sustained its power in the world. How would a 
young United States and an industrializing Britain react? Mexico’s challenges 
had only begun. Conflicts of nation making persisted through the 1860s. In 
part they resulted from the nature of in de pen dence: insurgents suddenly al-
lied with counterinsurgents to break with Spain; in 1821 they agreed on that 
and  little  else. In part too, long po liti cal debates resulted from the creative po-
liti cal experiences of 1808 to 1821: monarchists faced republicans; defenders 
of imperial traditions engaged liberal innovations, all complicated by tensions 
between central powers grounded in the historic capital of Mexico City, pro-
vincial interests focused on intendancies becoming states, and cities and towns 
with councils committed to traditions of urban sovereignty.47
All  those potential fault lines  were hardened by the new universalism of the 
age of nations. The imperial monarchies of the early modern era recognized di-
verse subjects with diverse laws, rights, and privileges— and multiple ways of jus-
tice to resolve disputes. New nations sought a new universalism, at least within 
their borders. Rights grounded in popu lar sovereignty must apply to all  people. 
Such visions grounded Spanish liberalism; its legacies  shaped Mexican state 
making in power ful ways. To liberals, the corporate rights to land, self- rule, and 
separate justice that defined indigenous republics  were “privileges” that had to 
end. Yet in many communities, liberal promises of universal rights seemed as-
saults on the right to be an indigenous republic.48
The new militarization of state and society added further challenges.  Under 
the monarchy before 1808, coercive powers  were limited; disputes  were settled 
at the highest levels by stakeholder negotiations, across the wider society by 
judicial mediation. Wars for and against in de pen dence created militaries.  After 
1821 troops  were everywhere and po liti cal disputes often led to mobilizations 
of force. Military power gave a new edge to the debates of nation making. And 
military power was expensive. Governments at  every level— national, provin-
cial, and local— faced new costs. Armed men who forged and then contested 
new state powers  were difficult to deny when they demanded pay. The costs of 
government  were much higher in the new nation.
Yet the means to pay  those costs  were limited— and also contested. The trib-
utes long collected from the indigenous and mulatto majority  were abolished 
amid po liti cal wars and popu lar risings before 1815. The collapse of silver min-
ing radically cut regime revenues and the stimulus to commercial life. Internal 
collections shrank, as did international trade and revenues. Fundamental po-
liti cal, ideological, and cultural divisions mixed in a context of militarization, 
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economic collapse, and sparse revenues. Mexican nation making must be seen 
in that context.
As emperor, Iturbide faced rising difficulties. Power ful economic actors and 
churchmen backed him; popu lar neighborhoods in Mexico City hailed his 
coronation.49 But asserting in de pen dence and taking a throne proved easier 
than building a regime. Debates over how to elect a Congress and relations be-
tween Congress and the executive led to grave conflicts. No judicial power was 
built, no fiscal system created, no constitution written. Eleven years of war and 
revolution had fragmented society. Many refused to pay taxes.  Others paid, 
but revenues never reached Mexico City as provincial authorities kept funds. 
Iturbide could not meet the demands of both the military and provincial powers. 
In October 1822, facing stalemate, he dissolved Congress. In December, Antonio 
López de Santa Anna, commander at the key port of Veracruz, rebelled with a 
group of republican conspirators.50
At first the rising found  little support. But the imperial army lacked the arms 
and ammunition to retake Veracruz. When Antonio Echavarrí, the general sent 
to defeat Santa Anna, saw he was about to lose command, he pronounced in 
 favor of a new Congress and peace with the rebels on February 1, 1823, at Casa 
Mata, near Veracruz. Iturbide’s rivals in the army joined the movement; José 
Morán, commander at Puebla, proclaimed himself head of a liberating army. 
In March, Iturbide reinstated Congress and fled the country, leaving the mon-
archy in disarray.51 Politics, for centuries focused on seeking influence within 
established monarchical institutions, was now an unbridled competition over 
who should govern and how.
In the summer of 1823, life in the lands drawn into the Mexican empire 
was difficult, the  future uncertain. Mining strug gled to revive; entrepreneurs 
lacked funds to invest. During years of conflict, immigrant merchants returned 
to Spain, taking what capital they had. Without the stimulus of silver, interna-
tional trade languished; without capital to revive mines, struggling operators 
looked for foreign investors. Commercial agriculture also strug gled, leaving 
urban food supplies uncertain. Bajío tenants with lands taken in insurgency and 
Mesoamerican villa gers who pushed back liberal attempts to privatize their lands 
continued to cultivate. They fed families and communities first, marketing only 
limited surpluses. Estates remained, but few  were profitable; rural social relations 
shifted to  favor- producing families.52
The dimensions of the Mexican republic remained uncertain. Population 
concentrated in the center and south. Mexico City held perhaps 150,000  people. 
About half of the nation’s 6 million  people lived in communities with Meso-
american roots and long ago made into indigenous republics in regions from 
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the heartland around Mexico City south to Yucatán. Coastal lowlands  were 
 little populated, mixing  people of Spanish, indigenous, and African ances-
try. The Bajío remained densely settled with mixed  peoples; commercial 
dynamism had given way to  family production. Population held sparse to the 
north. The largest city  there, Zacatecas, had 30,000 residents. Durango, Chi-
huahua, Saltillo, and Monterrey  were small towns. On the Pacific, San Blas and 
Mazatlán  were ports with few residents; on the Gulf, Tampico and Matamoros 
 were small but growing, as Veracruz no longer monopolized Atlantic trade.
With the fall of silver, economic dynamism waned in northern regions. 
The frontiers became isolated: El Paso and Santa Fe lost trades with regions 
south— and looked  toward the United States via the Santa Fe trail. The resi-
dents of San Antonio, Texas, began to see newcomers from the U.S. South who 
came to grow cotton with slave laborers. In California, missions congregated 
small numbers of natives while rancheros grazed growing herds. Most impor tant, 
in de pen dent Comanche used long adaptations to Spanish power and trade to 
build armed forces and assert power between New Mexico, Texas, and the Mis-
sissippi.  There  were many contenders and uncertainties in new strug gles to 
shape North Ame rica.
Founding a Federal Republic, Searching  
for a New Economy, 1823–1830
Most of the provinces aimed to maintain a Mexican  union. They had all come 
out of New Spain, remembered its economic dynamism, shared impor tant cus-
toms and institutions— old and new— and feared reconquest by Spain. They 
also worked to keep autonomies gained in years of civil war and  shaped by lib-
eral institutions. With Iturbide gone, few recognized the Imperial Congress 
or the executive power it named. In that context, negotiations led by Lucas 
Alamán proved pivotal. The educated son of a Guanajuato mining entrepre-
neur, Alamán convinced the provinces to recognize the government in Mexico 
City. As secretary of internal and international relations, he brokered deals 
with leading politicians in provincial capitals and other cities; he sent troops to 
Puebla and Jalisco when negotiations failed. He kept Chiapas within Mexico 
when Guatemala led Central Ame rica into a separate federation.53
Alamán was also central to writing the Founding Act of the Mexican Fed-
eration. A new national Congress met in November 1823 and approved the act 
early in 1824. In key debates, some deputies proposed a loose federation parallel 
to the early United States  under the Articles of Confederation.  Others sought a 
unified national state, looking to French and Spanish traditions. The final proj-
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ect came from Miguel Ramos Arizpe: a federation akin to the United States as 
remade in the Constitution of 1787— but with articles on religion, municipal 
rights, voting, and more derived from the Cádiz Charter of 1812.54
The constitution founding Mexico as a Federal Republic was signed in 1824. 
It declared that sovereignty derived from the  people, but first settled in the 
states being created in provinces extending from Yucatán, through the core of 
New Spain, to northern regions. Asserting that sovereignty belonged to the 
 people, and to the states they created, paralleled developments in the United 
States. That assertion, however, was neither an imposition nor an imitation in 
Mexico.55 The provinces created by Bourbon Intendancies and the Cádiz Con-
stitution’s Provincial Deputations prepared the way for state sovereignty. The 
1824 Constitution made a considered choice to lodge sovereignty in the  people 
and to constitute it first in regional states. The federal government would serve— 
and hopefully balance— popu lar and provincial sovereignties.
The found ers of the republic rejected the alternative of lodging sovereignty 
in a unitary abstraction called the nation— a legacy of the French revolution 
 adopted by Spanish liberals in 1812. They also rejected the Hispanic tradition 
of the sovereignty of the pueblos— towns and cities with councils. The 1824 
Constitution chose popu lar sovereignty and provincial priority over municipal 
rights and national sovereignty, the latter a route to more centralized national 
power. Yet both traditions remained vibrant in Mexico. When central rule 
returned in the 1830s, it built on urban bases. Throughout Mexico’s national 
history the pueblos have never been passive. Hispanic towns and indigenous 
villages have pressed their interests and negotiated demands with po liti cal par-
ties, government officials, military powers, and other po liti cal actors.56
In the Federal Republic, national legislative powers divided into two 
chambers: one of deputies representing the  people, another of senators rep-
resenting the states. The president was elected by the state congresses—in turn 
chosen by the  people of the states. Each state wrote a constitution, defining citi-
zens and their rights, including who could vote and hold office— always lim-
ited to men. Property qualifications  were few; tiered elections derived from the 
Cádiz Constitution allowed all adult men to vote locally for electors; the lat-
ter repeatedly chose propertied, educated, and po liti cally experienced men for 
office. The Federal Republic remained Catholic, endorsing a culture shared 
by all.
In October 1824, the state congresses voted Guadalupe Victoria Mexico’s 
first president. Nicolás Bravo, a landed insurgent who had joined Morelos, 
backed Guerrero, and then Iturbide, came in second to become vice president. 
Both had strong insurgent credentials, though Bravo was suspected of centralist 
258 — Alfredo Ávila and John Tutino
leanings. Victoria named a cabinet of diverse tendencies, leaving no group sat-
isfied. The new regime faced many challenges.
External threats seemed everywhere. Spain refused to accept the loss of its 
richest colony and threatened to send troops. The United States and the other 
new nations of the Amer i cas had recognized Mexican in de pen dence  under the 
Iturbide’s empire. More impor tant powers remained aloof. Neither Pope Leo 
XII nor his successors accepted Mexican sovereignty before Fernando VII died 
in 1833. That was not only a cultural challenge to a deeply Catholic country; it 
blocked the naming of bishops and other Church officials, limiting the Church 
in a most Catholic nation. France and other monarchical allies of Spain also 
refused recognition.57
That left  Great Britain pivotal. Britain had known the importance of New 
Spain’s silver since the eigh teenth  century. As allies of Spain’s liberals in the 
fight against Napoleon, British merchants and ships took direct roles in that 
trade in 1808. Britain emerged from the Napoleonic wars militarily triumphant, 
dominant in Atlantic trade, and with a rising industrial economy driving 
 toward global hegemony. In 1824, Mexico needed British recognition, capital, 
and trade.
Meanwhile, the new republic faced economic collapse. The trea sury seemed 
always empty, while bureaucrats and troops demanded pay. The constitution 
left direct taxes to the states; revenues from silver and commerce (should they 
revive) belonged to the states, as would any property or head taxes (which 
might replace colonial tributes). Only tariffs on international trade and rev-
enues from the Federal District, including Mexico City, funded the national 
regime. The states negotiated annual contributions to the national trea sury, but 
while the economy strug gled, contributions  were low and inconsistently paid. 
Making  matters worse, power ful interests that had loaned vast sums to the co-
lonial trea sury before 1821 forced national officials to recognize their claims as 
the price of accepting the new regime.58
Into that vortex came the British government, bankers, and investors. Victo-
ria’s national government needed cash and recognition. British officials sought 
open access and low tariffs for British textiles. But low tariffs would limit the 
only revenue that funded national power— and a flood of cheap textiles threat-
ened Mexican cloth makers, mostly artisans. The British solution: recognition, 
low tariffs, and loans from British banks to fund national power. Britain would 
get open markets and control of Mexican national purse strings. Victoria ac-
cepted. British loans made him the only president to complete a term during 
Mexico’s early de cades; the debts that resulted plagued national leaders for half 
a  century. Mexican cloth makers faced losses that fueled discontent.
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Economic strug gles continued. However distributed, revenues depended 
on trade, internal and international, all historically stimulated by silver. The 
de cade of insurgency had undermined the silver economy in the Bajío and lim-
ited it elsewhere. The dearth of silver and the commerce it stimulated cut the 
sources of capital that had financed New Spain’s economy. Again, the solution 
appeared to come from Britain. Coal mines  there had perfected steam pumps 
that might rapidly drain flooded mines. But bringing new technology to the 
Mexican highlands increased capital costs— and Mexicans had no capital. Led 
by Lucas Alamán, mine operators like the Condes de Regla at Real del Monte, 
the Condes de Valenciana at Guanajuato, and  others at Zacatecas and else-
where negotiated joint ventures with British cap i tal ists. British funds, technol-
ogy, and workers came to Mexico— and for the first time, returns on capital 
flowed out of Mexico to London and elsewhere. Nothing announced the trans-
formation of the mining economy between 1808 and 1824 more clearly than 
the turn to foreign financing.
Still, the mines  were slow to revive— revealing the enormity of the task and 
the difficulty of importing capital and technology. Zacatecas, least pummeled 
by insurgency and civil war, revived in the late 1820s; Guanajuato most dev-
astated by insurgency, did not flourish  until the 1840s; Real del Monte’s revival 
was even slower. When mines did revive, their revenues filled state trea suries: first 
at Zacatecas,  later in Guanajuato. The national regime never found revenues to 
sustain its costs, including  those of the military, nor to pay its debts to British and 
 other bondholders. For de cades  after 1824, bankers made short- term loans at exor-
bitant rates; famous agiotistas both funded and plagued the national regime.59
While the national government and the silver economy strug gled, some 
states found prosperity. Along the Gulf Veracruz gained from commerce; its 
rich lands raised food, cotton, and tobacco. Yucatán profited from trade with 
Havana as Cuba’s sugar and slave economy filled markets opened by Haitian 
revolutionaries. Puebla saw steady cultivation, but cloth makers suffered from 
British competition. The State of Mexico, surrounding Mexico City and reach-
ing far north and south, might be the richest of all— with mines at Real del 
Monte and Taxco, rich fields in the Valleys of Mexico and Toluca, sugar around 
Cuernavaca, and coastal lowlands around Acapulco. But mines strug gled to re-
vive, and estate operators saw profits plummet; they blamed villa gers who con-
trolled too much land and asked too much to harvest crops.60 Michoacán and 
Jalisco prospered— but not as much as Zacatecas with its recuperating silver 
mines. Guanajuato and Querétaro  were slow to regain prosperity. Local lead-
ers lamented that tenants prospered more than landowners— and that  women 
showed too much in de pen dence.61
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Some states found po liti cal stability;  others lived years of turbulence. With-
out po liti cal parties, groups seeking power or ga nized in diverse ways. The army 
became a po liti cal force— defending its right to separate justice while claiming 
power to resolve  others’ disputes. In the 1820s, many po liti cal actors or ga nized 
in Masonic lodges. Leading members of government in 1823 and 1824 joined 
Scottish Rite lodges founded by republicans who had opposed the empire. 
Iturbide’s partisans met in other lodges, such as the Black Ea gle  later headed 
by President Guadalupe Victoria. It affiliated with the York Rite, backed by 
Joel Poinsett, first U.S. minister in Mexico. The Yorkinos promoted popu lar 
mobilizations and gained influence in local elections. They accused their foes 
of centralism and inflamed a campaign against remaining Spanish immigrants. 
In 1826, Yorkinos won congressional elections; several gained ministries in Vic-
toria’s cabinet, notably Manuel Gómez Pedraza as secretary of war. They found 
power in many state governments. Their triumphs led to radical demands, in-
cluding the expulsion of Spanish immigrants (all legally Mexicans). By 1827, 
Yorkinos  were dominant and divided. As the 1828 elections approached, one 
faction, the Impartials, pressed the rights and interests of the states (including 
Coahuila’s Miguel Ramos Arispe and Zacatecas’s Francisco García) and backed 
Manuel Gómez Pedraza for president. Radical Yorkinos led by State of Mexico 
governor Lorenzo de Zavala backed popu lar ex- insurgent Vicente Guerrero.62
In 1828, popu lar elections for a new national Congress favored radical Yor-
kinos, but the vote for president came from existing state congresses. As a re-
sult, Gómez Pedraza came first, Guerrero second, and General Anastasio 
Bustamente third— backed by a few enemies of Zavala. The split radical vote 
denied Guerrero, the popu lar choice, the presidency. Before final results  were 
known, Santa Anna  rose in arms against a Veracruz state Congress that voted 
for Gómez Pedraza, arguing that the  people favored Guerrero. In Mexico City, 
Zavala promoted a protest that turned into a riot that destroyed the Parían 
market— where the rich bought Asian and Eu ro pean wares in front of the Na-
tional Palace. President Victoria could not resist the pressure: he named Guer-
rero secretary of war. Gómez Pedraza renounced his claim to office and fled 
to Jalisco. The new Congress named Guerrero president and Bustamente vice 
president.63
Near the end of 1828, several states that backed Gómez Pedraza built a 
co ali tion against Guerrero, insisting he had been imposed from the center. 
Guanajuato and  others called militias to arms— but lower officers and troops 
sympathized with Guerrero and refused to move against him. The strength 
of the new regime lay in its popu lar bases and it addressed their concerns. It 
expelled immigrant Spaniards, often merchants and easy scapegoats for eco-
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nomic dislocations and urban poverty. Guerrero prohibited imports of cloth 
and other goods to preserve markets for national producers, mostly artisans. 
The cut in trade hit already paltry national revenues, worsening under lying re-
gime difficulties.
Guerrero faced challenges governing. His secretary of the trea sury, Lorenzo 
de Zavala, tried to collect direct taxes, but they  were resisted by provinces as 
unconstitutional. Without funds, Guerrero turned to the agiotistas, gaining 
small revenues for large obligations. Meanwhile, the nation faced a Spanish 
invasion. An expedition landed at Tampico on the northern Gulf Coast. Santa 
Anna mobilized forces in Veracruz, as did Manuel de Mier y Terán in Tamau-
lipas; they defeated the invaders on September 11, 1829. Mexicans lived a brief 
but intense moment of patriotic fervor; in de pen dence seemed assured.
The situation soon deteriorated. In December, an army camped in Xalapa 
to guard against Spanish incursions demanded a return to constitutional 
rule. Vice president Bustamente led a co ali tion opposing Guerrero for having 
claimed extraordinary powers to suspend freedom of expression, collect direct 
taxes, and impose forced contributions on sovereign states. The ex- insurgent 
and arguably Mexico’s most popu lar early president fled home to the rugged 
south of Mexico State. Bustamente assumed the presidency in early 1830 and 
named Lucas Alamán secretary of internal and international relations.64 Again 
Congress exceeded its faculties: it declared Bustamente’s Plan of Jalapa just, 
recognized his rule— and made Guerrero ineligible.
New Beginnings, Escalating Conflicts,  
and Texas Sucession in the 1830s
In the 1820s, po liti cal Mexicans debated central power versus provincial rights 
in a context of economic collapse. In the 1830s, they forged new co ali tions and 
visions that came to be labeled conservative and liberal, aiming in diff er ent 
ways to find economic revival and po liti cal consolidation. The de cade  shaped 
Mexico’s  future: conservative and liberal visions contended for national pri-
macy past midcentury while the secession of Texas led to a war in the 1840s 
that saw an expansive United States take Mexico’s vast northern territories.
Though Bustamente sat as president, Lucas Alamán ruled from 1830 to 1832. 
He promised social order and a full national trea sury, yet pursued divisive po-
liti cal policies. He sent the military against Guerrero;  after months on the run 
the popu lar strongman who fought for in de pen dence and became president 
was captured, charged, summarily tried, and executed. Alamán also perse-
cuted Yorkino partisans, especially  those who won the 1828 state congressional 
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elections. Many saw their state sovereignty attacked. Even state governments 
that backed Bustamente strengthened militaries to resist centralization. Bus-
tamente’s secretary of war tried to strengthen the army, reducing the power 
of the civic militias that served state governors. The attempt provoked more 
discontent.
In economic affairs, Alamán reversed Guerrero’s policies. The new minister 
opened ports to cloth and other imports, charging tariffs to fund the govern-
ment and a bank to finance imports of machinery for Mexican factories. The 
Banco de Avío, the world’s first national development bank, aimed to back en-
trepreneurs committed to industrial production.65 It revealed Alamán’s vision 
of a new Mexican economy. In the 1820s he promoted British investment to 
revive silver mining. In the 1830s he used tariffs to facilitate industrial develop-
ment in Mexico—to limit British imports. Alamán hoped to balance revived 
silver mines and new industries. By the mid-1830s factories operated in Puebla, 
around Mexico City, and at Querétaro. They made industrial cottons, competed 
with imports, and employed growing numbers of workers— threatening the 
 house hold cloth makers that Guerrero had aimed to protect. Nothing proved 
easy or unifying— but Alamán had a vision of a new Mexico.
Alamán’s policies alienated merchants, including many importers at Veracruz. 
Their ire reinforced opposition among  those committed to state autonomy and 
resisted impositions from the center. In 1832, Santa Anna led a co ali tion of mer-
chants and popu lar groups at Veracruz in another rising to topple a national 
government he accused of taking power illegally, promoting centralism, and rul-
ing outside the constitution.
At first, Santa Anna’s movement gained  little response. Other states  were 
working to return to the  legal ways broken in 1828. New presidential elections 
 were due in 1832, and Manuel de Mier y Terán seemed an ideal candidate to 
leaders of impor tant states like Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, and Jalisco. But Mier 
y Terán committed suicide, leaving federalists without a leader. Fearful that 
Alamán would become president, frustrated states joined Santa Anna in rebel-
lion—on condition that that Gómez Pedraza return to complete the term he 
won in 1828. It was an ingenious plan to reclaim a broken  legal order. Busta-
mente saw the force arrayed against him and resigned.
In April 1833, elections in the state congresses chose Santa Anna as president 
and Valentín Gómez Farías as vice president, both strong federalists. For the 
first time in Mexico, radical liberals led by Gómez Farías took aim at the eco-
nomic power and cultural role of the Church.66 Since in de pen dence in 1821, 
state governments had sought the patronato, the right granted by the papacy 
to Spanish kings to name bishops and other high clerics. The Vatican insisted 
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that such rights did not extend to the nation or the states. Denied power over 
the Church, states desperate for revenue eyed ecclesiastical wealth. The states 
of Mexico, Michoacán, Jalisco, and Veracruz began to sell Church properties. 
Some radicals, inspired by eighteenth- century Spanish reformers, argued that 
Church lands should be distributed among small farmers to promote produc-
tion and popu lar welfare. Often proposed, re distributions rarely happened. 
Conflict between liberals seeking revenues and churchmen defending clerical 
rights and properties escalated. Most liberals  were Catholics; most churchmen 
accepted the nation and civil authorities— but resisted state intervention in 
Church affairs.67
The dispute was not entirely about wealth and power. Church institutions 
monopolized education in New Spain. José María Luis Mora, a liberal cleric 
from Guanajuato, offered a plan for higher education focused on citizenship, 
not religion. Governments would set programs of study based on the needs of 
the republic. Oaxaca, Zacatecas, and the State of Mexico founded Institutes 
of Arts and Sciences to educate new generations of liberals. Churchmen saw 
wealth, power, and control of education attacked; they mobilized in opposi-
tion, insisting that liberals  were attacking religion.68
Santa Anna left governing to his vice president; to implement reforms, 
Gómez Farías was backed by a liberal national Congress elected in 1833 and by 
power ful federalist interests. Still, reform provoked opposition. The vice presi-
dent dissolved the Mexico City Council, replacing it with one favorable to his 
plans; he prohibited publications critical of his program; he passed laws remov-
ing po liti cal enemies. Many faced punishment without  trials, fair or other wise. 
Opposition intensified.
When Gómez Farías and his congressional backers ended mandatory tithes 
and state enforcement of clerical vows, the Church protested but acquiesced. 
When the government gave states the right to name priests to vacant parishes, 
the Church would not obey, and Gómez Farías suspended the law. Then in 
1834 Congress decreed that bishops who did not accept state powers faced exile. 
As divisions escalated, Generals Gabriel Durán and Mariano Arista led part 
of the army in rebellion; Santa Anna defeated them— yet proved ambivalent 
 toward the policies of a government he led as president. He backed liberal mea-
sures, but insisted that solving revenue difficulties came first. He balked when 
Congress began to reform the military.69
Meanwhile, challenges mounted on Mexico’s northeastern frontier. Settle-
ment in Texas focused on San Antonio and grazing estates all around. Missions 
extended farther out, aiming to subordinate native  peoples. In de pen dence and 
the collapse of the silver economy ended the markets for Texas livestock and 
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other economic ties with regions south. A Comanche empire asserted power 
north and west. Meanwhile, the United States emerged from the War of 1812 
with in de pen dence confirmed and control of the Mississippi basin. The 1820 
Missouri Compromise settled the question of the expansion of slavery. The 
United States was poised for growth: industry flourished in the Northeast; cot-
ton and slavery drove west across the South; expansion across the Mississippi 
basin raised crops that fed eastern cities, southern plantations, and expanding 
trade.70
Texas became the vortex where strug gles to shape a Mexico facing economic 
collapse met rising Comanche power, and the expanding United States. Waves 
of settlers from the United States and Eu rope entered Texas, most committed 
to expanding cotton and slavery on rich coastal plains. The politics of Texas set-
tlement began in 1819 when Spanish authorities announced that  people from 
Florida and Louisiana, Spanish domains before they joined the United States, 
 were welcome in Texas. Iturbide’s empire confirmed the rights of the settlers 
and promoted the arrival of more. The Constitution of 1824 made colonization 
a question for the states. Texas merged with Coahuila in one extensive frontier 
state— a concession to the power of Miguel Ramos Arizpe. Coahuiltejano gov-
ernors ratified immigrant rights and granted new concessions to entrepreneurs 
who sought land in Texas to  settle colonists. Soon, newcomers outnumbered 
tejanos in Texas.
The question of slavery brought rising challenges. The Constitution of 
Coahuila and Texas declared all persons born in the state  free— allowing new 
settlers to keep the slaves they brought with them, but face a generational tran-
sition to  free  labor. In 1829, Mexican national authorities abolished slavery, but 
permitted its per sis tence in Texas while prohibiting imports. The end of slave 
 labor would accelerate. In 1830, Alamán decreed national power over immi-
gration and colonization, and prohibited foreign settlement near the borders 
of their country of origin. The rights of U.S. mi grants to  settle and maintain 
slavery in Texas  were challenged again. They began to discuss secession and an-
nexation to the United States.
Texans met in assemblies calling for the separation of Texas from Coahuila. 
English- speaking settlers, the power ful among them committed to cotton and 
slavery, would be a majority in the new state. In 1833, leading Texas entrepre-
neur and colonizer Stephen Austin trekked to Mexico City seeking separation 
from Coahuila, the repeal of the immigration law of 1830, and tax exemptions. 
Congress repealed the law, a centralist act unpopular with many federalists, 
and extended Texas tax exemptions for three years. But without Mexican au-
thorization, Austin wrote to Texas calling for a state government. Gómez Farías 
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learned of the letter and arrested Austin, who was held in Mexico City  until 
1835. The situation was tense as 1833 became 1834.71 Samuel Houston and other 
Texas leaders built armies to fight for Texas in de pen dence, aiming to  later join 
the United States. The threat alarmed Mexicans. Many saw a need for a more 
centralized regime to prevent the fracture of the nation.
In 1834, Santa Anna reclaimed power from Gómez Farías and appointed 
a cabinet of moderate federalists. Elections for Congress brought deputies 
who opposed their pre de ces sors’ radical mea sures. The new government began 
to search for a po liti cal center. While Santa Anna, his cabinet, and the new 
Congress agreed on the need to reform the constitution to prevent seces-
sions from breaking the nation, by 1835, several states seemed ready to defend 
their autonomies with arms. Many feared that the nation was on the verge of 
disintegration— not unimaginable given ongoing fragmentations in Central 
Ame rica and the Río de la Plata. In Campeche on the Yucatán Peninsula and 
at Cuernavaca just south of the capital, armed movements offered to defend 
national unity against separatist threats. Santa Anna, long a staunch defender 
of federalism as it favored Veracruz, began to see that states’ rights might lead 
to disunion. He deci ded to fortify national power by reducing state militias. 
Re sis tance came quickly, notably in silver- rich Zacatecas. Santa Anna sent the 
national army against the Zacatecas militia— and faced acquiescence rather 
than re sis tance. Mining wealth might fund provincial power; it also reduced 
incentives to disruptive vio lence.
Authorities in Coahuila and Texas opposed the limits on state militias, 
while local conflict set the governor against the state commander. Texas colo-
nists saw opportunity and refused to recognize  either the state or the national 
regime— though Austin convinced them not to declare in de pen dence. He knew 
a declaration would end Mexican federalists’ support for Texas. But when 
Santa Anna or ga nized an expedition to end the rebellion, Texans saw no rea-
son for restraint. In March 1836 they met in convention to declare the Republic 
of Texas. David Burnet was its first president; Lorenzo de Zavala— the Mexi-
can federalist pivotal to Guerrero’s rule in the late 1820s— was vice president. 
Santa Anna claimed an (in)famous victory at the Alamo in San Antonio, but 
Houston’s troops, mostly recruits from the United States, defeated him at San 
Jacinto. Captured, Santa Anna recognized Texas.72
Defeat in Texas— though Mexican authorities did not recognize its 
secession— intersected with rising discontent across Mexico. The press became 
alarmed. In 1833, cholera had ravaged cities and rural regions from Veracruz, 
through Puebla, and Mexico City and the surrounding State of Mexico— the 
national heartland. The epidemic brought death to thousands and rising food 
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prices to the living; cholera blocked communications, closed mills, para lyzed 
trade, and cut tax revenues.73 Meanwhile, cloth imports and new industries 
spread discontent among artisans. Dispersed powers had no cure. Attacks on 
the Church and the loss of Texas convinced many that liberal federalism had 
failed.
Congress began work on a new constitution. In 1836 it promulgated Siete 
Leyes Constitucionales— Seven Constitutional Laws— ending the Federal 
Republic and creating central rule. Sovereignty no longer focused on states or 
belonged to the  people. Rather, it derived from the nation, to be exercised by 
central authorities. The shift fused Spanish tradition and Cádiz liberalism. The 
name Siete Leyes evoked the medieval Siete Partidas; politics became a rela-
tionship between central powers and city councils. The center and the cities 
displaced the states and the  people.74 National authorities named provincial 
administrators to replace elected governors. The Leyes raised the population 
required to keep municipal councils, denying self- rule to many towns and most 
former indigenous republics. To vote, citizens faced income requirements for 
the first time. Departments that replaced the states did elect juntas (reminis-
cent of Provincial Deputations)— but power came from the capital. The found-
ers of the new polity feared congresses, national and provincial. They aimed 
to strengthen national power, yet divided it between the president and a new 
Supremo Poder Conservador— creating fractures at the top.75
Constitutional change could not alter entrenched ways; national officials 
strug gled to rule distant provinces and outlying communities. Cities and towns 
kept autonomies. It proved difficult to limit po liti cal participation. The Siete 
Leyes set income limits on voting and higher levels to old office; implementa-
tion was uneven. Departments, like the states they replaced, resisted national 
claims on revenues. Unable to end financial shortfalls, Anastasio Bustamente, 
now president  under centralism, raised import taxes and turned once more to 
the agiotistas, again trading short- term funds for mounting debts.76
The War for North Ame rica and the Strug gle for Mexico
Mexico faced serious prob lems in the 1840s. Po liti cal life seemed a disaster. In 
1840 a revolt led by General José Urrea and Valentín Gómez Farías called for a 
return to federalism, but forces backing Bustamente prevailed. Fears of per sis tent 
instability and escalating vio lence led to new co ali tions and old propositions. 
Some concluded that Mexicans could not govern themselves with republican 
institutions  because colonial customs and traditions prevailed. In August 1840 
José María Gutiérrez Estrada proposed a return to constitutional monarchy. 
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Military leaders argued that only military rule could save the nation, yet the 
military failed to impose order— and often provoked disorder. When Nico-
lás Bravo followed Bustamente as president  under the new centralizing char-
ter, congressional voting favored the Federalists.77  Under changing constitu-
tions, elections documented deepening fragmentation of po liti cal visions and 
interests.  There was never enough revenue to fund governments, national or 
provincial—or to pay militaries that  were always discontented and ready to 
back the next po liti cal proj ect. Ironically, in the same years the economy fi-
nally began to strengthen.78 Mining had revived at Zacatecas in the 1830s; it 
came back at Guanajuato in the 1840s. Meanwhile, a national textile industry 
took hold. Mechanized factories concentrated growing numbers of workers at 
Puebla and around Mexico City; the Hercules mill flourished in the canyon 
east of Querétaro.
Reviving silver mines began to generate employment, profit, and revenue, 
and stimulated trade that created more. Yet textile industrialization, British or 
Mexican, threatened artisan families— and the income of  women who spun 
thread in struggling  house holds. Villa gers, tenants, and rancheros still ruled 
most rural production, limiting profits among landlords who longed for colo-
nial agrarian capitalism. Still, as the 1840s began, economic revival was  under 
way and calls for po liti cal balance  were rising.79
Texas remained a headache. Politicians and military commanders saw a 
rebel province; none had the power or resources to force reincorporation. A 
greater prob lem was that Texas leaders claimed the Río Grande as its southern 
and western boundary; they dreamed of sovereignty including northern Tam-
aulipas and half of New Mexico, even as the Comanche ruled west of Austin. 
No Mexican president could accept such claims. The land between the Río 
Grande and the Nueces, the historic border between Tamaulipas and Texas, 
became the focus of discord and excuse for war.80
From the moment of secession in 1836, Texans sought  union with the 
United States. They failed  because they would be a slave state, disrupting the 
Missouri Compromise. In 1845, views in Washington  were changing. James 
Polk won the presidency with southern and expansionist backing, while the 
Texas Republic faced fiscal crisis and rising debts. The U.S. Congress approved 
annexation knowing that Mexico would see it as an act of war. The press in both 
nations excited war fever. Mexican president José Joaquín de Herrera knew he 
could not win a war against the United States— yet he could not state that 
publicly. He might have accepted an in de pen dent Texas defined by historic 
bound aries, but not with the new claims. Polk sent John Slidell to Mexico to buy 
San Francisco and northern California. The acquisition would bring gold, rich 
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lands, Pacific ports, and a way to rebalance slave and  free states in an expanded 
Union. Herrera refused to meet Slidell. The Mexican press inflamed tensions, 
accusing Herrera of preparing to cave to U.S. pressure.81
In December, General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, charged to lead an army 
to defend the North, instead toppled the government. Lucas Alamán backed 
him, as did other conservatives, arguing that monarchy was the only way to 
keep Mexico from falling to the United States. Alamán also knew that Mexico 
could not win a war against the United States— and that no government could 
survive without promising to reclaim Texas.82 Polk was ready take Texas— and 
more. He sent General Zachary Taylor to the banks of the Río Grande. The 
United States had invaded Mexico.
Hostilities began. Mexico, a quarter  century past in de pen dence, had nei-
ther a strong national regime nor a  viable economy; it lacked a military ready 
for international war; it had no navy; and it had neither the unity nor the re-
sources to mobilize for war. By contrast, the United States, seventy- five years a 
nation, had forged a regime grounded in a burgeoning economy combining 
southern cotton, northern industry, and westward expansion; it had profes-
sional armed forces trained at West Point and Annapolis; its resources for war 
 were beyond any Mexico could muster. Mexican leaders knew all this, as did 
men in Washington— who saw the chance to take a continent before Mexico 
might reach a consolidation that allowed re sis tance.
As war began, Mexican divisions persisted. State leaders often looked to 
local interests, promising to defend their states while providing few troops or 
funds to defend the border, ports, or the capital. As the U.S. navy blocked Mex-
ican ports, Yucatán declared neutrality to prevent an invasion; merchants in 
Culiacán, Sinaloa, took advantage of U.S. occupation to profit.  There was real-
ism in such decisions, but  little national patriotism.83 Some indigenous groups, 
rarely committed to a national proj ect that threatened their lands and autono-
mies as often as it offered rights and inclusion, took the war as a time to rise for 
local and regional in de pen dence— among Zapotecs at the Isthmus of Tehu-
antepec; among the diverse  people of the Sierra Gorda (north of Querétaro); 
and famously among the Maya of Yucatán, who  rose in what Mexicans called a 
Caste War. Movements for indigenous in de pen dence caused fear among Mexi-
can elites.84
Taylor’s army crossed the Río Grande to take Mexico’s northern cities. 
Small U.S. forces took New Mexico and California. Winfield Scott landed at 
Veracruz and quickly left disease- ridden lowlands to march to the capital. 
Facing multiple invading forces that  were well armed and well provisioned, 
Mexican politicians and generals concluded that only Santa Anna could raise 
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a defense. He did what he could in impossible circumstances, slowing the drive 
of Taylor’s forces from the north. But in August 1847, Scott’s army was poised 
outside Mexico City. National Guard forces, cadets of the Colegio Militar, 
some regular troops, and common citizens joined re sis tance at Churubusco, 
Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec. Nothing stopped  U.S. troops. National 
leaders left the capital to keep government alive in Querétaro. For two days 
in September the working  people of Mexico City  rose to hurl stones at U.S. 
soldiers, defending their city even if their leaders and army could not defend 
the nation and its capital.85
In Querétaro, a new president, Manuel de la Peña, assembled a cabinet 
and Congress. Radical federalists argued to continue the war—an irony as the 
states whose interests they defended contributed so few men and resources. 
The government entered peace negotiations early in 1848. It recognized Texas 
as a state of the United States. It accepted the loss of New Mexico (including 
Arizona) and California in exchange for an indemnity of 15 million pesos. The 
treaty signed at Guadalupe led to long challenges. Many Mexicans remained 
north of the border. By treaty, the United States committed to defend their 
rights as citizens and landholders, rights repeatedly abrogated in practice. By 
treaty, too, the United States accepted the duty to protect the border, a com-
mitment also rarely kept.
 After the War That Deci ded Every thing
The war of 1846 to 1848 set the  future course of Mexico, the United States, and 
North Ame rica. Im por tant issues took de cades and many lives to resolve: the 
roles of central powers, liberal policies, and indigenous communities in Mex-
ico; the questions of slavery, its expansion, and national unity in the United 
States. Still, by 1850 it was clear that Mexico would be a nation without a 
North to  settle and develop, and that the United States would be a continental 
power driving across a new West. In the new world of industrial capitalism, the 
United States took hemispheric hegemony as Mexico faced limited develop-
ment. We can only ask what Mexico might have become with the lands from 
Texas through California, and what the United States would be without them.
Both nations needed two de cades  after the war to set national politics and 
find ways forward. In the United States, new territories reopened the question 
of slavery’s expansion, driving divisions that led to Civil War— the deadliest of 
all conflicts of nation making in the Amer i cas. The 1865 Union victory ended 
slavery, setting the expanded nation on course to industrialization and expan-
sion, sustained by mines and lands once Mexican.86
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Mexico strug gled through postwar years of national doubt. A moderate re-
gime gave way to centralist conservatism uniting Alamán and Santa Anna and 
hinting of monarchism. A revived liberal movement took power in 1855 and 
began a radical transformation. Reformers ended the separate jurisdictions of 
the Church and the military— and privatized the lands of Church institutions 
and indigenous communities. A Church- backed reaction (most communities 
stood aside) brought the Reform War of 1858 to 1860. Liberal victory came with 
soaring debts, facilitating conservatives’ recruitment of a Eu ro pean interven-
tion, French occupation, and the imposed monarchy of Maximilian in 1864— a 
short- lived regime that proved more liberal than many Mexican liberals. The 
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1867 restoration of the republic  under the long- resistant Benito Juárez brought 
a welcome to U.S. capital, a turn to privatizing community lands, a new round 
of regional revolts, and in time the consolidation of a po liti cally authoritarian, 
eco nom ically liberal regime  under Porfirio Díaz— who had fought French oc-
cupation but welcomed a new Mexico rebuilt as an economic de pen dency of 
the United States.87
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In October 1825, London’s New Monthly Magazine commented that Guate-
mala, like Ame rica’s other newly in de pen dent countries, “fixed the attention of 
the sixteenth  century, [and] deserves no less to occupy the undivided consid-
eration of the nineteenth” with “a distinct place in the geography of modern 
Ame rica, and [to] claim forcibly the attention of the commercial world.”1 But 
the article described not  today’s country, but all of Central Ame rica, a newly 
declared republic that claimed the territory stretching from Chiapas to Costa 
Rica, which had been part of the Spanish Kingdom of Guatemala. Thus the 
magazine fixed its attention on colonial “Guatemala,” not the single federal 
state that bore the name in 1825. The confusion had many  causes, not least a 
tradition of conflating the history of Guatemala City with that of the kingdom, 
familiar to En glish audiences from the 1823 translation of Domingo Juarros’s 
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history (1808–1821), but dating back at least to the seventeenth- century Recor­
dación Florida of Francisco Antonio Fuentes y Guzmán.2
While the state of Guatemala strug gled to teach foreigners to associate its 
name with its territory, internally the challenge was to stitch many and di-
verse local identities and ambitions into a single “Guatemalan” framework. 
The princi ple of uti possedetis allowed in de pen dent Spanish American states 
to establish countries based on colonial territories,3 but  didn’t guide new gov-
ernments’ internal redistricting. Between separatist movements in the western 
highlands and rebellions in the eastern lowlands from the 1820s into the 1840s, 
getting the seven departments of the new state to identify as “Guatemalan” was 
as large a challenge to the new country as getting foreign powers to distinguish 
Guatemala from the other states of the Central American federation.
Encouraging foreigners to scale down their understanding and citizens to 
scale up their identity to include the newly assembled state meant teaching 
both groups to put aside po liti cal, economic, and demographic understandings 
inherited from the eighteenth- century Bourbon monarchy’s reformist policies 
and the early nineteenth- century constitutional monarchy’s revolutionary in-
novations, neither of which had created a polity that looked like in de pen dent 
Guatemala. Considering Guatemala as an innovation or invention of in de-
pen dence goes against the grain of much Guatemalan historiography; other-
wise nuanced scholarship anachronistically takes “Guatemala” as an entity back 
into the colonial period or as an unquestioned result of in de pen dence and pes-
simistically follows the  union’s failure, not the state’s complex endurance.4 The 
distinctive shape of the twentieth- century country frequently accompanies 
studies of the nineteenth  century, although con temporary maps show a more 
amorphous and less determined territory more closely related to its contingent 
and emergent real ity.5
Yet the story of the birth and consolidation of this country is not unique. 
As Alfredo Ávila, John Tutino, and Roberto Breña argue in this volume, Gua-
temala’s divided origins, built partly on Mesoamerican and partly on Spanish 
structures, compare with that of New Spain (Mexico). The crisis of the Spanish 
monarch (1808–1814) offered opportunity as well as disruption. Chambers’s 
study of how postin de pen dence Peru and Bolivia “traced and retraced” former 
Inca territories offers another parallel. The dissolution of Gran Columbia into 
Venezuela, Ec ua dor, and Colombia produced states that also acquired full sov-
ereignty  after emerging from a larger polity.
In essence, fledgling Guatemala experienced similar challenges to Spanish 
American countries that remained united: cycles of reform and re sis tance; 
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dissension among elites divided by region,  family, and ideas about the rhythm 
and depth of innovation needed; the actions and interests of popu lar classes 
inclined to resist changes perceived as eco nom ically destructive or po liti cally 
alien and unwelcome; the implanting of republican and constitutional systems 
of government interspersed with periods of less representative rule; and the 
influence of Eu ro pean and North American commercial interests. Considering 
the origins, birth, and eventual stabilization of Guatemala as a polity, this essay 
describes two pro cesses: first, how districts without central ties and individuals 
with initial loyalties to only a locality, class, or ethnic community learned to 
accept a place within a Guatemalan republic; second, the emergence by 1851 of 
a  viable country that still faced tensions between government and society. The 
story of Guatemala is thus a story of the emergence of an in de pen dent country 
out of a larger federation that merits comparison with similar “survivor” states 
from the former Gran Colombia and across Spanish Ame rica.
Isthmian Origins (1542–1821)
The territories and  peoples that formed the state of Guatemala in 1825 owed 
much to pre- European Maya civilizations, the initial organ ization of the Span-
ish empire, and the reorganization of the state- society relationship during the 
eighteenth- century Bourbon monarchy. Spanish Central Ame rica, known as 
the Kingdom, Audiencia (territorial court), or Captaincy General of Guate-
mala, was established by the Hapsburg monarchy in 1542, administratively 
uniting communities and territories conquered by half a dozen Spanish adel­
antados and their diverse native allies between  today’s Chiapas (Mexico) and 
Costa Rica.6 Hernán Cortés’s deputy Pedro de Alvarado defeated the Quiché 
and Kaqchiquel kingdoms of highland Guatemala as well as the Pipil regions of 
what is now El Salvador; the Montejo  family similarly conquered the  peoples 
of  today’s Honduras and Yucatán Peninsula, while Pedrarias Dávila’s forces 
took much of  today’s Nicaragua and Costa Rica. So the broad strokes of 
Guatemala’s core territory and Central Ame rica’s regional organ ization and 
capitals, including approximate ethnic and po liti cal divides, date to the early 
sixteenth  century. So, too, does the emergence of Alvarado’s capital, the mul-
tiply relocated Guatemala City—in its pres ent location since 1773—as the 
po liti cal, commercial, religious, fiscal, educational, and judicial capital.
In de pen dent Guatemala’s demography also owes much to the colonial pe-
riod. What would  later be “Guatemalan” highland districts  were originally set-
tled by Mayan  peoples who retained their culture and languages while granted 
lands and limited self- rule as indigenous republics during centuries of Span-
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ish rule. On the cusp of in de pen dence, Juarros cata logued languages including 
Kiche, Kakchiquel, Mam, Pocomam, Nahuatl, and Zutuhil, still spoken  today.7 
Late eighteenth- century censuses suggested the provinces in  today’s Guatemala 
 were about half Maya, 10  percent Eu ro pean, and 40  percent “mixed race” (la-
dino, mulatto, mestizo) with Eu ro pean, American, and/or African ancestry. 
Geo graph i cally, the Maya lived predominantly in the western highlands, in 
mountains, the most densely populated part of the isthmus. What would be-
come the coffee piedmont, the southern (Pacific) coast, and the Oriente high-
lands  were both more “ladino” and less densely populated.8 In addition to the 
estimated half a million  people living  under Spanish rule, in de pen dent indig-
enous communities like the Lacandones or Itzá lived in the Petén area border-
ing New Spain (Mexico). 9
Guatemala’s colonial communities did not form a single po liti cal entity but 
half a dozen territorial jurisdictions that operated as three distinct economic 
regions. The central valley and highlands (altiplano) combined agriculture and 
artisan textile and other productions, supplying urban centers.10 In 1819, Anti-
gua and Amatitlán in the central valley received Crown authorization to pro-
duce grana, a red dye extracted from crushing an insect that fed on the nopal 
cactus; it became the country’s principal export in the 1840s.11 Significant 
highland produce went north to trade in southern Mexico. The more sparsely 
settled Oriente (its principal populations: Santa Rosa, Quaquiniquilapa, and 
Mataquesquintla), was connected by the Royal Road that led to Salvadoran in-
digo zones and Honduran and Nicaraguan  cattle ranches. Along the road, the 
mostly mulatto  people of the Oriente provided pasturage for  cattle heading to 
Guatemala City and worked as mule- drivers.12 The eighteenth- century mili-
tary district of Petén, now frequented by tourists visiting Mayan ruins, was a 
sparsely inhabited zone where the first archaeological finds— “perfectly spheri-
cal” stones— were just coming to government attention.13
Eco nom ically, each district was tied to Guatemala City, the principal com-
mercial center and the region’s link to Eu rope through Atlantic ports, via  legal 
trade with Spain and illicit trade with  Great Britain. But producers and con-
sumers also bypassed the capital for regional trade in Central Ame rica’s largely 
self- sufficient internal market that cushioned residents from the worst blows 
of the declining world market for indigo. Internal trade fueled efforts made 
to retain Central American po liti cal as well as economic unity.14 Guatemala 
City businessmen developed financial investments (and often  family ties) to 
San Salvador, which produced indigo, the region’s principal export crop;15 to 
Chiapas, Honduras, and Costa Rica (which raised tobacco); to Tegucigalpa 
and Chiquimula (where limited silver was mined); and to Comayagua and 
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Nicaragua (where  cattle grazed and mules  were raised). Internal trade and 
business ties, though impor tant, did not prove strong enough to draw distinct 
economies into a single state system  after in de pen dence.
In the eigh teenth  century, a wave of Spanish immigration (especially 
Basques, including the Aycinena  family) and Enlightenment- oriented royal 
officials did not appreciably change the area’s overall demography; it did help 
revitalize elite commercial ties to the metropolis and revive intellectual inquiry 
and the foundation of impor tant institutions, including a merchants’ chamber 
and a  lawyers’ guild.16 Along with university professors and alumni (Guate-
mala’s San Carlos graduated over thirteen hundred from 1775 to 1821), they 
 were deeply involved with Bourbon officials in creating a short- lived Sociedad 
Económica de Amantes del País devoted to improving the kingdom’s po liti-
cal economy, and the Gazeta de Guatemala (1797–1816), a newspaper that was 
based in Guatemala City but  imagined a Central American public that it would 
inform and instruct. Indigenous  peoples— one of whose  great ancient centers at 
Palenque (Chiapas) was just being explored— were encouraged to join modern 
society by adopting Spanish clothes and language; all “learned” men  were invited 
to be useful, regardless of “birth or class.”17
Guatemala City retained its centrality as an intellectual hub. However, Car-
los III’s (r. 1759–1788) reforms encouraging increased accountability to Spain 
diluted the capital’s authority within the kingdom and  future state. Fiscal re-
forms (1760s) established royal coffers in the provinces and increased sales 
taxes,18 while territorial reforms (1784 and 1786) consolidated over a dozen dis-
tricts into four intendancies— Comayagua (Honduras), León (Nicaragua), Ci-
udad Real (Chiapas), and San Salvador (El Salvador). 19 Notably, the area that 
became the state of Guatemala remained fragmented as a patchwork of small 
districts reporting directly to the kingdom’s capital rather than a consolidated 
administration.20 In efforts to reduce the extension, both literal and indirect, of 
Guatemala City and its cabildo over “its” valley, the Crown essentially halved 
the original jurisdiction when relocating the capital to the Valle de la Ermita in 
1773  after a devastating earthquake.21 Thus, on the cusp of imperial crisis, priest 
and chronicler Domingo Juarros’s 1808 history identified ten “provinces” in 
the  future state of Guatemala, grouped into southern (Pacific), “central” (land- 
bound), and northern (Atlantic) regions.22 The formal po liti cal consolidation 
experienced in the rest of the isthmus did not occur in “Guatemala.”
Ironically, fragmentation deepened even as government authority strength-
ened. Bourbon policy promoted reviving or establishing city councils to im-
prove imperial communication and control, creating po liti cal repre sen ta tion 
and institutions that supported creole, indigenous, and ladino communities 
0
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in distinct locales. Creole— American Spanish— “provincianos” in the west-
ern highlands or ga nized po liti cally around two diff er ent towns that became 
a counterweight to Guatemala City: Antigua (Sacatepéquez), the earthquake- 
destroyed capital that reestablished its municipal government and po liti cal 
voice in 1799,23 and Quezaltenango, an impor tant center of agricultural prod-
ucts where creole and peninsular mi grants established their own cabildo and 
power center in addition to the existing native cabildo in 1805.  These two ca-
bildos immediately protected the interests of power ful families from the influ-
ence of  those based in Guatemala City, helping royal agents to govern the re-
gion.24  Others, too, had a say in the new system. The new jurisdictions created 
to reduce Guatemala City’s reach incorporated Petapa, Amatitan, and Escuinta 
as villas “with a separate government” for their Spanish and mulatto residents. 
Indigenous communities, too, felt the heavier hand of government through 
new settlements including Chamiquín (Verapaz).25
Arguably, the Bourbon emphasis on expanded municipal government did 
the most to create a region and identity in the Oriente.  There, primarily ladino 
or mestizo communities lacked a cabildo de españoles or pueblo de indios  until 
Bourbon royal officials set up municipal governments to increase tax revenue and 
promote militia recruitment while bringing “po liti cal and social (civil) life for 
their inhabitants to live in peace and justice” in Christian society and rule. New 
urban centers  were established in Iztapa, a Pacific Coast port, and Santa Rosa, 
in the Oriente’s Valle de Jumay in the military district of Verapaz.26 The new 
communities, which in the short term increased secular authority, often played 
impor tant roles in postin de pen dence revolts and negotiations with state capi-
tals as, not coincidentally, the town institutions founded to serve imperial in-
terests often rallied residents for their own purposes.
On the Cusp of In de pen dence
Despite its intellectual vibrancy, by the turn of the nineteenth  century the 
core area of Guatemala strug gled eco nom ically, in large part due to external 
constraints. The aggressive Bourbon drive to raise revenue eventually prevailed: 
declines in Indian tribute  were offset by increased sales tax and state mono-
poly revenues, but  those, in turn,  were offset by the costs of defending Spanish 
interests.27 Between the tax policy, the consolidación of Church debt in 1804 
and  later donativos sent to support Spain’s war against Bonaparte, Central Ame-
rica expatriated much of its specie and reached in de pen dence  running a gov-
ernment deficit that was regularly filled by subsidies from New Spain’s boom-
ing silver economy.28 Britain’s blockades in the late eigh teenth  century kept 
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indigo waiting in ports, prompting trading families to make connections with 
Anglo- Americans. Some even engaged in the illicit trade in silks and velvets that 
they hypocritically decried as harmful to government and their own interests, 
sponsoring trading trips to Philadelphia, Belize, Kingston, and Havana. Postin-
de pen dence claims of Guatemala’s being “unknown” in the Atlantic world  were 
implausible.29
Nor did the period described as the “Cádiz experiment” (1810–1814; 1820–
1823) set the stage for a  future Guatemalan state. Although they  were eco nom ically 
promiscuous, po liti cally Guatemala City’s elite strongly supported Spain’s war 
against Bonaparte and the Cádiz constitutional monarchy, preferring autonomy 
in the empire over full in de pen dence. Guatemala City alcalde Antonio Juarros 
or ga nized an elaborate series of public events in late 1808 to support Fernando 
VII, legitimizing the government through claims of Kiche and Kaqchiquel 
monarchies as pre de ces sors to the Hapsburg and Spanish monarchies.30 Yet, 
like earlier “Guatemala City” histories, the report of the ceremony emphasized 
city and isthmus, not city and valley. This wider identity was matched in the ca-
bildo’s actions: Juarros and other city councilors helped Captain General José 
de Bustamante negotiate a peaceful end to a radical movement in El Salvador 
in 1811 and offered only moral support to rebels from Granada (Nicaragua) 
who reached the capital in chains  after Bustamante squelched their movement 
for autonomy  later that year.
Peninsular decisions that sought to foster loyalty by providing a role for 
overseas provinces in imperial interim governments also discouraged Central 
American and  future Guatemalan unity by authorizing election of representa-
tives to many kinds of “province” between 1809 and 1821.  These ranged from 
one delegate to an early Junta Central to fifteen deputies to a  later Cortes.31 
Yet the moment also hinted at connections that would underpin the  later state 
consolidation: Guatemala City and Quetzaltenango consulted together in 1809 
and 1810 to select representatives to interim Spanish government posts.32 Both 
cities accepted the possibility of a “Guatemalan” territorial unit larger than 
each jurisdiction alone, although without recognition of a proto- Guatemalan 
state they operated as members of a community of cities within a Spanish im-
perial framework.33 Quetzaltenango’s subsequent instructions to its deputy 
in 1814 showed the limits of alliance, proposing a separate bishopric and inten-
dancy as well as seeking to lower royal monopolies (estancos) and increase judicial 
autonomy.34
The Cortes’s adoption and promulgation of the Constitución de la Monar-
quía Española in 1812, implemented in the Kingdom of Guatemala, introduced 
modern representative government to residents. Through indirect elections 
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of members of the constitutionally mandated ayuntamientos constitucionales, 
two diputaciones provinciales (Provincial Deputations), and Cortes deputies, 
Central Ame rica’s residents learned the mechanisms of demo cratic gover-
nance; they began to experience the rights and duties of citizenship that would 
continue  after in de pen dence.35 Still, po liti cal innovation did not consolidate 
a “Guatemalan” territory or identity within the captaincy general. The Cortes 
created two deputations for the kingdom, one each for Guatemala and Nica-
ragua, in an effort to mitigate regional tensions.36 The Cortes’s Guatemalan 
diputación included seven districts in what are now Chiapas (Mexico), Hon-
duras, and El Salvador as well as Guatemala.
Where the shape or outline of  future Guatemala did become evident was in 
the districts sending the kingdom’s deputies to ordinary Cortes sessions  after 
figure 8.1. Pledging loyalty to Fernando VII: The Kingdom of Guatemala, 1809. José 
Casildo España, “Las provincias del reino de Guatemala ofreciendo SLlS corazones al 
holocaust.” In [Domingo Juarros], Guatemala por Fernando VII (Guatemala, 1809). 
Private collection. This engraving, one of several illustrations in a pamphlet celebrating 
the Kingdom of Guatemala’s loyalty to Spain during the imperial crisis unleashed by 
Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808, represents the territories many provinces, each 
with a distinct identity, professing loyalty to Spain.
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1812. The constitutional system introduced proportional repre sen ta tion by 
population. As a result, five of the kingdom’s twelve deputies (one per seventy 
thousand inhabitants) represented districts that  later joined the state of Guate-
mala.37 Perhaps not surprisingly, the preponderance of “Guatemalan” deputies 
did not contribute to greater internal connections. Rather, elections fostered 
localist creole and ladino “dreams” for more autonomy within the system; the 
instructions issued to parish priest José Cleto Montiel, the diputado of  Totoni-
capán and Quetzaltenango, repeated in 1821 recommendations for the separate 
institutions that the Quezaltenango ayuntamiento had proposed in 1814.38 In 
short, we can see a strong “Guatemalan” repre sen ta tion at the same time as a 
notable regionalism that would  later influence in de pen dence from Spain, both 
mixed with “liberal” demands for better education and “conservative” interest 
in a stronger ecclesiastic presence.
One constitutional change with impor tant postin de pen dence ramifications 
for Guatemala and the other federal states had to do with incorporating new 
communities as partners and citizens in the body politic. The constitutional 
period offered the indigenous pueblos and castas the opportunity to partici-
pate in the government and to elect representatives with the full support of 
local and imperial officials— although some, like Quezaltenango’s Spanish city 
council, argued that since the indigenous  were equal  under the law, they should 
also be  gently stimulated to be more productive.39 José Mariano Méndez in 
1821 was only repeating points made by Central American delegates since 1810 
when he defended the region’s mulattos’ right to vote, arguing that it was dif-
ficult to verify  whether they  were in fact African in origin.40 Beyond taking an 
active role in the region’s indirect elections, the K’iche communities of Totoni-
capán  rose up in 1820 to insist on implementation of constitutional provisions, 
successfully getting decrees abolishing tribute payments enforced.41
Since the new system also abolished protective institutions like separate ca-
bildos for Spaniards and indigenous residents, the changes also revealed fissures. 
The corregidor at Quetzaltenango unsuccessfully sought to reserve a third of 
the seats in a now combined city council for indigenous residents— a majority 
of the jurisdiction’s  people. Was the refusal a lack compassion or flexibility 
among local Creoles or an attempt to facilitate indigenous exclusion in the 
representative system?42 In 1820, the Quezaltenango cabildo sent the ladino 
militia to help put down an indigenous uprising at Totonicapán, outside its 
official jurisdiction.43 This example puts the spotlight on the highland capital’s 
ambition to be a provincial and not just district capital, and on the militari-
zation of disputes between ladino Quetzaltenango leadership and indigenous 
Totonicapán, a tendency that would resonate and amplify  after in de pen dence 
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from Spain, when Totonicapán sometimes sought support from Guatemala 
City against its neighbor.
Essentially, in the de cade leading to in de pen dence, ideas of po liti cal com-
munity and popu lar sovereignty offered optimism of a new contract between 
government and society, one based on participation and negotiation rather than 
imperial rule. Guatemala’s leaders adapted the inclusionary and individual po-
liti cal and individual citizenship of Cádiz and extended it in practice to all resi-
dents of Eu ro pean, indigenous, and African ancestry— ending separate rights 
for indigenous republics, rights liberals often saw as privileges. The period saw 
expanded municipal governments and provincial organ ization, which increased 
an institutional base for local and regional agendas. However, the Cádiz experi-
ment, which aimed to bind the Amer i cas to Spain, did not forge provincial 
structures that could help mold identities at a Guatermalan “state” level.
In the jurisdictions closest to Guatemala City, the highlands and Oriente 
drifted further apart, both in demography and economic interest, with no po-
liti cal structure in place to bind them to each other or to Guatemala City. Los 
Altos continued to look north to Mexican trade; the Oriente looked south to 
the  cattle business with Honduras and Nicaragua, while shuttling indigo to 
Atlantic ports. Guatemala City’s role as arbiter and central tax authority was 
insufficient to build community or consensus in a system that had a limited 
economic integration and no institutional base. So in August– December 1821, 
that is, at the moment of in de pen dence,  there was no unitary “Guatemalan” 
polity, ethnic, economic, or geographic. Any new state would be formed out of 
many and diverse districts, a composite organ ization with much to accomplish.
The Fissures of In de pen dence
The formation of a single Guatemalan state incorporating the three distinct 
regions did not happen in the period of Central Ame rica’s initial in de pen dence 
from 1821 to 1823. As they chose separation from Spain in the fall of 1821, Cen-
tral Ame rica’s territories opted (not without difficulties) to unite first with the 
nascent and short- lived Mexican empire of Agustín Iturbide, a pro cess called 
“conditional” in de pen dence by historian Mario Rodríguez.44 Guatemala City 
leaders tried and failed to control a pro cess that began with the decision of the 
town of Comitán, in the intendancy of Chiapas, to join Mexico. Despite an act 
of provisional in de pen dence issued in Guatemala City on September 15, 1821, 
offering full citizenship to  those of African origin and inviting a meeting of 
district representatives elected  under Cádiz rules to a Central American Con-
gress to determine the isthmus’ po liti cal  future, constitutional city councils and 
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provincial deputations issued their own acts, and many sought separate integra-
tion with Mexico.
Among the districts choosing in de pen dence from Spain and also Guatemala 
City, Quetzaltenango stood out, since it would  later joined the Guatemalan state. 
In late 1821, the town’s cabildo, aided by other officials in Los Altos, as historian 
Arturo Taracena writes, “succeeded  little by  little in centralizing discontent of 
Sololá, Suchitepéquez, and Huehuetenango  toward the city of Guatemala.”45 A 
similar divisive dynamic emerged in the territories that would soon form Hon-
duras and Nicaragua. Sparring cities sought  either to control or split provinces. 
Totonicapán again opposed Quetzaltenango’s ambition “to make itself capital 
and elevate itself to the Rank of intendancy,”46 skeptical that Quetzaltenango’s 
creoles and ladinos would re spect Totonicapán’s K’iche majority.47 Thus, two 
cities, Quezaltenango and Guatemala, offered themselves to Iturbide as sepa-
rate provincial or regional powers in the area that is now Guatemala. In the end, 
the Mexican government supported neither and, in 1822, divided the districts 
of the former captaincy general into three military commands with capitals in 
Chiapas, Guatemala, and León (Nicaragua). Keeping Guatemala City as a re-
gional capital, Iturbide essentially repeated the north/south divide established 
in Cádiz while carving off Chiapas, the only Central American province that 
republican Mexico kept when Iturbide’s empire dissolved in 1823.
Concerned with advancing po liti cal fragmentation, Central Ame rica’s prov-
inces (minus Chiapas) separated from Mexico in 1823, elected representatives 
to a National Constituent Assembly (anc) and put animosity aside to form 
the federal Republic of Central Ame rica. Although the federation’s fifteen- year 
life was plagued by conflict, decisions taken at the anc had long- term effects 
not only on the forms of government in the isthmus, but on the shape and size 
of the states that emerged as republics by the 1840s.
Not surprisingly, one contentious topic addressed by the anc’s almost three 
dozen representatives was how many and which states would or should com-
prise the new  union.48 Guatemala City leaders wanted to continue as capital 
city of a power ful and large Guatemalan state including nearby valleys as well 
as cacao- producing Soconusco, the sugar and indigo region of Sonsonate, and 
intensively cultivated and textile- producing Quezaltenango. By contrast, dep-
uties from several districts expressed reservations about the consequences of 
forming a strong Guatemalan state that included around a third of the isthmian 
population. Guatemalans won out when several delegates from the highlands 
(Altenses) with strong ties to the capital city supported their goal, rather 
than formation of a separate Los Altos with its capital in Quetzaltenango.49 
In April 1824, the anc refused Quezaltenango deputy Cirilo Flores’s request 
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to postpone Guatemala’s election of a state assembly pending a constitutional 
committee meeting, putting Altense dreams on hold.50 On May 11, 1824, the 
anc decreed state congresses for Guatemala, San Salvador, Honduras, Nica-
ragua, and Costa Rica, its hand forced by assemblies already convened in El 
Salvador and Costa Rica, paving the way for a federation composed of  these 
five states.
Guatemala became the federation’s largest state, incorporating Quezaltenango, 
the Central Valley, the Oriente, the Petén, and Verapaz, with a population of 
about six hundred thousand, around 60  percent of Central Ame rica’s overall 
population. This configuration assured the young state’s access to both Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans and markets.51 Why did federal delegates agree to a Gua-
temalan state with more than half the isthmian population? The indigenous 
majority of the highlands likely influenced the decision. If Central American 
deputies did not agree with the New Monthly Magazine’s correspondent that 
the “Indians in the vicinity of Guatemala are as yet in a wild state; they speak 
the indigenous language, and clothe themselves like savages,” they  were perhaps 
aware that Los Altos might be less appealing to the international community as a 
 viable state when other Central American states’ Indians largely spoke Spanish 
and dressed “ after the Eu ro pean fashion” and thus seemed “more civilized.”52 
The anc’s federal state making thus bundled three regions into a single state, 
leaving the Creole powers concentrated in Guatemala City and the ladinos of 
the Oriente to engage the Maya majority of the highlands. They would spend 
the next quarter  century seeking a new po liti cal order and negotiating to make 
that  union work.
Forming the State from Within
Forging enduring Guatemalan unity out of multiple colonial districts became 
the work of several generations. In its first year, however, the state of Guatemala 
seemed to get off to a relatively strong po liti cal and economic start. In Octo-
ber 1825, the Guatemalan constituent assembly  adopted a state constitution. It 
enacted decrees identifying territorial divisions and raising the status of sev-
eral towns throughout the territory. Taken together, the founding documents 
showed aspirations to create a modern state and build trust among the districts 
that combined to form it.
Po liti cally, the constitution established a “republican, popu lar, and repre-
sentative” government. Guatemala retained Catholicism as the official religion, 
but permitted private worship for other sects. A system of indirect elections 
(with popu lar, district, and departmental juntas electorales) adapted from the 
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Cádiz constitution offered a familiar system and increased repre sen ta tion to 
one congressman for  every 30,000 (rather than 70,000) inhabitants. It pro-
vided town governments for settlements with as few as 200 residents (rather 
than Cádiz’s 1,000).53 This emphasis on population as a basis for po liti cal repre-
sen ta tion gave the highland districts with over 200,000 mostly indigenous 
 people considerable weight; the more ladino Oriente had 130,000.54 The magna 
carta explic itly maintained the possibility of creating a new state from part of 
Guatemala’s territory, perhaps to ensure that Los Altos’s aspirations would not 
delay adoption. It also welcomed Sonsonate, should the federal government 
determine that the district should join Guatemala instead of El Salvador.55 In 
seeking unity, the founding texts of the new Guatemala left much unresolved.
Internally, consolidation also proved a challenge. The 1825 state constitu-
tion identified sixteen districts, which it combined into seven departments.56 
Over the next fifty years, that consolidation would be undone in pursuits 
of local rights: by 1877 Guatemala had twenty- two separate departments. 
The initial instinct to create departments equal in size, population, and eco-
nomic importance reflected the three major geographic regions: the Oriente 
included Verapaz and Chiquimula, bordering Mexico, Honduras, and El Sal-
vador; the Central Valleys provided the districts of Guatemala/Escuintla 
and Sacatepéquez/Chimaltenango; the populous, indigenous western high-
lands gained Quetzaltenango/Soconusco, Totonicapán/Huehuetenango, and 
Suchitepéquez/Sololá.
The division sought economic coherence. Sacatepéquez and Chimaltenango 
 were the breadbaskets of Guatemala City. By uniting Guatemala and Escuintla, 
Guatemala City achieved control of indigo- producing coastal regions as that 
colonial economic motor entered its last days.57 It also sought po liti cal peace, 
or at least balance: Totonicapán and Quezaltenango both became capitals, rec-
ognized in promotions to villa and city status, respectively.58 Verapaz took in 
Petén— a region subsequent governments considered largely underdeveloped, 
underpopulated, and ripe for colonization. Relocation of the new state’s capital 
from Antigua, midway between Quezaltenago and Guatemala City, to the lat-
ter in July 1825, however, worried highlands leaders.59 The highland elite’s am-
bitions remained alive. In 1838 and again in 1848, the chiefs of this area would 
lead separatist movements seeking their own state.
The founding documents aimed to create a unitary population in a society 
of distinct pueblos. On paper, in de pen dent Guatemala was optimistic, almost 
utopian. The egalitarian propositions of Cádiz and the act of in de pen dence 
 were embedded in both federal and state constitutions, by which, as the New 
Monthly Magazine observed, “the Indians have acquired the right of citizenship, 
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and are placed completely on an equality with the descendants of the Span-
iards.” Where  later historians saw hy poc risy or error, many contemporaries 
shared Guatemala’s enthusiasm for the social experiment, reporting that “they 
[the Indians] cannot, therefore, be other wise than attached to the new system, 
and many of their entire towns are open partizans of the republican govern-
ment.”60 The author believed that Guatemala could create a modern country by 
including rather than by separating and subjugating its indigenous inhabitants. 
He observed that, “in the first Constituent Assembly of Guatemala, in 1823, 
three Indian deputies took their seats, of whom two  were ecclesiastics. Besides 
which, an Indian was elected Senator, and sat in the assembly of the republic; . . . 
nor is it improbable that in the first sittings of the Congress, several Indians  will 
appear as deputies.” Further, while acknowledging that the Indians “lead a life 
of  great hardship,” he noted that “in the province of Guatemala and  those of 
Quetzaltenango,  there are many who possess sheep in abundance.  These persons 
avail themselves of the wool to weave stuffs of vari ous kinds. . . .  The Indians also 
manufacture cotton cloth higher in price than the stuffs we have just mentioned, 
and of which the Indian  women make use for dress, as well as the poor classes of 
 people in the cities.”61 The happy incorporation failed to materialize.
The combination of three distinct economies and geographic regions into 
a single state opened diverse economic possibilities. In its first year, Guatemala 
appeared poised to establish its importance to the international dye trade; in 
1824 the optimistic official newspaper reported an extension of commerce and 
the spread of production of grana (cochineal) in Sacatepéquez, Sololá, and 
Verapaz.62 In 1825, traveler Dr. Lavagnino reported on both indigo and cochi-
neal as “most known to commerce and most esteemed” in the New Monthly 
Magazine and also referred to “many mines of silver in the provinces,” princi-
pally the Chiquimula area in Guatemala as well as Tegucigalpa in Honduras.63 
Pursuit of export economies, however, sowed the seeds of  later conflict. The 
agrarian reform promulgated in Decree 27 (1825) promoted the expropriation 
of underutilized private property, giving the government power not only to sell 
to individual  owners, but also to reserve one- third of both coasts and some of 
the interior for colonization. Discontent  rose among small landowners, many 
of whom  were mulatto or ladino.64
A composite Guatemala, with its capital in Guatemala City but with po-
liti cal and geographic units recognizing existing divisions, seemed poised for 
growth. An expanding economy that might draw Creole, foreign, and indig-
enous elites to work with the new government might lead the way. At least tem-
porarily, the altense leadership was committed to participating in the composite 
state; Cirilo Flores of Quezaltenango served as vice president to President Juan 
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Barrundia Zepeda, both committed to a “liberal” program of economic devel-
opment and po liti cal republicanism. Had this state been a fully in de pen dent 
country, perhaps this initial collaboration would have had time to mature. 
The challenge of being the largest and most diverse state in a federation kept 
old conflicts alive— and created new ones.
The Challenges of Federation and Foreigners
Guatemala’s first years as a single entity  were complicated by antagonistic 
relations between the state and the federal governments. Federal president 
Manuel José Arce was po liti cally more moderate (and centralist) than the 
first Guatemalan elected chief of state, the federalist Juan Barrundia.65 With 
both governments based in Guatemala City, po liti cal disputes escalated into 
military conflict between 1826 and  1830. In 1826, Arce deposed Barrundia, 
and Guatemala’s vice chief, medical doctor Cirilo Flores, tried to govern from 
Quetzaltenango. His radical liberal legislation— which abolished the mer-
chants’ chamber, reduced the Church tithe by 50  percent, and permitted the 
 children of clergymen to inherit Church property— was not welcomed in 
highland communities. Although Flores was a local son and had represented 
the region in the Mexican Congress of 1822–1823, his po liti cal  career and life 
ended si mul ta neously in October 1826 when a crowd referred to variously as 
a “mob of fanatical Indians,” rabble, and the populacho, and led by  women, 
followed him into the sanctuary of a church, dragged him from the pulpit, 
and killed him.66 Without executive authority, Guatemala’s first government 
collapsed.
A dynamic that would repeat itself  until the end of federation ensued. Sta-
bility would be established when federal and state governments  were in sym-
pathy, but fall apart  either due to federal interference, as in 1825, or  because of 
internal divisions— either between Guatemala City and the regions, or within 
the ranks of Guatemala City’s leadership. From 1826 to 1829, Guatemala’s insta-
bility came from within. Federal president Arce convened a new Guatemalan 
Congress, and the more conservative Mariano Aycinena was elected as chief of 
state.67 His government is largely described as dictatorial and inflexible, al-
though this son of Guatemala’s Basque “aristocracy” succeeded in strengthening 
the state against federal pressures.68 Still, a civil war in which liberal governments 
in Honduras and El Salvador fought Guatemala’s leaders and federation forces 
continued from 1827 to early 1829, when the liberals, led by  future federal presi-
dent Francisco Morazán, achieved victory, sending Aycinena into exile in the 
United States— leaving a divided elite to face economic ruin.69
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In 1829, a “liberal” government took office in Guatemala  after returning the 
capital to Antigua. It was led by vice chief of state José Gregorio Márquez, who 
had represented the central district of Chimaltenango in the 1825 constituent 
assembly.70 War had reduced the economic bases of the new state, particularly 
in the Oriente whose towns and pastures  were on a road now transited more 
by soldiers than by  cattle.71 José Cecilio del Valle, in a pessimistic article for the 
Sociedad Económica in 1830, reported abundant natu ral resources and poten-
tial, but failure in “artisanal” development; the country lacked exports due to 
the abandonment of grana and indigo; it had failed to follow Havana’s lead and 
invest in coffee; and it lacked industry and roads for  either interior or exterior 
commerce. Aware of competition from textile production from Eu rope and 
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Asia, he did note that in de pen dence brought  free trade policies that increased 
the number of ships trading in local ports.72
Despite (or perhaps  because of )  these difficulties, Guatemala’s principal fami-
lies disdained compromise. Conservatives refused an invitation to participate in 
a triumvirate executive that might have offered some balance to the government. 
Without them, a more radical legislative assembly abolished all the decrees of 
1826–1829 and exiled many Spanish- born residents, including the archbishop 
and members of the former government; it assigned “forced loans” to  those they 
called traitors, abolished religious  orders and confiscated their properties.73 
A few years of self- government achieved what in de pen dence could not: a hard 
break between Spaniard and Creole; several Spanish families  were sent into exile.
Six years  after its constitution and foundational legislation, the state of 
Guatemala received a respite from internal and external pressures. With the 
election of Mariano Gálvez as president, a new liberal government pursued 
Guatemala’s economic and po liti cal promise through transforming legislation. 
 Under Gálvez the Guatemalan and federation governments cohabitated in Gua-
temala City,  until the latter moved to San Salvador in 1834; for a time they 
collaborated, and experienced the necessary peace to experiment with state 
building. A sign that the new Guatemalan state was getting ready to claim the 
world’s attention was Gálvez’s commission of the country’s first history and 
map, influenced by José Cecilio del Valle’s recommendations. A former impe-
rial bureaucrat and a long- term thinker, del Valle understood a point  later his-
torians would underline: maps and the knowledge they represented  were tools 
for the government to use internally to exert control and externally to make 
po liti cal and economic connections abroad.74
Guatemala’s first atlas, published in 1832 by Miguel Rivera Maestre, with one 
map of the  whole country and a map of each department, 75 complemented a 
history of the con temporary period commissioned by Alejandro Marure. The 
legislature, for its part, commissioned a compilation of state laws in 1836.76 
Gálvez also sent Juan Galindo, Marure, and  others to inspect and document 
pre- Hispanic ruins to help claim and recover Guatemala’s ancient past.77 Map, 
history, and  legal rec ord— all three texts spoke to a consolidating Guatemala 
with a land, a past, and a  legal code focused on its current territory, not the 
entire isthmus. When Marure’s second edition of Bosquejo histórico de las revo­
luciones de Centroamérica was published in 1877, historian Lorenzo Montúfar 
emphasized that Gálvez had commissioned it so “his patria could be known in 
both worlds.”78 At the level of state government, Guatemala was taking shape. 
Still, the frontiers with Mexico and Belize remain vague.
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Part of becoming known was applying what many considered foreign princi-
ples in the new state. The Gálvez government embraced the idea of legislating 
pro gress and building a new nation as well as a new state. In his 1836 message 
to the Guatemalan Congress, Gálvez emphasized “innovation.” He insisted on 
making “every thing new, every thing republican: nothing of the colonial, mo-
narchical system”  because, other wise, “for In de pen dence, we would have done 
nothing more than change the name of  things.”79 To deliver this program, his 
government undertook to change  legal and social culture, and to impose a new 
liberal po liti cal system that emphasized equality  under the law as the way to 
end distinctions among persons of diff er ent race or class, and to provide equal 
opportunities. Many laws passed between 1832 and  1836 sought to reduce 
Church influence in society: in 1833 the formerly Jesuit University of San Car-
los was converted into a secular Acad emy of Studies; in 1837, the legislature 
enacted civil matrimony, allowing not only nullification but divorce; it abol-
ished payment of Church tithes, ended religious holidays, declared freedom 
of conscience (religion), and more.80 To broaden po liti cal participation, the 
figure 8.2. Mapping a new country: Guatemala, 1832.  
Courtesy of the Latin American Library, Tulane University
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Gálvez government extended more autonomy to the municipalities, enabling 
the “pueblos [to} administer their business” and use that in de pen dence to join 
in “the practical applications of the representative and federal system.”81
The most innovative effort was to “modernize” the judicial system by trans-
lating and adapting the Livingston Codes. Gálvez considered a system that 
mixed old Spanish laws and  orders with Cádiz- era and federation documents a 
disorded mess that contributed to criminal be hav ior. A committee adapted the 
Livingston system (created and then rejected by the Louisiana legislature) to 
the Guatemalan context. The assembly approved five codes and a definitional 
law between 1834 and  1836 and published “lessons” in the Seminario Guate­
malteco and other newspapers in 1837.82 The new jury system proposed a turn 
away from long- standing traditions of separate justice for diff er ent social and 
ethnic groups— and differening bodies such as the Church and the military. The 
goal was to create a liberal and modern nation- state by ending the role of single 
salaried judges and having  people on juries take on judicial responsibilities.83 Im-
plementation proved difficult and in practice the results  were negligible. With 
the exception of habeas corpus provisions, in March 1838 the new codes  were 
suspended due to “the sad results of this premature intent and  great discontent 
in the pueblos.”84 Did the latter prefer traditional ways of separate justice?
Gálvez’s interest in innovation was sometimes offset by practical consider-
ations. When a national law did not exist, legislation indicated that the govern-
ment should rely on Spanish pre ce dent.85 The executive branch relied on jefes de 
departamento who played almost the same role as the governors and jefes politicos 
of the ancient regime and Cádiz experiment. Nor did Gálvez try to change the 
role of municipalities, created  under Cádiz, which collected the new taxes, built 
and maintained prisons, administered primary schools, and recruited for the 
military. The Church did not stop registering births, marriage, and death, even 
if the law had removed this responsibility. Further, traditional alcaldes (magis-
trates) continued to serve as local judges,  either  under the new  legal system or, 
 after elected judges (jueces de primera instancia)  were established, de facto when 
 there  were not enough legally trained individuals to hold  these offices; a jury 
system, again  adopted, was rejected by many citizens as well.86
At the socioeconomic level, Gálvez promoted cochineal and indigo produc-
tion; imported the first coffee seeds from Havana; planned roads, ports, and 
other public works; designed a new public education system; and dreamed of 
prosperity for the new country, which he achieved to a limited extent.87 With 
amicable relations between state and federation,  there  were economic advances. 
In his address to Congress in 1837, the chief of state boasted that commerce had 
doubled from 1834 to 1836. In this economic climate, it is perhaps not surprising 
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that  there was a mea sure of reconciliation between  those who lost the civil war 
of 1826–1829 and the liberal government. Notably, in 1834 “the aristocracy” at-
tended the In de pen dence Day cele bration (September 15), followed by Gálvez’s 
reelection in 1835, symbolically sealing the rapprochement.88
Unfortunately, elite consensus in the capital prompted conflict with large 
segments of society in both the Oriente and the highlands. The Gálvez admin-
istration’s promotion of commercial development, in the form of individual 
and private com pany acquisition of what the government defined as public 
land, frequently infringed on lands owned by Maya communities and ladino 
peasants in central and eastern Guatemala— despite a stated re spect for com-
munal lands. Such policies provoked increasing challenges, not only by the 
poor but also by men like mulatto landowner Teodoro Mexía of Santa Rosa.89 
While an April 17, 1835, legislative order established a commission to hear and 
respond to land disputes,  little changed before rebellions broke out throughout 
the Southeast in 1837.90
In addition, despite aspirations to create more equitable socioeconomic re-
lations based on equality before the law, the state government sometimes aban-
doned theory for repressive practice. In 1835, President Gálvez responded to 
news of insecurity and an assault on the road to El Salvador by abolishing mu-
nicipal governments in the Oriente, “substituting in their place local justices.”91 
In the pueblos of Santa Rosa Department, including Jalpatagua and Moyuta, 
a general discontent centered on what seemed an arbitrary state interest in re-
ducing local governmental autonomy to “or ga nize the social, religious, cultural 
and economic life of the communities.”92
In the Oriente, or Montaña, discontent grew in response to policies that 
promoted foreign investment and “colonization” (or expropriation of land for 
foreigners) in about half the state’s territory— through contracts Gálvez signed 
with Belgian and British companies with support from the federal govern-
ment.93 While cochineal production assured Guatemala a “dominant posi-
tion among the Central American states in its trade with  Eng land,” former 
Bonapartist officers from France, unscrupulous bankers from  Eng land, Protes-
tant missionaries and educators from the United States, and Belgian colonists 
who found their way into Guatemalan society created tensions within the new 
country. Although they  were only a handful, and some established joint com-
panies with local merchants, foreign residents resisted paying war taxes. Their 
tendency to support their own, rather than local, interests and call on their 
consuls to bring in warships to defend them made them flashpoints for local 
dissatisfaction. 94
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A cholera morbus epidemic in Verapáz and Chiquimula compounded the 
challenges. Recent Protestant settlers  were  imagined responsible; doctors and 
officials trying to contain the outbreak  were accused on being “poisoners,” spark-
ing a revolt in June 1837 that transformed into the “war of the Mountain.”95 
An uprising begun by rural residents shouting “Long live religion and death 
to foreigners!” spread with the support of  those whose power had diminished 
 under liberal influence— namely, merchants and power ful families in Guate-
mala City, some members of the Church hierarchy, as well as landed  people 
in the Montaña increasingly beleaguered by state policies. Gálvez, who had 
repeatedly resisted accepting election to a second term, was forced from office 
in February 1838.96 As Ralph Lee Woodward concluded, the force necessary to 
implement the liberal programs seemed to contradict the rhe toric of liberty.97
As the state was embattled in the Oriente, Quetzaltenango’s ambitions to form 
its own country resurfaced. On February 2, 1838, deputies met in Quetzaltenango 
and declared the state of Los Altos. The federal Congress, meeting in El Salva-
dor, authorized the secession, despite its own waning authority. Guatemala’s 
Congress accepted the decision.98 Guatemala City’s interest in the highlands 
proved insufficient to give leaders an appetite for civil war, or a war that might 
pit it against even a weakened federation government.
Quetzaltenango’s ambitions  were also, as Arturo Taracena argues, an indig-
enous nightmare. If Los Altos’s ladinos protested liberal reforms, the indige-
nous in some communities preferred the central Guatemalan government. The 
Los Altos leadership enticed three towns of Suchitepéquez to join their sixth 
state in 1838 by offering department status to their unified districts.99 Other 
Indian villages met and opposed the Altense proj ect to create a sixth Central 
American state. Throughout February and March, Zutuhil municipalities— 
San Pedro, San Juan La Laguna, San Marcos la Laguna, and Santiago Atitlán— 
wrote to the Guatemalan government opposing a state they claimed would harm 
established commerce between the lake zone and Guatemala City and lead to 
double taxation. Kuiché municipality Joyabaj also mistrusted Quetzaltenango’s 
reassurances. When Quetzaltenango sought to collect taxes in Santa Catarina 
Ixtahuacán (Sololá) and San Sebastián (Retahuleu), the villages held cabildos 
abiertos and refused. In short, some highland communities turned to Guate-
mala’s government for support against Quetzaltanango’s ladinos, only to find 
that that the state quickly warned Los Altos of complaints from “subjects of an 
in de pen dent state.” The indigenous municipalities first sought to resolve their 
conflict directly with Los Altos authorities, and then with Guatemala’s aid. 
Only when both state governments appeared deaf to their complaints did they 
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join Rafael Carrera and the Oriente’s forces to compel change at the top.100 
Once both the highlands and Oriente opposed the central government, the 
Gálvez administration fell.
From State to Republic
By late 1838 Guatemala’s survival,  whether as a federal state or in de pen dent 
country, was in doubt. In 1839, president Mariano Rivera Paz called on the pa-
triotism of Guatemala’s constituent assembly to help restore a country whose 
“society seemed dissolved,” led to the brink of “misery and disorganization” 
by inexperience, “revolutionary furor,” and a fetish for “all that is new and the 
desire to destroy all that existed.”101 Yet conservative policies proved equally 
divisive. Guatemala required a de cade to transition from weak federal state to 
 viable republic, twice forcibly putting down revolt in the Oriente and rein-
corporating Los Altos (1839). It declared provisional separation from the fed-
eration (1839), defeated federal president Francisco Morazán and his largely 
Honduran and Salvadoran forces (1840), and suppressed a new rebellion in the 
Oriente (1847).102 Still, Guatemala’s general outlines became clear soon  after 
Gálvez’s government collapsed.  Under a government established by an Oriente 
rebel, the mestizo or ladino Rafael Carrera, a veneer of normalcy returned, al-
beit with more emphasis on economic than on universal rights. Guatemalan 
legislators repealed many “innovations” of the first period— abandoning the 
experiment in universal and individual rights, as well as Gálvez’s anticlerical 
policy—in search of formulas that contributed to stability. Carrera was an 
implacable  enemy of the federation  after its army had tried to vanquish him. 
The leadership of Mariano Rivera Paz (1839–1844), and Carrera (1844–1848; 
1851–1865) led to Guatemala’s emergence as an in de pen dent republic in 1847 
and prevented Central Ame rica’s other states from reestablishing the  union.
Carrera’s  humble origins as an illiterate pig- herder from the Oriente and his 
mixed- race ancestry led many nineteenth- century critics to label him a “cel-
ebrated Indian despot” (1857)103 and “dark colored and ill- looking mestizo.”104 
His support, according to many contemporaries, came from the priesthood 
and “his subordinate instruments, generally Indian or half breeds” 105 or merely 
from the Indians, while all other “classes . . .  have never ceased to hate and fear 
him, and watch for an opportunity to overturn his power.”106 Ralph Lee Wood-
ward Jr., René Reeves, Douglass  Sullivan- González, and  others have champi-
oned a more nuanced approach to his  career, which put the first acknowledged 
non- European in control of the country and, for some, initiated the rise of the 
ladino state.107  Sullivan- González in par tic u lar shows that the Church,  under 
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Antonio Larrazábal and  later Antonio García Peláez, was a tentative ally, will-
ing to call for patriotism and unity although not always to put its wealth or 
clergy into rebellious communities.108
During what many call the conservative regime (1839–1871), Guatemala’s 
leaders failed to pass a new constitution. They governed with “Constitutive 
Laws” approved in 1839 by a Constituent Assembly: one each for executive (De-
cree 65) and judicial (Decree 75) power, and (Decree 76): Declaration of the 
Rights of the State and its Inhabitants.109 Decree 65 heralded an increasingly 
power ful executive, adopting the title of “president” for the supreme executive 
figure 8.3. Leading a new country: Rafael Carrera
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authority.110 Decree 76 declared the state “sovereign,  free and In de pen dent,” 
while still insisting on the sovereignty of the internal pueblos; it reestablished Ca-
tholicism as the official religion and created a separate status for the indigenous, 
who supposedly lacked “the ilustración (understanding/education) sufficient to 
know and defend their own rights.” The code protected the property of any 
“population, corporation or person” and insisted on individual rights, includ-
ing  those of making  wills and expressing opinions, while it prohibited torture 
and illegal detention.111
Other legislation overtly recalled the colonial system. In 1838, the assembly 
reestablished the mint and the merchant’s chamber with their separate rights, 
or fueros. It then replaced jefes departamentales with corregidores, reestablished 
ecclesiastic supervision of education and  adopted a system of residencies (end 
of term reviews) for state officials; it reestablished the Church’s fuero.112 Vot-
ing for city councilors was restricted to sitting members, who  were required to 
choose among former councilors.113 The legislative assembly also revoked the 
exile of Archbishop Ramón Casáus y Torres, appointed by King Ferdinand VII, 
reopened monastic  orders, and resumed collecting Church tithes. Courts, too, 
returned to using the Recopilación de Indias in cases that seemed appropriate.114
For  those who saw the liberal- republican system as a menace to local au-
tonomy and the culture of indigenous republics, this policy represented not 
a retreat from modernity, but an attempt to overcome the government’s clear 
weakness and inability to control the country.115 The reversion to po liti cal 
pro cesses grounded in ways that had ruled for centuries before 1808 resolved 
prob lems inherent in a country with a large rural, illiterate population— long 
adapted to earlier Spanish ways. A deputy in Guatemala’s 1839 legislature re-
ported that the town of Comalapa (Chimaltenango) lived “major disorder” in 
all aspects of governance from the administration of justice to tax collection, 
maintenance of town buildings, including the jail, which “is a lake inside.” Ac-
cording to one Indian alcalde, the disasters stemmed in part from the move 
from perpetual to elected alcaldes, who  were replaced before they began to un-
dertake proj ects.116 In other towns, lack of literate residents to serve municipal 
posts undermined new ways of government. The governor of Verapáz reported 
to Congress that only one ladino in the Indian villages of Cahabón and Lan-
quín could read and speak Spanish. Over the ladino’s protests, the governor 
named him alcalde and ordered him to communicate government decrees and 
 orders. The unwilling official reported back that the towns’ municipales (coun-
cilors)  were inebriated and spent locally the funds collected for the national 
war tax.117 Such reports suggest that many indigenous communities preferred 
to live by their own cultures— and keep revenues at home. No won der earlier 
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administrations’ attempts to press structural changes had proved both in effec-
tive and unpopular. Gálvez’s anticlerical policies had led to reductions in the 
number of clergy in rural parishes; with the return of stronger Church- state 
relations, priests resumed their function as official and unofficial state agents in 
communities long accustomed to their presence, helping to inculcate a Guate-
malan identity as well as religious values in their sermons.118
While socially conservative steps aimed to stabilize the Guatemalan state, 
much new law passed between 1838 and 1848 promoted exports and commercial 
life, as in the foundation of a national bank.119 The new government continued 
to welcome Eu ro pean immigrants, with a  little more caution than Gálvez 
had shown.  Under Carrera and his supporters, German colonists established 
farms on what would emerge as the Costa Cuca coffee regions in the western 
highlands.120  Under conservative government,  legal compilations— the first by 
Alejandro Marure, covering to 1841, and the second by Andrés Fuentes Franco, 
reaching to 1856— were published.121 Also, if Guatemala  under Carrera reestab-
lished religious education and the colonial Universidad de San Carlos, the latter 
retained “liberal” professors like Friar José Mariano Herrarte (theology and 
law) to promote what historian Blake Pattridge calls “catholic liberalism”— the 
parts of liberalism that remained in effect  until the Reforma of 1871 reestab-
lished a government that called itself liberal. Pattridge found a dynamic curric-
ulum, with students embarking on professional studies in French and En glish 
languages, surveyors’ training, and programs in medicine and law. The con-
servative government attempted to balance a still precarious po liti cal situation 
with programs promoting commercial development.
A Conservative Republic
At the end of the period considered  here, as Guatemala fi nally called the 
world’s attention to itself as a fully in de pen dent republic, a liberal “revolution” 
in 1848 came followed by the establishment in 1851 of a conservative republic 
that institutionalized presidential government and militarized the state. Both 
remained axes of national authority into the twentieth  century. It took a per-
sonalist dictatorship that recognized regional and local differences rather than 
a democracy that attempted to legistlate homogenizing laws and common 
rights to link three regions and distinct interest groups— economic, ethnic, 
political— together in a single country.
On March  21, 1847, Rafael Carrera declared Guatemala a republic. He re-
jected the right of the western highlands, Los Altos, to form a separate state. For 
the first time, he declared Guatemala “indivisible.”122 In addition, he signaled 
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his hope that Central Ame rica’s other federal states would follow his example. 
According to Carrera, the states “despite the reduction suffered in their wealth 
and population . . .  comprise sufficient ele ments to constitute themselves into 
in de pen dent Republics, and in the full capacity of po liti cal bodies. Thus they 
have existed, in fact, since the Federation dissolved, or better said, since they 
shook off the yoke of Spain.”123 Carrera astutely and accurately presented his 
decision as consonant with liberal policy, citing a law approved by two legisla-
tures in 1833 that permitted the state of Guatemala “if the federal pact  were to 
falter” to consider itself as “or ga nized prior to that pact” to form a new social 
compact or “constitute itself for itself alone.”124 At the request of José Fran-
cisco Barrundia, a former radical, the Guatemalan constituent assembly rati-
fied Carrera’s decision for in de pen dence and absolute sovereignty. On the same 
date, Carrera called on Guatemalans to watch over “the Republic that I leave 
founded . . .  with  great ele ments of power.”125
If Guatemala’s entry into the world as an in de pen dent republic began auspi-
ciously, over the next four years the country suffered regional conflicts similar to 
 those that divided  it after the hasty marriage of Los Altos, Oriente, and Gua-
temala City in 1825. Ralph Lee Woodward describes 1848 as a decisive year 
and a failed revolution. More comprehensively, Douglass  Sullivan- González 
sees 1847–1851 as marked by a civil war brought on by Carrera’s inability to ad-
dress the needs of struggling sharecroppers in the Oriente— while dealing with 
overtures to British colonization proj ects, liberal opportunism, and western 
highland indigenous communities’ re sis tance to land challenges pressed by la-
dinos.126 A generation into statehood, Guatemala still lacked a unitary trajec-
tory. Both conservative constitutional rule and liberal governance had proved 
in effec tive at creating po liti cal unity— and no new economy had risen to inte-
grate the  imagined nation within or to forge strong ties to an emerging indus-
trial world.
In early 1847, a new rebellion broke out in the Montaña on Carrera’s Palencia 
estate. The president dedicated the next year to pacifying the Oriente’s  peoples. 
He cited laws Gálvez passed against his own revolt to justify application of 
military justice to the rebels.127 He agreed to call elections for a new legislative 
assembly, a demand by liberals who then won, installed their legislative assem-
bly, and established a government in August 1848, surprising many.128 Carrera 
withdrew to Mexico for the next year. Instead of bringing peace, the new liberal 
government exacerbated prob lems.
Its forces proved as incapable as Carrera’s in pacifying the Oriente. In the 
western highlands Quetzaltenango leveraged the crisis to again demand sepa-
The Republic of Guatemala — 305
ration and an in de pen dent state. Neither rebellion’s leaders accepted amnesty 
and invitations to become departmental governors, despite an offer to establish 
new ejidos for Oriente communities that had lost their lands. On August 26, 
1848, the Quetzaltenango city council pronounced its separation from Guate-
mala. It saw the June 15, 1838, federal decree and reintegration in 1840 as the 
“effect of force and terror,” thus Los Altos’s reincorporation into Guatemala 
was illegal. With Carrera’s temporary fall in 1848, they insisted on having been 
“placed anew in the exercise of their Sovereignty and In de pen dence.”129 With 
support from leaders from the Montaña, Quetzaltenango formed a governing 
junta representing four of six Los Altos districts (Sololá and Suchitepéquez 
sent no delegates); an interim government pronounced in  favor of the Los 
Altos constitution. El Salvador recognized the new state. In Guatemala, a com-
mittee of the legislative assembly studying the case vacillated; it would make no 
decision  until  every Altense municipality expressed its opinion.130 Guatemala’s 
interim president, Juan Antonio Martínez, then declared war against the Los 
Altos junta, capturing Quetzaltenango on October 25. The separatist movement 
withered, and the region was permanently integrated into the Guatemalan 
republic.
By late 1848, with the Oriente rebellion led by  brothers Serapio and Vicente 
Cruz still strong and  after two changes of executive power, Guatemala’s liberal 
assembly named Col o nel Mariano Paredes interim president. An apo liti cal mil-
itary man, Paredes reestablished order, working with moderates while increas-
ing military influence. His ascendancy signaled the end of liberal government 
in Guatemala for a quarter  century. Carrera returned from exile in Mexico and 
 little by  little reinserted himself into public life, helping put down Altense and 
Oriente rebellions, and recovering the presidency in 1851. Although Decree 76 
continued “in force as fundamental law”  until 1871, Carrera’s return brought 
impor tant modifications. An October 19 constitutive act created a presiden-
tialist state run by a president who was both “first magistrate” and “govern-
ing authority of the nation.”131 Elected not by the  people, but by a “general 
assembly” composed of members of the legislative chamber, the archbishop, 
supreme court, and members of the Council of State, the president was eligible 
for four- year renewable terms in office. The fifty- five representatives  were not 
considered “legislators”  because they shared the work of legislating with the 
president.132 This charter was revised on January 29, 1855, to name Rafael Car-
rera president for life (presidente vitalicio), a position he retained  until his death 
in 1865.133 The experiment of a national state built on popu lar sovereignty was 
suspended.
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Country of Continuities and Ruptures
The history of Guatemala from 1759 to 1851 is one of rupture and reconcili-
ation.  Under Bourbon reforms and Cádiz government, the districts around 
Guatemala City participated in the modernization of the relationship between 
government and society, accepting greater government authority and experi-
menting with direct and indirect elections and equality before the law. They 
did not, however, form a single polity or society. The challenge of in de pen dence 
was to join territories with distinct populations, economies, and leaderships 
into a  whole. Nation formation did not build on enduring po liti cal relation-
ships, but re- created them in thirty years of trial and error from 1821 to 1851. 
The Republic of Guatemala was very much a new country.
From the establishment of the Guatemalan state in 1825, with its constitution 
and representative government,  until the fall of Mariano Gálvez’s government in 
1838, the Hispanic revolution that was part of the Atlantic revolutions was imple-
mented first to break with ancien régime practices and then to continue the 
“Cádiz revolution” in an in de pen dent country. With the revolution or rebellion 
“of the Montaña” in 1838, the pendulum swung back and conservatives found in 
caudillo Rafael Carrera the possibility to break with Gálvez- era “innovation.” A 
third revolution in 1848 briefly returned more moderate “innovators” to pro-
mote their system of liberties, individual rights, and representative institutions 
 until Carrera initiated autocratic government ( under constitutional laws)  until 
1871. If they began with diff er ent ideas about how to build a state, Guatemalan 
leaders came to accept the need to establish enduring institutions that covered 
the three major geographic regions brought together together in 1825.
They participated  under Barrundia, Gálvez, and Carrera’s leadership by 
seeking to develop agricultural products for export, to improve state infrastruc-
ture, and to offer national and international investors a population that would 
work hard and re spect the rules. Gálvez and the liberals tried (at least on paper) 
to create a nation of equals before the law— a national pueblo. By midcentury, 
Carrera and his allies and successors paused that experiment to focus on bind-
ing together regional, ethnic, and economic interests that remained disperate, 
despite liberal efforts to legislate unity.
By 1851, Guatemala was a sovereign republic. Although its international 
limits required formal recognition by its neighbors, the country’s territory and 
existence  were largely accepted at home and abroad. Los Altos and Oriente 
accepted Guatemala’s authority. The government deployed military, ecclesias-
tic, and civil authorities to promote the state agenda in the countryside. The 
population remained largely rural, but cities started to attract new residents. 
The first coffee producers  were finding an export market. Privatization of 
The Republic of Guatemala — 307
indigenous lands had started, pushed in part by the arrival of entrepreneurial 
Eu ro pean immigrants, even though grandiose proj ects for foreign colonization 
fizzled. Some indigenous “became” ladinos, a pro cess of cultural assimilation 
common in Central Ame rica, but substantial Mayan populations retained their 
languages, customs, and tendency to cooperate with or defy the state to suit local 
interests. The rise of “ladino” power was not yet fully part of the po liti cal, 
economic, or cultural landscape.
By 1841, national laws  were codified— without a constitutional implanta-
tion of national sovereignty and legistlative rights to serve as bulwark against 
executive power. The mid- nineteenth- century Guatemalan state was personal-
ist, the price of a fragile unity.  Future governments would seek to solve prob-
lems by legistlating for “Guatemalan” conditions that remained marked by deep 
internal disparities, often forgetting their origins in the three separate po liti cal, 
economic, and cultural entities stiched together to make a nation.
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I have taken only  those mea sures that have been necessary for the support, protection, 
tranquility, and conservation of the Spanish criollos, of the mestizos, zambos and Indians. 
For all of them [are] countrymen and compatriots born in our land. — josé gabriel 
túpac amaru, 1780
Bolivia and southern Peru are homogeneous. . . .  My goal is to do well and raise  these 
two portions of territory, if I am able, to the height of civilization and common welfare. 
— andrés de santa cruz, 1837
At first glance, Andean history illustrates well the theme of divergence in the 
era of New World in de pen dence. In 1500, the Inkas exerted influence over the 
most expansive American empire from Cusco; before the end of that  century 
the new Spanish metropolis of Potosí became a nerve center of the global 
economy. But silver production declined  after 1650, and in the early nineteenth 
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 century the region broke into multiple countries governed by weak states and 
lacking cohesive national identities.1 That outcome was not inevitable. This 
chapter explores the forces of convergence and divergence within the Andean 
heartland— core highlands ranging from the regions around the once Inka cap-
ital at Cusco to the  later mining metropolis at Potosí and its hinterlands—to 
understand how  peoples with a long history of interactions came to separate 
into two nations: Peru and Bolivia.2
Inka roads, armies, and exchanges integrated the heartland in the fifteenth 
 century. Spanish rule linked the region to the global silver economy in the six-
teenth  century, but preserved strong indigenous leadership, ways of produc-
tion, and cultural customs at the local level. Although the heartland was split 
between two viceroyalties in 1776, economic, social, and cultural integrations 
persisted as evidenced by the uprisings of the 1780s, famously led by Túpac 
Amaru. Although po liti cal rivalries during the wars of in de pen dence led to the 
establishment of separate nations, the foundation of Peru and Bolivia as new 
countries was contingent— a historical pro cess in need of explanation.
The heartland was the core of what had been a larger Andean zone of re-
source exchange and empire building. Beginning almost four thousand years 
ago, Andean  peoples began to develop settled agricultural communities and 
systems of exchange that distributed products such as corn, tubers, wool, and 
coca among highly diversified ecological zones from the coast to the high al-
titude plains. From the shores of Lake Titicaca, Tiwanaku expanded its influ-
ence over much of the southern Andes between 550 and 950, while the Wari 
held sway over the central zone (much of con temporary Peru). Over the 
course of the fifteenth  century the Inka built an empire— Tawantinsuyu or 
the Land of Four Quarters— that expanded even beyond the former Tiwan-
aku and Wari territories. Some of  those recently conquered Andean  peoples 
helped Spanish invaders defeat the Inka in the sixteenth  century, and  under 
this new empire the silver extracted by indigenous laborers from the rich 
mountain of Potosí flowed across both the Atlantic and Pacific, much of 
it to meet high demand in China.3 Wealthy Spanish miners, in turn, could 
import luxurious silks and wines to make life in the harsh environment more 
tolerable. Silver also stimulated commerce throughout the Andes to meet the 
needs of workers and provide supplies for mining: woolens arrived from far- off 
Quito, while mules raised to the south near Tucumán met demand for power 
and transportation.4
Spanish colonialism dramatically affected Andean society by pulling native 
 peoples into a commercial economy and siphoning  labor power from agricul-
tural communities to the mines. Nonetheless, unlike the case of mining centers 
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in Spanish North Ame rica, as analyzed by Alfredo Ávila and John Tutino,  these 
forces did not make “a new world.”5 Rather, native Andeans in the heartland 
resiliently adapted their cultural traditions and social relations to changing 
conditions and demands. Although Potosí itself was a new metropolis— with a 
population in 1600 of about one hundred thousand at an elevation of thirteen 
thousand feet—it grew within a long- settled region. Despite dramatic demo-
graphic decline, the indigenous population of the Andean heartland provided 
 labor for the mines, about half of it from a forced draft (the mitá). In addition to 
taxes on silver and trade, a separate tax on the indigenous population was criti-
cal to colonial (and  later national) revenue. Traditional authorities (kurakas 
in Quechua, caciques in Spanish) and many commoners viewed this tribute as 
guaranteeing a degree of self- rule, access to communal landholdings, and an ex-
emption from sales taxes when they sold their products in markets. Native An-
deans without land or herds, on the other hand, often resisted payment.6 From 
1630 to 1730, silver production in Potosí declined, but agriculturalists and herd-
ers in the heartland— many of them members of indigenous communities— 
continued to exchange goods through regional trade networks. When silver 
began a modest recovery in the eigh teenth  century, the south- central highlands 
along with their connected tropical valleys (yungas)  were able to meet the de-
mand for supplies: sugar, cocoa, wine and brandy, woolen textiles and hides, 
meat, grains and tubers. While much reduced from the Inka realm of Tawantin-
suyu, this region included much of its former core (Cusco and the heartlands of 
the southeastern quarter named Kollasuyu).
The integration created by cultural ties, trade networks, and  labor migra-
tion, however, was repeatedly ignored when po liti cal authorities drew and re-
drew borders in the eigh teenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1776, the Spanish 
Bourbons removed the provinces of Upper Peru, including Puno, from the au-
thority of Lima and joined them to the newly created Viceroyalty of Río de la 
Plata, with its capital in the Atlantic port of Buenos Aires. The break, however, 
was anything but clean. Although silver from Potosí was henceforth exported 
through Buenos Aires, communities on both sides of the new administrative 
border continued to provide  labor and supplies. With the establishment of 
a Cusco Audiencia (High Court) in 1788, three provinces of Puno  were put 
 under its jurisdiction, while the rest continued to report to the Audiencia 
of Charcas in Chuquisaca  until the entire Intendancy of Puno was returned to 
Peru in 1796. An 1801 proposal to create a new viceroyalty encompassing heart-
land provinces of Cusco, Puno, and Charcas made sense, but did not come to 
fruition.7 In 1825, Simón Bolívar sanctioned the creation of a nation, named in 
his honor, in de pen dent of  either Peru or the United Provinces of the Río de la 
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Plata (which included the  future Paraguay and Uruguay as well as Argentina). 
He still hoped to build a  grand Andean federation that never materialized. Fi-
nally, in the wake of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), Bolivia lost its Pacific 
port and Peru its rich nitrate fields to the expanding nation of Chile.
Despite cultural diversity and economic differentiation within the Andean 
heartland, one does not need to resort to counterfactuals to find po liti cal at-
tempts to reintegrate the region. The  great Andean rebellions of 1780 to 1782 
encompassed this entire zone, and when the capture of Fernando VII created 
an imperial crisis in 1808, Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal reclaimed Upper 
Peru in a bid to weaken the rebels of Buenos Aires. The last Spanish viceroy of 
Peru, José de la Serna, retreated to the highlands, making Cusco the effective 
capital and allowing members of its cabildo and Audiencia to imagine a His-
panic reincarnation of the Inka empire. In de pen dence- era leaders did not view 
the division of the region into separate nations a foregone conclusion. Even 
 after a congress in “Upper Peru” declared its in de pen dence as Bolivia in 1825, 
vari ous schemes  imagined reuniting the two “Perus.” Andrés de Santa Cruz led 
the most promising attempt; he saw himself as a citizen of both nations and 
joined them in confederation from 1836 to 1839.
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Map 9.1. The Andean heartland, ca. 1776
Although the attempts at in de pen dence- era po liti cal integration of the An-
dean heartland failed, owing to internal rivalries as well as external opposition, 
they challenge us to consider alternatives to the separate nations of Peru and 
Bolivia. As in Central Ame rica, drawing national bound aries  after in de pen-
dence was a complicated and contingent pro cess.  There, as Jordana Dym traces, 
Guatemala emerged from pro cesses of both fragmentation (separation from 
the larger federation) and integration (strengthening the economic and po liti-
cal ties among three distinct regions).8 In the Andes, inhabitants of a territory 
that had been cohesive for centuries  were unable to overcome administrative 
divisions introduced by the Bourbons and reaffirmed out of po liti cal expedi-
ency  after the defeat of the royal army.
Given the contingency of their separation, we should not lose sight of the 
commonalities between northern Bolivia and southern Peru. This region shared 
a resilient indigenous peasantry who was neither passive nor isolated and at 
least some elites and intellectuals who envisioned polities that would incorpo-
rate, rather than exclude and dispossess, such communities. Both before and 
 after in de pen dence from Spain, the term “patria” was invoked to convey com-
mon membership in a polity, allowing Spanish concepts of vecinos as rights- 
bearing residents of a corporate community to overlap and interpenetrate both 
indigenous understandings of communal membership and evolving notions 
of citizenship in broader republics. Belonging to a patria asserted a degree of 
shared identity without negating internal diversity. Fi nally, the borders of a 
homeland represented by the patria  were flexible, rooted in but reaching be-
yond the local community.9 This chapter draws on the rich historiography of 
both Peru and Bolivia, as well as sources from the early nineteenth  century, 
to reassemble  those ele ments into an alternative view of a patria, if not a fully 
realized nation, integrated through culture and trade routes as well as po liti-
cal imaginings. Along the way, this counternarrative  will cross several periods 
whose chronological bound aries are as imprecise as  those geographic borders.
Economic Resilience and Movements for Home Rule (ca. 1750–1805)
The history of Peru is often told as a story of decline. Before the arrival of the 
Spaniards, native Andeans had developed technologies of agriculture, storage, 
and transport that supported dense populations, laying the foundations for the 
expansive Inka empire. In the first  century of colonialism, Spaniards harnessed 
 these  human and material resources to an expanding global market. Peruvian 
silver funded the rise of Spain as a world power and stimulated trade from Eu-
rope to China. So famous in Eu rope was the remote Andean metropolis that 
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the term “Potosí” became synonymous with striking it rich. Then silver pro-
duction entered a long decline and the territory named Peru gradually shrank 
from encompassing all Spanish claims in South Ame rica to a medium- sized 
nation of uncertain prosperity by the end of the nineteenth  century.
If we reconsider the Andean heartland during the eigh teenth  century from 
the vantage point of the altiplano rather than Lima, alternative narratives 
emerge to challenge expectations of de pen dency theory that extractive enter-
prises oriented  toward the global market would create enclaves of dynamism 
within larger zones of underdevelopment.10 The forced  labor draft (mitá) did 
constitute a double exploitation of indigenous communities, by siphoning off 
local resources (wool, foodstuffs, llamas) along with their  labor power. None-
theless, native Andeans ( women as well as men) responded to  these pressures 
with resilience, continuing traditional exchanges of products among ecologi-
cal zones and even selling surpluses in the new markets. As silver production 
declined and the population of Potosí shrank in the  later seventeenth  century, 
the peasant economy did not collapse. Some of the reduction in officially regis-
tered silver, moreover, reflected both tax evasion by large refiners and informal 
production by groups of skilled indigenous wage laborers.11 Fi nally,  after 1730, 
both the indigenous population and the production of silver began to recover 
from their long decline.12
Although Peru’s value to the Spanish empire could not rival New Spain’s 
in the eigh teenth  century, the Bourbon monarchs did not ignore its potential 
as they promoted economic revival and increased revenue collection through-
out the eigh teenth  century. To stimulate mining, Madrid reduced the tax on 
silver, made mercury for pro cessing more readily available, and provided tech-
nical help for upgrading excavations and  water pumping. Equally impor tant 
for the profits of silver entrepreneurs in Potosí, Spanish officials continued to 
enforce the mitá despite growing calls for its abolition and looked the other 
way as increasing quotas lengthened the shifts of forced laborers. Throughout 
the  century, Andean silver production increased at an average annual rate of 
1.2  percent, although it regained its earlier peak only briefly in the 1780s.13 In 
the midst of the recovery, Bourbon reformers opened more ports to trade and 
reor ga nized colonial administration to increase oversight and tax collection. 
Travel from the altiplano to  either coast was difficult, but shipping silver from 
Buenos Aires eliminated the overland Panama route, avoided Ca rib bean at-
tacks by imperial rivals, and reduced silver exported directly across the Pa-
cific. Moreover, authorities in Buenos Aires could increase vigilance against 
the contraband silver that had flowed through Brazil since the seventeenth 
 century. Despite the shifts in export patterns, however, Andean products 
continued to move freely across the new boundary between the viceroyalties of 
Peru and Río de la Plata.
Demand from the reviving mining centers and expanding cities no lon-
ger drew trade from as widespread an area, in large part  because producers in 
the Andean heartland met regional needs. Native Andeans  were exempt from 
the sales tax (alcabala), an exception some nonindigenous traders and colo-
nial officials viewed as an unfair competitive edge; thus it is difficult to mea-
sure and track commodities produced by indigenous peasants. Sources from 
1793, when that exemption was briefly abolished, suggest that native provi-
sioning accounted for a significant proportion of goods consumed in mining 
areas.14 Although the vast majority of Eu ro pe an goods entering Potosí that year 
(80   percent)  were imported through Buenos Aires, almost three- quarters of 
commodities (as mea sured by value)  were produced in the Andean heartland, 
including brandy from Tacna and Arequipa, cloth from Cusco, and coca from 
La Paz. Notably, much of the coca was produced and transported by native 
Andeans. Although large coca haciendas also expanded in response to demand 
from mining centers, indigenous communities often found markets for their 
cheaper coca during periods of silver contraction.15 Indigenous peasants and 
other small farmers in the regions north of Potosí and in Cochabamba similarly 
provisioned both the mining areas and the city of La Paz with wheat and corn, 
and native Andeans flocked to major trade centers in the region of Oruro.16 
Although brandy and cloth were produced on larger enterprises and traded by 
Hispanic merchants, the abundance of  these commodities in the markets and 
shops of Potosí demonstrate that the transfer of Upper Peru to the jurisdiction 
of Río de la Plata did not discourage trade across the new border.17
While Potosí remained the single most productive mining center in the 
Andean heartland, silver production  rose throughout Upper and Lower Peru. 
Moreover, growing populations in cities like Arequipa also created demand for 
foodstuffs and other locally produced goods in addition to Eu ro pean imports.18 
Cusco, where producers specialized in sugar, textiles, coca, and hot peppers (ají), 
experienced greater economic stagnation than Arequipa; on the other hand, 
the obstacles to making quick profits limited encroachment by non- Indians 
onto communal lands around Cusco. The major trade routes passed through 
the altiplano region around Lake Titicaca, where as much as two- thirds of the 
livestock was in indigenous hands and many worked transporting goods on 
packs of camelids and mules throughout the south- central Andes. Residents 
of the high plains sent the products of herding (wool, hides, meat) as well as 
crafts (leather goods and pottery) in both directions: to Arequipa and Cusco 
as well as to Oruro and Potosí.19 Although indigenous  labor and commodities 
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both received low compensation, the flexibility of peasant  house hold produc-
tion allowed for subsistence survival in hard times and modest surpluses when 
markets improved.20 In contrast to Mexico and Haiti, where popu lar rebellions 
destroyed export economies to establish familial subsistence production, ex-
ternal and internal trade and commercial and  family production continued to 
converge in the Andean heartland.
Although regional trade offered opportunities to some, demographic and ad-
ministrative changes in the eigh teenth  century also resulted in economic hard-
ship. The recovery of the indigenous population,  after the last  great epidemic 
of the 1720s, placed pressure on the land base of communities. Moreover, Bour-
bon mea sures to increase colonial revenues resulted in more efficient collection 
of “tribute,” the indigenous head tax, in part by ending exemptions for foraste­
ros (“mi grants” who may have been residents of a given community for genera-
tions).21 In 1751, Madrid also legalized the customary practice undertaken by 
governors (corregidores) to require communities to buy goods, often at inflated 
prices. Cusco elites forged economic and marital alliances with authorities in 
Upper Peru, for example, that allowed them to market their textiles through 
such repartos.22 Fi nally, in the 1770s, colonial authorities raised the sales tax 
from 2 to 4 and then 6  percent, and increased the range of commodities subject 
to taxation. Although indigenous traders selling products from community 
plots or herds  were exempt from taxation, they  were liable for tax on “Castil-
ian” goods that they marketed. Given this loophole, many indigenous traders 
feared that more of their cargos would be taxed than had been customary, es-
pecially when the sales tax was extended to coca and grains in 1779 and 1780.23
Colonial subjects in the Andean heartland responded in vari ous ways to 
 these increasing economic and fiscal pressures. As they had since the conquest, 
indigenous communities filed petitions and lawsuits aimed at staking claims 
to land, lessening the burden of their tax and  labor obligations, and protesting 
abuses by both colonial authorities and some kurakas.24 When Bourbon of-
ficials proved less open to negotiation than their pre de ces sors, however, many 
peasants and traders turned to open revolt.25 Crowds attacked custom houses 
newly established across this economic zone to collect the expanded sales tax, first 
in Cochabamba (1774), then La Paz (1777 and 1780) and Arequipa (1780), and 
fi nally  there  were plans to protest a proposed aduana in Cusco (1780). Evidence 
suggests that participation was widespread across classes and ethnic groups, 
and the opposition to an expanded alcabala reflected the potential links be-
tween economic cir cuits and potential polities.26 Although uprisings might 
respond to a trigger event, they drew from historical memory of alternative 
forms of rule and envisioned new arrangements of power. And trade networks, 
especially the cir cuits plied by muleteers and trajinantes (who used llamas as 
pack animals),  were an impor tant means of coordinating actions throughout 
a wider region. 27
As such a trader, José Gabriel Condorcanqui (1738–1781) had built up a net-
work of contacts that cut across vari ous ethnic and socioeconomic categories.28 
He was educated in the Jesuit college in Cusco established for the  children of 
the indigenous nobility, and  later in Lima met intellectuals associated with the 
University of San Marcos, where professors evaded censorship to discuss en-
lightenment texts. He was on good terms with many of the regional elite, and 
his network widened with marriage to mestiza Micaela Bastidas, who played a 
key role in their joint economic and po liti cal endeavors.29 Despite his education 
and commercial success, he too ran up against colonial, specifically Bourbon, 
forms of exploitation. His  uncle Marcos Thupa Amaro, kuraka of Surimana, was 
“bankrupted by the seizure of a train of mules and a hundred pesos’ worth of 
goods  because his mitá quota was one man short.”30 Condorcanqui, in turn, had 
to pay increased taxes on his trade goods in 1777 and disputed the reparto with 
several corregidores, one of whom jailed him for debts.31 Like other indigenous 
elites, he repeatedly went to court to establish his claim as hereditary kuraka 
of Tinta in the region of Cusco and his royal descent from Inka ruler Túpac 
Amaru, executed in 1572 by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. It sent a power ful 
figure 9.1. Traders with llamas in nineteenth- century Bolivia.  
Courtesy the Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia
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message when the kuraka, taking the name of Túpac Amaru, launched his 
movement by executing Corregidor Antonio de Arriaga in 1780.
Historians have long debated the  causes and goals of the  great Andean 
rebellion.32 Túpac Amaru claimed to be acting with  orders from the Spanish 
monarch, but the language and content of his proclamations and letters  were 
clearly anticolonial. Issuing  orders authoritatively as an Inka, he called for the 
reduction of tribute and sales tax rates and the abolition of the mitá.33 He par-
ticipated in and drew from an eighteenth- century revival of Inka history that 
included the circulation of Garcilaso de la Vega’s Royal Commentaries of the 
Incas, the composition and  legal use of Inka genealogies, and portraiture of 
kurakas and their wives in Inka dress.34 But Túpac Amaru was also reinvent-
ing what it meant to be an Inka; he declared his Christian faith, prohibiting 
harm to priests or desecration of churches, and in his efforts to recruit allies, he 
implied that the Andean patria over which he claimed authority could be em-
bedded within the larger empire of the Catholic sovereigns of Castile. Túpac 
Amaru appealed to all fellow countrymen born in “Peru” (referring to the full 
Andean region rather than the recently reduced viceroyalty)— American Span-
iards, mestizos, and zambos (mulattos) as well as Indians—to unite as compa-
triots in opposition to the corrupt and exploitative officials who came from 
Spain.35 Even before securing Cusco, he led his troops  toward Lake Titicaca; 
rebels in that region continued fighting  until 1783.36 In the heartland of Tawa-
ntinsuyu, where stories of a returning or regenerated Inka (Inkarri) had and 
would continue to circulate, some non- Indians as well as native Andeans could 
imagine their place within a polity governed by an Inka.
Certainly,  these co ali tions  were fragile. Some hereditary nobles chose not 
to recognize Túpac Amaru’s overarching authority, but they did not necessarily 
reject the larger vision of a reinvigorated authority for their class.37 Similarly, in-
digenous peasants had their own interpretations of who  were and  were not their 
fellow countrymen, often ignoring  orders not to kill locals of Spanish or mixed 
descent, thus scaring off some of the allies Túpac Amaru sought.38 Although 
Charles Walker rejects Peruvian nationalist narratives that claim Túpac Amaru 
as a precursor to the in de pen dence movements of 1810 to 1825, he does argue 
that the movement and its ideology constituted a militant “protonationalism.” 
Although the rebellion did not succeed in establishing a new polity, its lead-
ers spoke in the name of a patria, indicating “the existence of a unique body of 
 people and the attempt to attain po liti cal gains for this body or nation.”39
Even before Túpac Amaru’s execution of Arriaga, another anticolonial move-
ment was taking shape from the bottom up among the Aymara- speaking com-
munities around La Paz and Potosí. In this region, the legitimacy of hereditary 
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ethnic leaders had eroded to a greater degree than around Cusco, and local 
community authorities (often elected to the colonial office of village alcaldes) 
took the initiative in protesting the abusive practices of corregidores in forced 
sales and collection of tribute.40 Such local efforts  were not new, but an illiter-
ate peasant from the community of Macha came to spearhead a wider collective 
strategy. Interestingly, Tomás Katari and his allies initially sought the support of 
new Bourbon officials against the entrenched local elite. Katari promised that in 
return for being allowed to determine among themselves how to apportion trib-
ute payments, communal authorities could in fact increase revenue by cutting 
out corrupt middlemen. When Corregidor Joaquín Alós refused to recognize 
his authority, Katari traveled over two thousand miles to Buenos Aires, where 
he obtained a viceregal order to the Audiencia of Charcas to investigate the 
community claims and enact a just settlement. Instead the Audiencia ordered 
Katari’s arrest, and its troops subsequently killed the captive. This act triggered 
open revolt by Katari’s followers. Although Katari’s leadership was distinct 
from that of Túpac Amaru, his movement also expressed a vision of indigenous 
authority at the local level that grew out of “a long- term pro cess of cultural and 
po liti cal empowerment of the Andean  peoples.”41
The Amaru (Quechua) movement formed a tenuous alliance with the 
community- led (Aymara) revolt  under a new leader from the Sicasica province 
near La Paz. Julián Apasa earned his living selling coca and woolens within 
the south- central Andean trade cir cuit, an occupation that allowed him to spread 
anticolonial plans and forge a po liti cal network. Taking the name Tupaj Katari 
(“Resplendent Serpent”) and embodying physical and spiritual characteristics 
associated with Aymara warriors, Apasa effectively mobilized his peasant troops, 
twice setting siege to La Paz for 109 and 75 days, respectively.42 Although Tupaj 
Katari was in communication with Diego Cristóbal Túpac Amaru, who was try-
ing to maintain a multiethnic alliance from Cuzco, the Aymara soldiers often 
took retribution on all who gained in colonial exploitation, rather than distin-
guishing  those born in Ame rica from  those who arrived from Eu rope.43 Tupaj 
Katari  rose to prominence at the height of anticolonial protest, but had emerged 
out of longer- term strategies aimed at reinforcing local authority. Smaller re-
volts in the region of La Paz during the preceding de cades had demonstrated 
an emerging “democracy” in action in which leaders consulted communal as-
semblies and Aymara peasants experimented with incorporating Spaniards and 
mestizos on indigenous terms into visions of a new polity.44
Visions of the polity that might result from Andean rebellion in the 1780s 
ranged from Túpac Amaru’s multiethnic patria  under Inka rule to Tupaj Ka-
tari’s bottom-up federation of mostly Aymara communities. Revolts in which 
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Quechua and Aymara leaders alike experimented with practices and rituals 
that might incorporate non- Indians (albeit in ways  those American Spaniards 
and mestizos might not welcome) suggest that native Andeans did not neces-
sarily reject all outsiders from their idea of patria. As  later in Haiti, where all 
citizens  were declared “black,” as Carolyn Fick shows, all members of an Andean 
patria might be  imagined as indigenous.45 Andrés Túpac Amaru, for example, 
ordered non- Indians in the town of Sorata “to dress in Indian garb, chew coca, 
go barefoot, and call themselves Qollas” (a reference to the Inka territory of 
Kollasuyu); in the mining center of Oruro Hispanic rebels voluntarily donned 
Inka tunics.46 Such initiatives provide evidence to support Sinclair Thomson’s 
claim that “race war,” rather than inevitable, “was a result of po liti cal and mili-
tary pro cesses from among an array of diff er ent possibilities.”47 Although none 
of  these revolts prevailed, nor easily conform to Western notions of nationhood, 
such movements can be seen as alternative proj ects to establish home rule of the 
patria, some more inclusive but authoritarian,  others more exclusive but poten-
tially more demo cratic.
Several de cades would pass  after the suppression of the rebellions of the 
early 1780s before major po liti cal and military movements again shook the 
Andes. From their role as critical intermediaries who controlled access to An-
dean  labor and resources for Spanish conquerors, kurakas had seen the gradual 
erosion of their influence in the face of regime pressures. The defeat of Túpac 
Amaru brought an intensification of that trend. In addition to executing or de-
posing kurakas who had supported Túpac Amaru, colonial officials prohibited 
displays of Inka heritage; they even took from many loyal kurakas the authority 
to collect tribute.48 Viceroy of Peru Teodoro de Croix (1784–1790) also led re-
forms to create a more centralized and disciplined military force that could re-
spond to uprisings more effectively than the local militias who had performed 
poorly in 1780.49
It would be a  mistake, however, to see a period  after 1782 as one of complete 
quiescence. Provincial elites (Hispanic by reputation but often of mixed ances-
try) pursued strategies of negotiation and evasion to limit the negative impacts 
of the Bourbon reforms, and indigenous communities returned primarily to 
the courts in the ongoing effort to protect their resources and limit outside ex-
ploitation.50 One sign of the ongoing appeal of an alternative polity— for diverse 
inhabitants of the region— was a conspiracy in 1805. Despite memories of indig-
enous vio lence in 1780, two Hispanic provincials searched for a descendant of 
the Inkas to legitimate a plan to topple Spanish rule. Juan Manuel Ubalde was 
born in Arequipa, studied in Cusco, practiced law in Lima, and was appointed 
as a substitute member of the recently established Audiencia of Cusco in 1805. 
His coconspirator, mineralogist Gabriel Aguilar, was born farther north in 
Huánuco, but had traveled widely through the trading cir cuits of the south- 
central Andes.51 Their peregrinations traced pos si ble bound aries of an Andean 
patria. Although their plans  were discovered before they could be carried out, 
less than a de cade  later creoles and kurakas from Cusco jointly launched a re-
bellion, seizing territory from Arequipa to La Paz.
Imperial and Separatist Visions of an Andean Patria (ca. 1809–1825)
 Because histories of Spanish American in de pen dence focus their studies on the 
nations that emerged and work their way back in time, many artificially sepa-
rate Bolivian and Peruvian separatist movements. In most accounts, Peruvians 
are identified as the “reluctant rebels”; in  these interpretations, elites remem-
bered Túpac Amaru and feared provoking another race war, while native An-
deans took no interest in the disputes between Spaniards,  whether American 
or Eu ro pe an.52 Although Lima elites did remain largely royalist, many in the 
highlands led or joined revolts. “Bolivians” (the term did not yet exist) have 
a somewhat more rebellious reputation, but are noted for their formation of 
small republiquetas rather than a united front.53 In both cases, of course, Span-
ish forces  were defeated only with the assistance of troops arriving from the 
more autonomist regions of Greater Colombia and Río de la Plata. Although 
some Andeans (like their counter parts across Spanish Ame rica) initially re-
mained loyal to the Spanish Crown and  others opted earlier for in de pen dence, 
most shared a vision of a patria that encompassed territory on both shores of 
Lake Titicaca. And leaders in diverse po liti cal factions saw the importance of 
incorporating the majority indigenous population into their plans.
Urban elites throughout the Spanish empire responded to Napoleon’s cap-
ture of Fernando VII by forming assemblies (juntas) to govern locally in his 
name, but their goals varied: some regarded their actions as a temporary mea-
sure  until monarchism could be restored,  others hoped to create a space for 
greater home rule within a reformed imperial structure, and a few envisioned 
a movement  toward full autonomy. Lima, where both officials and merchants 
dreamed of reconstituting its former glory as the viceregal capital and exclusive 
port for Spanish South Ame rica, was notably absent from this trend. Cities 
in the Andean heartland, however,  were among the first to establish juntas: 
gatherings in Chuquisaca and La Paz in 1809 preceded the formation the fol-
lowing year of the more famous assemblies in Caracas and Buenos Aires, and 
Cochabamba, Oruro, and Tacna quickly followed in 1810 and 1811.
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Although members of the Hispanic elite initiated the junta in La Paz, they 
invited indigenous communities to send representatives. Supporters from below, 
moreover, pressured for mea sures such as the abolition of the mitá, the tem-
porary suspension of tribute and sales taxes, and the election of local leaders. 
Strikingly reminiscent of earlier attempts to identify all members of an Andean 
patria as indigenous, rebels occasionally used the term indio to refer to all  those 
born locally, grouping together “white, almost white (or having white skin), and 
real Indians.”54 In addition to attempting to forge an inclusive alliance within 
the region around La Paz, leaders planned to extend their movement through-
out the Andean heartland. Their initial declaration was addressed to the “cou-
rageous inhabitants of La Paz and of the entire empire of Peru.” They quickly 
gained adherents as far south as Potosí and Chuquisaca and sent troops  toward 
Lower Peru and the port of Arica.55 Although they could not hold the city of 
La Paz, many continued to fight for their “patria” as guerrillas in the Republi-
queta of Ayopaya, a territory that included landless Aymara, indigenous com-
munities, and mestizo and Hispanic smallholders.56 Notably, rebel authorities 
 adopted many of the tactics used de cades earlier in the area by the Kataristas, 
and financed their operations in part by marketing coca.57
The revolts in Upper Peru envisioned an Andean patria that straddled the 
boundary between Peru and Río de la Plata, while authorities in Lima and Bue-
nos Aires also vied for control over altiplano territory. Juan José Castelli, who 
led the first expedition to extend the power of the porteño junta, proclaimed 
that the movement aimed to liberate the indigenous population along with 
every one  else. As far away as Huánuco, where American Spaniards  were trying 
to recruit support among the surrounding villages for a revolt, rumors circu-
lated that the “Inka King Castelli” would arrive to liberate the communities 
and that members should prepare to greet him with traditional dances.58 From 
the other direction, Viceroy José de Abascal in Lima seized upon the crisis as 
an opportunity to re unite Lower and Upper Peru, sending troops that scored 
victories over both local juntas and porteño forces. Abascal had intensified mil-
itary reform, increasing the size and effectiveness of the Peruvian royal army.59 
In an effort to reinforce loyalty to the Crown, he recruited a diverse leadership 
to command the largely indigenous and mestizo troops. Among royal officers 
 were loyal kurakas from Puno and Cusco, notably Mateo García Pumacahua, 
earlier decorated for his role in defeating Túpac Amaru. In 1812 Pumacahua 
was promoted to brigadier and interim president of the Cusco Audiencia, but 
then passed over by the permanent appointment of peninsular Manuel Pardo. 
American Spaniards from Arequipa, including Pío Tristan and José Manuel de 
Goyeneche, returned from military ser vice in Spain to take command of the 
army of Upper Peru. Mestizos such as Agustín Gamarra (Cusco) and Andrés 
de Santa Cruz (La Paz) also  rose through the ranks.60
Just as Abascal was rewarding loyalty through military commissions, the 
convocation of the Cortes in Cádiz further altered po liti cal possibilities in the 
empire. In a reversal of earlier rebel attempts to Andeanize Spaniards and mesti-
zos, the 1812 Constitution extended “Spanish” nationality to indigenous inhab-
itants, declaring them citizens eligible to vote and abolishing the tribute they 
had been assessed since conquest. The exclusion of  people of African descent 
from citizenship would affect many along both the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts, 
but few in the Andean highlands. Many from vari ous classes enthusiastically 
embraced the constitution during the brief periods it was in force (1812–1814 
and 1820–1823).61 Presumably they shared its vision of a new national polity 
in which Spaniards included all “ free men who  were born and reside any-
where in Spanish dominions, as well as their  children” (article 5, section 1).62 
The nation, thus defined, was far vaster than the Andean heartland, much less 
the  later nations of Peru and Bolivia. But the constitution did grant significant 
authority to locally elected bodies. A pyramid of municipalities and provinces 
within a constitutional monarchy was not so diff er ent from what Tristan Platt 
suggests was the indigenous vision of “cantons and provinces, departments and 
nations as simply the ascending levels of a segmentary system whose smallest 
units  were to be found within the kinship and residential group.”63
Defense of the constitution was one trigger of a major autonomist move-
ment that began in Cusco. As in the aborted conspiracy of 1805, this rebellion 
was initiated by American Spaniards who sought indigenous allies; unlike the 
messianic dreams of Aguilar and Ubalde, its vision grew out of a new po liti cal 
context and its plans  were more realizable. In late 1812, a  lawyer circulated a let-
ter signed by thirty- seven local notables protesting the delay in calling elections 
for the town council (cabildo). The Audiencia tried to restore calm by arresting 
some more vocal agitators, but  these mea sures had the opposite effect of mobi-
lizing a protest  under José Angulo. When Abascal ordered a hard line against 
the protestors, Pumacahua, perhaps smarting from not being confirmed in his 
Audiencia post, joined the rebellion. Although he was cautious about his use 
of Inka symbolism, his descent from Huayna Capac likely bolstered his legiti-
macy among some, indigenous and nonindigenous alike.64 In 1814, autonomist 
forces fanned out, north to Huamanga and Huancavelica and south to Areq-
uipa, Puno, and La Paz, where they  were more successful. Many soldiers and 
officers, like Pumacahua, had just served in the suppression of the revolts in 
Upper Peru, but  were now mobilized for a new cause. Although the rebels  were 
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defeated by royal troops in 1815— after the restored King Fernando’s abrogation 
of the constitution—it revealed again the potential for po liti cal alliances that 
crossed class and ethnic categories, and the border that had divided the two 
Perus in 1776.65 As rebels in the province of Aymaraes expressed it in 1818, “We 
are now all of the same body, españoles and tribute- paying Indians.”66
By 1820— when the Cádiz Constitution was reinstated and peninsular troops 
prepared to sail to South Ame rica— the royal army still controlled much An-
dean territory. The leaders of the increasingly successful moves  toward in de pen-
dence elsewhere in South Ame rica recognized that they must end Spanish rule 
in the Andes to consolidate their own autonomy. José de San Martín landed 
near Lima in 1820 with soldiers from Chile and the Río de la Plata; Simón 
Bolívar came with Colombian troops (from regions now Venezuela, Colom-
bia, and Ec ua dor) and took over patriot command in 1822. The new viceroy of 
Peru, José de la Serna, moved his administration from Lima to Cusco, which 
he called “the ancient capital of Peru,” opening a last opportunity between 1821 
and 1824 to construct an Andean patria within the framework of the Spanish 
Constitution. A local newspaper published a poem that envisioned an empire 
stretching across the Andes from the Pacific to the Atlantic, led by La Serna 
from Cusco.67
Despite the last stand by La Serna, local guerrillas who favored in de pen-
dence slowly extended their control of territory across the altiplano, while 
forces commanded by Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre advanced from the 
north. As the balance of power tipped, American- born officers in the royal army 
one by one shifted allegiance to the cause of in de pen dence. The biographies of 
two reveal common roots in the provincial elite of the Andean heartland and 
the ongoing ties between Lower and Upper Peru. Agustín Gamarra was born 
in 1785 in Cusco, where he learned Quechua before studying Latin. He joined 
the king’s army in 1809 to fight insurgency in Upper Peru and  later the follow-
ers of Pumacahua, and by 1818 he was promoted to col o nel. Then he switched 
sides in early 1821, volunteering to serve  under San Martín.68 Gamarra’s enemies 
insinuated that his  mother was an Indian; the mixed heritage of his  future rival 
Andrés de Santa Cruz is undisputed. The  father of Santa Cruz, originally from 
Huamanga, was a  career military officer and midlevel royal bureaucrat, serving 
the viceroyalties of Peru and Río de la Plata. In the 1780s he was in La Paz to 
suppress the Katarista rebellion, and he  later married a  woman of the indig-
enous elite whose  family remained loyal to Spain. Andrés was born in La Paz 
but educated in Cusco, where he courted the  daughter of an Audiencia judge 
whom he  later married in Arequipa. He pursued a  career similar to Gamarra, 
joining the royal army in 1809 and rising to the rank of lieutenant col o nel in 
1817, when he was taken prisoner of war. Escaping to rejoining the royal army 
in Peru, he fell captive once again— and changed sides.
In addition to adapting to the fortunes of war, American- born officers saw 
that their chances of promotion in the Spanish army  were limited. In the in-
de pen dence forces, by contrast, Santa Cruz  rose quickly to become Bolívar’s 
chief of staff for the Peruvian division. The gambits of Santa Cruz and Gamarra 
paid off in 1824 with the definitive patriot victories at Junín (where Santa Cruz 
fought) and Ayacucho (where Gamarra participated). Although Bolívar fa-
vored a  union of the two Perus, he followed Sucre’s advice to convene a con-
gress in 1825 that founded a separate Bolivia.
An Andean Nation Briefly Realized:  
Trade Cir cuits and Confederation (ca. 1825–1839)
Before picking up the story of the intertwined po liti cal trajectories of Gamarra 
and Santa Cruz and their roles in promoting an Andean patria from bases in 
Peru and Bolivia respectively, let us revisit the regional economy during the first 
half of the nineteenth  century. The prolonged fighting between separatist and 
royalist forces between 1809 and 1825 took a serious toll on production across 
region. Peasants and workers  were pressed into ser vice, armies requisitioned 
supplies from communities, and mining came almost to a halt. Nonetheless, 
the production of silver and other minerals resumed more quickly than often 
assumed, albeit with regional variations. Moderate levels of silver extraction 
continued in Potosí, much of it by indigenous and mestizo small- scale pro-
ducers, as the mitá draft was abolished at in de pen dence. Puno also remained 
an impor tant mining center integrated into both regional trade cir cuits and 
the global market.69 Exports from and imports to Bolivia went through both 
the new country’s only port at Cobija on the Pacific, as well as the established 
trading center of Arica, which remained part of Peru  until 1883. With produc-
tion below pre-1810 levels, however, much Bolivian silver was minted and used 
to buy supplies from the regions of Cusco and Arequipa rather than reaching 
any port.70
Jurist José María Dalence, a native of Oruro educated in Chuquisaca, pub-
lished an overview on the geography, demography, and economy of Bolivia in 
1851 that reveals continuities from late colonial times. La Paz remained the most 
populous department, and the most indigenous; along with parts of Potosí and 
Oruro, it still produced large quantities of coca and herds of camelids. Dalence 
noted that while most of the nation’s borders  were secure, the boundary between 
La Paz and Puno down to Arica remained porous. In addition to Bolivia’s large 
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imbalance in global trade, the nation imported more wine, liquor, and sugar 
from Cusco, Puno, and Arequipa, than the value of its exports to Peru.71 Strik-
ingly, much of this transborder trade was transacted with small- denomination 
coins (known as the peso feble) minted in Bolivia with lower silver content than 
 either the colonial peso or the postin de pen dence Peruvian currency. For the 
most part, Eu ro pean merchants refused to accept this new currency, as did the 
Chilean government, which was trying to gain control of new import trades 
through its port of Valparaiso. Authorities in Lima periodically protested 
the devalued coins, but they continued to circulate within southern Peru. In-
formally, the Andean heartland had its own currency that crossed national 
bound aries.72
Although the regional economy experienced much continuity, new export 
products also emerged in response to demands of an industrializing Eu rope. 
Southern Peru became an impor tant source of wool for British textile mills. 
Trading  houses in Arequipa sent mestizo middlemen up into the altiplano to 
buy both sheep and alpaca wool, which was shipped out through the port of 
Islay;  until at least the  middle of the nineteenth  century, producers also directly 
marketed wool at regional fairs in the highlands.73 Although both old and new 
exports  were impor tant to the postin de pen dence economy of the south- central 
Andes, volumes  were small compared to the colonial period or the  later nine-
teenth  century. With low revenue from customs duties, the new governments 
of Peru and Bolivia continued to collect head taxes (renamed from “tribute” 
to “contribution”) from the substantial indigenous populations of the high-
land regions. This taxation policy had contradictory effects. On the one hand, 
figure 9.2. Coinage of a realm that briefly was: The Peru- Bolivia Confederation, 1838
it distinguished Indians from other Peruvians and Bolivians, setting them up 
for second- class citizenship. On the other hand, paying tribute protected com-
munities from privatization and dispossession of their land base.74 As Erick 
Langer details, the de cades  after in de pen dence allowed indigenous  people in 
the Andes and elsewhere to gain greater control over their livelihoods.75
Native Andeans constituted a majority in this region, and  there  were liber-
als on both sides of the new border who  were relatively optimistic about the 
possibilities of integrating them into their vision for a new patria. José Domingo 
Choquehuanca, a subprefect and elected representative from Azángaro (near 
Lake Titicaca), provides an in ter est ing example. Through his  father, a priest, he 
was descended from Inka Huayna Capac, but his grand father, cacique Diego 
Chukiwanka, had opposed Túpac Amaru, provoking local rebels to sack his 
properties in revenge.76 Choquehuanca, by contrast, joined with other stu-
dents at the university in Chuquisaca to support in de pen dence, and he tied 
their strug gle to earlier indigenous rebellions. He praised the brave fight of in-
digenous rebels for in de pen dence since 1780, emphasizing that Azángaro war-
riors had rallied to rebellion in 1814, joined in expeditions to both Arequipa 
and La Paz, and continued to fight even  after the rebellion’s leaders saw their 
cause as lost.77
As he compiled a report on the province’s population and economy cover-
ing the five years  after in de pen dence, Choquehuanca envisioned indigenous 
citizens as key participants. According to his figures, the citizens on the civic 
registries varied from 20 to 40  percent of the adult male population of each 
district, proportions including native Andeans.78 He estimated that as many as 
two- thirds of indigenous property  owners along with some mestizos belonged 
to the  middle class (what he called the acomodados).79 District by district, he 
provided estimates of agricultural and textile production, tracking export of 
textiles and animal products to Arequipa, Cusco, and La Paz and imports of 
coca, liquor, and grains from  these regions. According to his estimates, about 
64   percent of the province’s wool- producing sheep and  71   percent of  cattle 
 were in indigenous hands. Choquehuanca criticized landowners and officials 
who called Indians lazy and mistreated them, pointing out that the indigenous 
population had learned from colonialism that any outward sign of economic 
success was an invitation to expropriation and coerced  labor. “Pay them accord-
ing to the law,” he asserted, “and  there would be more than enough workers for all 
manner of  labor.”80 Although he acknowledged the difficulties of educating a 
population who  were not raised to speak Spanish, he claimed that the middling 
indigenous population already sent their  children to Arequipa to learn Span-
ish in order to expand their trading networks.81 Choquehuanca supported the 
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po liti cal reunification of the Andean heartland, and was  later accused by his 
po liti cal opponents of not being a true citizen of Peru due to his 1789 birth in 
Chuquisaca.82 In spirit, he was a citizen of an Andean patria still held together 
by a regional economy in which mineral production stimulated agriculture and 
small- scale manufacturing.
While trade cir cuits continued to integrate southern Peru and Bolivia, de-
spite the new national border, economic development in central and northern 
Peru followed a distinct path. The greatest mining revival in Peru occurred to 
the northeast of Lima at Cerro de Pasco, where copper would eventually re-
place silver as the primary export. Demand for manufactures and foodstuffs 
was largely met in its immediate hinterland. Sugar and cotton plantations ex-
panded along the northern coast, but only  later would be integrated into the 
world market. During the 1820s and 1830s, protectionist, po liti cally conser-
vative elites in Lima and the North faced off against  free traders and liberals 
in the South, especially Arequipa.83  After 1840, world demand for fertilizers 
triggered the infamous guano boom, which for several de cades provided the 
central government in Lima with critical revenues and enriched the capital’s 
merchant elite— but did  little to transform the country’s interior highlands, 
especially in the South.84
Given economic interests distinct from Lima and northern Peru, elites in 
southern Peru and Bolivia, including Gamarra and Santa Cruz, kept alive po-
liti cal plans to re unite the Andean heartland  after its partition at in de pen dence. 
The choices before the congress that convened in La Paz in 1825  were to join 
Peru, to join the United Provinces (the former viceroyalty of Río de la Plata) or 
to declare autonomy.  Either of the first two options could have thrown off the 
delicate balance of power among emerging republics; local elites  were wary of 
submitting to authorities in  either Lima or Buenos Aires. The congress voted to 
establish an entirely new country, named Bolivia in honor of the “Liberator.”85 
(In 1839 the capital’s name was changed from Chuquisaca to Sucre, honoring 
the country’s first president.) Santa Cruz, who agreed to be a representative 
despite his concern that it would harm his po liti cal  future in Peru, wrote to a 
friend that an impor tant minority, notably delegates from La Paz (who  were 
underrepresented relative to the department’s population), favored  union with 
Peru. Although the in de pen dence of Bolivia was an expedient po liti cal com-
promise in 1825, the constitution proposed by Bolívar and approved the follow-
ing year left open the possibility of federation with Peru and even Colombia.86
Despite the creation of two nations, the constitutions of both Peru and 
Bolivia granted citizenship to all who had fought in the patriot army. There-
fore, Santa Cruz was able to serve as interim chief executive of Peru in 1827 and 
as elected president of Bolivia the next year. Gamarra began by establishing 
his power base as prefect of Cusco, from where he crossed the border into 
Bolivia in 1828 to overthrow the “foreigner” Sucre before launching his own 
presidency of Peru in 1829. The two caudillos became rivals, each eyeing the ter-
ritory governed by the other. As conservative Gamarra fought Peruvian liberals 
over trade policies and constitutions, Santa Cruz seized an opportunity to ally 
with southern liberals to re unite Bolivia and Peru. From 1836 to 1839 he forged 
a Peru- Bolivian confederation of three states: Northern Peru, Southern Peru, 
and Bolivia.
Several models influenced the polity Santa Cruz aimed to construct. He 
shared Bolívar’s belief that a strong military guaranteed po liti cal stability while 
providing upward mobility for capable soldiers (uniformed in fine cloth from 
Cusco). His promulgation of new civil and criminal codes drew heavi ly from 
Napoleonic laws, adapted to an Andean society that was corporatist and hier-
archical rather than composed of theoretically equal individuals. Santa Cruz’s 
continuation of paternalist policies that protected separate jurisdictions for 
indigenous communities allowed local Aymara and Quechua authorities to 
exercise a degree of sovereignty at the local level. It was no coincidence that 
he chose Puno as the site to issue a lengthy decree detailing rights and protec-
tions for indigenous citizens, including exemption from all taxes other than the 
“direct contribution” (i.e., tribute).87 In May and June 1836, Santa Cruz visited 
Arequipa, Cusco, and Puno, dispensing  orders and promoting state institutions 
that would appeal to his supporters in Southern Peru: schools and law facul-
ties (reserving places for descendants of the Inkas in Cusco) and compensation 
for property losses at the hands of the confederation’s enemies in the “heroic” 
city of Arequipa. Most impor tant, he abolished trade barriers. The continu-
ous movement of Santa Cruz, in his role as “protector” of the confederation, 
throughout southern Peru and Bolivia prevented one city in the heartland 
from claiming preeminence over the  others— but did nothing to allay fears in 
Lima and northern Peru that their state had a subordinate status.
We  will never know what forms of governance might eventually have emerged 
within the Andean federation. The  union of Peru and Bolivia was seen as a 
threat by neighboring Chile, whose leaders allied with Gamarra to defeat Santa 
Cruz’s army in 1839. The confederation also faced internal tensions. Although 
support for  union was strong in La Paz, elites in Chuquisaca feared that Peruvi-
ans would dominate. In Peru, southern  free traders  were enthusiastic about the 
abolition of internal borders, but northerners had  little to gain from  those mar-
kets. The Lima aristocracy feared losing power to competitors in indigenous 
highlands, and Felipe Pardo y Aliaga relentlessly lampooned the confederation 
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and Santa Cruz in satiric verses that ridiculed the notion of indigenous citizen-
ship and leadership.88 Hispanic elites in Lima would neither relinquish their 
claim to southern Peru nor accept a broader  union where the po liti cal center of 
gravity could shift from the coast to the Andean heartland.
Conclusions
The economic and po liti cal integration of an Andean patria centered on Lake 
Titicaca reached its apogee  under the Peru- Bolivian Confederation, but it did 
not collapse in 1839. While subsequent governments in Peru and Bolivia con-
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tinually renegotiated commercial treaties, merchants in La Paz and southern 
Peru continued to advocate reunification into the 1840s.89  After midcentury, 
however, divergence predominated. Distinct export booms of silver in Bolivia 
and wool in southern Peru pulled trade cir cuits  toward  these nodes within the 
global market and away from trans- Andean commerce. As revenue from exports 
increased, moreover, national states relied less on the taxes paid by indigenous 
populations and the regional currency, the peso feble, depreciated.  Later, with the 
construction of railroads to get newly valuable commodities to ports, opportu-
nities declined for indigenous traders with mule or llama trains.90  These eco-
nomic shifts  were accompanied by policies to privatize communal land, laying 
the groundwork for the expansion of commercial haciendas in the second half 
of the  century.91
Some provincial elites and intellectuals continued to imagine regional in-
tegration, but their visions  were increasingly disconnected from the economic 
activities and movements of the heartland’s majority. As late as 1868, Boliv-
ian artist Melchor María Mercado, who was born in Chuquisaca and traveled 
throughout Bolivia and southern Peru, painted a series of landscapes linking 
the mountains around La Paz down to the coastal cities of Tacna and Arica.92 
And as the War of the Pacific heated up in 1880, Peruvian commander- in- chief 
Nicolás de Piérola proposed a federation with Bolivia similar to that tried 
 under Santa Cruz, which his  father had supported. Invoking a shared history 
of strug gle against Spain from 1780 to 1825, Piérola declared that when citi-
zens of the renewed federation  were asked about their nationality, they would 
respond, “I am Inca.” Inka, but presumably not indigenous, as the speeches 
and draft treaties mentioned “Indians” merely six times.93 Native Andeans for 
their part continued to resist threats to their livelihoods; but increasingly their 
movements and alliances  were contained within the national borders of Peru 
and Bolivia and targeted officials in their respective capitals.94
Advocates of an Andean patria centered in the altiplano did not succeed in 
building an enduring nation- state, but not  because such plans lacked support 
or a material basis between the  middle of the eigh teenth and the  middle of the 
nineteenth centuries. Bound aries and polities throughout the Amer i cas  were 
in flux in this period, as detailed by the essays in this volume. Although we tend 
to associate nations with republics, we have American examples of successful 
constitutional monarchies in Cuba and Brazil— and several experiments in 
Mexico from 1821 to 1867. The early Andean heartland movements that looked 
to an Inka sovereign or a Spanish monarch,  were not radically distinct from 
the Peru- Bolivia Confederation, with its power ful military caudillo. All  these 
 imagined communities, moreover,  were rooted in corporatist politics that rec-
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ognized a degree of local authority in communities— Hispanic cabildos or in-
digenous councils.95 The  imagined and contested patrias linked communities 
in spaces continuously being constructed rather than rigidly bounded.
As  drivers of mules and llamas plied their trade along highland routes 
throughout the Andean heartland, they carried with them more than wool, coca, 
and wheat. News of tax policy, of war and rebellion, of the rise of new Inkas, 
and of grievances against Spaniards traversed  these same routes. Such reports 
 were not received and interpreted in identical ways in diff er ent provinces or 
by distinct social groups. Nevertheless, broad co ali tions repeatedly converged 
to challenge not just  orders from Madrid, but from Lima and Buenos Aires. 
Ethnic conflict was always pos si ble, but at key times Spanish liberals declared 
Indians to be “Spanish,” and rebels called Spanish Americans “indios.” They 
failed, it is true, to establish alternative polities for more than a few years at a 
time, facing overwhelming military force from outside,  whether Lima or San-
tiago, as well as ongoing internal tensions. But the nations that  were established 
strug gled with their own challenges: to develop strong economic foundations 
and promote a common identity, and to resist foreign invasions that further 
reduced their borders by the end of the nineteenth  century. To observers in 
Cusco in 1780, La Paz in 1809, or Arequipa in 1836, such bound aries—on maps 
as well as in po liti cal belonging— were by no means foreordained.
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The in de pen dence of Latin Ame rica from 1810 to 1825 is one of the  great po-
liti cal events of the modern era. All but a handful of the Iberian colonies broke 
from their colonial rulers and established new nations. Other than Brazil (and 
briefly Mexico),  these new states became republics, as had the United States a 
few de cades earlier. This broad storyline, however, too often overshadows an 
equally impor tant and very complicated pro cess by which indigenous  peoples 
claimed greater autonomy for many de cades  after in de pen dence. Many gained 
considerable new autonomy within emerging nations; some found or increased 
in de pen dence; and overall, native  peoples often prospered  after 1820 in ways 
they had not been able to during long colonial centuries. Many who had never 
been conquered by Eu ro pe ans  were able to take back lands lost in the eigh-
teenth  century. They, as well as native  peoples who had lived within colonial 
polities, remained engaged with the newly in de pen dent states as they had 
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before with the colonial empires— but many found new, more autonomous 
ways of engagement. This distinguishes the fifty years  after in de pen dence from 
the colonial period and the era of national consolidation that followed  after 
1860. During this period, while new nations often strug gled, many indigenous 
 peoples enjoyed unpre ce dented in de pen dence.
In the second half of the nineteenth  century, the win dow of opportunity 
closed as Spanish American elites1 and the national states they ruled consoli-
dated power and made alliances with outsiders to crush the autonomy gained 
by indigenous  peoples during and in the de cades  after in de pen dence. The 
state- building pro cesses that  shaped Latin Ame rica in the second half of the 
nineteenth  century brought the increasing subjugation and marginalization 
of native populations. This “third conquest” worsened conditions for indig-
enous  people more than the late eighteenth- century consolidation of the co-
lonial state (which Nancy Farriss calls the “second conquest”).2 The pro cess of 
indigenous subjugation and marginalization has only recently begun to reverse; 
from the 1970s and accelerating into the early twenty- first  century, indigenous 
 peoples began to regain a share of po liti cal and economic power. The pro cess 
has been slow and very uneven, as have the results for indigenous majorities.
This essay focuses on the era from late colonial times to the late 1860s, when 
indigenous  peoples forged spaces in which they claimed increased po liti cal au-
tonomy and relative economic prosperity. The picture is complicated, but the 
overarching trends are clear. Indigenous populations across the Amer i cas ex-
hibited many diff er ent characteristics and cannot be simply subsumed  under 
the (artificial) category of “Indians.”3 Not only  were  there vast regional and 
national differences— the state did  matter— but most indigenous populations 
 were part of one of two general yet divergent categories: they  were  either peas-
ants integrated into the colonial states, or  peoples who resisted the hegemony 
of the Spanish or Portuguese, British or French Crowns and remained in de pen-
dent of the colonial (and  later, national) states. The numbers of  these in de pen-
dent  peoples  were small compared to the peasants living  under colonial (mostly 
Spanish) rule in the eigh teenth  century, but the uncolonized controlled the 
majority of the territory of Latin Ame rica (and the Amer i cas)  until  after 1860. 
Although we have much less documentation about  these long- independent 
 peoples, they  matter for the importance of their own histories and cultures, and 
 because like the indigenous peasants within the new republics, they profoundly 
affected the ways new nation- states became new countries.
This chapter argues, based on my own work within the new scholarly under-
standing of indigenous  peoples from 1800 to 1870, that while po liti cal vision-
aries faced the complex conflicts of nation building, many indigenous  peoples 
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enjoyed unpre ce dented de cades of power and prosperity. I concentrate on the 
Andean highlands and adjacent lowlands. As John Tutino argued for indigenous 
peasant communities within Mexico, this was a period of “decompression” in 
which the extractive colonial economies collapsed and state confiscatory pow-
ers weakened.4 Meanwhile, along the frontiers the lack of formal militaries and 
infrastructure such as forts, missions, and roads meant that many indigenous 
 peoples  were able to liberate themselves from Eu ro pean or Spanish American 
hegemony or push back the frontiers and liberate territory that the Spanish had 
taken in the de cades prior to in de pen dence.5
The scale of the Atlantic economy and the focus of documentation on the 
commercial sectors make it difficult to detail the changing levels of economic 
engagement and power at the regional, community, and  house hold levels. Yet 
growing complaints of commercial difficulties and scarcities of profit among 
 those who presumed to be power ful, and increasing evidence of in de pen dent 
production and commercial participation among long subordinate or marginal 
 peoples, document new indigenous autonomies across the Andes and into 
nearby lowlands.  These assertions of popu lar in de pen dence in times of strug gles 
to create po liti cally in de pen dent states paralleled the consolidations of “house-
hold production” that Carolyn Fick details for Saint Domingue as it became 
Haiti, and Alfredo Ávila and John Tutino show in the complicated pro cess of 
Mexico’s po liti cal development. The increased autonomy claimed by indigenous 
 peoples (and former slaves in Haiti) differentiates the Andes and Mesoamerica 
(and the revolutionary plantation colony) from regions of the Amer i cas, no-
tably the United States, Cuba, and Brazil, where postin de pen dence expan-
sion of slavery consolidated power and increased coercions within plantation 
systems— and, in the United States and Brazil, increased pressures  toward the 
displacement of nearby native  peoples. In the case of the Andes, participation 
in the Atlantic economy continued during times of contested nation making, 
if at reduced levels, as Sarah Chambers emphasizes in chapter 9. And in that 
continuation, highland indigenous communities become increasingly impor-
tant producers and interlocutors with the Atlantic economy and an incipient in-
dustrial capitalism, reinforcing the Andean ways of re distribution and reciprocity 
that Chambers also highlights. On the eastern frontiers, in de pen dent  peoples 
took advantage of weakened and contested state powers in the long- colonized 
highlands to mix military power and trade relations to access goods— weapons, 
tools, cloth, and more— they did not produce. Only  after 1860 did the equation 
change, as indigenous  peoples  were put  under pressure by Spanish American 
elites and states that took advantage of deepening ties with North Atlantic capi-
talism to forge a new economic model and marginalize indigenous  peoples.
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Tightening the Screws: Empire and Indigenous  Peoples before 1810
Indigenous  peoples within and near Spain’s empire faced a “second conquest”— 
and sometimes a first— during the de cades  after 1750. Across the Andean high-
lands, indigenous peasants suffered from an intensifying reparto de mercancías, 
in which the local officials called corregidores exacted rising surpluses through 
mono poly sales of goods— backed by the officials’ administrative and judicial 
powers. Meanwhile Spanish authorities began to replace community officials 
with outsiders, often mestizos, sometimes Spaniards, seeking greater control 
over indigenous communities and their resources. Priests worked to squeeze 
more monies from their indigenous charges, often leading to conflicts among 
Church leaders, regime officials, and resistant communities. The successes of 
 these assertions of power and surplus extraction  were uneven, but they  were 
especially resented in the Andean region, where the silver economy and thus 
commercial opportunities  were weaker than in New Spain.6
The increased pressures on and exploitation of the indigenous peasantry 
came to a partial end by the 1780s, in the aftermath of the  Great Rebellion in 
the Southern Andes (1780–1784), which extended far beyond the rising fa-
mously led by Túpac Amaru. Three major movements emerged from Andean 
communities, ranging from Potosí to Cuzco, with diff er ent motivations; all gen-
erated  great vio lence; all  were suppressed by Spanish forces hastily sent from 
other regions of the viceroyalty. Many of  these troops  were mestizo or mulatto 
militias recently or ga nized as part of the Bourbon reforms that attempted to 
impose the “second conquest.”7
The defeat of the uprisings, the execution many leaders, and the punishments 
meted out to participants and their communities blocked this first move  toward 
greater “Andean in de pen dence”— though not necessarily nation- making. Less 
emphasized but also impor tant, the Spanish Crown prohibited the repartos, 
and by 1784 the office of corregidor was abolished, replaced by intendentes and 
subdelegados who  were prohibited from trading in their jurisdictions (with 
only partial success). The new system— and the threat of another insurgency— 
did alleviate the most resented exactions on the peasant population.8  There 
 were gains taken in defeat.
Before and  after the uprisings, both a cause of the revolts and a consequence 
of the state’s reforms afterward, Andean communities reconsidered and reor ga-
nized their internal leadership structures. Hereditary kurakas, the local nobil-
ity that often traced origins to pre- Inka times and had entrenched their status 
as key intermediaries linking the Spanish and indigenous worlds during the late 
sixteenth- century consolidation of the silver boom led by Potosí, lost ground 
to commoners claiming leadership in the communities. At times, communities 
ran the old kurakas (as well as non- Indian ones set up by Spanish authorities) 
out of town or even killed them, insisting that the común was to rule.  After the 
 Great Rebellion, led by kurakas such as Túpac Amaru—at times pressed by 
commoners against abusive kurakas— regime reforms accelerated the demise of 
the indigenous nobility. Annually elected alcaldes de indios replaced hereditary 
indigenous leaders in Andean communities.9 The mix of rebellion and reform 
accelerated a new po liti cal culture among indigenous peasants in the Andes— a 
grassroots democracy that soon engaged the new, liberal winds that reverber-
ated through the empire in the era of Cádiz.
The situation was diff er ent in the frontier areas east of the Andean heart-
land.  There the Spanish Bourbon regime brought severe pressure on indig-
enous groups that had remained in de pen dent. They had not faced, or had 
fended off, the first conquest. Through the seventeenth  century and into the 
eigh teenth, the Spanish regime had remained mostly in the territories claimed 
in the sixteenth.10 The revitalization of the Spanish state  under Bourbons and 
the search for resources and revenues in a commercially dynamic and imperi-
ally competitive eigh teenth  century brought a more aggressive frontier policy. 
Military expeditions brought forts into long- uncolonized regions, followed by 
the establishment of missions  under the Franciscans who aimed to incorporate, 
convert, and subordinate in de pen dent  peoples. Scientific- military expeditions 
explored territories unknown to Crown officials. By the first de cade of the nine-
teenth, the Spanish regime had expanded its reach into the lowland centers of 
indigenous re sis tance of South Ame rica: across the arid Chaco plains; pressing 
the southern borders of Chile past the Bío Bío River into Araucanía; and deep 
into the pampas of the Río de la Plata region. In Chile, intensified negotia-
tions with the vari ous native  peoples south of the Bío Bío opened long- held 
indigenous territories to Spanish settlers. In de pen dent  peoples submitted to 
the frontier militias concentrated in new forts or lived around new missions set 
in regions where the Eu ro pean presence was new and intensifying. As David 
Weber argued, in the late colonial period the Spanish regime pressed a dynamic 
and successful (in Spanish terms) frontier policy based on a new conception of 
the Indian as “savage,” supported by scientific explorations, militarization, and 
systematic trade with in de pen dent  peoples.11
 These policies and programs drove Spanish control beyond bound aries in 
place for over a  century.12 The only region of South Ame rica where the new 
Spanish aggressive policy did not work and where the Spanish did not gain ini-
tiative, territory, and influence was the jungle zone east of central Peru.  There 
the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion expelled the Franciscan missions in the 
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Map 10.1. Spanish imperial control in South Ame rica, ca. 1800
Across most frontier areas, the militarization through militias and professional 
troops, often followed by missions and sometimes by new Hispanic settlers, 
brought advances against in de pen dent indigenous  peoples.
Regaining Power: In de pen dence and Indigenous  Peoples
The long strug gles for in de pen dence set off  after 1808 by Napoleon’s assault on 
the imperial center in Spain and energized  after 1810 by the participations of-
fered and limited  under Cádiz liberalism, brought new pressure on integrated 
indigenous populations across the Andes, as conflicts between autonomists and 
royalists became civil wars. Too often, interpretations of in de pen dence suggest 
that along the Andean mountain spine from the Audiencia de Quito (roughly 
pres ent- day Ec ua dor) to the altiplano and high valleys ending south of Potosí, 
the dense settlements of long- colonized indigenous communities stood aside, 
in contrast to the assertive participations of so many in the  Great Rebellion of 
the 1780s. It appears that Spanish Americans remained in charge during the 
wars that led to in de pen dence, and that indigenous  peoples mostly served as 
transporters of goods and dependent auxiliaries, while often seeing their  cattle 
and foodstuffs taken by troops on both sides. Yet indigenous men served in 
vari ous armies and communities, backing one side or another based on local 
interests, conflicts, and opportunities. Many, likely a majority of integrated 
indigenous  peoples, tried to keep their heads down and stay out of fighting 
among factions of  people who had long aimed to rule them and claim their 
 labor and surpluses. Some indigenous communities, as in Pasto, New Granada 
( today Colombia), backed the royalist cause  after the Popayán governor de-
creased their tribute. They created a “popu lar royalism” that favored the com-
moners over the traditional powers, as some communities had farther south in 
the  Great Rebellion.14 When communities could negotiate participation on 
favorable terms, they might join the fray for a time; but as in de pen dence con-
flicts became generalized and violent, dealing with what ever army passed by 
became a strategy for survival.
A spate of urban movements across the Andes debated autonomy and loy-
alty in the aftermath of Napoleon’s assault on imperial legitimacy in 1808. A pa-
triot army sent from the city of Buenos Aires  under Juan José Castelli entered 
Upper Peru (now Bolivia) but was defeated in 1811 at Huaqui, on the altiplano 
near Lake Titicaca. The porteños initially gained support in many indigenous 
communities along their march. Castelli proclaimed the end of tribute pay-
ments and denounced the “slavery” he  imagined the Indians suffered, asserting 
that the Buenos Aires junta saw the Indians as “ brothers.”15 Indigenous auxilia-
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ries  were instrumental in the Argentine army’s victories in Suipacha, but Cas-
telli’s  favor  toward Indians turned many non- Indians against the “patriots.” At 
the  battle of Huaqui, the native auxiliaries who accompanied Castelli waited 
on the sidelines. With defeat at Huaqui, the porteño troops dispersed and 
began to sack the surrounding countryside and the Potosí trea sury. The Indians 
of Sicasica refused to aid Castelli in his retreat. Other indigenous groups took 
advantage of the confusion to sack the city of La Paz, presumably controlled by 
“patriot” troops from Cochabamba.16 The American Spaniards of La Paz made 
peace with the royalists and kept their peace  until in de pen dence was declared.
Such urban adaptations for and against Cádiz liberalism sent conflict into 
the countryside.  There Spanish American leaders seeking autonomy allied with 
indigenous villages to mount guerrilla campaigns against the loyalist forces. The 
most notable indigenous rebellion was the Pumacahua rising of 1814. Mateo 
García Pumacahua traced his lineage back to Inka kings; he had been a loyal-
ist and a leading commander against Túpac Amaru in the 1780s. He became 
interim president of the Audiencia (the High Court and primary colonial au-
thority in Cuzco). Feeling marginalized by loyalist authorities, in 1814 he joined 
a rebellion begun and led by Spanish Americans; Pumacahua became the main 
military commander and attracted many Indians to his rebel army. However, the 
rebellion was suppressed by well- armed Spanish troops and Indian auxiliaries in 
1815 as Fernando VII reclaimed power and abrogated the Cádiz Constitution. 
Pumacahua was executed in the regional capital of Sicuani.17
Most of the guerrilla republiquetas  were pacified by 1816. Overt combat be-
tween loyalists and groups seeking autonomy receded in the Andes  until 1820, 
when Spanish liberals preparing to lead an expedition to fight the in de pen-
dence movement led by Simón Bolívar in Gran Colombia (modern Colombia 
and Venezuela) forced Ferdinand VII to reinstitute the Cádiz Constitution and 
its liberal precepts. That provided the opening for pro- in de pen dence armies 
to move north from Buenos Aires and Chile and south from Gran Colombia, 
to crush a still- loyal royalist Andean core. Bolívar and San Martín understood 
that only the “liberation” of the deeply indigenous Andean highland core, still 
ruled by powers loyal to Spain, could ensure po liti cal autonomy in their Cara-
cas and Buenos Aires homelands.
The conflicts that led to in de pen dence in the Andes mixed civil wars among 
Spanish Americans and changing participation among indigenous leaders and 
communities as dynamics and opportunities evolved. Early events in Upper 
Peru revealed American Spaniards’ ambivalence and indigenous communities’ 
in de pen dence. In both Perus, elites feared that a revolution might become what 
they saw as a race war— that is, a rising of indigenous masses reminiscent of the 
1780s. Spanish Americans had long benefited from the colonial system and in 
their dominance over the Indians, notably by receiving tribute and  labor via the 
mitá and other means. Many native Andeans  were leery of Spanish Americans 
and,  after their initial enthusiasm for the Auxiliary Army from Buenos Aires, 
also of “foreigners” who promised much, but whose power and commitment 
to indigenous welfare proved tenuous. In the small republiquetas  later formed 
to fight the royalists, Indians, mestizos, and Americans Spaniards mixed, but 
españoles americanos held most of the leadership.18 In the regions that became 
Peru, many indigenous communities only mobilized in 1820, when the vicere-
gal court faced a siege from porteño general San Martín’s army from Chile and 
fled Lima seeking refuge in the ancient indigenous capital at Cuzco.19 Even 
then, most native communities stood aside from the conflicts that created Peru 
and Bolivia.20
The situation was diff er ent on the frontiers. The wars that shook the Spanish 
empire and eventually led to in de pen dence had even more profound effects  there. 
For in de pen dent  peoples who did not recognize themselves as “Indians”— 
this was a Spanish term— these regions  were not margins but homelands. For 
 people who had remained  free of Spanish rule, often while obtaining arms and 
other goods through raids and trades, the wars opened new times of real in-
de pen dence and economic expansion. And for many, the times of indigenous 
in de pen dence lasted long into the nineteenth  century.
 There  were many and diverse reasons for the assertion of in de pen dent in-
digenous  peoples along what the Spanish called la frontera. Many troops sta-
tioned at the frontier in the Bourbon military buildup left to fight on one 
side or the other in the in de pen dence wars (it was frontier troops, including 
the gauchos of the pampas and the llaneros of Venezuela and Colombia who 
backed San Martín and Bolívar). Royalist leaders knew that the most experi-
enced troops manned the frontier forts; they repeatedly called them to defend 
the regime. Patriots recruited the same forces whenever they could. As wars 
persisted and widened within the core regions of the colonies, the officials saw 
higher priorities than funding frontier forts. As silver revenues fell and tribute 
payments dried up in the highland communities, governments could not sup-
port the forts. As troops and subsidies withdrew, indigenous  peoples took over 
vast swaths of territory. In some regions, the mission system meant to contain 
and convert frontier ethnic groups collapsed when Spanish missionaries left, 
 whether by force or fear. This occurred among once- thriving Franciscan mis-
sions among the Chiriguanos in the Andean foothills of eastern Upper Peru. In 
1813, seventeen missions contained more than eigh teen thousand Indians. By 
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1825, only two missions remained.21 Similar pro cesses weakened missions on 
the pampas and in the southern Chile.
Amid complex conflicts and adaptations along diverse frontiers, in de pen-
dent indigenous  peoples recouped territories they had lost to Bourbon imperial 
offensives. Some in de pen dent Indians fought on the side of the patriots, includ-
ing the Chiriguano cacique Cumbay. In 1813 he met porteño general Manuel 
Belgrano in Potosí to offer his warriors to the patriot leader.22 The Pehuenche 
in Chile favored the royalists and collaborated with loyal officers to attack the 
recently established Chilean republic.23 In turn, the Chilean patriot leader José 
Miguel Carrera had allied with the Ranquel Indians across the Andes to fight 
against patriot rivals.24 In de pen dent  peoples took diff er ent sides during the 
wars; most aimed to promote their own in de pen dence; few developed an ideo-
logical predilection among Spanish Americans or Eu ro pe ans, whose visions of 
Indians differed  little and never included indigenous in de pen dence.
In sum, the wars in the early nineteenth  century affected South American 
indigenous  peoples differently. Peasants living  under colonial Spanish rule 
suffered the depredations of warfare, losing livestock and supplies to passing 
armies. Many  were forced to work for one side or the other as porters, spies, 
providing shelter and the like. Other indigenous  peoples aimed to take their 
fates in their own hands, with limited success. The Pumacahua rebellion failed, 
in part  because of the fear the earlier  Great Rebellion in the 1780s still engen-
dered among American Spaniards. At and beyond the frontier, in de pen dent 
 peoples had diff er ent experiences. They quickly saw a lessening of the pressure 
of the late colonial state; in many regions they took back control over areas 
they had lost to Bourbon conquest. Some in de pen dent groups joined the wars, 
often on the side of the patriots. They helped create a military balance that 
favored their own in de pen dence— recouping lost territory and populations.
 After In de pen dence: Indigenous Power and Wealth
Once the wars  were over, new and still contested Andean states relied more 
than ever on indigenous  peoples and their tribute payments to sustain them-
selves. Other sources of income, notably mining revenues, diminished dramati-
cally. The dependence of the new states in the Andes on tribute incomes led 
to a rebalancing of power between them, the indigenous communities within 
them, and the increasingly in de pen dent  peoples on their margins. The new 
states did not have the capacity to put much pressure on indigenous groups, 
within or without, while many Spanish Americans looked to redefine the 
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Map 10.2. Spanish South Ame rica, ca. 1820
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position. This led to experiments in defining the nation as a multiethnic con-
struct, attempts abandoned in the last quarter of the nineteenth  century. Then 
indigenous  peoples returned to subordinate positions; even worse, government 
policies deliberately marginalized them, or attempted to eliminate them com-
pletely,  either physically (as happened along many frontiers), or as distinct 
 peoples with their own institutions, cultures, and languages.
 After Spanish rule ended and while nations  were constructed and debated, 
the indigenous  peoples integrated within the new states and the in de pen dent 
natives at their margins claimed real gains. The rising autonomy of indigenous 
peasants and communities within the nations led to greater prosperity and often 
higher standards of living  because neither the state nor Spanish American 
landlords had the ability to extract as much surplus as during colonial times. In 
contrast to developments in Mexico, the new Andean governments reinstated 
the indigenous tribute, soon  after abolishing it in the afterglow of in de pen-
dence. In Ec ua dor, Peru, and Bolivia, governments  were desperately short of 
funds, as other revenue sources did not materialize.25 They gave the renewed 
tribute diff er ent names, but the idea was the same— each Indian male between 
fifteen and fifty paid a tax in return for access to community land. That pact made 
explicit a relation implicit in the Spanish colonial order. It also made new states 
dependent on indigenous communities and gave their members, especially 
their men, a sense of entitlement to their lands. Across the Andes, the head tax 
endured at levels less than the colonial tribute. No government increased the 
amount of the head tax while the system remained in place. Presuming infla-
tion over the nineteenth  century, the head tax became a shrinking burden on 
each household— while solidifying rights to lands and autonomies in indig-
enous communities.26
Elsewhere in South Ame rica, tribute ended. In some, areas, tribute had 
counted for  little and was abolished early in the republican era or shortly there-
after. In the regions that became Argentina, the only Indians to pay tribute 
lived as peasants in the far northwestern part of the federation’s Andean prov-
inces, and their contributions  were insignificant to the national trea sury. The 
Buenos Aires revolutionary government abolished tribute in 1811, before the 
invasion of Upper Peru.27 In Colombia, the Congress of Cúcuta abolished In-
dian tribute in 1821; it lived on briefly as a “personal contribution,” but largely 
dis appeared by the end of the 1820s.28
Across the Andes, the basis for peasant organ ization, the república de indios, 
was strengthened as weak states relied on indigenous leaders to administer vil-
lages and collect tributes; the per sis tence of tribute fortified the village structures 
put in place to collect it. A few Spanish Americans became tribute collectors, 
now more a mea sure of integration into indigenous communities than an inser-
tion of outside interference (as such attempts had become  under Spanish rule). 
Arguably, postin de pen dence Spanish South Ame rica was more republican and 
local governance stronger than in any period  until the agrarian reforms of the 
twentieth  century. It was a time of republican governance based in indigenous 
peasant villages, often invisible to Spanish American and mestizo townspeople, 
who suffered from caudillismo and ongoing po liti cal instability. The exception 
seems to have been Ec ua dor, where many highland Indian villages  were con-
trolled by Spanish American and mestizo landlords and officials.29
 After in de pen dence, debate widened among Spanish Americans about 
 whether Indians constituted citizens as other members of society did. Follow-
ing the pre ce dent of Cádiz, initial responses  were yes: all citizens—no longer 
colonial subjects— should be equal.30 When General José de San Martín in-
vaded Lima with his Chilean and porteño troops, he decreed that all citizens 
should be called Peruvians; in the highlands this was taken to mean only Indi-
ans.31 Simón Bolívar, in a famous 1824 decree that also followed Cádiz pre ce-
dents, proclaimed that all Indian communities should be broken up and their 
lands distributed among their members. Lands not claimed by individual Indi-
ans would be sold by the state in public auction. A year  later, Bolívar provided 
a formula for dividing the land, providing Indian caciques twice the land of 
ordinary community members, but also abolishing hereditary leadership (caci­
cazgos).32  After Bolívar left and while facing fiscal penury and an indigenous ma-
jority demanding traditional roles and rights, the Bolivian state reversed  these 
laws in the late 1820s. That reversal meant that integrated indigenous  peoples in 
the Andes remained differentiated by the old “stain” of conquest and tributary 
subordination, though  every country masked the fact by calling the tribute by 
diff er ent names, such as “personal contribution” (contribución personal ).  People 
thus marked as Indian still voted in national elections, but as the  century wore 
on, literacy and landowning requirements increasingly excluded rural  peoples, 
Indian or not. This did not affect village- level administration, which was sub-
sumed  under the Indian republics reinforced by the consolidation of their resi-
dents’ separate status.33 In sum— and in diverse local ways— indigenous  peoples 
faced prejudice in the nations yet consolidated power and production in their 
communities.
Despite the equivocal and diminishing citizenship rights of Indian in na-
tional republics, their social rights remained intact or even expanded in their 
local communities— the heirs to colonial indigenous republics. We have  little 
information on  labor regimes in the early national de cades. The information 
we have suggests a less oppressive hacienda regime; in some cases some land 
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reforms effectively turned renters (arrenderos)34 into smallholders. In  others 
landlords gave haciendas to Indians, as happened in Tomina Province in south-
ern Bolivia, where the priest Manuel Martín Santa Cruz in his 1857 testament 
donated his hacienda, Collpa Lupiara, to his Indian arrenderos.35
Similarly, we lack information on advanced pay and obligated rural  labor 
on estates (too often called called debt peonage, implying domination that was 
rarely real) for the first few de cades  after in de pen dence. Still, Arnold Bauer has 
argued that postin de pen dence  labor relations  were relatively favorable to the 
hacienda workers— a situation well documented across Mexico. Estate  owners 
could not rely on weak states for police power to find or return workers who 
took proffered advances of goods and wages and then absconded. More reveal-
ing, why would employers offer pay in advance, given very weak enforcement 
mechanisms? The advances worked as enticements to  labor, offered to men 
with lands and rights in entrenched communities. If they did not perform the 
work or repay, estates could rarely make their debtors pay in the de cades of 
indigenous in de pen dence.36 In Colombia, for example, Aline Helg shows that 
neither the state nor landlords could discipline  labor in the mountainous and 
heavi ly forested Ca rib bean region, where  people easily escaped and many villages 
 were beyond the powers of governments or landlords.37
National state and landlord powers also weakened when indigenous lead-
ers became local and regional authorities. Cecilia Méndez has shown that in 
the aftermath of the royalist rebellion in Huanta from 1825 to 1828, the indig-
enous peasant leaders Tadeo Choque and Antonio Abad Huachaca remained 
the regional authorities, the former as provincial governor, the latter as a jus-
tice of the peace. They fought for the heartland caudillo Andrés de Santa Cruz 
in the 1830s and  until the ends of their lives remained the power brokers of 
their districts.38
Struggling national states without the resources and power to  favor Spanish 
Americans and their commercial enterprises meant that indigenous peasants 
could engage in activities without governments or landlords being able (or at 
times even interested) to take the surplus. In the Andes, indigenous peasants 
controlled much of the food production and most of the transport sector, pro-
visioning cities and mining centers as well as carry ing minerals to the coast 
and imported goods into the highlands. Many traded in contraband silver, 
colluding with import/export merchants and, at times, with mine  owners too. 
Informal alliance among indigenous muleteers and llama herders, merchants, 
and silver miners worked to keep the state weak so that all could avoid taxes.39 
No won der the definition of the Andean states was vague and contested for de-
cades, as Sarah Chambers shows. Many Spanish American elites and indigenous 
communities did not see defined bound aries or stable powers as in their best 
interests.
Andean peasant communities joined in extensive commerce, supplying cit-
ies with foodstuffs and locally made textiles, along with forage, fuel, and wood 
(though the difficulty of getting at the municipal rec ords has hindered a full 
analy sis of its importance).  Until the late nineteenth  century, indigenous com-
munities held the vast majority of arable land, making their predominance of 
food production a certainty. Tristan Platt has documented that northern Potosí 
communities produced the wheat that supplied much of the Bolivian high-
lands. Municipal police rec ords provide evidence of the amount of foodstuffs 
that indigenous traders sold in nineteenth- century cities such as Oruro and 
Potosí.40
Outside the control of the new states— though not outside their  imagined 
bound aries— still- independent  peoples joined in impor tant commerce often 
tied to international trade; with no state authority to rec ord it, their commerce 
remains unmea sured. Most significant was the  cattle trade in the South Ameri-
can pampas. Kristine Jones details how the raiding economies of the Mapuche 
and other  peoples of the Southern Cone as well as the Comanche and Apache 
who ruled between Mexico and the United States became enterprises impor tant 
to the world economy. They competed directly and successfully with Spanish 
Americans for the resources of their regions.41 Such raiding economies made 
pos si ble the rise of proto- states such as Calfucará, an alliance of Araucanian and 
Pampas Indians who dominated the salt licks of the Salinas Grandes where the 
 cattle herds taken from the pampas had to pass on their way west to Chile.42
The commercial opportunities claimed by in de pen dent Indians  were tied 
to the weakness of the new republics.43 The frontier military balance shifted to 
 favor in de pen dent Indians—an advantage that endured to the 1870s. The new 
states facing difficulties financing activities in their core regions and wracked by 
internecine conflict drew frontier- hardened militias to help rule their heartland 
cores— often to  little avail. Some leaders tried to bring in de pen dent Indians 
into the fight, but at their peril. Such in de pen dent  peoples brought in de pen-
dent agendas, sometimes launching campaigns against their “allies” and often 
raiding for their own advantage, debilitating national frontiers even more. In 
only one case is it clear that the engagement of in de pen dent indigenous war-
riors brought gains to Spanish Americans: Juan Manuel de Rosas, the governor 
of Buenos Aires, allied himself with Calfucará and other caciques to fight the 
Voroganos allied with the Carrera  brothers in disputes over rule of the Argen-
tine Confederation in 1830. To succeed, Rosas had to pay his Indian allies thou-
sands of  horses and  cattle, along with expensive sugar and tobacco.44
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The balance of power favoring in de pen dent Indians led to uneasy relations 
with frontier towns and villages, and large landlords too. Alliances shifted con-
stantly as po liti cal realities changed, reflecting rivalries on both sides of the fron-
tier. In central Argentina, along the eastern frontier of Peru, and in southeastern 
Bolivia fights among po liti cal factions, diff er ent jurisdictions, and indigenous 
 peoples with their own allies and enemies led to raids and conflicts in which in-
digenous groups might ally with Spanish American states or factions to launch 
strikes against indigenous groups or Spanish American towns linked to their po-
liti cal opponents. Vio lence was endemic across frontier regions, affecting  every 
po liti cal and social unit from national and indigenous federation leaders all the 
way down to the  house hold level. Baretta and Markoff long ago detected endur-
ing vio lence on  cattle frontiers in Latin Ame rica; this analy sis suggests that the 
vio lence as was as much about po liti cal power as about  cattle.45
In  these de cades of in de pen dence, indigenous groups leveraged superior 
powers of vio lence to gain access to goods they other wise would not have had. 
Landlords and local officials paid goods to keep Indians at bay. In Argentina, 
provincial governments paid indios amigos what they called vicios, goods such 
as tobacco and sugar,  horses and  cattle, to compensate their ser vice as buf-
fers to other, hostile Indians. Many leaders of power ful groups on the pampas 
and in Patagonia maintained constant written communication with provincial 
governors. Some maintained embassies in provincial capitals, creating state- like 
relations with their provincial peers.46 In Bolivia, landlords and departmental 
governors paid Chiriguanos to remain allies— tribute Spanish Americans paid 
to Indians. Still, in de pen dent Indians often switched allegiances, leading Span-
ish Americans to accuse them of treachery—as if indigenous  peoples could 
not have their own strategic, diplomatic, and economic interests. Much of the 
frustration came as Spanish Americans saw that they  were the weaker party— 
the payers of tribute. They could only hope that in de pen dent Indians would 
become dependent on them for goods they could not produce themselves: fire-
arms, sugar, and fine cloth. As  there  were usually multiple suppliers, alliances 
remained fragile and raids continued.47
The de cades from the 1820s to the 1860s, or even the 1880s (depending on 
the region) saw indigenous  peoples claim lives more in de pen dent and often 
more well off than during late colonial times. The peasants and communities 
that had been integrated into the Spanish polity  after the conquest  were rarely 
integrated fully as citizens within national states  after in de pen dence. But 
they managed quite well without much interference from state authorities. 
As landed villa gers provided most of the foodstuffs to the towns and vil-
lages throughout the Andes, peasants clung to the tributary regime— a small 
burden exchanged for  great local autonomy. Weak states continued to support 
the communities, reinforcing local self- rule and the landholding essential to 
villa gers, regional economies, and state revenues. Local patriarchal democra-
cies continued within villages entrenched in rights long ago granted to them 
as repúblicas de indios.
Spanish American landlords had  little access to capital during the postin de-
pen dence period of weak markets; they could not rely on weak and contested 
states to force  labor or the repayment of advances. So supposedly power ful elites 
pressed  favors and advances to keep men on the job, even guaranteeing credit 
at local shops.48 At and beyond the frontiers, in de pen dent raids by indigenous 
 peoples that Spanish Americans insisted on calling “Indians”— presuming their 
subordination while the latter repeatedly demonstrated their power— brought 
constantly shifting alliances, wars, and trades, and even the payment of tributes 
by Spaniards to Indians. Po liti cal turbulence was everywhere, in national heart-
lands, along frontiers, and beyond. So too was unpre ce dented indigenous in-
de pen dence: in communities denied full citizenship, but guaranteed lands and 
local autonomies; among in de pen dent  peoples who would not recognize that 
they should live as Indians, docile and dependent.
figure 10.1. Indigenous in de pen dence— imagining the threat  after its end
366— Erick Langer
Indigenous In de pen dence in Spanish South Ame rica — 367
Indigenous and Pop u lar In de pen dence across the Amer i cas
Indigenous in de pen dence reached far beyond the Andean highlands and nearby 
lowlands during the de cades  after 1810. In the Mesoamerican regions of central 
and southern Mexico, former indigenous republics lost  legal sanction and faced 
attempts to privatize their lands, yet de cades of national commercial trou bles and 
po liti cal instability allowed many communities to consolidate control of produc-
tion for sustenance and local markets.49 In the once commercially rich Bajío, a 
de cade of insurgency took down the silver economy and enabled indigenous and 
mixed- race  peoples, long without rights to indigenous republics, to take con-
trol of local production while prejudicing the commercial foundations of the 
nation.50 And beyond the frontiers of a once expansive New Spain, a Coman-
che empire built in a  century of war and trade with Spanish North Ame rica 
used mobile cavalries to mount assertive raids and active trades and emerge as the 
dominant power on the high plains west of the Mississippi from 1810 and 1850.51
Assertions of indigenous in de pen dence  after 1810 are most notable in and 
near the Andes and New Spain, once the core regions of Spain’s American em-
pire. The fall of the empire and the collapse of the silver economies weakened 
regime powers and cut entrepreneurial opportunities, opening spaces in which 
indigenous communities and other popu lar groups pressed claims to in de pen-
dence within struggling new nations. The fall of Spain’s empire and the silver 
economies also undermined the Spanish American nations’ abilities to press 
power beyond their borders, enabling Comanche, Mapuche, and other in de-
pen dent  peoples’ new assertions of power.
Assertions of indigenous and popu lar in de pen dence extended beyond the 
regions once pivotal to the silver economies. In the western highlands of Gua-
temala, Maya communities grounded in indigenous republics and entrenched 
on the land made themselves central to the strug gles that created a Guatemala 
nation separate from the  imagined Central American Federation.52 In lowland 
Yucatán, a region famously beyond the dynamism of New Spain’s silver econ-
omy, communities pressed their interests  after 1821— culminating in a devastat-
ing war for Maya in de pen dence (too long mislabeled a caste war) in the 1840s 
that threatened the capital at Mérida and enabled thousands to live in true in-
de pen dence for de cades.53 Far to the south, in the interior headwaters of the 
Río de la Plata system, Guaraní  peoples long dealing with Jesuit missions ( until 
the 1767 expulsion) in lands contested by Spanish and Portuguese frontiers-
men became the foundation of a Guaraní- speaking Paraguay  after 1810, turning 
inward against participation in Atlantic trade.54
While popu lar assertions of in de pen dence  were most widespread and suc-
cessful across Spain’s former domains, they  were impor tant in the Atlantic slave 
socie ties, too. That former slaves ruled Haiti is often noted as a hemispheric ex-
ception; that ex- slaves  there  shaped the second American nation by taking the 
land for  family production is less often noted and makes Haitian in de pen dence 
less exceptional. Autonomy on the land was a key goal and a widespread real ity 
across the hemi sphere in the age of in de pen dence. And Haitians’ success helped 
inspire parallel risings by slaves seeking their definitions of freedom and in de-
pen dence across Atlantic Ame rica. Near Richmond,  Virginia, the conspiracy 
known as Gabriel’s Rebellion developed in 1800 while the Haitian Revolution 
continued. The plot was revealed to authorities; the conspirators arrested and 
executed— yet the threat alone led national politicians to resolve an emerging 
po liti cal crisis, preserving national unity and the emerging economy of cotton 
and slavery.55 The 1812 Aponte rebellion challenged slavery in Cuba in the year 
the Cádiz Constitution proclaimed liberties for American Spaniards and in-
digenous  peoples too, but not  people of African ancestry.56 Slaves  rose in British 
Demerara in 1823 and in Bahia, Brazil, in 1835.57 Conspiracies rumored and real 
 were everywhere where slavery continued.58 When the United States fell into 
civil war over slavery in 1860, slaves quickly looked to their own interests in a 
conflict they could not control.59 Amid that strug gle, slaves in Dutch Guyana 
 rose against their bondage.60
Many  people of African ancestry bound to  labor as slaves pursued in de-
pen dence across the Amer i cas.  After Haiti, however, they found  little success. 
Did the reconsolidation of slave- based export economies (beyond Haiti)  after 
1800 provide economic resources, sustain state powers, and contain slaves’ as-
sertions? The contrast with the widespread collapse of silver, enduring po liti cal 
instability, and the meaningful turn to indigenous in de pen dence in Spanish 
Ame rica seems clear.
Key exceptions to indigenous in de pen dence during the first half of the 
nineteenth  century confirm that comparative understanding. Where expand-
ing slave- based production for export sustained early commercial prosperity, 
funded po liti cal stability, and drove expansion into interiors to further export 
production, notably in the U.S. South, indigenous  peoples faced war and dis-
placement. Andrew Jackson’s campaigns and the forced removal of the Chero-
kee to Oklahoma are the most famous of the assaults that make the contrast 
clear.61 In Brazil’s south- central interior, indigenous  peoples faced pressures 
culminating in war just before the arrival of the Portuguese court in 1808. 
The contested shift to po liti cal in de pen dence that led to the Brazilian empire 
brought brief times of relief that soon became a contested indigenous in de-
pen dence as coffee plantations worked with slave  labor expanded into natives’ 
homeland.62
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In the making of new countries across the Amer i cas, complexity and di-
vergence were everywhere. Still, revealing patterns emerge: where commercial 
economies strug gled and state- making proved long and contested, indigenous 
 peoples claimed meaningful in de pen dence; where slavery and export prosper-
ity persisted, slaves sought “in de pen dence” on the model of Haiti, yet found 
 little success; where cotton and slavery drove into indigenous lands, slavery ex-
panded and native  peoples faced death and displacement. Only in Haiti did the 
laboring subjects of colonial prosperity claim enduring in de pen dence. They 
inspired many  others— and set fear spreading among  those who still aimed 
to profit from slavery. For their self- liberating efforts, Haitians gained lives of 
autonomous poverty on the land, faced military rulers at home, and lived ex-
cluded from the world of commercial nations— the only world that mattered 
among  those who ruled across the Atlantic and the Amer i cas in the nineteenth 
 century.
While po liti cal visionaries strug gled to create states that would allow po-
liti cal in de pen dence to a few across the Amer i cas, indigenous  peoples, slaves of 
African ancestry, and diverse  others pressed their own visions of in de pen dence. 
For them, access to land, community rights,  family production, and cultural 
autonomy  were often more impor tant than state powers. The latter,  after all, 
 were often mobilized against popu lar groups pressing their versions of in de-
pen dence. During de cades when state building was contested and commercial 
economies strug gled, indigenous and popu lar in de pen dence was a clear goal 
and a widely lived real ity—in Haiti, across Spanish Ame rica, and in continen-
tal interiors never subjected to colonial rule. It rarely survived the expansion 
of export economies and the consolidations of state power that marked the 
Amer i cas  after 1870.
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 After a  century of conflict and transformation the diverse new countries of the 
Amer i cas began to consolidate around 1870. Polities stabilized. The United 
States held together  after the Civil War; Brazil became a republic in 1889; Cuba 
a nation in 1895. The many nations of Spanish Ame rica settled into new bound-
aries and found a new po liti cal calm notable in the shadow of the preceding de-
cades of conflict. Economies accelerated in the entrenched world of industrial 
capitalism. The United States—at least its industrial Northeast— joined in in-
dustrial leadership. The rest of the Amer i cas found new dynamism as commod-
ity exporters: old silver regions turned to new crops and minerals to supply the 
industrial cores; long marginal areas found roles in the global economy; and 
the old Atlantic exporters carried on as they faced the end of slavery.
The mid- nineteenth  century, however, was not without conflicts, contradic-
tions, and new divergences. A series of wars proved pivotal to the end of slavery, 
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the end of indigenous in de pen dence, and the consolidation of states sustained 
by export economies. First and most transforming was the War for North 
Ame rica of 1846–1848. That conflict brought Texas with lands for the expan-
sion of cotton and slavery and California with gold mines that stimulated west-
ern settlement into the republican  union. It left Mexico with half its territorial 
claims, continuing commercial difficulties, po liti cal instability— and enduring 
indigenous autonomies. And it began the demise of Comanche power.1 The 
challenge of incorporating Mexican and indigenous territories into the United 
States reopened the question of the expansion of slavery, leading to the deadly 
civil war of 1860–1865 that ended slavery, preserved the Union, and enabled 
a continental expansion driven by northern industries, commercial farming 
across the Midwest and West (as railroads, barbed wire, and repeating  rifles 
ended Comanche and other indigenous in de pen dence), and mining and graz-
ing across the far West— while a once- dynamic South strug gled to produce cot-
ton without slavery (or rights for ex- slaves).
The end of the U.S. Civil War coincided with the War of the  Triple Alli-
ance (better, the War against Paraguay) of 1864–1870. A Brazilian empire still 
grounded in coffee and slavery allied with Uruguayan and Argentine republics 
rising as suppliers of wool, livestock, and wheat to industrial Britain to attack 
Paraguay— a nation of Guaraní in de pen dence, language, and culture all but 
closed to world trade. Britain backed its allied suppliers in a conflict that de-
stroyed the Guaraní  peoples and their in de pen dence, forcing the interior of 
South Ame rica open to trade.2 While that conflict raged, a multiracial alliance 
in Cuba  rose in 1868 to challenge Spanish rule and slavery in a war that lasted 
a de cade; Spanish rule survived to oversee a pro cess that ended slavery in 1886. 
Cuba began to make sugar without slaves, and soon without Spain, as the war 
of 1895–1898 led to in de pen dence  under U.S. hegemony.3
Meanwhile, in the shadow of the destructive  U.S. Civil War and while 
the Ten Years War challenging slavery continued in Cuba, Brazilian military 
 officers returning from what proved a difficult war against Guaraní Paraguay 
began to question slavery. They resisted ser vice as slave chasers, enabling de-
cades in which northeastern planters facing declining sugar markets sold slaves 
to southern planters expanding coffee production, creating an empire with a 
 free North and a slave South. Slaves increasingly ran away and resisted; north-
ern states and southern cities ended slavery, allowing them to recruit runaways 
(many they had recently sold away) as  free workers. Slavery fell in Brazil in 
1888, followed a year  later by the collapse of the empire that had sustained it.4
As the nineteenth  century approached its end, slavery fi nally ended as a major 
support of export production in the Amer i cas. The fall of slavery coincided with 
the consolidation of republics: in the United States  after 1865, in Brazil  after 
1889, in Cuba from 1895. Yet former slaves faced exclusions everywhere: all the 
former slave socie ties recruited growing numbers of immigrants to sustain 
urban and rural production. As Haitians had faced beginning in 1804, the 
emancipation of slaves led to marginalization of ex- slaves and their descen-
dants.  After a long conflictive era of making new countries, former Atlantic 
slave socie ties found diff er ent roles in the world of industrial capitalism that ex-
panded rapidly  after 1870: Haitians remained committed to  family production 
and excluded from global trades; Brazilians continued to produce increasing 
amounts of coffee, leading world production without slaves; Cubans continued 
to supply U.S. markets with sugar, ruled by U.S. investors who brought prejudices 
against Afro- Cubans and limits to Cuba’s republican in de pen dence.5
The United States, by contrast, soared to continental hegemony  after 1870. 
An urbanizing Northeast saw its industries begin to compete in global markets; 
the South provided cotton raised by ex- slave sharecroppers facing Jim Crow ex-
clusions; farmers across the Mississippi basin and beyond gained mechanized 
ways of production in new markets ruled by power ful rail and commercial 
trusts that provoked populist discontent; and regions taken from Mexico and 
cleared of Comanche and other native  peoples boomed with a mix of mining, 
commercial grazing, and irrigated agriculture as Anglo- American entrepre-
neurs promoted a transformation of the Spanish North American economy by 
mixing Eu ro pean settlers and Mexican workers. The rise of the United States 
to global importance in the world of industrial capitalism came with enduring 
internal contradictions.6
Meanwhile, the core regions of Spanish Ame rica— once home to  great in-
digenous states; then from 1550 to 1810 the center of silver economies pivotal to 
global trades— after 1870 consolidated national republics built on new export 
economies that enabled the subordination of the indigenous  peoples that had 
found unpre ce dented (and often unrecognized) in de pen dence  after 1810. New 
countries became oligarchic republics  shaped by liberal land rules, the triumph 
of export- import flows fueling an industrial capitalism centered along a North 
Atlantic axis, and po liti cal exclusions that kept power and prosperity among 
elite Spanish Americans and immigrant allies who brought capital and ties to 
global markets.
The diverse national outcomes are well known. Peru found wool and guano 
as exports to fund state consolidation and constrain indigenous communities— 
processes furthered when copper from Cerro de Pasco brought added export 
revenues and state powers.7 Bolivia found export revenues in tin in the late 
nineteenth  century— and used them to subordinate assertive Aymara and 
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 others on the eastern frontiers.8 Chile stabilized early, thanks to the earnings 
of feeding gold- rush California and despite an active indigenous frontier to 
the south; it  later flourished with nitrate exports (in large part in coastal zones 
taken from Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884); it consoli-
dated its liberal, oligarchic, export republic with late nineteenth- century cop-
per sales.9 Struggling republics from Colombia and Venezuela through Central 
Ame rica to Guatemala found coffee the way to revenues in world trade; they 
strengthened state powers— and pressed against mixed populations and native 
communities that often faced attacks on lands and demands for  labor that 
brought new subordinations.10
Mexico lived parallel yet diff er ent developments  after 1870: liberals in power 
pressed to privatize indigenous community lands, promote foreign investment, 
and stimulate exports while limiting po liti cal participations. Silver fi nally 
regained the heights of earlier times in the 1870s—as the United States and 
Germany joined Britain on the gold standard, ensuring that the value of silver 
plummeted. Still, politics stabilized while vanilla exports  rose in the 1860s, cof-
fee in the 1880s, henequen (supplying twine to mechanizing agriculture in the 
United States) in the 1890s, and copper and petroleum (supplying U.S. indus-
try) around 1900.11 The diversity of exports made Mexico diff er ent, as did its 
internal industrialization— rare outside the United States in the nineteenth- 
century Amer i cas. Textile industries founded in the 1830s survived and ex-
panded to serve national markets. More notably, Monterrey— long a small 
northeastern town suddenly near the U.S. border  after the war of the 1840s— 
gained capital by facilitating exports of slave- grown Confederate cotton to 
British and northern U.S. mills during the Civil War. It used the capital and 
entrepreneurial skills generated then, and its rise as a rail junction in the 1880s, 
to build textile, beer, glass, and iron industries serving Mexican markets from 
the 1890s— soon joined by Guggenheim- owned smelters pro cessing silver ore 
for export to the United States.12
A glance might suggest that Mexico had emerged from the collapse of silver, 
po liti cal conflicts, indigenous autonomies, international wars, and territorial 
losses to build a republic and an economy set to prosper in the world of indus-
trial capitalism. It was the only American nation outside the United States to 
combine industry and agriculture for local markets and exports, along with 
rising mineral and energy sectors. But Mexican industries came late; they re-
mained constrained to supplying limited national markets. As in most of Span-
ish Ame rica, in Mexico commodity exports drove prosperity that favored a few 
and excluded the many (except as poor producers and poorly paid workers) to 
sustain an oligarchic republic of deepening inequities.
Everywhere in the Amer i cas, the consolidation of nations  shaped by concen-
trating prosperity and widening exclusions came with the promotion among 
the power ful of new theories of racial hierarchy in which  people of Eu ro pean 
ancestry  were proclaimed inherently superior, legitimating the subordination 
and marginalization of all non- Europeans,  whether of indigenous, African, or 
mixed ancestry. Racial exclusions and discriminations might vary from the 
sharp black- white lines drawn in the United States, to the gradations of color 
accepted in Brazil and the Ca rib bean, to the diverse anti- indigenous visions 
that formed across Spanish Ame rica— with greater or lesser openness to mixed 
 peoples. Still, “scientific” exclusions proliferated as republics consolidated in 
the late nineteenth  century.13
By 1900, the old Eu ro pean empires  were gone (except for a few Ca rib bean 
remnants). Slavery too had fi nally vanished in the Amer i cas as a sanctioned 
way of production for profit. Such celebrated triumphs, however, came with 
economies that still profited the few and marginalized the many— whether 
once in de pen dent indigenous  peoples or recently freed slaves. And in the ex-
pansion of socially exclusionary export economies serving an industrial capital-
ism that concentrated production and power in northwestern Eu rope and the 
northeastern United States, the  people of the republics consolidating across 
the Amer i cas shared much with  others around the world.
In the United States, the industries, railroads, mine operators, oil devel-
opers, and the commercial interests that integrated an urbanizing Northeast 
and Midwest with a still agro- pastoral South and West (and western mines) all 
boomed— except in recurrent years of collapse. Sharecroppers descended from 
slaves grew the cotton that sustained northern industries— and faced racial ex-
clusion. Also excluded  were the surviving natives forced into reservations to 
make their lands available for commercial expansion, the Mexicans still pres ent 
or newly arrived who laid tracks, built dams and irrigation systems, worked 
mines, and picked crops. Less excluded but clearly prejudiced  were the many 
farmers, often of Eu ro pean immigrant ancestry, who lived with climate and 
market uncertainties that led to mounting debts while railroads and commodi-
ties traders profited from their produce. Also prejudiced  were the newly ar-
rived immigrants crushed into urban slums or dispersed in mill towns across the 
Northeast, struggling to find work at more than poverty wages while the indus-
tries they sustained drove continental expansion and global trades. Viewed as a 
single nation— the United States was on the rise. Viewed as a continental em-
pire, while industries and cities  rose in the Northeast bringing profit to some, 
prosperity to many, and lives of difficult  labor to too many,  people across the 
rest of the nation faced export economies that concentrated wealth and preju-
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diced producers— freed slaves, Mexicans, Native Americans, and many workers 
and farmers of Eu ro pean ancestry, too. One only need read populist po liti cal 
rhe toric to know that many Euro- Americans living during westward expansion 
believed they faced exploitations around 1900.
While a rising United States prospered from exclusions within and Latin 
American nations forged oligarchic republics grounded in export economies 
and social subordinations, the late nineteenth  century saw a new expansion of 
Eu ro pean empires.  People across Africa and the  Middle East, South and South-
east Asia, faced armies empowered by the same technologies that subordinated 
in de pen dent Amerindians. Made dependent on Eu ro pean rulers, newly colo-
nized regions  were drawn into the same world of industrial capitalism that 
 shaped countries across the Amer i cas. They too supplied commodities to in-
dustrial centers— and bought industrial products. And Eu ro pean imperial rule 
came sanctioned by the same “scientific” racisms that legitimated New World 
exclusions. “Native”  peoples everywhere lost lands, lived exploitations, and faced 
denigration as workers often  imagined as lazy and requiring coercion.14
The second generation Eu ro pean empires of the late nineteenth  century did 
not replicate the early global polities that integrated the first world economy 
 after 1500. The first empires faced slow transport and communications capaci-
ties; their military powers  were limited and easily replicated (note the resistant 
power of New World nomads once they gained  horses and firearms). The result 
was the polycentric first world economy in which Potosí and the Bajío could be 
more impor tant than Madrid or Seville, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro more impor-
tant than Lisbon, Saint Domingue as impor tant as Paris.
The second wave of Eu ro pean empires used new industrial technologies 
of transport and communication and newly deadly weapons to draw a wider 
world of  others into the economy of cap i tal ist concentration: China and South 
Asia, once key industrial regions of the polycentric world economy; an Islamic 
world that had led the world in trade and technology before 1400; African 
kingdoms that engaged in diverse trades before focusing on supplying slaves. 
 After 1870, all but China  were drawn into empires; all including China  were 
pressed to supply commodities and cheap  labor and buy industrial products. 
Cap i tal ists and empire builders everywhere justified their powers and  others’ 
subordination as grounded in “inherent” racial differences.
Latin American republics and African, Islamic, and Asian imperial subjects 
became essential peripheries in the world of concentrated industrial capitalism 
around 1900. Yet that world would not last. And the American republics that 
had emerged from the new countries formed in the conflictive transformations 
of 1750 to 1850 found that, as republics, they faced better chances than many 
recently colonized regions in the new era of national assertion and global trans-
formation that began in 1910.
The challenge to the global industrial capitalism only consolidated  after 
1870 came quickly. Mexico— perhaps the most promising and polarized of the 
Spanish American republics— collapsed in revolution in 1910. In 1914, Britain 
and Germany, industrial powers competing for global hegemony, faced off in 
a deadly  Great War. The United States joined to turn the tide in Britain’s  favor 
while Rus sia exploded in a revolution that challenged capitalism— but not 
industrialization. While victorious Anglo- Americans worked to restore indus-
trial capitalism, Mexico and the Soviet Union began contrasting proj ects of na-
tional development, the former cap i tal ist, the latter socialist. Global industrial 
capitalism collapsed in the Depression of the 1930s, turning the Amer i cas and 
the world  toward a search for “national development.”
 People across the hemi sphere dreamed that the benefits of industrialism, 
long concentrated in Britain, northwestern Eu rope, and the northeastern 
United States, could be brought home to benefit every one.  There  were possi-
bilities in large nations like Mexico, which had a strong industrial start, and in 
Argentina and Brazil, which had limited starts but ample and diverse resources. 
Elsewhere, the dream often proved an illusion. But for de cades, while the in-
dustrial powers faced depression and wars hot and cold, American republics 
turned to promising and sometimes promoting shared welfare among their di-
verse  peoples. In the same era, the  peoples of the second colonial empires  were 
first drawn into their rulers’ wars and then turned to anticolonial campaigns 
that ended imperial rule between 1945 and 1970; they left deep divisions, en-
trenched exclusions, and insurmountable challenges of national development, 
especially if equity was a goal.
Throughout the twentieth  century, Spanish Ame rica’s indigenous  peoples 
pressed rights to fair, prosperous, and often- autonomous inclusion within na-
tions. The Mexican revolution was revolutionary  because villa gers led by Emil-
iano Zapata fought for rights to land and self- rule long grounded in indigenous 
republics and recently lost  under liberal reforms. They lost the war but won the 
land, forcing a new regime claiming to be revolutionary (while seeking national 
cap i tal ist development) to return land to communities.  Later, major agrarian 
reforms occurred in Bolivia in 1953 and in Peru in the late 1960s, giving land 
to rural workers who had labored on the haciendas. The Mexican example, 
however uneven in application and outcomes, became a beacon for indigenous 
 peoples and rural villa gers across the Amer i cas— resonating in movements for 
indigenous rights from Chiapas to Ec ua dor and beyond in the late twentieth 
 century.15
382— Erick Langer and John Tutino
Epilogue — 383
Broad promises of national development with egalitarian inclusions in the 
United States helped movements for African American,  women’s, Mexican 
American, and  others’ rights to flourish in the face of enduring re sis tance during 
de cades of war, depression, war, cold war, and colonial adventures. Parallel move-
ments  rose across the Ca rib bean and in Brazil, too— and in the diverse socie ties 
across the globe that remained divided by racist legacies as they emerged from 
the last colonial empires.
The new countries that emerged from the first colonial empires across the 
Amer i cas lived histories laden with conflict and contradiction, promise and 
challenge. The empires that or ga nized the first global economy from 1500 to 
1810 offered subordinating inclusions to indigenous  peoples who survived the 
disease- driven depopulation that  shaped the sixteenth  century, especially in the 
Spanish domains that forged the silver economies that drove global trades for 
centuries. The same empires forced millions of enslaved Africans to  labor in the 
spaces vacated by that depopulation, especially in Atlantic plantations that sent 
sugar, tobacco, and other goods to Eu rope.
The  century of conflict that took down the first colonial empires across the 
Amer i cas, created new countries, and spurred industrial capitalism led first to 
contested nations and indigenous in de pen dence across Spanish Ame rica; stron-
ger nations (and an enduring colony) built on expanding slavery in the United 
States, Brazil, and Cuba; and an isolated nation of poverty in revolutionary 
Haiti. Contradictions  were everywhere—as  were promises of liberation and 
openings to autonomy. The global consolidation of industrial capitalism  after 
1870 brought export economies, oligarchic republics, and subordinated (and 
often expropriated) indigenous  peoples across Spanish Ame rica. It brought the 
end of slavery in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil— and kept former slaves 
marginal and often excluded. Haitians found  little change or gain. Then the 
turn to national development  after 1910 opened possibilities (always limited 
and often contested) for indigenous communities, excluded racial groups, and 
 women across the hemi sphere and around the world—in times marked by 
global wars and depressions, national revolutions and anticolonial movements. 
 There have been real gains— and obvious limits.
As promises of national development give way a globalization often pre-
sented as a utopian opportunity, centuries of history of conflict and contra-
diction, opportunity and uncertainty— and changing divergences— across the 
Amer i cas and the world suggest that  those seeking just inclusions and shared 
prosperity should keep one eye on the promise and another on the enduring po-
tential for constraints, conflicts, and contradictions. Dynamic cities and growing 
industries now spread across the globe. Yet concentrations of power, production, 
and prosperity mix everywhere with exclusions, poverty, and marginality. Be-
fore 1850, slavery forced millions of Africans to migrate to  labor; now millions 
around the world seek to migrate in search of distant opportunities— while 
power ful states work to limit their mobility. Coercions remain, sometimes forc-
ing  people to  labor, often pressing them to stay home—or in the shadows—
to face marginality. Meanwhile, indigenous  peoples in the Andes, across the 
Amer i cas, and around the world again press for autonomies that might enable 
them to participate with real benefits. Historic challenges persist—in new glo-
balizing formulations of production and power, participation and re sis tance. 
The once new countries of the nineteenth- century Amer i cas face continuing 
challenges— shared by many newer countries across the globe.
Notes
 1 See Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2008), and Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and 
the U.S.­ Mexican War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
 2 On Paraguay and the war, see Thomas Wigham, The Politics of River Trade: Tradi­
tion and Development in the Upper Plata, 1870–1970 (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1991), and E. Bradford Burns, The Poverty of Pro gress: Latin 
Ame rica in the Nineteenth  Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
 3 See Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), and Gillian McGillivray, Blazing 
Cane: Sugar Communities, Class, and State Formation in Cuba, 1868–1959 (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2009).
 4 See Emilia Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Robert Conrad, The Destruction 
of Brazilian Slavery, 1850–1888 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); 
and Robert Brent Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil (Boston: Atheneum, 
1972).
 5 On Cuba and the United States, see Louis Pérez, On Becoming Cuban: Identity, 
Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
 6 See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: Ame rica’s Unfinished Revolution (New York: Harper, 
2002); Monica Prasad, The Land of Too Much: American Abundance and the Paradox 
of Poverty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Michael Kazin, The 
Populist Persuasion: An American History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); 
and Katherine Benton- Cohen, Borderline Americans: Racial Division and  Labor War 
in the Arizona Borderlands (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
 7 See Paul Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in 
Postin de pen dence Peru (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University Press, 1989); Nils Jacob-
sen, Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano, 1780–1930 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993); and Florencia Mallon, The Defense of Community in the 
384— Erick Langer and John Tutino
Epilogue — 385
  Peru’s Central Highlands: Peasant Strug gle and Cap i tal ist Transition, 1860–1940 
(Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University Press, 1983).
 8 See Erick Langer, Economic Change and Rural Re sis tance in Southern Bolivia, 
1880–1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989) and Expecting Pears 
from an Elm Tree; see also Laura Gotkowitz, A Revolution for Our Rights: Indig­
enous Strug gles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880–1952 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2008).
 9 Harold Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886–96 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), and Thomas Klubock, Contested Communities: 
Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile’s El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904–1951 (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
 10 Marco Palacios, Coffee in Colombia: An Economic, Social, and Po liti cal History, 
1850–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); William Roseberry, 
Coffee and Capitalism in the Venezuelan Andes (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1984); and Robert Williams, States and Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of Na­
tional Governments in Central Ame rica (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1994).
 11 On vanilla, Emilio Kourí, A Pueblo Divided: Business, Property, and Community 
in Papantla, Mexico (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); on coffee, 
Heather Fowler Salamini, Working  Women, Entrepreneurs, and the Mexican Revo­
lution: The Coffee Culture of Córdoba, Veracruz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2013); on henequen, Allen Wells and Gilbert Joseph, Summer of Discontent, 
Seasons of Upheaval: Elite Politics and Rural Insurgency in Yucatán, 1876–1915 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); on oil, Jonathan Brown, Oil and 
Revolution in Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
 12 On textiles, Aurora Gomez- Galvariatto, Industry and Revolution: Social and Eco­
nomic Change in the Orizaba Valley, Mexico (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2013); on Monterrey, Rodolfo Fernández, “Revolution and the Industrial 
City: Vio lence and Capitalism in Monterrey, Mexico, 1880–1920” (PhD diss., 
Georgetown University, 2014).
 13 Brooke Larson,  Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the 
Andes, 1810–1910 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Nancy Ste-
pan, The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin Ame rica (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Marisol de la Cadena, Indigenous Mestizos: The Pol­
itics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919–1991 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2000).
 14 C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914 (Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell, 
2003).
 15 See Lynn Stephen, Zapata Lives! Histories and Cultural Politics in Southern Mexico 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), and Waskar Ari, Earth Politics: 
Religion, Decolonization, and Bolivia’s Indigenous Intellectuals (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2014).
This page intentionally left blank
Contributors
alfredo Ávila is Research Professor at the Institute of Historical Research 
at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He is author of En nombre 
de la nación and Para la libertad: Los republicanos en tiempos del imperio, 1821–
23. He is working on a history of early experiments with liberalism in Spanish 
American countries.
roberto breña is Research Professor in the Center for International Stud-
ies of the Colegio de México. His books include El primer liberalismo español 
y los precesos de emancipación de América, 1808–1824 and El imperio de las 
circunstancias: Las independencies hispanoamericanas y la revolución liberal 
española.
sarah chambers is Professor of History at the University of Minnesota, 
Twin Cities. She is author of From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and 
Politics in Arequipa, Peru, 1780–1854 and Families in War and Peace: Chile from 
Colony to Nation. She continues to study  women and gender in the formation 
of American nations.
jordana dym is Professor of History at Skidmore College. She is author of 
From Sovereign Villages to Nation States: City, State, and Federation in Central 
Ame rica, 1759–1839, and coeditor of Politics, Economy, and Society in Bour­
bon Central Ame rica, 1759–1821 and Mapping Latin Ame rica: A Cartographic 
Reader.
carolyn fick serves as Associate Professor of History at Concordia Univer-
sity, Montreal. Her book The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution 
388 — Contributors
from Below opened the recent rethinking of that movement from the perspec-
tive the slaves that took arms to  free themselves and found a black nation.
erick langer is Professor of History and International Affairs at George-
town University. His books include Economic Change and Rural Re sis tance in 
Southern Bolivia, 1880–1930 and Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree: Franciscan 
Missions on the Chiriguano Frontier in the Heart of South Ame rica, 1830–1949.
adam rothman is Professor of History at Georgetown University. He is 
author of Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South 
and Beyond Freedom’s Reach: A Kidnapping in the Twilight of Slavery and is 
currently working on a general history of emancipation in the United States.
david sartorius is Associate Professor of History at the University of 
Mary land, College Park. He is author of Race, Loyalty, and the Ends of Empire 
in Spanish Cuba. He is currently working on politics and sexuality in Cuban 
slave society.
kirsten schultz is Associate Professor of History at Seton Hall Univer-
sity. Her book Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Court 
in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821 is a key study of transatlantic power. She is now 
completing a new analy sis of governance in eighteenth- century Brazil.
john tutino is Professor of History and International Affairs, and Director 
of the Amer i cas Initiative, at Georgetown University. He is author of From In­
surrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Vio lence, 1750–1940 
and Making a New World: Founding Capitalism in the Bajío and Spanish North 
Ame rica.
Abad y Queipo, Manuel, 246
Abascal, José Fernando de, 90, 319, 329, 330
Abasolo, Mariano, 245
Accau, Jean- Jacques, 167
Adams, John, 149–50
Adelman, Jeremy, 4, 186, 192
Age of Revolution, 71–73, 95–98. See also 
Cádiz liberalism; specific wars
Aguilar, Gabriel, 328
Alamán, Lucas, 256–57, 259, 261–62
alcabala. See sales taxes




Alto Douro Com pany, 207
Alvarado, Pedro de, 280
Amaru movements. See Andean rebellions
American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), 8, 11, 
42, 113–14
Amer i cas: challenges and outcomes, 11–19; 
consolidation of, 376; divergence of, 9–10; 
in Eu ro pean empires, 26–27; in de pen dence, 
50–51, 381–82; indigenous adaptation, 3;  
indigenous in de pen dence, 350–69; integrated 
history, 3–10; maps, 34, 54, 75; in world 
economy, 27–33. See also Latin Ame rica; 
Spanish Ame rica; specific countries
ANC. See National Constituent Assembly
Andean rebellions, 319, 323–24, 329–31;  
Aymara movement, 325–27;  Great Rebellion 
in the Southern Andes, 353, 354; Túpac 
Amaru rebellion, 43, 73, 317, 325, 353
Andes: bound aries, 320, 338; confederation, 
332–37, 333; head taxes, 258, 323, 333, 361; in-
de pen dence, 331; indigenous in de pen dence, 
352–69; indigenous  peoples, 17, 59, 330, 334, 
336, 361, 363; juntas, 328–29; map, 319;  
patria, 320, 327, 328–32, 337–38; products, 
322; silver economy, 16, 33–35, 43, 58, 317; 
trade networks, 318, 322–23. See also indig-
enous populations; specific countries
Andrada e Silva, José Bonifacio de, 218
Angulo, José, 330
Antiguo Régimen, 79
Apache  peoples, 238, 364
Apasa, Julián, 326
Apatzingán Constitution (1814), 250
Apodaca, Juan de, 252, 253
Aponte rebellion (1812), 368
Arce, Manuel José, 293
Argentina, 59, 364
Argüelles, Agustín, 85, 245
Arista, Mariano, 263
Arizpe, Miguel Ramos, 245, 256–57, 264
Army of the Three Guarantees, 263
Arredondo, Joaquín, 252
Articles of Confederation, 114
Atlantic export economies, 11, 18, 38–40, 51–55, 
204–5. See also specific products
Austin, Stephen, 264–65
Aycinena, Mariano, 293
Aymara movement. See  under Andean 
rebellions
Aztec  peoples, 234
Bahia, Brazil, 368
Bajío, Mexico: revolution in, 6, 9, 11, 32, 47–48, 
61; as trade center, 5–6, 15, 36, 234, 241, 248, 
367





Baretta, Silvio R. Duncan, 365
Barrundia, José Francisco, 304, 306
Barrundia Zepeda, Juan, 292–93
Basques, 282, 293
Bastidas, Micaela, 324
 Battle of Ayacucho (1824), 91
 Battle of New Orleans (1815), 116
 Battle of San Jacinto (1836), 265
 Battle of the Alamo (1836), 265
Bauer, Arnold, 363
Beckert, Sven, 5, 55
Belgrano, Manuel, 359
Bentham, Jeremy, 179
Bill of Rights, 115
Blackburn, Robin, 3, 4
Black Hawk War (1832), 119
Bolívar, Simón, 17, 51, 168, 192, 318–19, 331, 362
Bolivia, 3, 10, 17, 58, 318–19, 324, 365; agrarian 
reforms, 382; confederation with Peru, 
332–38; exports, 378–79; map, 337
Bourbon dynasty, 85, 236, 237, 241, 251–52, 280, 
282–83, 284, 321, 323
Boxer, Charles, 204
Boyer, Jean- Pierre, 163, 164, 166–67
Bravo, Nicolás, 257–58, 267
Brazil: coffee trade, 9, 14, 54, 182, 201–2, 221, 
368, 377; constitutionalism, 214; as Empire, 
202–3, 210, 223–24;  free trade, 211; in global 
economy, 204–10, 218, 220; gold trade, 
39–40, 42, 205–7; in de pen dence, 8, 13–14, 
54, 201, 211–22; indigenous  labor appropria-
tion, 207–8; indigenous marginalization, 
223, 368; juntas de fazenda, 208; maps, 206, 
217; Portuguese court in, 8–9, 201–2, 220; 
Portuguese monarchy in, 47, 51, 212, 243; as 
Republic, 224; slave trade, 2, 6, 9, 14, 39–40, 
46, 52–54, 182–83, 202, 203, 207, 208–9, 
212, 218–22, 221, 377; sovereignty, 212–17, 
222–24; sugar trade, 38, 40, 52; tobacco 
trade, 204
Britain: on Brazilian in de pen dence, 218, 219; 
industrial revolution, 5, 7, 12, 16, 31–32; 
investment in Mexico, 258–59; world 
economy, domination of, 43–45, 62, 212,  
258
Brown, John, 125
Buenos Aires, 58–59, 87–88, 90, 318, 321, 322
Burnet, David, 265
Bustamente, Anastasio, 260, 261, 262
Bustamente, Carlos María de, 247, 250
Bustamente, José de, 285
Byron, Lord, 77
cacao trade, 40, 289
caciques. See kurakas
Cádiz Constitution (1812), 7, 9, 73, 77, 87; goal 
of, 89; implementation in Spanish Ame rica, 
89–93, 185, 187–91, 192, 213, 247, 248, 249, 
252, 285–86, 290–91, 330–31; intellectual 
sources of, 81–87; Preliminary Discourse, 
85–86
Cádiz liberalism, 11–12, 15, 17, 51, 74–87, 
247–52; Catholicism as sole religion, 80; 
Church reaction to, 81; intellectual sources 
of, 81–87; main protagonists, 78; Spanish 
Ame rica and, 87–98, 285, 288; tenets, 79–80
Calfucará, 364
Calhoun, John, 120–21
California: gold rush, 61–62, 121; as U.S. state, 
269, 377
Calleja, Félix, 246, 249–50, 251
Campomanes, Pedro Rodríiguez, 179
Canada, 112–13
Caracas, 87–88, 90
Carlos III, 81, 83, 282
Carlos IV, 76, 81, 83, 242, 243
Carrera, José Miguel, 359
Carrera, Rafael, 299–300, 301, 303–5, 306
Casáus y Torres, Ramón, 302
Catholicism, 80, 81, 235, 257
 cattle trade, 364
Cherokee Constitution (1827), 119
Chiapas, 286, 288–89
Chile, 17, 58, 92, 319, 336, 379
China: demand for silver, 42–43, 44–45, 48, 
234, 317; demise of, 10; as economic power, 
5, 25, 381; opium trade, 48–49; porcelain 
trade, 25; silk trade, 25; trade routes, 29, 31
cholera epidemic, 265–66, 299
Choque, Tadeo, 363
Choquehuanca, José Domingo, 333–34
Christophe, Henri, 146, 156, 159, 160–62
citizenship: of indigenous populations, 79, 89, 
330; to patriot army fighters, 335; of  people 
of African descent, 330; popu lar sovereignty 
and, 167, 288; post- abolition, 147, 153, 158, 
162, 164, 167. See also specific countries
Civil War, U.S. (1861–1864), 2, 10, 12, 14, 62, 
121–29, 128, 269, 368, 377




Code Henry (1811), 160
Code Noir (1685), 143
coffee trade, 161, 165, 169, 297, 379; slavery and, 
6, 9, 180–81, 368, 377
Colombia, 58, 168, 178, 279, 331, 358, 361, 363
Columbus, Christopher, 26
Comanche, 10, 17, 18, 61, 256, 264, 267, 364, 
367, 377
Committees of Correspondence, 112
Communist Manifesto (Marx/Engels), 121
Companhia Geral do Comércio do Grão Pará 
e Maranhão, 207
Compromise of 1850, 121, 125
Condorcanqui, José Gabriel. See Túpac Amaru, 
José Gabriel
Confederate government, 126
Consolidation of Royal Bonds, 242–43
Constitución de la Monarquía Española (1812). 
See Cádiz Constitution (1812)
Constitution of 1791 (France), 81, 83–84
Constitution of Coahuila and Texas (1827), 
264
Continental Congress, 112
copper mining, 30, 335, 378
corregidores, 302, 323, 325–26, 353
Cortés, Hernán, 280
Cortes Gerais, Extraordinárias e Constituintes 
da Nação Portuguesa, 213–16
Cortes of Cádiz, 9, 73–74, 76–77, 88–89, 185, 
245, 330. See also Cádiz liberalism
Costa Rica, 16, 280
cotton trade, 10, 12, 46, 48, 50, 56–57; slavery 
in, 54–55, 109, 123–24. See also textile 
trade
creoles, 118–19, 177, 179, 189, 191, 284, 287, 289, 
290, 328
Crevecoeur, J. Hector St. John de, 111
Croix, Teodoro de, 327
Cruz, José de la, 252
Cuba: Cádiz Constitution in, 187–91; call to 
in de pen dence, 175–76, 177–78, 188, 191–93; 
coffee and slave trade, 180–81; creole elite, 
189; economic expansion, 179–80, 182; 
foreign trade, 183–84; in de pen dence, 377; 
land distribution, 180; as loyal colony, 8, 
13, 176–77, 186–87; map, 178; politics of 
Spanish rule, 185–92, 193–94; slave popula-
tion, 181; slave rebellion, 368; sugar and 
slave trade, 2, 3, 6, 9, 46, 49, 52, 60, 176–77, 
182–83, 183, 184–85
Cumbay, 359
Cuzco, 16–17, 316–17, 319
Dalence, José María, 332
Dávila, Pedrarias, 280
Declaration of In de pen dence (U.S.), 112
Declaration of the Rights and Man and Citi-
zen (France), 143
Demerara, Guyana, 52, 368
Dessalines, Jean- Jacques, 146, 156, 159, 160
Díaz, Porfirio, 271
Diderot, Denis, 179
Directorio que se deve observer nas Povoaçõs dos 
Indio do Pará, e Maranhaõ, 208–10, 223
Directory’s Constitution (France, 1795), 153





Dutch Empire, 39, 41, 204, 368
Dutch Guyana, 368
East India Com pany, 41, 44
Echavarrí, Antonio, 255
Ec ua dor, 58, 279, 362
electoral rights, U.S., 12
Elliott, J. H., 4
Elorza, Antonio, 83
El Salvador, 16, 286, 293
Engels, Friedrich, 121
Escalera, La, conspiracy, 189, 191
Estado da Índia, 204
Estates General (France), 143
Euro- Atlantic Wars (1750–1830), 5
federalism, 117
Fernández de Lizardi, José Joaquín, 247
Fernando VII, 15, 50, 60, 242, 243, 252–53, 258, 
328, 330–31; Cádiz liberalism and, 76, 77, 
78–79, 80, 81, 87–88, 90, 187; dissolution 
of Cortes, 73; reinstallation of, 81, 89, 91; 
support for, 93, 285, 286
Ferrer, Ada, 180–81, 192
Findlay, Ronald, 5, 27, 30, 32
Fischer, Sybille, 157–58
Flores, Cirilo, 289–90, 292–93
forced  labor draft. See mitá
France, 46–47, 74, 113–14, 139, 152, 168, 
242–43. See also Napoleonic wars
Franciscan missions, 354, 358
392 — Index
Frank, Andre Gunder, 27
French constitutional thought, 81, 82, 83–84
French National Convention, 145
French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1815), 8, 
96, 115
Fuente, Alejandro de la, 182, 190
Fuentes Franco, Andrés, 303
Fuentes y Guzmán, Francisco Antonio,  
278–79
Fugitive Slave Clause, 115
Fugitive Slave Law (1850), 125






Gálvez, Mariano, 295, 296–98, 303, 306
Gamarra, Agustín, 329–30, 331, 332, 336
García Paláez, Antonio, 300–301
Garrison, William Lloyd, 124–25
Gazeta de Guatemala (newspaper), 282
Gettysburg Address (1863), 127
Godoy, Manuel, 74, 78, 83, 242, 243
gold standard, 379
gold trade, 26, 27–28, 33, 42, 49; California 
gold rush, 61–62, 121; costs and infrastruc-
ture, 205–7; slavery in, 204–5
Goman, Jean- Baptiste, 163
Gómez Farías, Valentín, 262, 263, 264–65, 266
Gómez Pedraza, Manuel, 260
Goya, Francisco, 74
Goyeneche, José Manuel, 329–30
Granada, Nicaragua, 285
Granados, Luis Fernando, 6
grana trade. See cochineal trade
Gran Colombia, Federation of, 168, 279, 357
 Grand Anse, Haiti, 163
 Great Depression (1929–1939), 62
 Great Rebellion in the Southern Andes 
(1780–1784), 353, 354
 Great Sioux War (1876), 120
Grito de Dolores, 245–46
Grotius, 82
Guanajuato, 36, 37
guano exports, 58, 335, 378
Guaraní  peoples, 59, 367, 377
Guatemala (country), 286; borders, 294, 295, 
296; cochineal trade, 292, 294, 297; coffee 
trade, 297, 306; conservative regime, 301–5; 
continuities and ruptures, 306–7; federa-
tion challenges, 293–95; foreign residents, 
298–99; immigrants, 303; indigenous  
majorities in, 3, 16; indigenous rights, 
291–92; indigo trade, 284–85, 291, 292, 
294, 297; as indivisible, 303–4; literacy, 
302; Livingston Codes, 297; map, 294, 296; 
rebellions, 304–5, 306; sovereignty, 306–7; 
state formation, 290–93, 297, 306; state to 
republic, 300–303; taxation, 299–300
Guatemala (Kingdom), 10, 15–16, 60, 278, 286; 
citizenship, 286, 287–88; divided districts 
in, 279–84, 283, 286, 288; in de pen dence, 
cusp of, 284–88; in de pen dence, fissures of, 
288–90; indigenous rights, 287; map, 283
Guatemala City, Guatemala, 280, 281, 282, 285, 
291, 304
Guerra, François- Xavier, 76, 95
Guerrero, Vicente, 244, 251, 252–53, 260–62
Guridi y Alcocer, José Miguel, 245
Gusmão, Alexandre de, 207
Gutiérrez Estrada, José María, 266–67
Habsburg dynasty, 39, 84–85, 204, 280
Haiti, 2, 164; citizenship, 147, 153, 158, 162, 
164, 167; coffee trade, 161, 165, 169; as 
divided, 160–62; freedom in, 146–47; 
in de pen dence, 148–57, 168, 368, 369; land 
distribution, 162–67; map, 166; peasant em-
powerment, 163–67; plantation citizenship, 
147–48; plantation economy, 5, 49, 143, 157, 
163, 168–69; plantation structure, 149–50, 
153–55, 159, 160–61; poverty in, 6; slavery in, 
3, 14; trade relations, 148–49, 155. See also 
Saint Domingue
Haitian Revolution (1791–1804), 4, 8, 11, 
12–13, 45–46, 51–52, 96; background, 
142–45; sugar trade, demise of, 168–69
Hamilton, Alexander, 49, 107–9, 110, 115
Hamnett, Brian, 92
Harpers Ferry Raid (1859), 125
Hartford Convention (1814), 116
Havana, Cuba: British seizure of, 42, 208; 
economic expansion, 179–80, 182, 294; 
shipbuilding, 37
head taxes, 258, 323, 333, 361. See also tribute 
payments
Helg, Aline, 363
Herrarte, José Mariano, 303
Herrera, José Joaquín de, 267
Hidalgo, Miguel, 47–48, 88, 245–46
Index — 393
Hispaniola, 139, 152. See also Haiti; Saint 
Domingue
historic nationalism (nacionalismo histórico), 
81, 84–88
Honduras, 16, 286, 293
House of Braganza, 204
Houston, Samuel, 265
Huachaca, Antonio Abad, 363
Humboldt, Alexander von, 234
imperialism, 8
Inca/Inka  peoples, 30, 33–35, 316–17
India, 5, 11, 41, 42, 44
indigenous populations: appropriation of 
 labor, 207–10; appropriation of land from, 
6, 17, 362; arable land of, 364; citizenship, 
79, 89, 362; colonized vs. uncolonized, 
351; cultural assimilation, 307; diseases 
from Eu rope, 26, 39, 234; displacement of, 
1–2, 119–20; on frontier, in de pen dence of, 
358–59; grassroots democracy, 354; hacienda 
regimes, 362–63; head taxes, 258, 323, 333, 
361; in de pen dence, 17–18, 268, 350–69, 366; 
inversions, 55–63; local politics, 239–40, 
336; marginalization of, 223, 361, 380; post- 
in de pen dence, 359–66; second conquest 
of, 351, 353–56; self- rule, 8, 237, 280–81; 
ste reo typed conceptions of, 354; third 
conquest of, 351; tribute payments, 89, 237, 
246, 254, 284, 287, 318, 323–26, 329, 330–31, 
333–34, 359, 361–62, 369; weak republics 
and, 364–66. See also specific countries; 
specific  peoples
indigo trade, 16, 40, 60, 284–85, 291, 292, 294, 
297
industrial capitalism: consolidation of, 382, 
383; rise of, 3, 4–5, 6, 7, 12, 376; U.S. transi-
tion to, 122–23, 129
Infiesta, Ramón, 185, 186
Inka. See Inca/Inka  peoples
Inquisition, abolition of, 80
intendentes, 353
Iturbide, Agustín de, 51, 60, 252–55, 288
Iturrigaray, José de, 243, 245
Jackson, Andrew, 116, 119
Jamaica, 39
Jefferson, Thomas, 49–50, 115–16, 117, 155–56
Jesuit missions, 38, 208, 367







Juarros, Domingo, 278–79, 281, 282, 285
Juguetillo, El (journal), 247
Junta Americana, 246
Junta Central, 76, 87
Junta de Reformas de Ultramar, 191
Junta Nacional Americana, 248
juntas de fazenda, 208
Katari, Tomás, 326
Katari, Tupaj. See Apasa, Julián
Knight, Franklin, 179
kurakas, 33, 35, 318, 327–28, 329, 353–54, 362
ladinos, 16, 281, 284, 289, 291, 298, 300, 307
Langfur, Hal, 210, 223
Langley, Lester, 3–4
La Parra, Emilio, 83
Larrazábal, Antonio, 300–301
Latin Ame rica: commodity production in, 168; 
impoverishment, 183–84; in de pen dence, 
48, 52, 177, 381–82; indigenous in de pen-
dence, 350–69; military- authoritarian rule 
in, 51; monarchies in, 162. See also Amer i cas; 
specific countries
Laurens, Henry, 112
Leclerc, Charles Victor- Emmanuel, 155, 156
Leo XII, 258
liberalism, Hispanic, 7, 79, 81. See also Cádiz 
liberalism
Lin, Man- Houng, 48
Lincoln, Abraham, 109, 125, 126–28
Livingston Codes, 297
Los Altos, Guatemala, 288, 289, 299, 300, 303, 
304–5, 306
Louisiana, 39, 118–19
Louisiana Purchase (1803), 8, 116, 117–18






Manifesto de los Persas, 93
Mantúfar, Lorenzo, 295
Mapuche  peoples, 364
394 — Index
Maravall, Antonio de, 83
Mariana, Juan de, 81–82
Marichal, Carlos, 47
Markoff, John, 365
Martínez, Juan Antonio, 305
Martínez Marina, Francisco, 84–85
Marure, Alejandro, 295, 303
Marx, Karl, 79–80




Maya  peoples, 15–16, 29, 280–81, 298, 307, 367
Méndez, Cecilia, 363
Mesoamerica, 14, 30, 235, 237, 239
Methuen Treaty (1703), 41, 205
Mexía, Teodoro, 298
Mexican- American War (1846–1848), 266–69, 
377
Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), 4, 9, 382
Mexica  peoples. See Aztec  peoples
Mexico, 2; abolition of slavery, 120, 264; Brit-
ish investment, 258–59; Catholicism of, 257; 
cholera epidemic, 265–66; Church, role of, 
262–63; commodity exports, 379–80; Con-
stitution, 233, 257; constitutional change, 
266; on Cuban in de pen dence, 176, 177–78; 
economic change in, 60–62, 256–61; as 
Federal Republic, 257; in de pen dence, 
90–91, 233, 242–46, 253–54; indigenous 
majorities in, 3; indigenous rights, 383; land 
appropriation, 6; loss of territory, 234; map, 
270; sovereignty, 257, 258; Texas secession, 
10, 12, 15, 61, 120, 261–66, 267, 377; textile 
trade, 267; trade among diverse  peoples, 29. 
See also New Spain
Mexico City, Mexico, 1; role in silver trade, 
36, 237
Mier y Terán, Manuel de, 261, 262
Miki, Yuko, 223
Minas Gerais, 205, 209
mining: in Brazilian economy, 205; collapse of, 
15. See also copper mining; gold trade; silver 
trade; tin mining
mission system, 238, 264, 298; civil society and, 
117, 119; collapse of, 358–59; Franciscan, 354, 
358; funding of, 237; Jesuit, 38, 367
Missouri Compromise, 50
mitá, 33–35, 318, 321, 325, 329, 332, 358
modernity, 181
Montejo  family, 280
Montiel, José Cleto, 287
Morán, José, 255
Morazán, Francisco, 300
Morelos, José María, 246, 248–50, 257–58
Moya, José, 181
mulattoes, 159–60, 163–64, 167, 249, 281, 287
Muñoz del Monte, Francisco, 189
nacionalismo histórico. See historic nationalism 
(nacionalismo histórico)
Napoleon Bonaparte, 153, 155–56
Napoleonic wars, 7, 8–9, 12, 16, 17, 47, 73, 74, 
87, 211, 242–43
National Constituent Assembly (ANC), 289–90
nationalist historicism. See historic nationalism 
(nacionalismo histórico)
native  peoples. See indigenous populations; 
specific populations




Netherlands. See Dutch Empire
New Granada, 92, 356
New Monthly Magazine, 278, 291–92
New Spain, 1, 367; Cádiz Constitution, 
implementation, 247, 248, 249, 252; Cádiz 
liberalism in, 247–56; Declaration of In-
de pen dence, 250; map, 235; monarchy in, 
252–56; politics in, 239–42; rebellion, 88, 
91, 233, 242–46, 253–54; silver economy, 
5–6, 14, 15, 33–38, 233, 234–38, 248, 255–56; 
textile trade, 238, 241; as Viceroyalty, 17, 58, 
59–60, 88, 89–90, 353. See also Mexico
New World. See Amer i cas
Nicaragua, 16, 280, 285
nitrate exports, 17, 58, 319, 379
North, Douglass, 27




Oriente, Guatemala, 284, 288, 298, 300, 305
O’Rourke, Kevin, 5, 27, 30, 32
Ortiz, Fernando, 177, 193
Ortiz, Josefa, 245
Osorno, Francisco, 249




Pardo y Aliaga, Felipe, 336–37
Paredes, Mariano, 305
Parthasarathi, Prasannan, 27, 41, 44
patria, Andean: use of term, 320, 327; visions 
of, 328–32
Pattridge, Blake, 303
Peace of Amiens (1802), 46–47
Pedro I, 14, 51, 203, 213–16, 215, 219–20, 222
Pedro II, 203, 222
Peña, Manuel de la, 269
Peninsular War (1808–1814), 7, 211
Pensador mexicano, El (journal), 247
Perkins, John, 192–93
Pernambucan Revolt (1817), 211
Peru, 3, 10, 17, 58, 319; agrarian reforms, 
382; confederation with Bolivia, 332–38; 
economics and home rule, 320–28; exports, 
378; map, 337; silver trade, 320–21




Piquet peasant rebellion (1844–1847), 167
Plan de Iguala (1821), 8, 253
Plan de Jalapa (1829), 261
Platt, Tristan, 330, 364
Poinsett, Joel, 260
Polk, James, 120, 267–68
Polverel, Étienne, 145, 146–47
Pombal, Marquês de, 207–10, 223
Pomeranz, Kenneth, 5, 27, 28, 109
Pontiac’s War (1763–1766), 110
popu lar liberalism, use of term, 94–95
popu lar sovereignty: citizenship and, 167, 288; 
end of in Guatemala, 305; fear of, 90; in 
Mexican constitution, 257; movements, 9; 
origins of, 4, 7, 11, 13, 85, 91; rise of, 19, 51; 
slavery and, 54–55, 125; universal rights and, 
254; in U.S., 12
porcelain trade, 25
Portuguese Ame rica, 9; constitution, 213–14; 
global economy and, 41, 204–10; map, 
34; Portuguese monarchy in, 47, 51, 212, 
243; slave trade, 39, 46, 207, 208–9, 212; 
sovereignty, 210, 212–14, 216, 223–24; state- 
nation, 224n1. See also Brazil
Potosí, 16–17, 33–35, 316–18, 320–21
Pufendorf, 82
Pumacahua, Mateo García, 329, 330
Puno, Intendancy of, 318
Quebec Act (1774), 112–13
Quechua movement. See Andean rebellions
Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, 284, 285, 287, 
289–90, 291, 293, 299, 304–5, 306
quilombolas, 210, 222–23
Quito insurrection (1765), 73




Red Stick Rebellion (1813–1814), 116
Reeves, René, 300
Reform Wars (1858–1860), 2, 18–19, 270
República dos Palmares, 210
republicanism, 8, 95
Revolutionary War (1775–1783). See American 
Revolutionary War (1775–1783)
rice trade, 40
Rigaud, André, 151, 159
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: as capital, 208, 222, 243; 
Portuguese court in, 8–9, 201–2, 220; Portu-
guese monarchy in, 47, 51, 212, 243
Río de la Plata, Brazil, 58, 90, 92, 207, 217, 
318–19
Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 295
Rivera Paz, Mariano, 300
Rodríguez, Mario, 288
Rosas, Juan Manuel, 364
Rothschild, Emma, 181
Roume, Philippe, 152
Saco, José Antonio, 189–90
Sagra, Ramón de la, 189
Saint Domingue, 1; map, 140; name change to 
Haiti, 157; plantation citizenship, 147–48; 
plantation economy, 5, 49, 143, 157, 163, 
168–69; plantation structure, 149–50, 153–55, 
159, 169; slave trade, 5, 13, 138, 139–42; sugar 
trade, 5, 13, 39, 139–40, 168–69; trade rela-
tions, 148–49, 155
sales taxes, 282, 284, 318, 322, 323, 325–26, 329
Salvucci, Linda, 183
Salvucci, Richard, 183
Sánchez- Mejía, María Luisa, 85
San Martín, José de, 17, 51, 331, 358, 362
Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 177–79, 255, 
260, 261, 262–63, 265, 268–69
Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 316, 319, 329–30, 




School of Salamanca, 81–82
Schwartz, Stuart, 206–7
Seminario Guatemalteco (newspaper), 297
Seminole War (1835–1842), 119–20
Serna, José de la, 319, 331




silk trade, 25, 26, 29
silver trade, 2, 3, 26, 27–28; collapse of, 15, 18, 
48, 62, 234, 236, 248, 255–56; contraband, 
363–64; economic impact of, 5–6, 11, 14, 16, 
33–38, 42, 233, 234–38, 317; politics in, 240; 
rise of, 61, 318; slavery in, 40–41
Skinner, Quentin, 82
slave trade, 2, 3, 5, 10, 182–83, 208–10, 383; abo-
lition of, 120–21, 124, 145, 152–53, 157, 269, 
376, 377–78, 380, 383–84; in coffee produc-
tion, 6, 9; in cotton production, 54–55, 109, 
123–24; in gold production, 204–5; popu lar 
sovereignty and, 12, 54–55, 125; reproduc-
tion and, 140; second slave socie ties, 182; in 
silver production, 40–41; in sugar produc-
tion, 6, 9, 11, 26, 27, 38–41, 124, 139–42, 141, 
176–77. See also specific countries
Slave Trade Clause, 115
Slidell, John, 267–68
Sociedad Abolicionista Española, 191
Sociedad Económica de Amantes del País, 
282, 284
Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, 
179–80
Soles y Rayos de Bolívar, in de pen dence plot 
(1823), 178
Sons of Liberty, 112
Sonthonax, Léger Félicité, 145, 146–47
Sousa Coutinho, Rodrigo de, 208, 210, 211
South Asia: demise of, 10; as economic power, 
25, 381; opium trade, 48; Portuguese trade 
with, 26; textile trade, 25, 31, 44–45; trade 
routes, 29, 31
Southeast Asian spice trade, 25, 29
sovereignty, popu lar. See popu lar sovereignty
Spain, 4, 41, 236; absolutism in, 73, 79, 81, 91, 
94, 250, 251–52; occupation of, 7, 12, 15, 
47, 73, 74; politics of rule, 185–92. See also 
Cádiz liberalism
Spanish Ame rica: Cádiz Constitution, 
implementation, 89–93, 185, 187–91, 192, 
213, 247, 248, 249, 252; fall of empire, 367; 
indigenous in de pen dence, 350–69; map, 
360. See also Amer i cas; Latin Ame rica; 
specific countries
Spanish Enlightenment, 81, 83–84
spice trade, 25, 29
Stevens, Edward, 150, 151
Suárez, Francisco, 81–82
subdelegados, 353
sugar trade, 2, 3; Dutch involvement, 39, 204; 
silver and, 40–41; slavery in, 6, 9, 11, 26, 27, 
38–41, 124, 139–42, 141, 176–77
 Sullivan- González, Douglass, 300–301, 304
Supreme Being, concept of, 157, 172n35
Taino, 157
Taracena, Arturo, 289, 299
taxes. See head taxes; sales taxes; tribute 
payments
Tecumseh, 116
Ten Years’ War (1868–1878), 184–85, 377
Teotihuacan, Mexico, 29
Ternavasio, Marcela, 90
Texas: secession from Mexico, 10, 12, 15, 61, 120, 
261–66, 267; as U.S. state, 269, 377
textile trade, 17, 25, 31, 44–45, 48, 205, 238, 241, 
267, 378. See also cotton trade
Thomas, Robert Paul, 27
Thomism. See neo- Thomism
Thomson, Sinclair, 327
Thupa Amaro, Marcos, 324
tin mining, 378–79
Tiradentes conspiracy (1789), 209
Tiwanaku, 317
tobacco trade, 40, 204, 237
Tocquevile, Alexis de, 119
Toltec  peoples, 29
Tomich, Dale, 182
Tories, 8
Totonicapán, Guatemala, 287–88, 289, 291
Toussaint Lourverture, François- Dominique, 
142, 145, 146, 147–56, 159
trade. See slave trade; specific products
Treaties of Commerce and Navigation (1810), 
212
Treaty of Basel (1795), 152
Treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo (1848), 121
Treaty of Madrid (1750), 207, 223–24
Treaty of Mortefontaine (1800), 155
Treaty of Paris (1783), 42
Treaty of Ryswick (1697), 139
Index — 397
Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777), 117, 155, 207
Treaty of Subsidy (1803), 242
Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), 207
Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 41
tribute payments, 89, 237, 246, 254, 284, 
287, 318, 323–26, 329, 330–31, 333–34, 359, 
361–62, 369. See also head taxes
Trienio Liberal (1820–1823), 89, 90–91
Tristan, Pío, 329–30
Túpac Amaru (Inca ruler), 324
Túpac Amaru, Andrés, 327
Túpac Amaru, Diego Christóbal, 326
Túpac Amaru, José Gabriel, 316, 324–25
Túpac Amaru rebellion (1780), 43, 73, 317, 
325, 353
Ubalde, Juan Manuel, 327–28
Union of the Iberian Crowns (1580–1640), 204
United States of Ame rica: California as state, 
269, 377; colonial population, 110; diver-
gence in, 109; electoral rights, 12; as federal 
 union, 109–16; Louisiana Purchase, 8, 116, 
117–18; maps, 113, 126; Northeast economic 
power, 18; religious diversity, 111; as rising 
empire, 116–21; slavery in southern states, 2, 
6, 46, 54–55, 109, 121–29, 182–83, 368; ter-
ritories, 1–2; Texas as state, 269, 377;  union 
and empire, use of terms, 109, 116–17
universal rights and popu lar sovereignty, 254
Urrea, José, 266
Uruguay, 59, 217, 219
U.S. Constitution: compromises, 114–15; 
Fugitive Slave Clause, 115; Hamilton on, 
107–8; Slave Trade Clause, 115; Thirteenth 
Amendment, 127
U.S.- Mexican War (1846–1848), 120, 121
uti possedetis princi ple, 279
Valle, José Cecilio del, 294, 295
Varela, Féliz, 189
Varela Suanzes, Joaquín, 82
Vattel, 82
Vega, Garcilaso de la, 325
Venegas, Francisco Xavier, 245
Venezuela, 58, 88, 92, 279, 358
Victoria, Guadalupe, 260
Vitoria, Francisco de, 81–82




war capitalism, 5, 6, 55. See also slave trade; 
sugar trade
War for North Ame rica (1846–1848).  
See Mexican- American War (1846–1848)
War of 1812, 8, 12, 116
War of Spanish Succession (1700–1714),  
41





Woodward, Ralph Lee, 299, 300, 304
world economy: Amer i cas in, 27–33; domina-
tion by Britain, 43–45, 62, 212, 258; first 
and second empires and, 381; as polycentric, 
30–31; silver trade in, 33–38
World War I (1914–1918), 62
Xavier- Guerra, François, 7
Zapata, Emiliano, 382
Zavala, Lorenzo de, 260, 261, 265
This page intentionally left blank
